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As a region, the nations of the Pacific face continuing challenges to theireconomic, political, social and cultural survival. Recognising that the
question of regional change — whether to cooperate more closely or not — is
a key item on the agenda of Pacific Islands Forum, this volume makes a timely
and crucial contribution to the debate. Providing excellent arguments about
the implications for more integrated regional governance — and the agendas
behind attempts to push through these reforms, Pacific Futures is essential
reading for those seeking to understand how the region can move forward.
In four sections, these essays address issues of governance, human rights and
custom, law reform, language and culture loss, the potential for a single
currency, labour mobility and development assistance. Written by academics
and professionals from the region and beyond, the arguments are presented
under the uniting theme of sovereignty and the idea of a Pacific community.
Also including reflective contributions by some of the Pacific’s most widely
respected leaders such as Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi, Bishop Jabez
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Foreword
Hon. Tuilaepa Sailele Aiono Malielegaoi 1
At their Special Meeting in Auckland in April 2004, Pacific leaders adopted a far-
reaching vision for the future of the region: 
Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony,
security and economic prosperity, so that all of its people can lead free and worthwhile
lives. We treasure the diversity of the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures,
traditions and religious beliefs are valued, honoured and developed. We seek a Pacific
region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the sustainable management
of its resources, the full observance of democratic values and for its defence and
promotion of human rights. We seek partnerships with our neighbours and beyond to
develop our knowledge, to improve our communications and to ensure a sustainable
economic existence for all.
This vision recognises that the Pacific has moved into a new historical era, which calls
for a reassessment of the approaches we take to the issues that we face. For us, the
immediate post-colonial period, in which the countries of the region gained and shaped
their political independence, is coming to an end. In a rapidly changing world, we need
to find our proper place, a place that will bring real and lasting benefits to our citizens.
The new arrangements we make must offer Pacific solutions to unique Pacific challenges. 
At the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Apia in August 2004, leaders confirmed
their wish that a comprehensive Pacific Plan be developed, an instrument that would
carry forward their vision by developing a deeper level of regional cooperation, which
might lead us to a more effective degree of real integration. Development of the plan is
now under way.
Above all, the leaders want the plan to be practical. We want it to identify, on a
sectoral basis for a start, where the region can, gain the most from sharing its often
limited resources. We want it to identify areas and ways that will produce resource
savings, harmonise processes and align policies. We want it to deliver real benefits to the
people of the Pacific by proposing concrete plans for enhancing economic growth,
sustainable development, good governance and security — the key goals of the forum. 
Regionalism in the Pacific has had its successes. It has been a process without which
the region might well have been considerably worse off. Notwithstanding those successes,
I think we have to admit that our commitment to regionalism has been, at most, partial
and intermittent. It is unsurprising, and natural, that this should be so — in a world of
sovereign states, we shall, in the Pacific as elsewhere, continue to identify our vital inter-
ests in national terms. But what the leaders’ vision is pointing to is that we need to look
much more closely at the extent to which those interests might be sufficiently similar to
be pursued regionally. 
I have emphasised the need for a practical approach to regional cooperation. That is
a sine qua non; without delivery of practical benefits, efforts to cooperate will, quite
rightly, not gain the support they must have. But there are also broader questions raised
by the leaders’ vision, which those concerned for the future of the region need to contem-
plate. Just what is the Pacific region? Are we a genuine combination of like-minded
states, held together by abidingly strong cultural affinities and shared experience in what
is, globally speaking, a unique environment? Or are we, in essence, a historical construct,
flung together by the whims of our colonisers, a region by default? Or are we, in a
mundane, down-to-earth way, a marriage of convenience, a strictly limited commitment
with limited mutual attractions?
What is to be the nature of our relationships with the wider world? How are our
small states going to find a place, one that pays some regard to their views and interests,
in a globalised world? How will we best interact with our neighbours, some of them very
powerful and likely to become more so, on the rim of the Pacific? How do we most effec-
tively interact with those parts of our region that have not achieved independence, the
territories and other entities? And what is the future role vis-a-vis the island states of our
larger, wealthier forum members, New Zealand and Australia? To what extent — and
allowing that their situations are far from identical — will they further develop their roles
as full members of a Pacific community?
All of these questions — and they are only some of those that face us — are much
easier to ask than to answer. But they not only need to be asked, but debated widely and
with originality, by people right across the region. There is a cynical view that there has
been enough talk, that the problems of the Pacific Island countries ‘have been done to
death’. I, like many others, get weary sometimes with what seem to be the endless series of
consultants and other savants who pronounce on us about almost everything. But I am also
very conscious that the Pacific faces a time of rapid change and very serious challenges. We
have to diagnose and understand thosethese changes and challenges as accurately as we can
if we are to have any chance of fashioning adequate responses. To do that, we have to ask
the right questions of the right people — the people of the region themselves.
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I hope that the consultation process, which will be a crucial part of the develop-
ment of the Pacific Plan, will open up these many questions. As I say, we must also be
immediately practical and that is how the task force charged with putting together
proposals for the Pacific Plan has approached its job. So much of what we are really
talking about in this context is about service delivery, a key function for any government,
whatever its size. How can better regional cooperation ensure, at national levels, improved
education and health services, more effective transportation facilities, the opportunity to
develop a commercial enterprise, those very fundamental things on which people base
their aspirations for better lives? And — a very important question — how do we imple-
ment good regional policies? We have, for many years now, been devising strategies and
plans at regional levels, which, on paper, have all the appearance of usefulness.
Implementation at the national level has, I’m sure we would all feel bound to admit, been
patchy. If our commitment to more effective regionalism is to have any meaning, if it is
going to impinge positively on the lives of those who place their trust in us, we will have
to find better means of translating our good intentions into sustained action at the
national level.
That issue of the relationship between our national and regional selves goes also to
the broader matter of sovereignty. We are right to be proud of our national sovereignty, as
all self-respecting states must be. But we also need to know the nature of our sovereignty
and its boundaries. It is a fact that an element of effective sovereignty is transferred from
the State to a larger grouping every time a country signs a treaty or convention, or indeed
joins a regional or international organisation. There are examples of this in our region
already: fisheries is one practical case in point, and the range of governance- and security-
related issues comprehended by, for example, the Pacific Islands Forum Finance
Ministers’ Meetings process and the Biketawa Declaration point us in the same direction.
A globalising world will continue to lead us into a more complex definition of sover-
eignty, one that seems bound to take us further away from the old, classical concept of a
nation-state. We need to look at these developments positively, not just as a threat,
although I readily admit that states of our size face special challenges. Within our region,
we need to begin to explore how and in what areas a real shared sovereignty might benefit
us. Are there new issues and arrangements now facing the Pacific that would be best dealt
with through binding, regional decision-making processes? Again, the answers are not
easily evident, but we must find out.
I hope that this publication will make an important contribution. It should, as — it
contains much that is of interest from some of the leading observers of our region.
I congratulate the Pacific Cooperation Foundation on its initiative and wish them very
well in their efforts to generate wider interest in and understanding of the Pacific region.
1 Prime Minister of Samoa and Pacific Islands Forum Chair 2004–2005.
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Introduction
Michael Powles
THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL CHANGE — whether to cooperate more closely,
even to integrate, or not — has been placed fairly and squarely on the regional agenda by
Pacific Islands Forum leaders. In his foreword to this book, Prime Minister Tuilaepa has
emphasised that new challenges are facing our region as a result of globalisation and
other trends. He argues, and it is clearly the view of forum heads of government, that ‘we
need to explore how and in what areas a real shared sovereignty might benefit us. Are
there new issues and arrangements now facing the Pacific that would be best dealt with
through binding regional decision-making? Again, the answers are not easily evident, but
we must find out.’
This book is sponsored by the Pacific Cooperation Foundation, established in New
Zealand with government and private sector support to promote a greater understanding
of Pacific issues as well as mutually beneficial cooperation. The book’s aim is to help the
debate, which, eventually, will come up with answers to the questions posed by Prime
Minister Tuilaepa and others concerned for the future welfare of Pacific peoples. The
region’s leaders have set a course with their proposed Pacific Plan, but, like the courses set
by the first voyagers into the Pacific, the final landfall is as yet unknown. Discussion
might reveal widespread preference for the option of closer integration, politically as well
as economically, foreshadowed in the pathfinding report of the forum’s Eminent Persons’
Group (EPG) in 2004. Alternatively, there might be a preference for other forms of
regionalism — or for the status quo.
I believe that the course the EPG and forum leaders have set is the right one — that
we in the Pacific must cooperate much more closely, including the gradual pooling of
sovereignty, if we are to make our way successfully in the world — but this volume
pushes no particular line. Rather, it is intended to provide background, social and
cultural as well as economic and political, to some of the issues confronting the peoples
of the region, and then to offer some varying perspectives, indeed differing viewpoints,
on how we might move forward.
Throughout the debate that must now take place if these questions are to be
resolved, it will be crucial that the prime objective is kept at the forefront: the welfare and
interests of the peoples of the Pacific. It will be all too easy for academics and politicians
to discuss aspects of regional cooperation at a level that has little meaning for the peoples
of the region. The EPG, in proposing the vision for the region (quoted in his foreword
by Prime Minister Tuilaepa), was clear on this:
We consider that the Vision, mandate and work plan for the Forum should be clearly
defined and directly relevant to the lives of Pacific people and their daily concerns.
(EPG 2004)
Without widespread support from leaders in government and civil society, this whole
exercise will likely come to be viewed as just a flash in the pan, a waste of time and,
worse, it will encourage the cynics who believe that meaningful regional cooperation is
unattainable. A process of public consultation is now under way and it will be a key
prerequisite to progress along the course that leaders have set for there to be prolonged
and detailed public dialogue, especially with all elements of civil society. 
The questions and issues debated in this book will be among the subjects requiring
public debate.
The book is divided into four parts; the first on Political and Constitutional
Challenges, the second on Social and Economic Challenges, the third on A Developing
Pacific Community and the fourth on Finding Pacific Solutions: Some Pacific Voices
from Across the Generations.
The opening discussion of Part One is of Governance and Constitutional Issues:
Reflections on current problems and future options. John Henderson discusses the
misleading use of alarmist terminology, such as ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states, and the role of
former colonial powers in the region (several of them now major aid donors) in failing to
give most Pacific Island countries a fair go at the time of their independence — in terms
of rational national boundaries and the provision of unmodified Western constitutional
structures. He discusses the problems that arise when donors make their aid conditional
on ‘good’ governance (defined by the donors themselves) and the resentment created
when this is seen as a new wave of colonialism. Henderson emphasises that to be lasting
and effective the political systems that emerge in Oceania will need to be home-grown —
even though this will take time. 
Teresia Teaiwa and Malakai Koloamatangi focus on Democracy and its Prospects in
the Pacific, discussing the fundamental concept of ‘democracy’ and reviewing its manifes-
tations in the Pacific. They, too, highlight the inappropriateness of some Western models
of democracy for Pacific states and, using specific examples from Kiribati and Tonga,
point to the need for renewed focus on indigenous forms of democracy. Lau Asofou So’o
develops the same theme with respect to the specific example of Samoa in Culture and
Governance in a Future Pacific: The case of Samoa. He describes in some depth the
blend between introduced and indigenous notions of governance, which has been
adopted by Samoa, how this works in practice and the challenges it poses. He points to
the success of Samoa politically, as perhaps the most stable island country in the region,
and argues that while adopting a wholly indigenous system of government would pose
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serious problems, the incorporation of indigenous elements into existing systems, in the
way Samoa has with its constitution, could be a sensible way forward for Pacific countries
in the future.
One of the most sensitive and serious challenges in a Pacific context is the tension
between aspects of indigenous culture and universally accepted standards of human
rights. Strict ‘universalists’ argue that cultural norms have to give way to universal
standards whenever conflict appears, while ‘cultural relativists’ contend that, in situations
of conflict between the two, universal standards should be applied in light of cultural
norms. This continues to be a subject for debate in several Pacific countries, including
New Zealand and, of course, Fiji. Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi succinctly argues for the critical
middle ground between these opposing camps in Navigating Passage Between Human
Rights and Culture in Fijian Waters. Continuing the legal theme, Blaise Kuemlangan, in
Law Reform and Development for Nation-Building in the Pacific, describes the impor-
tance of development law as an essential instrument for national development in Pacific
countries, mentioning as examples the national and regional importance of the imple-
mentation nationally of international fisheries instruments, enhancing participatory or
community-based approaches in natural resource management, or legislatively enabling
the use of customary marine tenure in fisheries management. Kuemlangan highlights and
deplores the hibernation or decay of essential law reform agencies in some Pacific
countries and calls for the review and amalgamation of some of the existing institutions.
The book’s second section, on Social and Economic Challenges, begins, appropri-
ately, with language and culture. Any consideration of new or different options for the
Pacific’s future must give close attention to issues of language and culture.
Galumalemana Afeleti Hunkin and Fepuleai Lasei John Mayer discuss in depth issues
relating to Language and Culture Loss in the Pacific. While they paint a fascinating
picture of a region that is home to about one-fifth of the world’s languages, the list of
extinct and endangered Pacific languages is, sadly, growing. Hunkin and Mayer describe
the success of measures in Hawai’i and New Zealand to preserve and promote the
Hawaiian and Maori languages through the Aha Punana Leo and Kohanga Reo ‘language
nest’ programmes and suggest that these endeavours badly need replication throughout
the region if Pacific languages and indeed cultures are not to be devalued: ‘Saving the
languages of the Pacific will require cooperative endeavours on the part of educators,
academicians, politicians, the media, the clergy, and the support of the very superpowers
that have put the Pacific languages on this course of extinction.’
Regional trade policy developments are described by Wadan Narsey in PICTA,
PACER and EPAs: Weaknesses in current trade policies and alternative integration
options. He argues that PICTA (the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement) poses real
challenges for Pacific Island countries, which will be difficult to meet. In his view, they
would be better off to bring obligations in PACER (the Pacific Agreement on Closer
Economic Relations) in relation to Australia and New Zealand into force sooner rather
than later, and thereby create the foundation for a Pacific Economic Community, which
would include island countries and Australia and New Zealand. Looking beyond the
immediate region to the policies pursued by global financial and developmental institu-
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tions, and also by Australia and New Zealand, Claire Slatter describes in Neo-Liberalism
and the Disciplining of Pacific Island States — The Dual Challenges of a Global
Economic Creed and a Changed Geopolitical Order how free market and other neo-
liberal economic policies have effectively been imposed on Pacific Island countries. She
discusses the negative implications of trade liberalisation for Pacific Island countries and
the extent to which ‘neo-liberal analyses of Pacific states and societies continue to influ-
ence the way the Pacific and its future are perceived by donor governments’. She
powerfully disputes the views of Helen Hughes and other Australian academics who view
the Pacific from a neo-liberal perspective, and argues that ‘the aggressive marketing of
neo-liberalism and its core values of individual advancement, private wealth accumula-
tion and open access to resources, strike at the heart of things that have long been
enshrined in law, cultural value systems, and social practice in the Pacific Islands. The
time is long overdue for critical investigation and public debate on the long-term impli-
cations of following a course set by outside navigators whose final destination is not of
our choosing’. 
In A Single Currency for the Pacific Countries? T. K. Jayaraman reviews in detail
the conditions that would need to exist before a single currency would be a viable option
for Pacific Forum countries. He concludes that the present degree of economic union in
the region is insufficient to support the introduction of a single currency at this time.
The chapter is a useful reminder of the careful deliberative approach that is necessary
when calls are made for increased cooperation or integration in particular areas to avoid
premature action that would be counterproductive and harmful to regional cooperation
generally. 
The question of labour mobility, however, is currently higher on the regional
agenda. For political as well as economic and social reasons, the issue of the movement of
people among Pacific Islands Forum countries will need to be faced sooner rather than
later. (It is ironic that most proponents of neo-liberalism include free trade and the free
movement of capital in their prescriptions but somehow overlook the case for the free
movement of labour.) It is therefore welcome, for human at least as much as for
economic reasons, that Satish Chand in Labour Mobility for Sustainable Livelihoods in
Pacific Island States makes the case for the mobility of skilled and unskilled workers
within the region. Complete freedom of movement as exists between Australia and New
Zealand might be some time away. New Zealand already has some experience with
temporary-worker schemes and immigration quotas for entrants from some island
countries and Cook Islanders and Niueans have open access. But if the New Zealand and
Australian proponents of closer cooperation, indeed integration, among forum countries
are to retain credibility, they must soon face the sensitive issue of labour mobility and the
movement of people throughout the region.
Vijay Naidu addresses Development Assistance Challenges. He points out that
Pacific Island countries face unique challenges, including, in one or more countries, trade
dependence on one or two commodities, lack of international competitiveness, human
capital loss, natural hazards and, in addition, a range of ‘man-made’ disasters including
governance problems, lack of accountability and inadequate social services. Naidu
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discusses what has been called the ‘Pacific paradox’ — high development assistance flows
but low or stagnating economic growth — and ways forward. New development
challenges are likely to include the need for increasing buffers against the negative reper-
cussions of free trade and globalisation. He argues the importance of ensuring that
development assistance enhances the decision making processes in recipient countries.
Finally, in this section, Graham Sem in Climate Change and Development in Pacific
Island Countries, describes the enormous challenges climate change issues pose to Pacific
Island governments and also the importance of their developing their own capacity to
respond to these challenges if policies in this area are not to be determined by foreign
interests and international organisations.
The third section, A Developing Pacific Community, looks at regional cooperation
and examines some of the issues and options for the future. The notion of a ‘Pacific
community’ is of course far from new. It has been used for decades to describe, among
other aspects of regionalism, the sense of community that Pacific Island peoples can feel
about each other and, practically, regional cooperative arrangements. The first contribu-
tion here, by Richard Herr, is Pacific Island Regionalism: How firm the foundations for
future cooperation? Any discussion of options for the future must start with an under-
standing of what has been achieved so far. Herr assesses the resilience of the Pacific
Islands’ regional capacity in light of the track record to date. Overall, he concludes that
Pacific Islands regional cooperation ‘stands out as a rare example of apparent success
within the developing economies across the globe’.
But what do we mean by ‘regionalism’ in the Pacific context and what, if any, are
the natural ‘regions’ in the Pacific? Ron Crocombe in Regionalism Above and Below the
Forum: The geographical/culture regions, Asia-Pacific and others argues with character-
istic force that many of the assumptions relating to Pacific regionalism that have been
accepted by policy-makers in Pacific countries might not be appropriate. He discusses the
necessary conditions for effective regionalism and argues that the ‘forum region’ is no
more a natural region than, on a larger scale, a region comprising not only forum
countries but all the dependant Pacific territories, or, on a smaller scale, the ‘culture-area
regions’ of Melanesia, Polynesia or Micronesia, and discusses as well regional relation-
ships involving island countries and the countries of the Pacific Rim. Crocombe argues
that the ‘paradigm shift from West to East’, with Asian countries soon becoming the
main external influences on Pacific countries, will have a major impact on notions of
regionalism. This valuable contribution raises issues and arguments that undoubtedly
need to be debated and weighed. At the end of the day, of course, it is also a considera-
tion that the ‘forum region’, for all its failings, does have a regional structure and an
increasingly strong habit of regional cooperation developed over many decades. The
paradigm shift from West to East is largely a reflection of China’s rapid emergence as a
major power. And that is a development, certainly not an unwelcome one, that the whole
Asia-Pacific region, including Australia and New Zealand, must come to terms with.
Greg Fry, in Whose Oceania? Contending Visions of Community in Pacific
Region-Building, discusses the specific and crucial issue of the role of Australia and New
Zealand in the contending visions of community in the region. He points out that much
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Australian talk of Pacific regionalism is motivated more by perceived national security
interests than by community or humanitarian concerns. While clearly involving
Australian ideas (sometimes prescriptions), support and indeed finance, it is not neces-
sarily intended to include Australia itself. He acknowledges that New Zealand
assumptions might well be different (and to many New Zealanders a Pacific community
so defined that New Zealand was excluded would be unthinkable), and he does note that
the recent Australian Senate report on the Pacific (Senate 2003), unlike the Howard
Government’s stated policies, envisages at least some opening up of Australia to the
Pacific community. 
In the last chapter of this section, Rethinking Sovereignty in the Pacific, Transform
Aqorau explores new ground in developing a convincing argument that traditional
(Western) concepts of sovereignty might no longer be wholly appropriate or helpful in
the modern Pacific. He discusses the history of regional contact and cooperation in the
Pacific before colonial times — what kind of ‘sovereignty’ was enjoyed then? — and
describes the many factors that increasingly make sovereignty much less than absolute.
Moreover, the notion of ‘sovereignty’ to which most Pacific peoples subscribe differs
significantly from traditional Western understanding of the concept. Aqorau goes on to
suggest that the development of a Pacific Plan and deeper and closer collaboration
among forum members could well be the embryonic stages of a move to further circum-
scribe the notion of sovereignty in the Pacific, initially, presumably, through gradually
increasing the pooling of sovereign powers. If it develops, this trend could be a part of the
answer to the different and unique situations of Niue, facing depopulation, Tuvalu and
Kiribati, facing loss of land through ocean-level rise, Tokelau, seeking to manage its
affairs with limited human and other resources, and even the present dependant territo-
ries of France and the United States, several of which are pressing hard for greater
involvement and acceptance in a Pacific community.
The book’s last section, Finding Pacific Solutions: Some Pacific Voices from Across
the Generations, comprises short contributions from a former prime minister, an inter-
national jurist, a leading churchman, a former congressman from Micronesia, on the one
hand, and two young Pacific people, on the other. Each gives a personal perspective on
issues facing the region, now and in the future. 
The title of the last short contribution, There is Hope for the Future, reflects the
underlying sub-theme of the book. Greg Urwin, Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands
Forum, seeking to put the region’s several serious challenges into a broader and more
appropriate context than they are often given, especially by commentators who are not
Pacific Islanders, has described the natural and predictable forces which, two or three
decades after independence, are behind many of the region’s most pressing challenges.
Many of the symptoms of change, often described in alarmist terms by overseas
commentators, can equally be viewed as positive, if sometimes painful, steps on the road
to nation-building as the region reaches the end of its immediate post-colonial phase.
There are problems for sure but, as Urwin says: ‘From where I’m standing, it is, from the
point of view of all those concerned for the Pacific’s future, no bad time to be alive.’
(Urwin 2004.)
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A new course is being set. One observer describes a new revolutionary notion for
the Pacific:
In the twentieth century, the concept of the insular tribe inflated to include the
‘national tribe’, is a revolutionary notion for the Pacific. Now, in the twenty-first
century, in tandem with similar movements in Europe, Africa, the Americas and Asia,
all peoples of the Pacific are beginning to recognise the viability of the ‘regional tribe’
… It will then no longer matter, for example, that Samoa — Western Samoa and
American Samoa — is split in two, not when, at a higher level, all Samoans will in fact
be one again: as equal citizens of a larger federation. (Fischer 2002: 282–3)
There are many uncertainties, but it seems increasingly clear that, to face today’s growing
challenges, Pacific peoples need the strength they can gain from greater cooperation, even
integration. ‘Rethinking sovereignty’ to find truly Pacific solutions might be the key.
Prime Minister Tuilaepa in his foreword speaks of seeking more areas of ‘real shared
sovereignty’. 
Recognition that there are at least the beginnings of a shared sense of identity will
be a crucial first step. We will all remain Tuvaluans or I-kiribati or New Zealanders or
Fijians, but increasingly we will recognise the value of our also being Pacific peoples. The
leading Tongan writer Epeli Hau’ofa has written powerfully of the power of the Pacific as
a unifying force for all Pacific peoples, whatever their cultures or backgrounds: 
Conquerors come, conquerors go, the ocean remains, mother only to her children.
And this mother has a big heart; she adopts anyone who loves her. (Hau’ofa. 1994:
148)
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Part One
POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Governance and Constitutional
Issues: Reflections on current
problems and future options 
John Henderson
THE COUPS IN FIJI and the Solomon Islands in 2000, army mutinies in Papua New
Guinea and Vanuatu, the collapse of the Nauru economy, and widespread political insta-
bility in a number of Pacific Island states have given rise to a new and threatening
vocabulary for discussing Pacific affairs. Concern has been expressed about ‘failing’
Pacific Island states. There have been alarmist predictions about the ‘Africanisation’ of the
‘artificial’ island states. Australia has been portrayed as being under terrorist threat from
an ‘arc of instability’ of states in trouble stretching from Indonesia through Melanesia to
Fiji. Western aid donors share the concerns and have formed a new wave of economist
‘missionaries’, preaching salvation to developing countries through the practice of ‘good
governance’.
This chapter seeks to explore the extent to which challenges posed by Pacific gover-
nance and constitutional issues justify such alarmist language. The differing perspectives
of aid donors and recipients on the nature and origins of the problem will first be
explored before focusing on the governance issue. The ‘artificial’ nature of the post-
colonial states in Melanesia, which have little or no sense of national identity, will then be
considered. The analysis moves on to explore possible solutions, including federal polit-
ical structures and presidential alternatives to the Westminster parliamentary system of
government. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the continued relevance of
traditional political systems.
What is the problem? 
Views on the nature and severity of the governance and constitutional issues and
problems facing Pacific Island states vary widely. From the perspective of the outsiders,
particularly Western aid donors, it is corrupt and inept local elites who have contributed
most to their countries’ political instability and economic problems. The donor states
seek answers to the ‘Pacific paradox’ — why large amounts of aid, which make Oceania
the most aid-rich region in the world on a per capita basis, have achieved such limited
results. Economic growth has been slow, and in some cases negative. In countries where
economic collapse has combined with lawlessness, concern has been raised about ‘failing’
states. The answer, Pacific Island states are asked to believe, lies in the introduction of
good governance, economic reforms, the practice of democratic government and respect
for human rights — and closer regional cooperation.
From a Pacific Island — and particularly Melanesian — perspective, however, there
is ample ‘blame’ to share around, with much of it belonging to the former colonial
powers who are now the major aid donors. This chapter concentrates on two key areas:
the ‘artificial’ nature of many countries’ borders and the ‘inappropriate’ political systems
inherited from the colonial era. This has meant that in the extreme cases — for instance,
the Solomon Islands — there was, from the indigenous perspective, no Pacific nation-
state to ‘fail’. What failed was not the governance of Pacific society (the various clans and
tribes of which had governed themselves successfully without outside help for many
hundreds of years), but the governance creations of the colonial power. The Westminster
parliamentary system, it is argued, has not survived the transplant to the fragmented
societies of Melanesia. Elsewhere in the more cohesive societies of Polynesia and
Micronesia, while there has been greater political stability, the small size and lack of
resources called into question the viability of the micro-states that emerged out of the
colonial era. Furthermore, whatever can be said of the colonial era, it did not provide an
effective training ground for democracy. Power rested firmly in the hands of the colonial
power and was shared only tentatively in the lead up to independence.
The governance issue
Who defines good governance? After all, no one advocates ‘bad’ governance! Does the
political system have to be Western in its democratic form and philosophy to be good?
Are the doctrines of economic rationalism and free trade the only viable options for
economic policy? Or is the attention given to, for instance, corruption simply a conven-
ient way to shift the blame for economic theories — or ‘medicine’ — that did not work
from the ‘doctor’ to the ‘patient’?
The term ‘good governance’ was popularised in the early 1990s by the World Bank
as it sought to promote free market and business-friendly economic reforms in devel-
oping countries. The timing of this initiative is explained by the ending of the Cold War,
and the need for a new rationale for granting aid. (In the ideology-driven Cold War
period, supporting your ‘side’ was reason enough.) Good governance, from the econo-
mist’s perspective, meant small government, achieved by deregulation, privatisation,
cutting the size of the public service, promoting free trade, moving to indirect taxes and
adopting a liberal attitude to investment. It also meant adopting Western forms of
democratic government and adherence to human rights principles focusing on the rights
of the individual.
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More recently, greater emphasis is being given to the political rather than economic
aspects of governance. At the 2000 Pacific Islands Forum in Kiribati, agreement was
reached on the Biketawa Declaration, which defined good governance as the practice of
open, transparent, accountable, participatory, consultative, fair and equitable govern-
ment. Reference was made to the ‘inalienable rights’ of all citizens to participate in the
political process. The need to uphold democratic principles, including the peaceful
transfer of power, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary were also empha-
sised. Indigenous rights, cultural values and the role of civil society were also included.
The list is clearly laudable and uncontroversial and was readily agreed to by all forum
states. Its implementation, however, presents a much more difficult challenge.
The governance literature focuses on four key areas of concern: legitimacy, account-
ability, respect and competence. The way these ideals are pursued differs between
Western and non-Western traditional societies. In Western systems, legitimacy to govern
is established through the ballot box. It is the outcome of the electoral process that
provides the mandate to govern. Periodic free and fair elections are an essential attribute
of a democracy. Accountability — the holding of officials and politicians to account for
their actions and inaction — is the aspect of governance stressed by aid agencies. To
achieve this there must be, to use another governance buzz word, ‘transparency’. Public
exposure provides a check on corruption. 
Respect for human rights and the rule of law is a further key governance require-
ment. A stable and fair legal environment is essential to attract investment. A basic level
of competence, including the ability of the government to carry out core tasks, is the
fourth governance attribute. Improving the effectiveness of the public sector remains
a major area of concern for aid provided by the development banks. 
These four key governance attributes can be achieved in a variety of ways, which
need not be limited just to Western forms. For instance, collective (or village) rights and
obligations are important, along with respect for individual human rights. Legitimacy
and accountability might be achieved through a Western-style majority vote or the delib-
erations of a village council. Ron Crocombe’s definition of democracy in the Pacific
context does not require every adult to have voting rights. He refers to the selection of
leaders ‘by processes appropriate to that context, by those whom they lead’. Crocombe
also includes the requirement for the leadership to be accountable ‘and responsive to the
wishes of the people led’. (Crocombe 1992: 6)
Accountability is a key requirement for traditional as well as modern political
systems. Leaders who fail to meet expectations are subject to removal. Indeed, in earlier
times, the failure of a chief to perform could literally prove fatal! 
The point is that there are a variety of ways governance goals can be met. There is a
need to avoid becoming preoccupied with the formal constitutional forms that charac-
terise Western forms of government. The focus should be on how the process works
in practice. Democracy is not an all-or-nothing process, but is best assessed along
a continuum of being more or less democratic in the various parts of the political process. 
Problems can arise when donors make their aid conditional on good governance.
This creates resentment among developing countries and might be seen to be part of
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a new wave of colonialism. It is clearly not democratic for powerful donor states to insist
that the aid recipient must adopt particular economic policies. That should be for the
local people to decide. Imposing governance provisions in the name of democracy makes
a nonsense of the term. Governance must mean much more than the remaking of the
island states in the image of the major aid donors.
But the reality is that aid-dependent island states have little choice but to accept
governance conditions, although their degree of commitment to implementing the
reforms varies widely. An increasingly attractive option is to ‘look north’ to Asia — where
aid providers such as China do not share Western notions of governance. (But there are
likely to be other expectations, such as an affirmation of the ‘One China’ policy.) 
The governance literature increasingly assumes a link between the two ‘goods’ —
democracy and economic development. What is good for democracy is seen to be good
for economic development and vice versa. On the other hand, the example of Singapore
is cited as evidence that a strong and sometimes undemocratic hand can better promote
economic growth through the adoption of ‘necessary’ but unpopular reforms. 
The experience of the Pacific is mixed. Economic development, where it has
occurred, has not ensured political stability or democratic government. Nor has democ-
racy produced development. Fiji has the strongest economy among the Pacific Island
states, but it also has experienced three of the region’s four coups. Papua New Guinea
has, if anything, the ‘problem’ of an excess of democracy, but despite an abundance of
natural resources, there has been little economic development. One of the reasons for this
is the lack of national cohesion, and the instability this produces, which will be examined
in the next section.
Artificial states
The national boundaries of Pacific Island states drawn up during the colonial era sought
to secure and promote the interests of the European powers. Scant attention was paid to
local culture and identity. The result is that a series of artificial states were created, which,
especially in Melanesia, have contributed to the region’s instability. The ‘imagined
communities’ that developed out of colonial rule in Africa and Asia did not emerge in
Melanesia. (Anderson 1991.)
A further complication was the importation of labour, which, in the case of Fiji for
instance, drastically changed the population mix, and with it the course of politics. At the
time of the first coup in 1987, Indo-Fijians were in the majority. This is no longer the
case, but the political reality remains that if an Indo-Fijian should become Prime
Minister again, a further coup would be likely, as happened in 2000.
At the time of independence, there was little opportunity to change the colonial
boundaries. A rare exception was the case of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Tuvalu, a group
of Polynesian islands, separated from the Micronesian Gilbert Islands, which became the
new state of Kiribati. Elsewhere in Micronesia, Palau and the Marshall Islands were
permitted by the United States to stay out of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM).
In Melanesia, the outcome of establishing states that defied culture is that, after a
quarter of a century, there is little or no sense of national identity. Secession attempts
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have taken place in the Santo rebellion in Vanuatu in 1980, and more seriously in the
Bougainville civil war in the 1990s. A case can be made that had Bougainville’s 1975
unilateral declaration of independence — which preceded Papua New Guinea’s
independence — been recognised, the more than 10,000 deaths resulting from the
decade of civil war could have been avoided. The counterargument is that a successful
secession by Bougainville would have set a precedent that might have triggered the
fragmentation of Papua New Guinea and its Melanesian neighbours. Would this have
mattered? After all, Papua New Guinea’s population is far greater than the rest of the
region put together. Bougainville had the potential to establish a viable state — with a
population of about 200,000, (roughly the size of Samoa), and the considerable wealth
provided by the Panguna copper mine.
The problem of artificial states has not been such a serious political issue in
Polynesia. The hierarchical cultures extended chiefly authority for as far as could be
secured by battle or other means, and to this extent more closely resembled the formation
of Western nations. There is not the same diversity of language or culture, and a greater
readiness to identify nationally as, for instance, ‘Tongan’ or ‘Samoan’. 
Polynesia and Micronesia, however, face other challenges, the origins of which date
back to the colonial era. In a number of cases, remoteness, small size and limited
resources severely restricted prospects for the establishment of economically viable
countries. The relationship between size, democracy and development is far from clear.
The current precarious situation of Nauru and Niue (populations of 10,000 and just
1,400 respectively) highlight the vulnerability of the very small. With populations the
size of a small New Zealand town, they face all the responsibilities of a nation state. Some
manage well. Tuvalu, Cook Islands and Palau (all with populations less than 20,000)
show that small can be viable. Most of the region’s strife and trouble spots have been in
the relatively large (by Pacific standards) and resource-rich states of Melanesia — Papua
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji. Bigger, it seems, might not be better.
Federations
The establishment of federations provides a means for a grouping of small states with
limited resources to link together. In the 1980s, Cook Islands Prime Minister, Sir Tom
Davis, proposed a Polynesian Federation. It was backed by the President of French
Polynesia, Gaston Flosse, and the King of Tonga, who saw himself as leader. There was
also support from some Maori leaders in New Zealand, but the idea lapsed through a
lack of New Zealand Government funding.
Similar calls were made in Melanesia, but the only federation formed between
Pacific Island states took place in Micronesia. In 1986, the Federated States of
Micronesia was established by linking the island states of Chuuk, Pohnpei, Kosrae and
Yap — all previously part of the Congress of Micronesia, which embraced the US Pacific
territories. A number of other former US territories — most notably the Marshall Islands
and Palau — remained outside the new federation. While to date the FSM has stood the
test of time, this has been largely as a result of generous US funding. Without this
economic incentive, the federation would have long ago fragmented into its different
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cultural units. There has been little or no development of a sense of national unity, and
the FSM is hardly an appealing model for other parts of the region.
Federations might be formed within as well as between states as a means of devolving
authority in diverse societies. This has been seen widely as a solution to the problems of
the Solomon Islands. Like Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands has had a provincial
system with power resting ultimately with the central government. A looser federal system
would require power sharing between the states and the national government. Critics of
the federation proposal argue that it would give most of the advantages to the larger states,
while small states would be deprived of resources. Meeting this problem is a challenge in
the framing of Pacific constitutions — to which attention is now turned.
Constitutional issues
All Pacific Island states have written constitutions formulated as part of the independence
process. There was, however, a certain naivety and patronising attitude evident in the
apparent assumption of the departing colonial power that if ‘rules’ of constitutional
government were written down in detailed constitutions (book-length in the case of
Papua New Guinea) they would be followed. The same assumption lives on in the many
regional declarations Pacific states continue to be asked to sign.
New Zealand’s role in the drafting of written constitutions is ironical given New
Zealand’s own experience in following the example of the United Kingdom in not having
a formal written constitution. The New Zealand Parliament remains the highest court,
and, at the end of the day, can act unrestricted by a constitution. There is only limited
scope for judicial review and this relates generally to process, not substance.
Not surprisingly, the Pacific Island constitutions reflected the political structure of
the colonial power. In most of Polynesia and Melanesia, a Westminster form of parlia-
mentary government was established. In Micronesia, there is a greater mixture of political
systems, but the influence of the US presidential system is evident. This provides an
opportunity to compare how the two systems have worked in the Pacific setting.
Given the different cultural and historical settings in which the Westminster system
developed, it is not surprising that difficulties have been experienced in transplanting it
to a Pacific environment. A criticism of the Westminster system is that the formal
division between government and opposition accentuates internal divisions within
society and fosters instability. The confrontational approach clashes with the Pacific ideal
(seldom achieved in practice at the national level) of consensus decision-making. From a
Pacific perspective, the government-opposition split is divisive and wasteful of scarce
resources. It seems strange to be paying a group of politicians to criticise the government.
This accounts for the frequent calls for governments of national unity. It also explains
why micro-states such as Niue and Tuvalu have sought to avoid the divisive tendencies of
political parties and why they operate non-party systems. It seems to make more sense in
small societies for all politicians to pull together for the common good. But politics is by
nature a competitive vocation and political unity is very difficult to achieve in practice.
In Westminster systems political unity is not considered to be a desirable objective
except in emergency situations. This is because it compromises the role of the opposition
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in carrying out its task of keeping the government honest. Power-sharing arrangements,
such as those required by the 1997 Fiji Constitution, work to undermine the
Westminster system. The more the emphasis is on consensus, the less scope there is for
the opposition to hold the government accountable.
A further issue relating to accountability is the short sitting times of many Pacific
parliaments. If a parliament is not sitting — perhaps because the government is seeking
to avoid a vote of no confidence — it cannot be holding the government accountable.
Furthermore, accountability procedures such as parliamentary question time and
committee systems are poorly developed in most Pacific parliaments.
To provide accountability and stability, the Westminster system requires an effective
party system. Indeed, political parties are widely seen as the essential ingredient for devel-
oping and maintaining a modern democratic system. Ideally, in the Westminster system,
there should be two major parties which at different times fill government and opposi-
tion roles.
But the trend in the Pacific, particularly in Melanesia, has been for more and
weaker parties — and with it greater instability. ‘Independents’ now make up the largest
group of candidates in PNG elections. Party allegiance is not determined until after the
election — when support can be secured by the highest bidder. The objective of elected
members of parliament is to join the government rather than hold it accountable.
The experience of Pacific states calls into question one of the few ‘iron laws’ of
political science — that first-past-the-post electoral systems produce stable governments
based on two-party-dominated legislatures. One of the reasons why this does not happen
is that the left-right ideological division that underpins politics in developed democracies
is just not relevant to most Pacific societies. The multi-party coalitions that form the
governments in most Pacific Island states are characteristic of proportional electoral
systems, where small parties might hold a disproportionate influence.
The net result is that Westminster has provided an unstable political system for the
Pacific. Of most concern is the ability of parliaments to bring down governments through
votes of no confidence. In the absence of the backing of stable political parties, a prime
minister must devote considerable time and energy to maintaining a parliamentary majority.
This creates a major diversion from managing the process of government. The need to
reward loyalty and attract new support has a corrupting influence on the political process. 
The presidential alternative
Would a presidential system provide a better form of government than the parliamentary
system for Pacific Island states? Ideally, a presidential model should provide for greater
stability. The president is directly elected by popular vote for a fixed presidential term
and during this time cannot be removed by the legislature except by impeachment.
Accountability is advanced through the separation of powers between the executive, legis-
lature and judiciary. To maintain this separation the president’s cabinet is chosen from
outside the legislature. This potentially gives the president access to the widest possible
range of talent. It is in contrast to the Westminster system, where ministers are drawn
from, and are held accountable to, the legislature. 
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A further advantage of the presidential system is the leadership potential it provides.
A president is well placed to deliver the strong leadership necessary to hold divided
societies together. The requirement to campaign across the country should ideally have a
unifying effect. This contrasts with parliamentary systems where the prime minister
needs the majority support of members of parliament to remain in power, even though
his election to parliament is dependent on local constituent support.
There are disadvantages with the presidential system. With the important exception
of the United States, presidential systems have a poor track record. Research has shown that
presidential forms of government are more than twice as likely as parliamentary systems to
experience military coups. The division of powers in a presidential system can result in
legislative logjams. It also contributes to excessive rigidity and inflexibility. It is, for instance,
difficult to get rid of discredited leaders. On the other hand, the restriction on the number
of terms of office might be wasteful of leadership talent. For example, the highly respected
Ieremia Tabai in Kiribati was not able to seek a further term of government.
There has been only limited experience of presidential systems in the Pacific. Just
Palau and the FSM have executive presidents, although in the case of the FSM, the presi-
dent is chosen by Congress rather than by direct election. An early agreement that the
office of president should rotate around the four states of the federation has broken down. 
Kiribati is an innovative example of a state seeking the best of both worlds. Those
aspiring to be president must first gain election to the legislature, which nominates the presi-
dential candidates. A nationwide poll follows. This blending of political systems has
contributed to the success of Kiribati’s small democracy. It is also noteworthy that the consti-
tution of the autonomous state of Bougainville provides for a directly elected president.
It is interesting to note that parliamentary systems in Oceania function best when
they operate like presidential systems with the focus on the leader. This was the case with
a number of dominating leaders in the decade after their country’s independence,
including Ratu Kamasese Mara in Fiji, Michael Somare in PNG, Walter Lini in Vanuatu,
and Solomon Mamaloni in the Solomon Islands.
Traditional systems
What role, if any, do traditional political systems have in modern Pacific Island govern-
ment? As this question is dealt with in another chapter, the comments here will be brief.
The importance of tradition and culture is stressed in the independence constitutions —
but generally in sections confined to the preamble. The difficult issue of reconciling
traditional and Western democratic systems has been generally avoided. It is also
noteworthy that some ‘traditions’ might have their beginnings not in the deep past, but
relatively recently. (Ewins 1998.)
A number of constitutions make provision for councils of traditional leaders to
advise government on tradition, culture, language and land. These include Fiji’s Great
Council of Chiefs (ironically a product of the colonial era), the House of Ariki in the
Cook Islands, the National Council of Chiefs in Vanuatu, and the Council of Iroij in the
Marshall Islands. But the role of these bodies is limited, and generally does not challenge
the imported Western political structures.
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Samoa is a special case. At the time of independence, the traditional matai system
was given a key role in the political system by restricting franchise and candidature rights
to matai, the heads of families. Ironically, this restriction on Western forms of democracy
was approved by a Western-style referendum held under universal suffrage. A further
referendum held in 1990 introduced universal suffrage, but the restriction on candidates
remains. Supporters of the matai system argue that it enhances rather than detracts from
democracy by holding matai accountable to their extended families. But cases of the
removal of matai for failure to perform their responsibilities are extremely rare.
While Samoa has largely avoided criticism for the undemocratic features of its
constitution, Tonga has come under increased pressure from aid donors to implement
democratic reforms. Tonga was never under colonial rule — which explains why its polit-
ical structure continues to resemble a feudal monarchy. Under the current system, which
dates back to the 1875 constitution, elections cannot change the government, which
effectively remains in the hands of the King. Defenders of the current system argue that,
whatever its democratic faults, it has provided political stability. 
The examples of Tonga and Samoa suggest that the more traditional systems are
also more stable. There is a lesson here for other Pacific states and aid donors. The price
of democratic change, for instance in Tonga, is likely to be a period of instability. But this
should not be a reason for compromising on the need for accountable government. It is
important to ensure that appeals to tradition and culture are not used as a seemingly
respectable shield to prevent the exposure of arbitrary or corrupt rule.
Conclusion
The use of alarmist terminology, such as ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states, tends to convey an
overly bleak outlook for Pacific Island states. It also carries the implication that the ‘fault’
lies with the island states. Political contention, however, has included periods of violence
bordering on anarchy in only a minority of Pacific states, mainly in Melanesia. Most of
the 14 independent and self-governing Pacific Island states are successful democracies.
Compared with many other regions of the world, Oceania, except some parts of
Melanesia, remains relatively peaceful and respectful of human and democratic rights.
Ethnic conflict is likely to continue in Melanesia, but it will be as much a result of
the circumstances left by departing colonial regimes as the failure of local political leader-
ship. Political instability will continue until the colonial borders and imported political
systems are revisited.
There are positive and negative features in the Westminster and presidential
systems, and different combinations will work or fail according to local circumstances.
Looking to the future, there is a need for Pacific states to evolve and ‘own’ their political
systems. Despite the urgings of the governance advocates, when it comes to political
systems there is no ‘one size fits all’. Local settings must be taken into account. It is
wrong for donor states to be overly directive, as they cannot appreciate the importance of
local nuances. For instance, putting the Solomon Islands back the way it was before the
2000 coup is not a solution, no matter how many Australian and other outside police
and administrators try to make it so. To be lasting and effective, the political systems that
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emerge in the Solomon Islands and elsewhere in Oceania will need to be home-grown.
This will take time. But efforts by outsiders to speed the process up are likely to be
counterproductive.1
Notes
1 For an extension of this argument, see John Henderson. 2003. ‘The Future of
Democracy in Melanesia: What role for Outside Powers?’ Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol.
44, No. 3 (2003). pp. 225–40.
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Democracy and 
Its Prospects in the Pacific
Teresia Teaiwa and Malakai Koloamatangi
Introduction
In 2001, East Timor completed its formal transition to independence as Timor-Leste,
after some 30 years of forced integration with Indonesia. In the meantime, groups inside
and in exile from West Papua continue to strive for liberation of their nation. In 2004, a
Coalition for Democracy ended Gaston Flosse’s almost two decades of uninterrupted rule
over French Polynesia: with a two-seat majority in the Legislative Assembly, the Coalition
put Oscar Temaru, of the pro-independence political party Tavini Huiraatira, in the
President’s seat for five months. At the time of writing, a constitutional crisis looms over
the French territory, with Flosse having lured one member of Temaru’s Coalition across
the floor; the dissolution of Parliament and fresh elections are likely. National sovereignty
and electoral freedom are part and parcel of the democratic ideals that have been
enshrined by indigenous rights groups in these Pacific nations. Not least among the
observers who watch such developments with interest are sovereignty and indigenous
rights groups in Aotearoa — among whom there is little consensus about the status of
democracy as a political model for their futures; but the formation of a Maori political
party to contest the 2005 elections is a landmark in the electoral history of New Zealand.1
Alarms have been raised by events in other parts of the Pacific about the steady
fragmentation of multicultural and multi-ethnic nation-states. Armed conflicts erupted
in Fiji and the Solomon Islands in 2000 that involved the destabilisation and usurpation
of power from democratically elected governments, as the culmination of long-standing
tensions and perceived economic and social disparities between ethnic groups. As a
result, many outside observers and some indigenous analysts are questioning the viability
of the nation-state model in the Pacific. 
In the din of such rhetoric, it is easy to overlook the valiant and persistent willing-
ness among Pacific peoples to work for democracy. In this chapter, we strive not to make
this mistake. We consider the prospects for democracy in the Pacific, first by providing
an outline of what democratic theorists consider to be the essential conditions of democ-
racy. We then survey democratic realities in the Pacific, with a view to these conditions.
Finally, we critically recount colonial attempts to democratise indigenous leadership
models. The case of Tonga and Kiribati are discussed here as continuing attempts at
democratisation. They also highlight the fact that indigenous models of democracy
should be examined more closely by political commentators and analysts.
Conditions of democracy
Today, almost the whole ‘civilised’ world is ‘democratic’. As a system of rule it has been
praised and condemned. Democracy, as a way of life and a system of government, in which
the people (the majority of them at any one time) are sovereign, has been conceptualised
and treated differently by different people at different periods of history and for various
reasons. But it is generally accepted that democracy is, in erudite phraseology, a ‘contested’
concept owing to disagreements about what it is (definition), how to recognise it when it
appears (taxonomy), and why one form is better than another; indeed, why it ought to be
institutionalised at all (justification): theorising democracy is difficult, making it doubly
hard to replicate. One of the reasons for this re-examination, as we have indicated, has been
the attempt to import democracy and implant it in non-Western countries.
It is tacitly and generally accepted, at least from a Western standpoint, that there are
certain societal and institutional elements that are crucial to constructing democracy and
these are found in developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United
States, which differentiate them from ‘non-democracies’.2 The absence of these compo-
nents, to put it differently, makes democratisation difficult. Does this mean, then, that
democracy can take root and grow only under some conditions but not under others?
The argument in favour or against this proposition depends to a large extent on the
existence of the following indices of democracy. It is an old idea that the various struc-
tures of society form a logical whole and, in this case, that political democracy is
underpinned by a socioeconomic ethic that is free and equitable. Seymour Martin Lipset
(1959) made the seminal argument that there was a natural and logical connection
between economic development (seen, for example, in the rise of living standards), legit-
imacy (rising living standards convince people of the moral efficacy of government) and
democracy (the result of people’s control of government, which was induced initially in a
two-way relationship by government governing ‘for the people’). It follows, then, that
there is a strong linear relationship between economic development, democracy and
legitimacy. Stable democracies were to be found mainly in Western Europe, where the
conditions put forward by Lipset had reached a high level of development. A cautionary
note that somewhat dampened the eulogising of the Western democratic virtue came
from Robert Dahl, who classified Western democracies as in fact polyarchies, whereby
‘regimes … have been substantially popularized and liberalized … highly inclusive and
extensively open to public contestation’ (Dahl 1971: 65).
In addition to socioeconomic conditions as an essential component, there are also
contributing factors that could be classified as being strictly institutional in nature. There
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ought to be, in the first instance, electoral democracy, where essentially the government is
voted to power by the majority of the people by means of regular and honest elections;
and through an electoral system that does not favour one group of voters over others.
Rather, all individual votes should have equal weight (Sklar 1987: 691-4). Once the
elections are decided, the principle on which the electoral system was established should
be carried through into the process of government formation. This is the ‘majority rule’
tenet, whereby the ‘majority’ in parliament is asked, indeed required if a democratic
government is to be created, to form the government. While in power, all government
action and policy must be truly representative of the collective wish of the electorate
which gives it its legitimacy and source of power. This responsive nature of a truly
democratic government is to be constructed and nurtured by governmental and adminis-
trative accountability, which is in turn created by institutionalising the ‘separation of
powers’ principle. A more meaningful delineation and extension of this principle is the
idea that these separate, but interacting, centres of power would and should check and
balance each other. In the event that the government of the day produces policies or
conducts its affairs in a way that is undemocratic or unrepresentative of the people’s
wishes, there is, at least, the comforting thought that it is likely to be voted out in the
next elections. An opposition party or faction in the parliament, however, would first
oppose such actions by the government.3
The set-up just described, however, does not in itself guarantee political democracy,
no more than does the presence of relatively high levels of economic development, if we
take democracy to mean what it meant to its Greek creators and subsequent thinkers: the
rule of the people. For what would prevent an undemocratic people from creating an
undemocratic government or political system? Therefore, if political democracy is not to
be created by political means, nor sustained by economic development alone, then surely,
there must be other contributive sources. One of these is an efficiently functional legal
system, usually referred to in connection with political democracy as the ‘rule of law’.
This rule of law provision demands that all other methods of conducting or
regulating state or civil affairs, such as convention, tradition, customary prescription and
the like, are to be subordinate to it. It calls forth the creation and maintenance of legal
norms, which are to be administered and enforced by an independent and impartial
judiciary. The sources of such laws could either be of local manufacture, through the
dictates of a constitution (which is partly a codification of custom) together with parlia-
ment for instance, or an outside source could be utilised, or both, as long as there are no
inherent contradictions between the local and the introduced laws. And, as long as the
laws thereby used ensured and enhanced justice, whatever way that might be made to
mean by those it serves (though it is a given that to create a ‘democratic’ system of justice,
democratic ideals must be its founding principles). Just as the judiciary is impartial, so
too should be the laws and the officers who administer them, the judges. Their impar-
tiality is important if they are to be of any value to political democracy — for an
important part of their endeavours is the supervision of government action, usually
through administrative law, to see that it complies with accepted legal precepts. Implicit
in this depiction is the assumed function of the law: to protect the individual from
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arbitrary government control. In this way, the judiciary is a significant component of the
check-and-balance equation referred to previously. But again, the rule of law does not
necessarily make a democracy unless the laws themselves are created on notions that are
clearly democratic or would inevitably lead to it. For this (the source of democratic laws),
we will have to look elsewhere. The cradle of such an inception is generally regarded to be
culture, or more specifically, those elements of culture that are concerned with such
matters: political culture.
Most writers on the process of democratisation agree on the importance of
constructing a ‘democratic’ culture if democracy is to be created and sustained (Diamond
1993; Almond and Verba 1963, 1989; Pye and Verba 1965). Political culture could be
taken to mean, more or less, a people’s attitudes toward the political system and their
roles within it. One of the classic studies, which dealt with the significance of culture,
underscored the basic establishment of a civic culture. The civic culture was:
[N]either traditional nor modern but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on
communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that
permitted change but moderated it. (Almond and Verba 1963: 6)
A civic culture, in other words, was a mixed culture, where citizens were required to be
active participants in the political process, though they were allowed to maintain some of
their more parochial, subjective attitudes. This would instil in them a moderate, there-
fore tolerant, attitude, which permitted change, but only if justified. Almond and Verba
put it succinctly: ‘The civic culture appears to be particularly appropriate for a
democratic political system’ (1963: 366).
Beyond the civic culture, however, others point to the importance of a mass culture
committed to democratisation if it is to be established. The civic culture with its elitist
connotation, in its birth and perpetuation, is too narrow a base to support democracy. A
mass culture, on the other hand, so they argue, is important for two reasons. One,
because not all of the cataclysmic and durable changes are imposed from above. Some of
the time changes, or rather the pressure for change, can flow from the bottom up. And
two, those who hold and exercise power — the political elites — are not exclusive in their
membership: sometimes, due to social, economic and generational change, they draw
their membership from a wider section of their constituencies (Diamond 1993: 431). 
An intrinsic component of the cultural requisite for democratisation, and one that
makes possible the inference of one from the other, is the idea of democratic personality.
With assistance from psychoanalytical studies, some writers have offered specific ‘frames
of mind’, or ways of thinking, which they consider to be crucial for moulding democrat-
ically thinking and democratically acting individuals. One such conception requires, for
example, that an individual should not possess a rigid and exclusive mind-set, but an
open mind that is tolerant, and indeed expectant, of change (Barbu 1956: 106-17).
Almond and Verba list other ways by which a democrat, or at least an aspiring one,
ought to think and act. He or she will: be in possession of an ‘open ego’ and will have a
‘warm attitude toward other human beings’; have a capacity for sharing values with
others; have a multi-valued rather than a single-valued orientation, thereby becoming
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more tolerant and understanding of other people’s values; have trust and confidence in
the human environment; be free from anxiety.4 What all these personal characteristics
seem to add up to is the idea of accommodation, which is itself an outgrowth of a univer-
sally accepted system of rights and freedoms. Accommodation is most important where
differences occur between individuals. And as conflict more often than not occurs within
a society faced with, or undergoing, the throes of democratisation, accommodating other
people’s differences is all the more important as the basis of any personality or socio-
cultural complex confronted with the inherent uncertainty that democratisation brings.
Democracy in the Pacific
So far we have provided the societal and political elements that thinkers from diverse
backgrounds, in their search for predictability, have deemed as prerequisites for the devel-
opment of liberal democracy. Two qualifying statements are of immediate importance
here. One, theoretically the existence of these conditions does not guarantee successful
democratisation, as democracy can be produced by other processes. And second, these
are ideal constructs that may or may not correspond to reality. However, theorising
democracy allows for conceptual clarification, which we will now compare and contrast
with Pacific realities.
As mentioned earlier, recent political events in Timor-Leste, French Polynesia and
Aotearoa/New Zealand bear testament to the utility of representative democratic systems
for Pacific people’s political goals and modern conceptions of wellbeing. We provide here
a simple inventory of democratic elements of government in Pacific states (see Table 1).
What it reveals is the extent to which former and current colonial powers retain political
influence — even if that influence is largely symbolic. The head of state in French
Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna is the President of France; the head of
state in American Samoa and Guam is the President of the United States of America; and
Queen Elizabeth II functions through her respective representatives as head of state in
the Cook Islands, Niue, Norfolk Island, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Island, Solomon
Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu. As long as there is a sense of autonomy or sovereignty on
the ground or in-country, such ‘remote control’ governance seems not to engender too
much resentment or concern. (Indeed, the sovereignty of Pacific states is more likely to
be constrained by international monetary authorities and trade agencies than by the
former colonial powers per se). And it is through such special relationships with former
colonial masters that emerging nations can function.
The colonial heritage
Colonial powers are often credited with introducing the concept of democracy and its
formal political apparatuses to the Pacific. However, colonial rule by definition could not
be democratic. At its best, colonial rule provided a limited form of political representa-
tion and participation; at its worst, it provided none. In British colonial Fiji, a legislative
assembly provided representation for Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians in the early
20th century, but it was dominated by propertied European citizens. In another colony,
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the Gilbert Islands (now known as Kiribati), the British also attempted to encourage
indigenous participation in governance by setting up an executive council at the national
centre, and advisory councils on each island — this development came in the early 1960s
after more than 50 years of colonial rule. Otherwise, most colonial systems allowed
indigenous participation only insofar as it might enable the maintenance of colonial
power, authority and order — indigenous people could participate as civil servants,
police or local magistrates, but not as legislators. Of course, it could be argued that
colonialism laid more subtle foundations for democracy in the promotion of modern
formal education, monotheistic religion and capitalistic commerce. But while the
strongest rationale for colonisation throughout the Pacific was economic gain and devel-
opment for the colonising power, the region’s history of colonialism and decolonisation
has challenged theories of correspondence between economic development and political
democracy.
Representative government 
All of the 14 developing country members of the Pacific Islands Forum (Cook Islands,
FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, the Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa and Vanuatu) have governments based on some form of
competitive representative electoral system. As a constitutional monarchy, Tonga has the
most limited form of representation, with an unelected cabinet of 12 appointed by the
King, and only nine seats in parliament available for general election (a further nine seats
are filled by elections among 33 hereditary noble titles and estates). With the American
congressional model prevailing in Micronesia or the northern Pacific Islands region, the
British Westminster parliamentary model provides the foundation for most Pacific polit-
ical systems; but some significant variations exist. In Fiji, for instance, an ethnically based
electoral roll and system of parliamentary representation produces a situation of ‘one
person — two votes’, where each voting-aged person must cast two ballots in his or her
constituency — one for a candidate of their registered ethnicity, and one for a candidate
standing in an ‘open’ seat. In Samoa, the region’s oldest independent state since 1962,
universal suffrage was not obtained until 1991 when the vote was extended from only
matai or titled adults to all citizens of 21 years of age. Still, candidacy for 47 of the 49
parliamentary seats is restricted to matai, with two seats reserved for ‘afakasi and ethnic
minorities not affiliated with village-based districts.
Elements of democracy
Commentators have criticised the adversarial methods of modern democratic systems in
the Pacific for a number of reasons. There is a sense that the mana or dignity of heredi-
tary chiefs is sullied when they enter into competitive party politics. Even though
hereditary chiefs, especially in Polynesia, were, at least in the early days of independence,
groomed for modern leadership, there have been significant cases in post-colonial Samoa
and Fiji where constituencies have either petitioned or instructed their chiefs not to run
for public office. 
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The ‘first-past-the-post’ system, also known as ‘winner takes all’ or ‘majority rules’,
is used in most Pacific nation-states despite indigenous cultural traditions of decision-
making by consensus. In 1999, Fiji introduced the alternative vote, a preferential voting
system intended to lead to proportional representation of political parties in parliament.
The failure of this electoral system in achieving a moderate government of national unity
has been documented elsewhere (Fraenkel 2000). 
Perhaps the greatest challenge laid down for democracy and its proponents in the
Pacific is the development of a national constituency interest. As many observers have
noted, there is little ideological depth to political party formation and activity in much of
the Pacific; instead, communal, parochial or provincial interests tend to take precedence
for politicians. Furthermore, the poor representation of women in parliaments across the
Pacific indicates a widespread ambivalence about the purpose and possibilities of repre-
sentative government. In 1999, Fiji peaked with eight women members of parliament;
Kiribati with one woman in a 42-member parliament; and Samoa, Niue and Cook
Islands with two women each in their parliaments. Overall, Guam is at the upper end
with almost one-third representation by women in its 15-member legislature, and at the
other extreme are Vanuatu and Solomon Islands with no women representatives. 
The media are crucial participants in the development of democratic culture in the
Pacific. To the consternation of monarchists in Tonga, Tongan migrants living abroad
seem to be playing an active role in fostering democratic ideals, most notably in Internet
chat forums. The concept of a free press has come under constant attack in the region’s last
remaining monarchy, with the New Zealand-based newspaper Taimi o’ Tonga repeatedly
banned from sale in Tonga in spite of judicial rulings on the illegality of such bans. In spite
of the likelihood of incurring the wrath of their governments, Pacific journalists have been
at the forefront of movements to keep elected representatives accountable: Kalafi Moala of
Taimi o’ Tonga and Sano Malifa of The Samoa Observer have received international recog-
nition for their contributions to media freedom. Successive governments throughout the
Pacific have not hesitated to attempt to limit or censor media coverage.
Pacific realities
It is fair to say that the democracies that are found in the Pacific are not liberal democra-
cies. A democratic political set-up supported by a liberal base is not present in the Pacific,
nor would it be easy to erect one given the conditions present. Civil societies in Pacific
nations lack the civic cultures needed to sustain them as societies are, in places, governed
by other motivations. The Samoan matai kinship system, for example, at times undercuts
state authority and informs other areas of state-society relations (see So’o, 2000).
Confidence in the rule of law has been severely undermined in the Solomon Islands, Fiji
and Papua New Guinea, particularly in the past decade. Geographical barriers to coordi-
nation and administration in nations as vast and widespread as Papua New Guinea and
Kiribati remain significant; but in general, rural and outer-island populations have yet to
experience the full benefits of independence and democracy. As many commentators
have observed, the institutions of democracy have been best exploited by urban, educated
or business elites.
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Serious economic and development constraints exist for Pacific nations: Niue and
Cook Islands, by virtue of their constitutional relationships of free association with New
Zealand, are faced with a shortage of human resources — with more of their people
living in New Zealand than at home (20,000 Niueans in New Zealand and 1,300 or less
living in Niue; 15,000 Cook Islanders at home, 25,000 in New Zealand). Many other
islands lack natural resources and rely heavily on aid and remittances to sustain their
economies. In some cases, cultural traditions compound the problem by inhibiting the
sale of land through group ownership.
Although democratic regimes are present in the Pacific, it is clear that they lack the
socioeconomic base from which to sustain the political structure. For example, Tuvalu is
a model parliamentary democracy according to recent Freedom House surveys, but it is
ranked by the United Nations as a least-developed country, with its very existence threat-
ened by sea-level rise. Despite these harsh realities, it should not be all doom and gloom.
At least, one could say, the institutional rudiments of democracy are present in most
Pacific nations, if not the desire to become fully liberal democracies.
But it is perhaps self-defeating to persist in trying to fit Pacific realities into foreign
models. Instead, what scope is there for Pacific people to strengthen their commitment to
democracy by rediscovering indigenous precedents for modern values and processes? The
Melanesian ‘big man’ system is often described as ‘meritocratic’ and egalitarian in its
emphasis on achieved leadership, whereas Polynesian systems are characterised as hierar-
chical and hereditary leadership. Such broad generalisations do not account for
incidences of hereditary title in parts of Melanesia, and instances of achieved leadership
in parts of Polynesia. Paradoxically, influential literature on contemporary Melanesian
politics suggests that there is unruliness or indiscipline in Melanesian approaches to
democracy — best illustrated in the ‘arc of instability’ literature (see, for example, May
2003). Unfortunately, too much of the literature on Melanesian leadership also ignores
the roles of women in promoting such meritocracy and egalitarianism for nation-
building (see Douglas 2000); and most of the literature on state formation in the colonial
era does little to illuminate the ways that timely attention to, rather than suppression of,
minority interests could have prevented some of the major conflicts of the late 20th and
early 21st centuries. Appropriate revisions of the history could perhaps contribute to a
better understanding of energetic contestations and unexamined alternatives that under-
pinned state formation in the Pacific (see forthcoming PhD theses by Alice Pollard and
Robert Nicole on Solomon Islands and Fiji respectively).
Indigenous dynamics — Tongan and Kiribati examples
We now offer an analysis of Tongan and Kiribati attempts at democratisation. The two
countries are at different stages of development, having had different historical and
cultural experiences with democracy. Although there are some elements that are common
to both, their value lies in their differences as they represent examples of the search for
indigenous variants of democracy.
The contest between reformers (a more embracing term than democracy activists)
and the status quo in Tonga contains within it much of the conventional tension and
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justification for democratic government, and democratisation generally. This includes the
changing fortunes normally expected in such argument. Much of Tongan history before
the formalisation of authority by the 1875 constitution was in fact fluid and accommo-
dated challenges to authority (see, for example, Campbell 1989). This is in spite of the
peaceful, orderly and patriarchal account that is recounted by tradition. Hence, the
democracy versus monarchy duality is a variant of an existing tension. For example, at
the time of writing (November 2004), people were still somewhat aghast by the
announcement that the Government intended to appoint elected members of parliament
— nobles and commoners — to cabinet at the end of the 2005 general election. It was
remarkable for several reasons. No indication was given prior to the announcement that
such a move was afoot. This came on the heels of such (characteristic) intransigent
wielding of power seen earlier in the year when three senior ministers, including Clive
Edwards, the powerful Minister of Police, were forced to resign without opportunity for
defence, supposedly for incompetence. The Prime Minister, who is the monarch’s
youngest son, has stated that this ineptitude resulted in the Government’s loss of some
crucial litigation, which lost it quite a lot of money. Prior to this and, according to some
opinion, partly responsible for the dismissals, the Government again underlined its
unresponsive nature by deciding that Peau Vava’u (which is owned partly by Crown
Prince Tupouto’a) should be given the sole licence to fly the domestic market. Criticisms
arose from the fact that the ‘one-airline’ policy had been devised to allow the
Government-owned Royal Tongan Airlines to monopolise the domestic air route but had
then collapsed, making the continuation of the policy unjustified. The other reason,
which was more emotionally charged, was that the other airline over which Peau Vava’u
had triumphed — Fly Niu Airlines — was co-owned by private commoner businessmen:
making the saga a classic ‘eiki vs tu’a (chief vs commoner) confrontation. Other criticisms
included the fact that the DC3s used by Peau Vava’u were more than 60 years old; the
Fly Niu Dash 8s were newer and therefore safer.5
The catalyst for these latest developments and one that is credited partly with the
dismissal of the three ministers was the series of manoeuvres the Government undertook
that affected media freedom and independence in the kingdom. More importantly, it
affected a Tongan’s fundamental right of free speech as guaranteed by Clause 7 of the
1875 Constitution. The Government had justified its new policy of requiring newspa-
pers to be registered and to follow additional criteria, such as the need for coverage to
respect tradition, as its way of enforcing the right of private citizens to be afforded
privacy, respect and dignity. It argued that newspapers, the critical Taimi ‘o Tonga
especially, had violated people’s rights for too long. There was a need for clear rules to
establish minimum ethical standards. And, to the Government’s credit, there was
certainly a need for this. However, it went about it in a way that seemed to target the
Taimi particularly; for instance, by disallowing registration by publishers who were not
Tongan or even publications partly owned by foreigners, which affected Taimi publisher,
Kalafi Moala, who was an American citizen. Indeed, it allowed the Kele’a, a more radical
broadsheet, to continue because it was Tongan-owned. Moreover, it attempted five times
to challenge the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Government, in this case the Privy
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Council, did not have the power to formulate policy that seemed to contravene Clause 7.
Finally, Parliament successfully adopted the Media Operators’ Act in July 2003, which
limited foreign ownership of newspapers to 20 per cent, thereby effectively outlawing the
Taimi. This victory was further enhanced by amendments to Clause 7 later in the year,
which required licensing of the newspaper industry along stricter lines, but which gave
rise to a rare public demonstration. This was, however, a Pyrrhic victory, as the Taimi and
other ‘foreign-owned’ newspapers are again on sale in the kingdom after a judicial review
of the constitutional amendment.
The Government’s intention to install the new ministers should be seen against this
background. At other times, the Government justifies the maintenance of the status quo
with what it deems necessary to generate economic development. It seems to adhere to
the ‘Asian’ model of partial democratisation while development is targeted through
public sector reform and providing incentives for entrepreneurship in the private sector.
It often points to the free market environment within which Tongan businesses operate
and the equitable laws to facilitate this. The monarch as well as other members of the
royal family pointedly argue that an impoverished democracy is not worth having — and
that it would be better for political democracy to be deferred while standards of living are
improved, providing a more sound foundation for political reform.
The latest government proposals should also be seen within another context. This is
the fact that the announcement, despite some uncertainties, goes some way to satisfying
one of the fundamental concerns that reformers had even before the inception of the pro-
democracy movement, now the Tonga Human Rights and Democracy Movement. We
refer to the enduring call for greater popular participation in government. ‘Akilisi Pohiva,
the acknowledged leader of the democracy movement, and others had begun to make
this demand in 1987 when he was first elected to Parliament. For a long time, the call
was simply to increase the number of commoner members of parliament in order to
achieve some semblance of parity with their general numbers. This has given way
recently to a more comprehensive proposal, which in essence would see all 30 members
of parliament directly elected by the electorate. The monarch would then be free to
choose his ministers from those elected. The idea is that ministers and members would
then be accountable to the people through elections. This is contrary to the present situa-
tion, where ministers are chosen by the monarch unilaterally and they hold their
positions while in his favour. The Government’s intention, of course, falls far short of the
reformers’ proposal and the details are yet to be worked out. It nevertheless offers some
hope for further dialogue and accommodation. 
As it is in Western societies, democracy remains most effective at a local level. In
spite of the heavy patriarchal and androcentric character of indigenous political processes
and structures, Kiribati has perhaps one of the strongest democratic cultures thanks to
the confluence of its indigenous and colonial traditions of governance. Although anthro-
pological orthodoxy holds that much of Kiribati language and culture is derived from
Samoan migrations, it seems that those early migrants were keen to abandon the Samoan
tradition of bestowing chiefly titles and enforcing social hierarchy. As a result, the
southern and most populous atolls of Kiribati do not follow hereditary leadership — an
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ethos exemplified in the name of the largest atoll, Tabiteuea (e tabu te uea — meaning,
‘chiefs are prohibited’). The proponents of chiefly status were banished to the northern
atolls, where they were free to invest ‘kings’, and in some cases ‘queens’, with absolute
authority. Yet, even in the north, local governance was practised as it was in the south
through the forum of the maneaba or meeting house, where every clan and family could
be represented (albeit by a male). This type of localised and family-based face-to-face
democracy provides the foundation for one of the most stable political systems in the
Pacific. At a national level in Kiribati, there is robust political competition and debate at
the same time as there is a reluctance to allow political power to remain entrenched for
too long. The first President of Kiribati, Ieremia Tabai, served three terms, successfully
steering the nation through the first decade of independence, yet he has found it difficult
to re-enter national politics after retiring from the prestigious regional bureaucratic
position of Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Similarly, after
serving two terms as President, Teburoro Tito was re-elected for a third term only to be
ousted when his government’s budget was defeated and fresh elections were held in 2003.
The finely honed vigilance of the I-Kiribati towards tyranny is proving a useful ballast
through the turbulent seas of modern political life. 
The relative stability and coherence of democracy in Kiribati no doubt owes much
to counterveiling economic planning and development. Whereas the type of indigenous
democracy at work historically at the local level is based on a carefully cultivated subsis-
tence economy, modern democracy has been buoyed by a combination of colonial,
post-colonial and neo-colonial legacies. The colonial legacy for Kiribati’s economic devel-
opment was a trust fund accumulated from British profits from the phosphate mining on
the island of Banaba. This fund has provided a cushion and much-needed income from
interest earned on the principal. A crucial post-colonial windfall for Kiribati came in the
form of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which recognised 200-mile exclusive
economic zones for all coastal nations: for Kiribati, this meant that its 811 sq. km of
predominantly arid low-lying coral atoll was expanded into 3,550,000 sq. km, making it
one of the largest nations in the Pacific, with particular claim to valuable fisheries within
its territory. At the same time, Kiribati has maximised its oceanic legacy by also exporting
its human resources —more than 1,300 I-Kiribati men are currently registered as
seafarers working overseas, and remitting close to $A12 million annually (Borovnik
2004). Kiribati has also negotiated strategically with competing aid donors — managing
to reduce its per capita aid dependence in the past decade, as well as diversifying its
sources of aid by reducing its reliance on ‘traditional’ donors such as Australia, and
playing off rival powers China and Taiwan. Although Kiribati, like Tuvalu, remains one
of the Pacific’s least-developed countries, what economic development it does have seems
to adequately support political democracy. Whether there are aspects of Kiribati’s polit-
ical and economic development that might be exported to other Pacific nations remains
to be seen; and indeed, the very idea of importing and exporting models is one we would
hope to question. Clearly, not enough attention has been paid to the potential of indige-
nous and locally grown systems and processes to adapt successfully to modern political
and economic realities. 
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Conclusion
The development of a Western conception of liberal democracy in the Pacific has been
greatly uneven and difficult: democratisation in Kiribati and Tonga exemplifies this
complexity — one is affected, for example, by physical constraints but is nevertheless
sustained by a democratic cultural ethic, while the other faces human-devised obstacles
despite the existence of historical precedents for reform. This means that indigenous
variants are more likely where an accommodation is increasingly sought between local
and foreign models. Indeed, such a fusion can be seen already in, for example, develop-
ments in law, where a conscious effort is made to placate both customary and modern
concerns. We suspect, however, that there are demarcation boundaries that form the
melting points for each Pacific nation, where one side would consist of those ‘universally’
accepted elements of democracy without which systems would be undemocratic, while
the other side would constitute local institutions and norms. Herein lies the future of
Pacific models of democracy, which underscores one of the basic tenets of democratic
government: ‘certain uncertainty’.
The relentless march of globalisation and the intensifying hegemony of multina-
tional corporations and international monetary organisations are making people all over
the world — exemplified in the first few years of this century by demonstrators at World
Trade Organisation meetings in Seattle, Genoa and Doha — demand more and better
representation in and from their nation-states. Indeed, the relationship — fragile as it
might be — between political participation and economic development lying at the heart
of our consideration of democracy and its prospects in the Pacific, might eventually
reveal that participation is not just about prosperity, but has more to do with morality
and a living culture.
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Appendix
Political Systems of the Pacific
Chief of State/
Country System Head of Govt. Voting Comments
American Bicameral Fono — President of USA/ 18 yrs; Members of Senate are elected
Samoa Senate (18), House Governor of American universal from among local chiefs; 
of Representatives Samoa 20/21 in House of Reps from
(21); four-year terms. popular vote; 1/21 appointed
from Swains Island.
Cook Islands Unicameral (25); Queen Elizabeth II/ adult; House of Ariki has purely 
five-year terms. PM of Cook Is. universal advisory role; Queen’s represen-
tative appointed.
Federated Unicameral Elected President is 18 yrs; 14 seats — four from each 
States of Congress. chief of state and head universal state to serve four-year terms, 
Micronesia of govt.  10 from single-member districts
to serve two-year terms.
Fiji Bicameral; President appointed by 21 yrs; Great Council of Chiefs advises
five-year terms. Great Council of Chiefs/ universal, President; 34 Senate seats 
elected PM compulsory appointed by GCC, nine
appointed by Pres., one by
Rotuma Council; 23 House of
Reps seats for Fijians, 19 for
Indo-Fijians, three for ‘others’,
one for Rotuma, 25 open seats.
French Unicameral President of France/ 18 years; One seat in French Senate; 
Polynesia (57 seats); elected President of universal two seats in French National 
five-year terms. Territorial Govt. Assembly.
Guam Unicameral President of USA/ 18 yrs; One non-voting seat in US
Legislature (15); Governor of Guam universal House of Reps; the Guam 
two-year terms. electorate cannot vote in 
US Presidential elections.
Kiribati Unicameral Elected President is chief 18 yrs; 39 elected by popular vote, one
Maneaba ni of state and head of govt. universal attorney-general appointed, 
Maungatabu (42). one representative from Banaba
appointed plus one other.
Marshall Unicameral Elected President is chief 18 yrs; 
Islands Nitijela (33); of state and head of govt. universal
four-year terms.
Nauru Unicameral Elected President is chief 20 yrs; 
Parliament (18); of state and head of govt. universal, 
three-year terms. compulsory.
New Unicameral Territorial President of France/ 18 yrs; New Caledonia also elects two 
Caledonia Congress (54); elected President of universal seats to the French National 
five-year terms. Territorial Congress Assembly.
continued over 
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Political Systems of the Pacific continued
Chief of State/
Country System Head of Govt. Voting Comments
Niue Unicameral Queen Elizabeth II/ 18 yrs; Of 20 seats — 14 village reps 
Legislative elected Premier universal and six from common roll.
Assembly (20); 
three-year terms.
Norfolk Unicameral Queen Elizabeth II/ 18 yrs; Legislative Assembly members 
Island Legislative elected Assembly universal elected by electors with nine 
Assembly (9); President and equal votes each but only four 
three-year terms. Chief Minister votes can be given to any one
candidate.
Palau Bicameral Elected President is chief 18 yrs; Senate — nine seats to serve 
Parliament of state and head of universal four-year terms; House of 
(Olbiil Era Kelulau). government Delegates — 16 seats to serve
four-year terms.
Papua Unicameral Queen Elizabeth II 18 yrs; 89 seats from open electorate, 
New Guinea National through Governor-General/ universal 20 from provincial electorates.
Parliament (109); elected PM
five-year terms.
Pitcairn Unicameral Island Queen Elizabeth II through 18 yrs; Five seats elected by popular 
Island Council (10) Governor/Mayor universal vote and have one-year terms, 
w/ 3 yrs one nominated by five elected 
residency members, two appointed by
Governor including one seat for
Island Secretary, the Island
Mayor, and a Commissioner
liaising between Governor and
Council.
Samoa Unicameral Head of State appointed 21 yrs; 47 seats, village-based electoral
Legislative by Legislative Assembly/ universal districts with only chiefs (matai)
Assembly/Fono elected PM standing for election; two 
(49); five-year terms. elected by independent non-
village affiliated voters.
Solomon Unicameral Queen Elizabeth II through 21 yrs; Single-member constituencies.
Islands National Parliament Governor-General/ universal
(50); four-year terms. elected PM
Timor-Leste Unicameral Elected President/ 17 yrs; First parliament elected in May
National elected PM universal 2002, consists of 88 members
Parliament (min.  on an exceptional basis.
52 seats, max. 65); 
five-year terms.
Tokelau Unicameral General Queen Elizabeth II through 21 yrs; 15 members from each of three
Fono (48); three-year NZ-appointed Island universal islands elected by popular 
terms. Administrator/three-member vote, plus three island village 
Council of Faipule rotates mayors (pulenuku). 
head of govt. duties annually 
continued over 
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Political Systems of the Pacific continued
Chief of State/
Country System Head of Govt. Voting Comments
Tonga Unicameral King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV/ 21 yrs; 12 Cabinet ministers appointed
Legislative Assembly PM appointed by King universal by King; nine nobles appointed
or Fale Alea (30); by 33 nobles; nine elected by 
three-year terms. popular vote.
Tuvalu Unicameral Queen Elizabeth II through 18 yrs; 
Parliament or Fale Governor-General/ universal
I Fono (15); four-year elected PM
terms.
Vanuatu Unicameral Elected President/ 18 yrs; National Council of Chiefs or 
Parliament (52); elected PM universal Malvatamauri advises on
four-year terms. matters of culture and
language.
Wallis and Unicameral President of France through 18 yrs; Three traditional kings with
Futuna Territorial High Administrator/ universal limited powers (who also form 
Assembly President of the Territorial part of the membership of 
Assembly Cabinet along with three others
appointed by the High
Administrator); Wallis and
Futuna elects one member to
the French Senate and one
deputy to the French National
Assembly.
Notes
1 New Zealand occupies a unique position in the history of democratic rule in the
Pacific; and the levels of representation by MPs of Pacific heritage in the past two
parliaments have been notable (four MPs — one National and three Labour in the
Parliament of 1999–2003; three MPs — three Labour in the Parliament of 2003–05.)
2 We would prefer to frame the argument in this way rather than the questionable
manner that is employed by some people of defining democracy by examining what it
is not in order to get at what it is. We do not intend to mask the variety of democracy
by being dismissive of its existence elsewhere: in fact, it is precisely its ‘easy’ kinship
with other forms of rule that makes it attractive to non-Western societies, including
Pacific nations.
3 There is disagreement about the value of such an opposition party, or that of a party
in the process of democratisation. 
4 An important study regarding the connection between a democratic personality and a
democratic culture was A. de Tocqueville, 1956, Democracy in America, New York.
De Tocqueville had argued that the America of the 1830s was a democracy because its
culture and social structure were conducive to democratic government.
5 The King, in his domestic travel, flew with Fly Niu.
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Culture and Governance 
in a Future Pacific: 
The case of Samoa
Lau Asofou So’o
Introduction
This chapter is about governance in Samoan culture. The questions asked are: what is the
nature of Samoa’s governance system? What issues are there in Samoa’s governance system
that need to be addressed in a future Samoa? What lessons can be drawn from Samoa’s
governance experience for a future Pacific?
Broadly defined as the way things are done in Samoa, culture (or fa’asämoa) encom-
passes sociopolitical aspects of Samoan society. The latter makes up Samoa’s governance
system, and, because it revolves around matai (titled people), it is called the fa’amatai or
matai system. Although fa’asämoa and fa’amatai are sometimes used interchangeably in
the literature, the latter refers specifically to leadership, decision-making processes and
practices associated with matai. Therefore, governance in Samoa implies the fa’amatai.
Samoa’s governance system
Matai titles are names that were established at different times throughout history and
range in age from those established back in time immemorial to those created only
recently. Once established, these titles are perpetuated and transmitted through genera-
tions of families. The matai system operates at five levels: the family, village, sub-district,
district and national levels.
Family
A matai heads every Samoan family. Holders of matai titles are elected by members of
their respective families for life. Only rarely, if at all, have holders been stripped of their
titles. Once elected and confirmed as a candidate for a family title, the new titleholder
needs to be formally accepted into the village’s council of matai, the fono.1 This is done in
a title-conferring ceremony called saofa’i. An additional requirement for a title to be
legally conferred is for the first name and title of the titleholder, and of those who
sponsored his election, to be published in the Government newspaper, Sävali. If no
complaint is lodged with the Land and Titles Court against the newly conferred title
within three months, the title is legally confirmed. Only then can the titleholder legally
use the title and claim all the cultural privileges associated with it.
A matai’s responsibilities include representing the family in the fono, settling family
disputes, protecting family interests (such as family lands and titles), upholding and
advancing family prestige and honour, and providing leadership. Therefore, the matai
should be looking after the collective interests of the family and not just his own, those of
his wife and children, his sisters and brothers. This ideal should be expressed in the
allocation of family land for immediate and long-term use by family members, in the
redistribution of goods obtained in the reciprocal process of gift-giving, and so forth. The
ideal is to uphold and perpetuate collective values for the benefit of all family members
vis-a-vis individualistic values. Lessons on respect for one’s elders, upholding mutual
respect between brother and sister, knowing one’s place within the family and position of
responsibilities, respect for the matai and his wife and so forth are initially taught and
learned in the family. Successful achievement of these cultural objectives contributes to
order, peace, security and the wellbeing of family members, which in turn contribute to
order, peace, security and the wellbeing of the village and country generally.
Village
The majority of Samoa’s population of 175,000 live under the traditional authority of
the fono. There are 238 village governments in Samoa.2 Although there are slight varia-
tions in village structures and composition, most have the same features and functions.
The fono governs every village. Like the modern state, the fono performs the
functions of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Its ultimate responsibilities
are the village’s wellbeing and security. A generalised fono structure would consist of
matai numbering between 20 to 60, or even more. All matai titles belong to the two
categories of ali’i and tulafale. Generally, tulafale give traditional speeches on behalf of the
ali’i and perform the general functions of an executive. Ali’i, on the other hand, delib-
erate on important decisions and uphold the prestige and dignity of the village as a
whole. In most cases, they are the village’s genealogical link to the country’s ‘royal’
lineages. In ancient times, when most serious issues of dispute were settled on the battle-
field, it was around the various branches of ‘royal lineages’ that support for war and
candidates for titles of high rank and authority were rallied.
In the context of the modern state, fono are indispensable. It is through village
governments that central government projects are implemented in rural areas. Pulenu’u
(village mayors), elected by their respective fono, are paid a modest salary by the
Government through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They become the intermediaries
between the Government and fono. Village governments are assets to the state. For
example, escaped prison inmates were captured and returned by one village to the
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custody of the Ministry of Police after public appeals to that effect. Moreover, the imple-
mentation of government social service programmes in rural areas depend on the
cooperation of fono. For example, the Government provides salaried teachers for village
schools while villages are responsible for building their own schools. In most villages,
they also provide accommodation, morning tea, lunch and dinner for teachers on a daily
basis. Similarly, the Government provides salaried district hospital doctors and nurses,
medical equipment and medicine, while districts (comprising several villages) provide
hospital buildings and are also responsible for the personal safety and security of doctors
and nurses.
Below the fono are other sub-village organisations comprising the aualuma (daugh-
ters of the village who no longer attend school), taulele’a (sons of the village who no
longer attend school and who are not holders of matai titles), faletua ma tausi (wives of
ali’i and tulafale respectively, that is, wives of matai), and fafine laiti (literally, junior
wives, who are the wives of untitled men residing in the village). Government
programmes that encourage the construction and maintenance of village plantation
roads, among other programmes, are the responsibilities of taulele’a. Government beauti-
fication programmes to encourage village cleanliness and provision of several village
necessities, such as various categories of mats plaited from pandanus and coconut leaves,
are the combined responsibilities of wives of matai and taulele’a, and the aualuma.
Widely acknowledged as the mälosi (strength) of the village, taulele’a uphold and defend
the honour and strength of the village by going to war, if necessary, with any individual
or group of people who might undermine or challenge village honour and authority.
It is also the responsibility of the fono to ensure a sufficient supply of resources for
the village on a daily basis. For example, occasionally, the fono specifies a day on which all
untitled men’s gardens will be inspected. The purpose of the exercise is to make sure that
no village families will run out of food. Likewise, the fono will sometimes put a ban on
the fishing of its lagoon, harvesting of coconuts, hunting of a particular species of bird,
and so forth. Such bans allow time for young coconuts to ripen sufficiently before the
next harvest, for fish to grow bigger before the lagoon is fished again, or for a particular
species of bird to multiply and grow in size before it is harvested again. Thus, such
temporary bans are a way of managing village resources. The fono can also make public
announcements in the media to ban people from other villages fishing its lagoon and
hunting the birds of its land. Again, the aim of the exercise is to preserve and utilise
wisely village resources for the benefit of its residents.
Settling village disputes and ensuring protection from outside threats are among the
most important security responsibilities of the fono. Disputes that cannot be settled at the
family level are brought before the fono, whose responsibility it is to try to solve them by
first examining the cause of the dispute, identifying the people in the wrong, and then
either reprimanding or punishing the culprits. Village punishments can range from cash
fines (given to the village council to be used in various village projects) of any amount
between $ST50 and $ST500, demanding the family of the culprit provide food for the
village, suspending the culprit from participation in village affairs, or expelling the culprit
from the village either for a specified time or indefinitely. The kind of punishment given
Pacific Futures38
and its severity depends on the seriousness of the offence as determined by the fono.
Village protection dictates the formulation and enforcement of policies relating to night-
time curfews, bans on the sale and consumption of liquor, vehicle speeding in the village
and so forth.
Qualification for village protection, secure supply of resources and guarantee of
peace is the rendering of tautua (village service). Such service is given to all traditional
village organisations of which one is a member. For example, if one is a matai, his service
is rendered to the fono; if one is a member of the taulele’a organisation, his service is given
to that organisation, and similarly with villagers who are members of the aualuma,
faletua ma tausi or fafine läiti. Tautua could be in the form of financial contribution,
provision of food for continuing village functions and so forth. Tautua as such in return
for village protection and security could therefore be equated to paying tax in the modern
state in return for all state services for which its citizens are entitled.
Sub-District
Although sub-districts are not as active now as they were in the past, elements of sub-
district governance still exist and are invoked in certain modern contexts, such as when
deciding boundaries for electoral constituencies in the modern state and when
campaigning for parliamentary elections.
A sub-district is a geographical area occupied by people who, before modern times,
acquired an independent identity, although they are still part of the larger unit, which is
the district. A sub-district comprises several village settlements administered separately by
their own fono. More often than not, people who reside in a sub-district can trace their
descent (in terms of matai titles) to a common ancestor, which is the main factor that
unites villages as a sub-district. Additionally, villages in a sub-district have been culturally
allocated certain roles and status in the sub-district hierarchy of titles and associated
responsibilities.
Sub-District L illustrates these points. It consists of five villages. Village I is the
village of orators (tulafale). Its role is to give speeches and to coordinate and administer
the affairs of the sub-district. In inter-sub-district functions, it speaks on behalf of Sub-
District L. Villages II, III, IV and V are occupied by people whose titles’ descent could be
traced to the paramount title of the district. Even though there are also tulafale in
Villages II-V, their primary responsibilities are to their respective fono. Similarly, even
though there are ali’i in Village I, its other traditional role is giving speeches on behalf of
the sub-district, among other sub-district responsibilities.
District
By the time of European contact in the 19th century, Samoa had 11 distinct political
divisions. These political divisions still exist today. Six are on Savai’i, four on Upolu and
one comprises the islands of Manono and Apolima and their extensions on the north-
western coast of Upolu. Every district has established administrative structures and lines
of communication, a capital village and at least one paramount title, which it confers.
The districts of Upolu and their paramount titles are Tui Ä’ana in Ä’ana, Tui Ätua
in Ätua and Mälietoa in the central district of Tuamasaga. Their capital villages are
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Leulumoega, Lufilufi and Afega respectively. Later in history, another district was estab-
lished in Ätua called Va’a-o-Fonoti. The six districts of Savai’i are Fa’asalele’aga (whose
capital is Säfotuläfai), Gaga’emauga (whose capital is Säle’aula), Gagaifomauga (whose
capital is Säfotu), Itü Äsau (whose capital is Äsau), Palauli (whose capital is Vailoa) and
Sätupa’itea, whose capital is Sätupa’itea.
The capital of a district administers and coordinates the affairs of the district, and
confers its paramount title. For example, Leulumoega, capital of Ä’ana, is occupied
predominantly by tulafale whose orator group (fale’upolu) is called faleiva (house of nine).
Faleiva confers the Tui Ä’ana title and administers the affairs of the district, among other
responsibilities.
National
Before the arrival of Europeans in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Samoa did not
have a tradition of a permanent ‘national’ system of government in the sense that the
country was administered permanently from a central headquarters. Instead, a system
existed where a district under the leadership of its paramount titles, which conquered
another district, would establish a kind of ‘central’ government. This ad hoc arrange-
ment, however, would last only as long as the victorious district was able to maintain
power. Once successful in the battlefield, the new victors would establish dominance over
the island group or a significant section of it until they in turn were defeated.
In peaceful times, however, a national system of dispersed power administered by
capital villages of the 11 political districts formed the country’s political system. In the
19th century, when there were attempts to have a modern national government under a
monarch, the orator groups of the 11 political districts played a dominant role. These
orator groups are collectively known as Tumua ma (and) Pule, Itü’au ma (and) Älataua,
‘Äiga i le Tai ma le (and) Va’a-o-Fonoti. Tumua implies the capital villages of Ä’ana,
Tuamasaga and Ätua districts. Va’a-o-Fonoti refers to that district within Ätua. It was
established in the late 16th century after a war in which the paramount titleholder of the
time, Fonoti, was victorious, thus the name Va’a-o-Fonoti (the longboat of Fonoti). The
designation Va’a-o-Fonoti was awarded in recognition of the bravery of the people of this
part of Ätua district, who sided with Fonoti in that war. Pule, on the other hand, implies
the capital villages of the six political districts of Savai’i. The 11th political district is
Aiga-i-le-Tai, already explained. In times of war and when soliciting support for candi-
dates to succeed to district titles and the kingship in pre- and post-European contact
respectively, negotiations were carried out by orator groups of capital villages on behalf of
their districts.
Besides the orator groups, which are tulafale, there is also the traditional institution
of ‘Äïga (royal lineages), whose descendants do not always reside in the same district.
‘Äïga in this context refers to the descendants of district paramount titles and are there-
fore ali’i titles, although some ‘äïga include tulafale. When Samoa became independent
in 1962, the highest political offices of state were held by the four highest-ranking titles
in the land, which are Mälietoa, Tupua, Matä’afa and Tuimaleali’ifano. Mälietoa and
Tupua became joint head of state, Matä’afa was Prime Minister and Tuimaleali’ifano
occupied the Council of Deputies or Deputy Head of State Office. These titles are called
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Tama-a-’äïga, literally, sons of ‘royal families’. Royal families in this context means
families from which successors to district paramount titles are elected.
Even though they have not been incorporated as legal institutions of state, village
governments, tumua ma pule, ‘äïga and paramount titles continue to exist alongside the
legal institutions of state. They still have significant influence in the political affairs of
Samoa and Samoan culture generally. For example, 90 per cent, if not more, of protest
marches against government policies are organised and led by the framework of Tumua
ma Pule, ma ‘Äïga. This was the situation in the protest marches of the mid-1990s against
the introduction of the Value Added Goods and Services Tax (VAGST) and the reduc-
tion of the term of office of the Controller and Chief Auditor from a life term to a
three-year contract. The protest march had some success in that it pressured the govern-
ment into reducing the tax on some goods and removing it from others. Its other aim of
undermining and eventually overturning the democratically elected Human Rights
Protection Party (HRPP) government was not successful. This objective was later
dropped from the protest agenda when the means of achieving it were judged illegal and
unconstitutional by legal and majority public opinion.
Issues
Family
Ideals do not always translate into reality. Therefore, it is important to understand some
of the shortcomings in family governance in order to suggest ways of improving the
situation. Among niggling problems associated with family governance are those relating
to the election of titleholders, the daily administration of family affairs by titleholders,
selfish interest of incumbent titleholders and unfair redistribution of reciprocated goods.
Problems associated with some of these issues are directly related to the mobility of
family members to the extent that some no longer reside permanently at the family’s
original residence.
Ideally, all family members should have a say in the election of their titleholders. In
reality, only senior members make those decisions. In some cases, family members who
reside permanently or semi-permanently overseas insist that such family elections must
wait until they are present. Often, these situations drag family elections to 10 or more
years leaving the family title vacant during all that time. A family whose matai is not
represented in the fono would be in a disadvantaged position in that its interests are not
being represented. It would be in the family’s best interest to try to involve as many
family members as possible in title elections. Members who reside permanently overseas
must either be present at family elections or trust resident members to make those
decisions in the family’s best interest. For matai who reside permanently in the title’s
residential village, they must consult each other on all family matters.
There have been cases of matai administering their family’s affairs for their own
immediate family or personal interest. For example, one foundation titleholder (sa’o)
published in the official government newspaper (the Sävali) in accordance with the Land
and Titles Act 1981 a notice whose ultimate effect was for his granddaughter to inherit an
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important portion of family land. This particular piece of land is the traditional house
site of that title. The title belongs to a huge family with several descendants residing in
and outside Samoa. By cultural implication, this public notice could also mean that the
granddaughter would succeed to the family title currently held by her grandfather, who
was elected to the title by the whole family. The Land and Titles Court is doing a good
job protecting collective family properties against self-interests such as the case cited here.
It is important that the Land and Titles Court give public seminars in towns and villages
to educate the public about their legal rights in order to minimise and eventually eradi-
cate this tendency towards pursuit of selfish motives.
Village
Arguably, weaknesses in a village government are associated with some of its traditional
structures and processes, which, ironically, are the same aspects of that system that have
enabled it to survive to the present. The issue here is how to reconcile differences in
values and expectations associated with an indigenous village government on the one
hand, and accepted values of modern society on the other. As long as the two comple-
ment each other, there is no problem. However, experience has shown that irreconcilable
elements of the two systems in extreme cases have sometimes resulted in fatal incidents.
A fatal incident in Lona village in Fagaloa district illustrates this point. Mäta’utia, a
matai of Lona village, had had a continuing dispute with his village going back 10 years.
After trying to reconcile these differences, Mäta’utia (who had been banned for life from
the village during that time) and his family were in the process of making peace with and
rejoining the village when Nu’utai Mäfulu returned from New Zealand where he had
lived for 20 years (Observer, 6 October 1993). A member of Mäta’utia’s family in his 40s,
Nu’utai’s attitude was to continue his family’s stand-off with the village against the wish
of the majority of his family. On returning from New Zealand, Nu’utai ran a small shop
in the village and operated a bus business (Observer, 29 September 1993). Nu’utai’s
defiant attitude against the village angered the village fono, which resolved to expel him
from the fono. Villagers were ordered by the fono not to buy from Nu’utai’s shop or ride
on his bus. In the district cricket championship match, Nu’utai played in the team of the
village that beat the team of his own village, Lona (Observer, 1 October 1993). As far as
the fono was concerned, the last straw came on Saturday night, 25 September 1993.
That evening, one of the villagers was sent to ring the bell to signal the start of the
village’s curfew. He could not get to the bell. Nu’utai stopped him from reaching the
place where the bell was, claiming that because the bell was hanging on land that
belonged to him (even though authority over that land was at the time disputed), he
would not allow the bell ringer on to his land because the fono had stopped villagers from
buying from his shop or riding on his bus. He told the bell-ringer: ‘If you don’t use my
shop then don’t come on to my land’ (quoted in Observer, 1 October 1993). That was
too much for the fono, which called an urgent meeting that night to decide Nu’utai’s fate.
The urgent village council meeting at about eight o’clock that evening followed
Nu’uta’i’s gesture of personal challenge against the village’s ruling and authority. The fono
resolved to summon Nu’utai before it and that his shop and cars (bus, jeep and another
vehicle) be burned. The taulele’a acted promptly on receiving their instructions. Nu’utai’s
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personal belongings were burned to the ground and destroyed (Observer, 29 September
1993). As stones were thrown at Nu’utai’s house, he got down on his knees and pleaded
with the taulele’a not to harm his wife and their four children, who were with him inside
the house. The order for his wife and his children to be tied up as well was fortunately
prevented by a village pastor’s intervention. Nu’utai was then tied up and led to the fono.
He was followed closely by his wife and their children (Observer, 29 September 1993).
Just before he got to the place where the village fono was waiting, he was shot in the
forehead at point-blank range by his first cousin, Selesele, who was in his 30s. Nu’utai’s
body was then carried to the fono.
In the aftermath of this sad incident, Selesele was charged with Nu’utai’s murder.
Forty-two members of the village appeared in court to face charges. Of the 42, six
pleaded not guilty. The other 36 admitted to the charges, which included throwing
stones, burning Nu’utai’s bus, Suzuki jeep and another vehicle, burning Nu’utai’s house
and store, and for willfully damaging Nu’utai’s property (Observer, 6 October 1993). The
six matai who were charged in the Supreme Court with Nu’utai’s death were aged
between 52 and 77 (Observer, 2 November 1993).
Interpretations of the broad causes of the Lona incident are manifold. According to
the highest-ranking titleholder of Lona village and Fagaloa district, Talamaivao Niko
(who is a former police officer, former member of parliament and former Cabinet
Minister), the cause of the incident was Nu’utai’s attitude. Because Nu’utai had been in
New Zealand for a long time and had money in Samoa, he acted differently. Moreover,
given that boundaries in Fagaloa are unmarked, ‘Nu’utai’s action in stopping the ringing
of the curfew bell was probably too much’ (Observer, 8 October 1993). Talamaivao also
blamed Nu’utai’s death on the late Prime Minister, Tofilau Eti Alesana, whose HRPP
government passed the Village Fono Act 1990. According to Talamaivao, the act gave
village councils, like that of Lona, the right to mete out punishments. Talamaivao said
that he had always maintained that this act would encourage villages to invoke tradi-
tional punishments, which in the present age would be considered barbarous and
primitive (Observer, 8 October 1993).
What is more interesting in the context of traditional village governance are the
arguments in support of the perspective of the council and Mäfulu’s first cousin. The
often-stated argument is that fono would go to any extreme to enforce their authority. It
would be an insult to the fono and the village as a whole if people under village authority
could successfully oppose that authority. The fono is also worried that as soon as village
people are successful in opposing its ruling, it would be the end of fono authority. There
might as well be no village government at all and all Samoan citizens could be left under
the authority of the state as provided for in the country’s constitution. Though, ideally,
the liberal architects of Samoa’s constitution would prefer it that way, realistically the
small number of police to enforce law in the country would mean that the state could
not survive without the dual existence of village governments and their invaluable contri-
bution to law enforcement, protection and security within the traditional framework of
village sociopolitical structures. As a former Commissioner of Police, while in office, once
said: ‘The matai system was still the best one offering assistance to police’ (quoted in
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Observer, 22 October 1993). This statement was made not long after the fatal shooting at
Lona village. Referring to a case where taulele’a of one village caught for the police five
escaped prisoners, the same Police Commissioner commented: ‘You won’t find this sort
of assistance anywhere else in the world’ (quoted in Observer, 22 October 1993).
As Meleiseä has explained (1987: 214–20), an incident at Falelätai district was also
directly linked to village authority. Täriu’s relationship with his village in Falelätai was a
cordial one initially. However, it changed for the worse after Täriu lost the defence, in the
Land and Titles Court, of the title recently conferred on him by the Falelätai fono. Täriu’s
cordial relationship with Falelätai changed after he realised that some of the matai who
were present in his title-conferring ceremony sided with the parties that successfully
challenged the conferral of the title on him. Täriu refused to attend church. When the
village punished him for this, he refused to pay his fines. Eventually, Täriu was banned
from the village and village people were ordered by the fono to boycott Täriu’s buses.
Täriu successfully challenged his village ban in the court. Falelätai was ordered to pay
Täriu money for the loss of his earnings, among other costs. The Falelätai fono was
furious. They refused to pay Täriu the money and they also refused to accept Täriu back
to the village.
Against this background, one of the Falelätai matai, Nanai Likisoe, was seen riding
on one of Täriu’s buses. The order was immediately issued to have him tied up and
brought before the village council, where a fire was lit on which Nanai was intended to
be placed. A stick was put through Nanai’s bound feet and hands. Nanai’s treatment
resembled the normal manner in which pigs are carried to be cooked in an oven. Nanai
was dragged from his residence to the place of the village council meeting. The interven-
tion of the village pastor prevented Nanai from being placed on the village oven. As
Meleiseä (1987: 218) has argued:
Clearly the Matäutu [Falelätai] fono was acting in protection of their authority, and
the severity of their punishments was to ensure that defiance of that authority —
particularly by someone like Täriu, a ‘modern’ man, a businessman, a man who had
been to New Zealand — would not be imitated by others.
Meleiseä (1987: 218) goes on to quote Gilson, who has also pointed out that the impor-
tance of upholding the authority of matai in their own villages is the reason for many of
their punishments, and it does not really matter what the offence is: what matters is that
‘if left unpunished, [it] weakened Samoan confidence in village government’.
Section 6 of the Village Fono Act 1990 allows a fono to impose punishment on its
residents. The only way of checking the extent and appropriateness of that punishment is
when the adversely affected person appeals the fono’s decision under Section 44 of the
Land and Titles Court Act 1981 (Village Fono Act 1990, Section 11). An increasing
number of such cases have been brought before the Land and Titles Court, which has, in
most cases, ruled in favour of the complainant. These court rulings would act not only as
a deterrent against repetitions of such extreme village punishments, but would hopefully
persuade fono against excessive use of power. Hopefully, in the long run, village govern-
ments will not resort to these extreme punishments.
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Abuse of matai authority for personal gain could potentially render village authority
meaningless, as well as bringing shame on that institution. The case of a decision made
by the fono of Faleälupo village in the period leading up to the 2001 general elections
comes to mind. The Faleälupo incident started with the incumbent member of parlia-
ment of Faleälupo wanting another term in office. The best way of achieving that aim
was for the fono to officially declare that the incumbent MP was the only constituency
candidate to contest its seat. If only one candidate is put forward, he/she is declared
elected unopposed by the Chief Returning Officer. This seems to be the plan that one or
perhaps two matai of high rank in Faleälupo’s fono had in mind. However, when the plan
was put to the fono, the rival candidate and his supporters objected. Because the matai
who were executing the plan held positions of influence and power in the fono hierarchy,
the rival candidate was given the ultimatum of either agreeing to withdraw his candidacy
or being expelled from the fono. Expulsion from the fono would minimise the rival candi-
date’s chance of winning his constituency’s parliamentary seat.
The rival candidate would not bow to the bully-boy demands. He wisely exploited
the rebellious members of the same village, who had recently been expelled after
contesting successfully in the Land and Titles Court their constitutional right to establish
a new Christian church in the village. Bad publicity of the incumbent MP’s political
ambitions and his seemingly selfish and power-abusing supporters helped the rival candi-
date’s cause tremendously. In the end, the rival candidate defeated the incumbent MP by
613 votes to 601 (So’o 2002: 228-9). The rival candidate’s victory could be interpreted as
a defeat of the whole concept of village government and traditional governance generally. 
Abuse of village authority also surfaces in campaigns for parliamentary elections.
Although the incident discussed here is fairly common throughout the country, I shall
use the case of Village V in the present discussion. In the period leading up to the general
elections in 1991, Village V made a fono decision to support a particular candidate. After
the elections, evidence was cited in the fono that some members of the village voted for a
rival candidate. Those voters were punished (So’o 1993: 11).
The case of Village V is an example of how traditional values associated with collec-
tive fono decisions can clash with modern ideals of freedom of choice and the political
right to vote for the candidate of one’s preference. Ideally, Samoans would prefer that once
a fono decision is reached, everyone should abide by it. It shows the extent of village unity,
the strength of village solidarity and so forth. From the perspective of the modern state
and human rights principles, however, such collective village decisions obstruct the
individual’s freedom to choose the parliamentary candidate of one’s choice. It was in this
context that the Government’s Commission of Inquiry, appointed to examine Samoa’s
principal Electoral Act (1963) and its amendments, recommended that never again should
custom interfere with the electoral process (Muli’aumaseali’i 2001). In other words,
custom and tradition should be separated from the due process of parliamentary elections.
Stated differently, village governments should be discouraged from exercising undue influ-
ence in the electoral process as stipulated in the Electoral Act 1963, Section 98.
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Sub-District / District / National
After the adoption of the modern state system, traditional issues relating to governance at
the sub-district, district and national levels have become relatively irrelevant. In the late
1980s, however, there were discussions relating to the issue of incorporating some
elements of governance at these levels into the constitution. A negative response to a
question in the 1990 referendum, which asked whether there should be a position for
Tumua and Pule in the constitution, put an end to those discussions. Perhaps the only
relevance of these particular political levels in the modern state system is that, as units,
they have been subdivided to form the present electoral constituencies.
A Pacific future as extracted from the Samoan experience
Ideas of what a future Pacific could look like can be gleaned from the Samoan gover-
nance experience. Two points will be discussed in this context: the first relates to the
continued existence of indigenous institutions and their associated practices and value
systems; the second relates to alternative political set-ups that could be established.
Existing indigenous governance systems
The Samoan governance experience clearly shows the resilience of the fa’amatai. Some
200 years after the introduction of Western institutions, and despite the enforcement of
Samoa’s Constitution since 1962, the fa’amatai is still the predominant form of govern-
ment in Samoa. What lessons for the Pacific can be learned from this experience? First:
that indigenous institutions will not wither away overnight, if at all; and second, any
future Pacific will have to take this factor into account.
For Pacific Island states whose indigenous institutions still exist and are still relatively
strong, like those of Samoa, it would make sense that they are incorporated into the formal
institutions of the state. The Samoan experience shows that indigenous systems have positive
and negative aspects. Positive aspects must find a place in existing formal structures of state.
Not only do these positive aspects govern the lives of the overwhelming majority of the
population, but it is also through them that people make sense of life in their island world.
Negative aspects of indigenous systems, on the other hand, could either be ignored
and allowed to wither away over time, or they could be improved on and even corrected
so they could contribute positively to a future Pacific. 
On the premise that indigenous institutions (and their associated practices and
values), such as the fa’amatai, are elevated to a higher level of recognition as one possible
means of improving existing governance systems in the Pacific, the next step is to recog-
nise indigenous governance systems as one possible way of establishing regional links in
the Pacific. It is fairly well understood that several Pacific Islands share certain common
aspects of their societies. One such element of commonality is the existence of indige-
nous governance systems. For example, Tonga, Fiji and Samoa have chiefly systems.
Positive aspects of these systems could be further developed, improved on and even
corrected to accommodate modern beliefs and values.
These chiefly systems could then be used as a point through which links between
societies could be established to discuss and agree on regional issues. Other points of
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establishing links between Pacific Island societies are family connections. For example,
despite the influence of the state system, which brings its citizens together into a unified
and controlled unit, Pacific societies still remember and recognise their links through
family connections. Several families in Fiji recognise their connections in Samoa.
Likewise, Samoa recognises its family connections in Tonga and vice versa. There are also
elements of culture that could form other points of linkage between Pacific Island
societies. These could be tapped into for a better future Pacific if the present regional
governance systems are not living up to expectations in terms of catering for the interests
of Pacific Island societies individually and as a region.
Alternative governance systems
On the subject of how indigenous institutions could be of value in a future Pacific, there are
four possible options available. The first is where a wholesale Western introduced system of
government is imposed on existing institutions. No such system exists in the Pacific today,
with the exception of those Pacific Island societies that are still under colonial powers. The
second option is where the indigenous system has been adopted as the formal governance
system of the state. No such system exists anywhere in the Pacific today. The third option is
that where the indigenous system has been adopted as the state system into which elements
of introduced systems (or an introduced system) are incorporated. No such system exists in
the Pacific. The fourth option is where the introduced system has been adopted into which
elements of the indigenous system are incorporated. This is the option that has been
adopted by most Pacific Island countries, including Samoa.
In the case of Samoa, the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy has been
adopted, into which elements of fa’amatai have been incorporated. For example, only
matai could contest parliamentary seats with the exception of the two seats for non-title-
holders whose descent could be traced to non-Samoan origin. Until 1988, only matai
could vote in parliamentary elections. The four highest titleholders in the land, tama-a-
’äïga, were accommodated in the constitution to hold the highest offices of state. Even
though village governments were not formally incorporated in the constitution,
commonsense and reality dictated that they be acknowledged and respected by the
Government and the state generally.
A constitution that is a blend of introduced and indigenous elements gives rise to
the question of balance. How much of each system would indicate a balanced blend of
the two systems? What elements of each system should be selected? No doubt these
questions were put on the table when Samoa’s constitution was drafted. Overall, Samoa is
a success story in that it has remained a relatively stable country since independence in
1962. It is perhaps the most politically stable country in the Pacific, with the exception of
New Zealand and Australia. Even Tonga is experiencing serious constitutional issues.
However, Samoa has not been completely free of constitutional and political
problems during its 40 years of independence. Remedies have been determined by the
nature and persistence of these problems. For example, the proliferation of matai titles
for the purpose of parliamentary elections has resulted in the public decision, through a
referendum, that matai qualification for the ballot would be replaced by universal
suffrage. As a way of tapping into resources at the disposal of village governments, the
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practice of villagers electing their own village mayors, who would be paid an annual
salary by the Government, encourages closer links between autonomous village govern-
ments and the central Government. Channels of communication deployed when
implementing development programmes in villages initiated by the central Government
utilise this link through village mayors. Mayors are intermediaries between the central
and village governments. They are elected and therefore controlled by village councils,
but are paid for by the central Government and are accountable to both.
Arguments are beginning to circulate in academic circles advocating a greater role
for indigenous institutions and associated values in existing systems of state governance
(see Huffer 2004; So’o and Huffer 2005). Ideas advocated by Huffer and So’o could
result in two possibilities. One is where a new governance system is established in which
indigenous institutions play a predominant role. It might result in replacing existing
governance systems with a completely indigenous system. Alternatively, it could result in
the incorporation of more indigenous elements into existing systems of the kind Samoa
has adopted in its constitution. It might be more practical and realistic to follow Samoa’s
example than to adopt a completely new system founded on indigenous frameworks into
which introduced elements are incorporated.
Notes
1 Fono can be used in plural and singular form.
2 Official information from Head of the Division of Internal Affairs, Ministry of
Women, Community and Social Development (13 September 2004). In addition to
the 238 Samoan villages, there are 28 other settlements that are not administered as
traditional village governments. These settlements have been formed around the Apia
area, comprising communities that live on privately owned land (ibid.).
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Navigating Passage 
Between Human Rights and
Culture in Fijian Waters
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi 1
THERE IS THROUGHOUT PACIFIC SOCIETIES profound scepticism, even suspi-
cion, about the compatibility of traditional and cultural values with the concept of
human rights. Many traditional leaders and nationalists make little effort to understand
it. For their part, liberals and human rights activists would ‘democratise’ culture, custom
and tradition, but without them, they are not who they are. The challenge is to find an
acceptable medium that takes account of these different but valid points of view. In
recent times, the clarion call of traditionalists in the Fijian milieu has been the perceived
‘threat’ to the essence of being indigenous Fijian that these values present, particularly in
the emphasis given them by economically advanced societies as well as aid donors.
What is first required is an understanding of the meaning of these ideas to establish
common ground, if possible. Custom, culture and tradition comprise of the knowledge,
beliefs, folklore and social systems of a distinct ethnic community. The concept of
human rights embodies the basic individual rights that are ours as of right, ie., by virtue
of our humanity. In traditional societies, the rights of the individual were subject to those
of the group or collective. Individual rights in an indigenous Fijian setting received little
emphasis. Consequently, dissent was either suppressed or disregarded. This in itself
presents an interesting conundrum for traditionalists as they attempt to cope with more
direct and varied differences of opinion. Consensus is sometimes impossible to achieve
but traditional culture and customs have yet to find appropriate means of mediating
conflict in a way that incorporates dissent.
This dichotomy between traditional and modern societies is not irreconcilable
because both have a like interest in ‘peace, order and good government’, if only because
that assures their respective members of stability and wellbeing. Traditional Fijian society,
like other Pacific societies, operated largely by consensus. This has often been criticised
as, in practice, the few who were qualified by status to speak made decisions on behalf of
the many. Mobility was not as fluid as in some other societies. Yet within the ascribed
roles people performed, there was a degree of flexibility. Leadership was restricted to the
turaga or chiefs, but they also had to contend with each other for power and position. He
who proved himself survived and prospered.
This is but one of several interconnections between the two perspectives that allows
for a synthesis, which enables tensions between the two to be moderated. The result is an
amalgam that allows our societies to move forward while retaining what assures identity
and self-affirmation. There is also a point at which one has to recognise that tradition
and culture by their very nature are resistant to the discourse on rights; for example, the
notions of hierarchy, land ownership or chiefly titles. The appropriate response is to
recognise and acknowledge that such practices and beliefs are subject to change. 
In Fijian culture, custom and tradition, there is a holistic view of society, with the chiefs
and the people forming an inseparable whole. ‘Turaga na turaga ni tamata, Tamata na
tamata ni tamata’ is an old Fijian adage, ie., the people are people of the chiefs, the chiefs are
chiefs of the people. This symbiosis exists in the context of clearly defined roles for turaga or
chiefs, matanivanua or heralds, bete or priests, bati or warriors and mataisau or craftsmen,
gonedau or fishermen. These ascribed positions ossified upon colonisation in 1874. Within
this system there existed a process of consultation loosely called ‘consensus’, for want of a
better definition. In reality, it was agreement among those who made the decisions rather
than involvement of the entire mataqali, yavusa or clan of the vanua or political unit.
To reflect and acknowledge the widening participation of the well-educated,
women and youth in the affairs of the mataqali or yavusa, tradition and culture remain
impervious to their detriment. Where there is an opportunity to allow these groups to be
consulted, adjustments can be made without destroying the structures in place. To ignore
or deny such developments undermines them. This is because they do not take account
of social realities. The rationale for all values and attitudes, whether traditional or other-
wise, is that they conveyed what was the nature of society at various points in time. The
reason for these belief systems and values was that they were the most efficient means of
allocating and distributing power and resources.
It is also important to understand that traditional Fijian society was not feudal in
the sense understood in medieval Europe. Notwithstanding the hierarchy of chiefdoms,
particularly in eastern parts of Fiji, there remained a remarkable accessibility of people to
their chiefs, irrespective of their status. This populist element was also demonstrated by
the various counterbalances to chiefly authority within a vanua. Thus, there were limits
to absolutism. The chiefs exercised their power within certain limits. The bete or priests
and the qasenivale or elders also retained some influence as did the bati, the warriors. The
situation was also enlivened by the incessant intrigue and counter-intrigue that featured
prominently in traditional Fijian politicking. This found different forms with the coming
of Christianity and colonisation in the manoeuvring for favour and manipulation of
these profound influences.
Human rights brings to this equation a broader foundation on which to ground
tradition and custom. Ultimately, what is no longer practical or believed is discarded, just
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as pre-contact religious beliefs, cannibalism and the more violent aspects of traditional
society were discarded. The more inclusive embrace promoted by human rights advocates
brings into the fold those that were previously outside it. By enabling those who were
unheard to make a contribution to and to participate in society, a sytem of inclusive
human rights allow more vibrancy in and strengthens the structure of society. This is not
to demean or make light of the fears of the traditionalists. They are real. Those to whom
some recognition needs to be accorded, however, do not wish ill on the structures that are
their heritage. They merely wish to be heard and taken seriously. This aspect is often lost
in the defensiveness of traditionalists.
The dialogue between the two requires engagement rather than a mutual wariness
that serves no one. It is for human rights advocates to advance the cause in a non-
confrontational manner. What is critical is to explain the essence of human rights: to
accord everyone dignity and allow individuals to participate in decisions about their lives.
These rights are not absolute. They are exercised in a context. Where contemporary
definitions of human rights meet traditional culture and custom, there ought to be
respect for the place the latter have in people’s lives and the importance they ascribe to
them. The accommodation between the two must necessarily lie in recognising the
aspects of culture, custom and tradition that can justifiably remain untouched by matters
of human rights. This will depend on the circumstances and the occasion. 
As the impact of globalisation and the market economy strengthens, so the fears of
the traditionalists are reinforced. These fears are shared in varying degrees by many
Fijians, even if they are felt only subconsciously. However, there is no return to the old
ways because that is not a feasible proposition. Engagement is necessary to allow Fijian
culture, custom and tradition to adapt and to reflect social change. It will not be easy
because their fears derive from the sense Fijians have of being ‘overwhelmed’, whether by
colonisation, the Christian missionaries, the advent of indenture or the entire process of
modernisation itself. However, such engagement needs to be undertaken to ensure the
survival of what is intrinsic to indigenous Fijian identity: a sense of themselves.
Notes
1 This contribution was written by Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi when he was a lawyer in
private practice in Fiji.
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Law Reform and Development for
Nation-Building in the Pacific
Blaise Kuemlangan1
Introduction
It is only natural for a keen follower of development law to immediately focus on an issue
related to that broad subject or to discuss a matter based on his current official portfolio
and personal zeal, such as legislative implementation of international fisheries instru-
ments, alternative law-enforcement options, enhancing participatory or community-
based approaches in natural resource management or legislatively enabling the use of
customary marine tenure in fisheries management in the Pacific. Any of these matters,
however, would require a fairly involved discourse in order to ensure that the justified
degree of analysis is accorded them. Despite this preliminary intuitive misgiving, the
need to keep within the predetermined restrictions placed on the length of this discus-
sion counsels the author to stay on familiar ground. In this context, writing this brief
dissertation on the general need for sound development law in the Pacific (outside
Australia and New Zealand) is unavoidable. The thesis submitted herein might be all too
familiar in the Pacific region, but it should be restated in light of the prevailing socioeco-
nomic and political environment: law plays an important role in development and law
reform institutions and programmes can contribute to the development of sound laws
concerning current regional issues that must be addressed nationally. 
The role of law in development
What is the role of development law in nation-building? The Development Law Service
of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), in Law and Sustainable Development
Since Rio (FAO 2002), in answering this question, puts it in its proper context:
The role of law in development has been perceived differently over time, ranging from
a belief that good laws lead directly to development, to great scepticism that law
matters at all. Generalizations in this area are dangerous. In the first place there are
many different legal systems, some of which accept change more easily than others.
Each country has its own traditions regarding administrative law, the use of litigation
and the role of the judiciary and other legal institutions. Moreover, the role of law in
society varies enormously: in some countries legislation seems generally effective,
while in others it appears to have little impact. Other sources of variation are almost
infinite.
Nonetheless, the author, like his colleagues, who have worked as legal professionals in
development worldwide, and contributors to Law and Sustainable Development Since Rio
(FAO 2002), believes that law is essential to creating suitable enabling environments for
government action and private initiative.2
Good laws and functioning legal institutions contribute to the predictability, security
and flexibility needed to foster development. Conversely, poorly designed and imple-
mented laws can inhibit effective action, by distorting incentives and discouraging
appropriate interventions by government and civil society. Good law, of course, is
only one among a number of elements that need to be in place for meaningful change
to occur, but it is an important one — and judging from the amount of new legisla-
tion the past decade has produced, law’s central importance is widely recognized.
(FAO 2002)
That law is an essential instrument for national development is not a given if its sound-
ness is not secured. This requires ensuring the quality of the process for legal reform,
starting from analysing the substance of existing laws and their operation, weighing the
importance of reform, to finding an appropriate solution. 
The process of analysing the substance of the existing law requires answering the
following basic questions: 
— Does the law provide an appropriate positive regulatory environment for activities
in support of sustainable development?
— Is the law relatively free of unnecessary regulatory constraints that could inhibit
activities that are essential for achieving the goals of sustainable development?
— Are the mandates for different institutional actors clear, coordinated and desirable?
— Does the law enable the formation and empowerment of appropriate stakeholder
organisations?
It should be noted of course that the answers to the above questions should always be
placed in the context of the country concerned and the problems at hand. For example, a
foreign regulation on telecommunications, which is adopted wholesale in its substance,
could be complex and unnecessary in many of its regulatory aspects for the developing
country concerned, but indispensable in the short term in order to regulate the mobile
phone industry.3 And the problem with institutional actors might not be one of lack of
clarity of their mandates, or with stakeholder organisations, the inability to form and
empower such organisations, but the proliferation and dynamic nature of these entities.
Pacific Futures54
Assessing the effect that the law has in its operating environment is the other
important aspect of analysing its substance. This analysis is undertaken by asking: in
what way does the law influence the behaviour of individuals and institutions? This step
in the process of law review demands an awareness of the fact that laws often fail to
achieve their desired effect due to: lack of political will; failure to anticipate the means
and costs of effective implementation, including monitoring and enforcement; failure to
recognise the limitations of legal reform in bringing about social and economic change;
lack of understanding of or acceptance of the law by the regulators and the regulated; and
weak judicial institutions. 
The next step in the law review process is to analyse how easy or hard it might be to
correct the identified constraining features, or at least to mitigate their impact. It is vital
to identify what concrete technical and political measures are required to make the neces-
sary changes, and what obstacles stand in the way. If the problems have arisen from the
operation of the law, how can the defects in implementation be remedied?
The final step in the law review process is to find the appropriate solution. The
dominant but erroneous view is that law reform is a matter for lawyers and law institu-
tions. However, ensuring that law reform and development result in good law is not just
a matter of finding technical solutions but requires the full involvement of all stake-
holders — government and non-governmental institutions, communities, resource-
dependent people and the private sector, in particular the constituents of private sector
organisations or individuals. Broad participation in law reform not only improves the
quality of the law, it is a major factor in improving its implementation. It helps create a
legitimacy of the law and might stimulate organised support of the law and commitment
to enforce it. It might remove indifference or passive resistance, which might impede
implementation as effectively as active opposition does. At the least, participation publi-
cises legislation in society at large, among those directly affected by it and those expected
to enforce it.
The contributors to this publication provide a rich tapestry of global and regional
issues that national laws can, and in some cases must, play a vital role in ensuring
progress. Issues such as governance, resolving conflict over resources, protecting tradi-
tional and cultural values, ensuring democracy, creating better trade and investment
climates and protection of the environment and sovereignty are but a few of the issues
that require an appropriate enabling legal environment. To these can be added the other
regional and development law reform issues identified by Justice Tuiloma Neroni Slade,
including intellectual property rights, protection of traditional knowledge and genetic
resources, the implications of multilateral trade rules, commercial and business environ-
ments, security (terrorism, money laundering, drug smuggling, trafficking of small arms)
and international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) (Slade
2004). It should be noted that many of these issues have been identified by the leaders at
the Pacific Islands Forum and related ministerial fora4 as pressing issues that require
immediate action.
In law reform, particularly in developing countries with inadequate resources to
undertake comprehensive legislative reviews, it is a tempting and often easy prospect to
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transplant foreign legislative models. While the process and substance of law reform and
development can be guided by international instruments and norms or the experiences
and models of other jurisdictions, law can be relevant and have legitimate character only
if it is tailored to the situation of the country and broad participation in law-making is
assured. Even the production of model laws, which merely requires inserting the name of
the country receiving legislative drafting assistance in the place where it states, ‘insert
name of country here’, should be discouraged.
Ensuring broad participation in law reform and tailoring the law to the situation of
the country can be facilitated by law reform agencies, which, if properly constituted and
functioning, will not only ensure the involvement of conventional institutions in the law
reform process, but should have the ability to ensure that socioeconomic and cultural
issues are considered and that the relevant stakeholder participates fully in the law devel-
opment process.
The need for law reform and development agencies
It is the author’s experience in the review of certain Pacific Islands’ legislation or proposed
legislation that there is a lack of relevant law reform agency studies and expertise in law
review exercises, particularly in developing natural resource management legislative
frameworks. If such a situation cannot be blamed on the deliberate or accidental exclu-
sion of law reform agencies from recent legislative reviews in Pacific jurisdictions, there
might be a worrying trend in deterioration of the state of law reform agencies or their
relevancy to law reform and development in the Pacific. A reading of Justice Slade’s Law
Reform Potential in the Pacific Area (Slade 2004) would discourage a focus on the demise
of law reform in the Pacific, for law reform Pacific-wide could deteriorate only if there
were law reform and functioning law reform agencies in existence in the first place.
Justice Slade uncovers the stark reality that law reform and law reform agencies have
existed and functioned in the conventional form only in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and
Solomon Islands and in lesser variations in the other Pacific jurisdictions. Out of the
three, the Fiji Law Reform Commission appears to be the only fully functional law
reform agency today. The Law Reform Commission of Solomon Islands was initially
active until the departure of its chairman in 1995. Samoa and Vanuatu have not taken
steps to establish their law reform agencies, although, like Fiji, Papua New Guinea and
Solomon Islands, law reform legislation have been enacted in those jurisdictions. There is
a Law Reform Committee in Tonga, which have been active from time to time.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to review at least one example of the deterioration of a law
reform agency for the lessons it might hold and to highlight the pitfalls, which, if they are
not avoided, would render law reform agencies and programmes redundant. 
Justice Slade (2004) also referred to a threat to law reform in the Pacific in the form
of periods of hibernation by existing law reform agencies. It is the solemn view of this
author that in the case of Papua New Guinea’s Law Reform Commission (PNGLRC), it
is not just hibernation — it is serious decay. The creation5 and operation of the
PNGLRC in its early days occurred in accordance with the classic prescription for the
establishment and sound operations of a law reform agency: creation by legislation,
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allocation of financial resources to fund the agency’s work, quality of its governing arm
(commissioners) and secretariat (personnel), nature and scope of its work, independence
and accountability, cooperation through relationships with other agencies with interests
in law reform (civil service, legal profession, academia) and programmed operations
(research, discussion of working papers, consultation, analysis of further responses and
further research, internal policy paper and final report) (Murphy 2004). By the late
1980s and early 1990s, the PNGLRC had begun to experience a serious decline in its
work caused by a suite of negative political interference and neglect through, among
other things, the appointment of uninterested commissioners and secretary, a chronic
lack of funds and other resources and total disregard by political leaders for the commis-
sion’s then impending demise. The situation was such that a draft 1992 status report on
the decline of the PNGLRC, manifested through the progressive reduction in the
numbers of reports, monographs and working papers, was not published for want of
funds. To add to the PNGLRC’s woes, the establishment of the Constitutional
Commission (CC)6 and its extravagant funding and personnel resources diverted atten-
tion away from the needs of the PNGLRC, which, in any event, should have been
undertaking the kind of work outlined in the terms of reference of the CC. Justice Gibbs
Salika had the unfortunate duty of describing the problems of the PNGLRC and its
worrying state at a recent regional conference in the following terms:
The Commission has not received any new reference from the Minister for Justice
during the two years 1998–1999. The continuous financial constraints and lack of
logistical support continue to be the major problem faced by the Commission. It has
deteriorated in these years to a point where even the basic needs such as water supply,
telephone and fax services, transport, the air condition [sic] units and the general
supply of stationery have not been consistently maintained …
The function of the Law Reform Commission has, in the last few years, lost its objec-
tives due to continuous neglect by the relevant authorities. It has therefore become
ineffective and has taken the backstage in law reform and can be best described as
defunct. Lack of the necessary expertise, manpower and logistics has greatly affected
the operations of the Commission. Instead of giving the necessary financial support,
the relevant authorities decided to create ad hoc committees to address law reform
issues. The establishment of CRC, now CDC, is also an indication of lack of support
to the LRC. One new body after another is being established, duplicating the roles
and functions of the LRC at considerable costs and achieving very little for the
country. (Salika 2000)
The PNGLRC’s demise highlights the dangers of neglect or indifference to law reform
programmes. It should be a warning to decision-makers that there cannot be sound law
reform or development of legislative frameworks to advance fundamental national devel-
opment issues that are often dictated by global and regional obligations or trends without
an active law reform agency or programme. Indeed, in the case of Papua New Guinea,
many law reform initiatives in the past decade, such as the revision of the Organic Law
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on Provincial and Local Level Governments and the integrity of political parties, could
have benefited from the input of a functioning law reform agency.
Regional coordination and implementation
Typically, law reform and development as well as law reform institutions are matters that
belong to the national domain. How can regional collaboration ensure that appropriate
action is taken at the national level? The approach advanced here is loosely based on the
well-used aphorism, ‘Think globally, act locally’. The Pacific region believes in and is not
new to giving pragmatic application to this adage, coined by the global community for
environmental protection and sustainable development. The region’s success in areas
such as fisheries management, where the internationally admired regional flagship, the
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, which has been and should continue to be a forum in
which Pacific nations agree on fisheries management measures at the regional level for
implementation at the national level without the traditional menace of formal sanction,
is testimony to Pacific pragmatism. Indeed, this approach is pursued in relation to law
enforcement issues and other development concerns through the forum. Such an
approach should be emulated in advancing the course of formulating sound development
laws as well as initiating law reform programmes in Pacific jurisdictions. However, it is
first necessary to take a step back and take stock of the regional initiatives that could lend
support to this concern. There are numerous forum institutions, such as the Pacific
Islands Law Officers’ Meeting (PILOM), the Customs Heads of Administration
Regional Meeting, the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference and the Forum
Regional Security Committee, which are involved in issues related to the general areas of
security and law enforcement. While these institutions are also relevant to law reform
and development in their area of competencies, it would seem that PILOM, the Pacific
Judicial Conference and the Australasian Law Reform Agencies’ Conference are the most
relevant institutions that could lead regional cooperation and coordination on the issues
of law reform and development. Some minimum communication and information
sharing among the three institutions, supported by the Forum Secretariat, should result
in a more coordinated and rationalised regional approach and therefore impetus to law
development concerns of the region. PILOM, which is associated with the forum and
could therefore obtain secretariat support, might wish to initiate this inter-regional insti-
tutional cooperation considering that the issue of the rule of law might feature at its next
convention.
In conclusion, it would appear from a cursory examination of regional initiatives
that while the role of law in development and the pressing need for law reform is recog-
nised in the region as encapsulated by the many forum and related institutional
resolutions,7 little has been done beyond such recognition. Even more alarming, at least
to the author, is the multitude of existing Pacific institutions that appear to be fully aware
and communicative of the region’s development needs, goals and the threats thereto, but
the transition to implementation of the numerous commendable regional resolutions
appears elusive except in rare cases. Perhaps what the Pacific really needs at this juncture
is for it to resist the unnecessary creation of new regional institutions, to review and
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amalgamate where possible some of the existing institutions, particularly those with
similar mandates and, most importantly, to pursue a more aggressive programme for
implementation of the various forum resolutions, including the establishment and
implementation of appropriate legal frameworks that foster sustainable development. 
Notes
1 The author is a legal officer of the Development Law Service of the Legal Office,
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). The views
expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not represent the views
of FAO.
2 For the Pacific, some issues, such as customary marine tenure, which are important
but risk becoming irrelevant, or laws that protect them but risk being given dubious
application, might now require legislative intervention. See Graham and Idechong
(1998). See also Kuemlangan (2004).
3 Papua New Guinea and its telecommunication legislation is an example of such a
situation.
4 See, for example, the Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement,
Forum Communiqués, 2004 Forum Economic Ministers’ Meeting and related
outcomes (Forum Economic Ministers’ Forum Economic Action Plan 2004 and
Implementation Plan) and Trends and Developments and other forum publications:
(http://www.forumsec.org.fj/) 2003.
5 The Papua New Guinea Law Reform Commission was established by the Law
Reform Commission Act 1975.
6 The Constitutional Commission (established by the Constitutional Commission Act
1993) was replaced by the Constitutional Development Commission (established by
the Constitutional Development Commission Act 1997).
7 See, for example, the Forum Economic Ministers’ Meeting 2004 Implementation
Plan: (http://www.forumsec.org.fj/)
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Part Two
SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
Language and Culture 
Loss in the Pacific1
Galumalemana Afeleti L. Hunkin and 
Fepuleai Lasei John F. Mayer
Introduction
The total number of world languages has been estimated to be 6,809.2 The majority of
these languages are spoken by only a small percentage of the world’s population and
many of these minor languages are rapidly disappearing as modernisation and the
encroachment of more dominant languages and cultural influences take their toll. The
situation is especially dire for the languages and cultures of the Pacific. A significantly
large percentage of the total languages of the world, or about one-fifth, are found in the
Pacific, and most of these belong to small and extremely vulnerable linguistic communi-
ties. Of the total languages in the Pacific region, 832 are found in Papua New Guinea
alone. Languages found in Fiji, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and New Caledonia
number 226. There are an additional 20 Micronesian languages and 38 Polynesian
languages found in the region. In Australia, another 235 languages can be added to the
total. In the past century and a half these small but diverse linguistic communities of the
Pacific have been subjected to powerful and unrelenting forces of contact by dominant
external cultures and languages such as English, German, French, Japanese and Spanish.
The effects of this contact have been devastating to the linguistic and cultural diversity
that once thrived throughout the region. Approximately 157 indigenous Pacific
languages have been listed as endangered and 48 of them have already become extinct.
Skutnabb-Kangas (2002) has made a distinction between language death and
language murder. The former implies the natural death of a language or a voluntary
choice by speakers to switch codes. The latter describes, for the most part, the effects of
the policies of colonial and post-colonial world powers that have resulted in the slow but
steady elimination of subordinate languages and cultures. Regardless of the cause of
death or the terms used to describe the process, the pattern is clear and alarming. Of the
little more than 6,800 extant languages in the world, 6,530 (96 per cent) are spoken by
about only four per cent of the global population. The remaining 270 languages (four
per cent) are spoken by close to 96 per cent of the global population (Miyaoka 2001).
Recognising the powerful influence that this small number of super languages has had on
the rest of the world’s languages is crucial to understanding the current global state of
language loss. Skutnabb-Kangas is more to the point: ‘The world’s top 10 languages in
terms of numbers of speakers represent only 0.10%–0.15% of the world’s oral languages,
but these big “killer languages” account for approximately half of the world’s population’
(2002: 6). It has been estimated that within the next century as many as 50 per cent of
the world’s languages could vanish because of the destructive influence of the world’s
super-language communities. And the languages of the Pacific are among the most
endangered. This chapter examines some of the factors that have led to the trend of
language and culture loss in the Pacific and the general state of the languages in the
region. 
The process of language loss in the Pacific
The politics of missionary and secular expansion in the Pacific can offer insights into the
mechanisms involved in the rapid loss of languages and cultural identities in the region.
The language policies enacted in the Pacific at the beginning of the 19th century are
vivid examples of the use of language for the synthesis and maintenance of social, polit-
ical and economic power. The contemporary problems that have evolved from these early
language policies have had a major impact on language usage and cultural identity for all
of the larger language communities in the Pacific, including the well-documented cases
of Hawai’i and New Zealand. Many smaller, more remote communities have also been
impacted and have experienced tremendous linguistic and cultural changes. And while it
is true that the socioeconomic changes brought about by European contact were
relatively visible and rapidly, the changes that were enacted on the languages and cultures
of the region have been slower to materialise. It is often years later that the language
policies set in place decades earlier begin to show their effects on subsequent generations
of speakers of those languages. 
The linguistic diversity of the Pacific encountered by the early European missionary
and colonialist was viewed as an obstacle to colonial expansion and the facilitation of the
kinds of social and moral changes that were deemed necessary for its inhabitants. From
the perspective of the Pacific Islander, however, linguistic diversity was a means of
expressing external and internal identity. It was a means of finding one’s place within a
larger societal or political organisation, as well as a means of providing a definition of self
and realising community identity. In the ensuing conflict of philosophies (Pacific
Islander vs. European), it was the European colonialist, armed with overt and covert
language planning policies, who dominated. Mühlhäusler (1987) provides an excellent
summary of these kinds of policies, which have characterised the history of language
change in the Pacific. He states,
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The solution of these perceived difficulties was similar in almost all areas of Australia
and the Pacific, ie., the imposition of the metropolitan language (English, French,
German and so on) as the language of intercommunication. It was widely acknowl-
edged that this goal was best reached via a number of intermediate strategies,
including:
(a) use of indigenous lingue franche
(b) use of pidgin varieties of the superstrate
(c) teaching of the superstrate to an increasing number of indigenes. 
(Mühlhäusler 1987: 3–4)
Two underlying assumptions that motivated this type of policy were the convictions that
the indigenous languages were inferior to the languages of Europe and that they
presented a barrier to communication and, ultimately, assimilation.
Mühlhäusler has noted that these policies and activities were often an intricate
network of deliberate and uncontrolled actions. Uncontrolled policies included the reduc-
tion of the speech community through disease, murder, blackbirding and dispersal; the
introduction of the concept of language status — that there are official or correct
languages (usually the dialect selected by the missionary) and other dialects that are
inferior; the introduction of media, such as radio and writing, as a means of standard-
ising the speech of the community; changes in the functions and domains of the
language; and the introduction or generation of a lingua franca. 
Deliberate measures included: the selection of official languages; status assignment
to local languages; education policies; political suppression; Christianisation; and
sanctioning of foreign naming practices. Language planning policies of this sort reveal
the true underlying political motivation: the levelling of diversity and the introduction
of a single system for nationalistic, religious and economic reasons. Despite decades
of independence, many Pacific Island nations are still functioning to some degree under
these theoretical and philosophical frameworks.
In Polynesia, these policies have caused the near death of several languages,
including Maori in New Zealand, Hawaiian in Hawai’i and Rapanui on Easter Island,
and have contributed to the loss of much of the diversity that existed in the Pacific in
pre-European times. Early missionary policies often followed a pattern of selecting a
standard dialect from among groups of languages or dialects that had never been written
or described before. This created relative status rankings within these areas and gave rise
to the levelling of linguistic differences throughout the region. 
In Hawai’i and New Zealand, as elsewhere, decisions about the variety of the
language to be used as well as questions about orthographic representations were made
by the missionaries. Because it was not feasible to develop grammars for every language
or dialect within a region, it was often the case that a single language or dialect was used
as the language of literacy within a geopolitical area. In the case of Tuvalu, for example,
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a diglossic situation developed with Samoan, introduced as the literate language,
coexisting with the vernacular home or community language, Tuvaluan. 
While political and economic consideration might have led to the selection of
standard languages such as Tahitian, Samoan, Rarotongan and Bauan from among
linguistically diverse regions, it was the introduction of literacy that institutionalised the
process. The speed at which the islands of the Pacific became literate was remarkable.
The adoption of a linguistic standard introduced differential status to other varieties of
the language, and also contributed to the levelling of linguistic variation. 
Although the initial missionary policy favoured the use of the vernacular in educa-
tion, as political and economic interests began to erode missionary influence, European
languages such as English and French became the languages of education and public
intercourse. As these languages moved into more diverse domains of use, indigenous
languages began to lose their utility. Levy (1970), for example, reports that the interac-
tion of French and Tahitian has led to a gradual loss of domains of use of Tahitian. And
as competency in Tahitian has decreased, speakers have found it difficult to express
various aspects of the Tahitian culture. The result is that cultural practices have begun to
drop out of modern Tahitian society, and the language has begun to lose its depth of
expression. This is particularly true with respect to lexical items, which are lost in
response to the simplification of many aspects of indigenous life. The creation of the
demi class (part Tahitian) in Tahiti is indicative of this kind of change (Levi 1970).
French Polynesia currently has seven indigenous languages, the largest being Tahitian
(117,000 speakers). Smaller, less secure language communities in the region include
Austral (8,000 speakers), Mangareva (1,600), Marquesan North (3,400), Marquesan
South (2,100), Rapa (521) and Tuamotuan (14,400). 
One can also apply the same language contact framework that occurred with the
European languages to the interrelationships of lingua franca and regional pidgins (eg.,
Tahitian, Cook Islands Maori, Standard Fijian, Solomon Pijin, Bislama and Tok Pisin) with
many of the smaller languages in the Pacific. Tuamotuan is rapidly undergoing a
Tahitianisation and dialect differences are disappearing because of contact with Tahitian
(Mühlhäusler 1987). Samoan, with 56,700 speakers in American Samoa and 199,377 in
independent Samoa, has affected Tokelauan and Tuvaluan. Tokelau currently has just 1,680
speakers. While there are currently two languages spoken in Tuvalu, there are just 8,440
speakers of Tuvaluan and 870 speakers of Kiribati. The languages of Niuafoou and
Niuatoputapu are being subsumed by Tongan in the Kingdom of Tonga. There are presently
103,200 speakers of Tongan, 690 speakers of Niuafoou and Ethnologue currently lists
Niuatoputapu as extinct. Rensch (1990) has shown the effect the Uvean has had on East
Futunan in the Wallis and Futuna Group. Secondary education, while in the French
language, takes place on Wallis Island, where Futunans are expected to speak Uvean. There
are currently 7,500 speakers of Uvean and 3,600 speakers of Futunan. In the Cook Islands,
there are 16,800 speakers of Cook Islands Maori (Rarotongan) compared with only 600
speakers of Penrhyn, 840 speakers of Pukapuka and 2,500 speakers of Rakahanga-Manihiki. 
The levelling effect of these large regional languages is most heavily felt by the
smallest language communities, especially those in Papua New Guinea, Melanesia and
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Micronesia. While the majority of the Pacific languages are found in Melanesia and
Papua New Guinea, many of these language communities have very small and declining
populations of speakers. These isolated language communities are slowly facing extinc-
tion because of the influence of dominant non-Pacific languages, as well as indigenous
lingua franca and regional pidgins such as Solomon Pijin, Bislama and Tok Pisin. For
example, in Fiji, with 10 living languages, the most populous language community
speaks a variety of Hindi, Fijian Hindustani, with 380,000 speakers. In addition, 4,929
people speak English as their primary tongue. The largest indigenous language in the
island nation is Fijian, with only 330,441 speakers, or just 46.2 per cent of the total
population. Other Pacific languages spoken in Fiji include Western Fijian (57,000
speakers), Lauan (16,000), Rotuman (9,000), Gone Dau (500), Lomaviti, Namosi-
Naitasiri-Serua, and an introduced Micronesian language, Kiribati (5,300). For the
Solomon Islands, there are 69 living languages (including English, Pijin and several
Polynesian Outlier languages). Pijin, an English-based Creole, is spoken by 15,000 first-
language speakers and 300,000 second- or third-language speakers. Of the remaining
languages in the region, only 12 have populations of more than 10,000 speakers. In fact,
17 languages have less than 10,000 speakers, 24 languages have less than 4,000 speakers
and 14 languages have less than 1,000 speakers. Endangered or extinct languages include
Dororo, Guliguli, Kazukuru, Laghu, Rennellese Sign Language, Sa’a, Tanema and Vano.
Likewise, in Vanuatu, which has been influenced by English and French, of the 109
living languages, only one, Bislama (an English-based Creole) has more than 100,000
speakers. There are 27 languages with between 1,000 and 7,000 speakers and 80
languages that have less than 1,000 speakers (including 32 with less than 200 speakers).
Endangered languages include Aore, Eton, Ifo, Maragus, Nasarian, Sakao, Sowa, Ura and
Vatrata. Ifo, a language once spoken on Erromanga, is now extinct. 
In New Caledonia, there are 38 living languages, the largest being French, with
53,400 speakers. In addition, two Creoles, Vanuatu-Bislama (1,200 speakers) and Tayo,
a French-based Creole (2,000 speakers), are also used in the region. Of the remaining
Pacific languages, only six are spoken by more than 4,000 speakers. Of the remaining
languages, 12 have between 1,000 and 4,000 speakers while 19 have populations of less
than 1,000. Extinct languages include Waamwang and Zire. In Papua New Guinea, with
some 832 languages, the same pattern also holds true. Language communities range from
more than 100,000 for a few of the larger languages to some with less than 100 living
speakers. Current lists of extinct languages for Papua New Guinea include Aribwatsa,
Bina, Hermit, Kaniet, Karami, Mulaha, Ouma, Uruava and Yoba. If the languages of
Australia are also considered, more than half of the 268 languages found there (180) have
been classified as endangered. Of that number, 31 are already extinct.
The vast geographical area of Micronesia exhibits the same pattern of influence
from external languages such as English, German, Japanese and Spanish. In addition,
regional lingua francas have also affected the vitality of smaller languages within the
reorganised political territories of this part of the Pacific. In the Northern Mariana
Islands, Chamorro is the largest language with 14,000 speakers, followed by Carolinian
with 3,000, and Tanapag. In Palau, there are 15,000 speakers of Palauan, followed by
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Sonsorol (600) and Tobian (22). Nauru currently has some 6,000 speakers. The FSM has
16 Pacific languages, the largest of which are Chuukese (33,341) and Pohnpeian
(27,700). Of the remaining languages, three have approximately 6,000 speakers, while
11 have less than 3,000 speakers. The Republic of Kiribati has 58,320 speakers of
Kiribati (Gilbertese). Guam has 62,000 speakers of Chamorro, and there are 43,000
speakers of Marshallese in the Marshall Islands. Because of resettlement and migration
patterns, several languages in the region have become established in communities beyond
their indigenous borders. The 3,000 speakers of the Polynesian language Kapingamarangi,
for example, are split between communities on Kapingamarangi and Ponape. Outside of
Kiribati, speakers of Kiribati also have settlements in Fiji (5,300), the Solomon Islands
(1,230) and Tuvalu (870). Like the languages of Melanesia and Papua New Guinea,
many of the smaller language communities have little vernacular material available in
their respective languages. 
Despite widespread political independence within the region since the 1960s,
Pacific languages and cultures are still under severe threat. For island-based cultures
today, the greatest threat of language loss is from the influence of an introduced
dominant language and its accompanying world view, which has become accepted over
the years with little question. English-language education, the influence of electronic
media (eg., television, Internet) and the appeal of American and European pop culture
among today’s youth are powerful forces that work at eroding the utility and relevance of
indigenous languages. While the media and pop culture are relatively new influences,
education has had the longest influence on language choice. Milner (1981) states that the
Fijian language and culture might be in danger of eventual extinction because of the
continued dominance of the English language in the school system. Those opposed to
the use of Fijian in schools argue that the Fijian language is not capable of expressing
modern concepts or coping with modern needs. This is a sentiment that is echoed
throughout the Pacific. Milner points out, however, that Fijian (like any other language)
is more than capable of handling almost any demands made on it. What is required is a
change of mind-set.
But the problem of language loss is not limited to indigenous language communi-
ties within their own island groups. It is also a problem for migrant communities abroad.
In New Zealand, for example, the languages spoken by small migrant Pacific Island
communities such as Niuean, Tokelauan and Cook Islands Maori might be facing extinc-
tion. Today, these communities exhibit steady patterns of language shift and language
loss as the majority of their populations have settled in metropolitan centres such as
Auckland and Wellington. Language surveys for 2001 show an alarming trend in
language loss (http://www.stats.gov.nz). For example, only 28 per cent of the New
Zealand-Niuean community (out of a total population of 20,100) can hold a conversa-
tion in the Niuean language. This is down from 32 per cent in 1996. Of the 6,200
Tokelauans in New Zealand, only 44 per cent can converse in Tokelauan (down from 53
per cent in 1996). For the 52,600 Cook Islands Maori in New Zealand, only 18 per cent
can hold a conversation in Cook Islands Maori (the same percentage as in 1996). When
the data are examined for the New Zealand-born members alone, the picture is even
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more ominous. For Niueans, only 15 per cent of those born in New Zealand can speak
Niuean; only 37 per cent of the New Zealand-born Tokelauans can speak Tokelauan;
while only five per cent of local-born Cook Islands Maori can speak Cook Islands Maori.
Efforts to save the languages of migrant Pacific Island communities take on more impor-
tance when viewed in the light of the shifting nature of Pacific Island populations. There
are, for example, about 8,000 Niuean living worldwide, but only 2,240 of these live in
Niue. Similarly, of the 4,500 Tokelauans globally, only 1,680 reside in the Tokelau
Islands. Only 16,800 Cook Islands Maori reside in Rarotonga out of a total population
of 43,000. 
Thus, the process of language shift and eventual language loss of Pacific Islanders
might perhaps be more striking in the diaspora. In the case of migrants to metropolitan
centres such as Auckland, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Sydney, etc., Pacific Islanders are
exposed to powerful language environments in new urban areas of settlement. The conse-
quent social assimilation in these new urban cultures brings about a rapid decrease in the
utility of heritage languages and an equally rapid alienation from traditional cultural and
social practices. This is especially true for Pacific Islanders born abroad or those who have
migrated at an early age. These first- and second-generation Pacific Islanders frequently
develop a passive competency in the language of their parents. That is, they might
comprehend the language to a limited degree but they will invariably find it more
comfortable to respond in English. This pattern of dependency on English increases as
the child matures. Often these young adults eventually become alienated from traditional
cultural practices and social interaction because of their inability to understand and speak
the language of their heritage community. Government policies in these urban centres
have historically accelerated this process through educational programs that devalue
heritage languages and cultures. They require students to assimilate into the mainstream
language and culture, usually English. In these urban areas, Pacific Island languages are
not viewed by policy-makers as serious subjects of study and therefore they do not have a
useful place in local or national domains. Unfortunately, this view is also held by many
Pacific Islanders themselves. English is still viewed as the key to academic and economic
success and Pacific Islanders traditionally have not supported the teaching of heritage
languages in schools. 
In the United States and New Zealand, as in other countries with Pacific Island
communities, heritage languages are also exhibiting signs of linguistic innovation as
succeeding generations of speakers integrate their knowledge of English with their
limited competency in their home languages. This process has resulted in noticeable
changes in the phonology, syntax and lexicon of Pacific languages as they are spoken
within migrant communities abroad. Language mixing is also more evident in these
communities. In Hawai’i, for example, a mixture of Samoan and English is often used in
casual conversations with great fluency. This mix is even used by competent Samoan
speakers, especially when the topic involves non-Samoan concepts. It is a code-mixing
phenomenon similar to the mixture of Tagalog and English, often termed ‘Taglish’ (cf.
Thompson 2003). It is clear that ‘Samlish’ is a well-established linguistic innovation,
especially among newer generations of Samoans living abroad. 
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The changes that have occurred to Pacific Island cultures and languages as a conse-
quence of migration to New Zealand, Australia and the United States bring home the
realisation that conscious and deliberate efforts must be made to preserve these
languages. This requires cooperation by the heritage communities and government
entities. Deliberate policies enacted with the view of retaining and cultivating these
languages are required. Examples of this kind of cooperative effort can be found in New
Zealand and Hawai’i. The successful programs for the revitalisation of the Maori and
Hawaiian languages can serve as powerful examples for other Pacific communities. In
Hawai’i, a group of concerned Hawaiian-language educators founded the Aha Punana
Leo (Language Nests) in 1983 to work for the revitalisation of the Hawaiian language. In
1984, following the example of the Maori Language Nests of New Zealand, the first
Hawaiian language preschool (Punana Leo) was established. In 1986, lobbying efforts by
Hawaiian educators and community members succeeded in repealing a century-old ban
on the use of Hawaiian as a medium of instruction in public schools. Since then, the
success of the Hawaiian-language immersion schools (kindergarten–grade 12) and the
existence of academic programs of instruction at the university level have given hope for
the revitalisation of the Hawaiian language. There are currently some 1,000 mother-
tongue speakers of Hawaiian and an additional 8,000 who can speak and understand
Hawaiian. The existence of bachelors, masters and doctoral degree programmes in the
Hawaiian language has begun to place the Hawaiian language on an equal academic
footing with the English language. And while the Hawaiian-language programme is the
largest and most significant Pacific Island language and culture programme within the
University of Hawai’i system, other programmes of study now include Chamorro,
Maori, Samoan, Tahitian and Tongan. 
Similar efforts in New Zealand for the Maori language have met with great success.
In 1981, the development of the Kohanga Reo (Language Nest) immersion schools to
teach traditional values and knowledge to preschool children in the Maori language was a
significant step in the revitalisation of the language. In 1987, the Maori Language Act
declared Maori an official language of New Zealand and established the Maori Language
Commission, Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Maori. By 1997, 32,000 students were receiving
Maori medium education and an additional 55,379 were learning to speak the Maori
language (http://www.tetaurawhiri.govt.nz). There are now an estimated 50-70,000
speakers of the Maori language and another 100,000 who can understand Maori. It is
also heartening that within the past decade the New Zealand Government, in partner-
ship with the Samoan community in New Zealand, has worked to establish a Samoan
language curriculum within the school system, from preschool to the tertiary level. New
Zealand’s Prime Minister, Helen Clark, during a visit to Niue in November 2004,
pledged support for the inclusion of the Niuean language in the New Zealand school
curriculum. It will join the Maori, Samoan and Cook Islands Maori language curricula,
which cover preschool as well as the senior classrooms in New Zealand. This will expand
the number of Pacific Island languages taught in New Zealand schools to four. Other
national organisations, such as the Human Rights Commission, are also taking steps to
give support to these national efforts. 
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Conclusion
One of the key issues facing Pacific peoples is accepting the fact that their languages are
under threat from external and internal forces. Among the most potent of the external
threats is the continued erosion of indigenous languages and cultural values by dominant
regional and global influences. Internal threats to language and cultural vitality arise from
defeating self-images that value non-indigenous ways over traditional ways. These
negative views and beliefs are the legacy of the educational policies imposed on the
Pacific Islands over the years. Western worldviews have taken root in the minds of Pacific
Islanders and pervade virtually every aspect of modern life. The results can be compared
with unconsciously planting a ‘Trojan horse’ way of thinking into the minds of the
people. Over the years this has resulted in the devaluing of local cultures, ways of
thinking and, in particular, languages. Pacific Island languages and cultures must be
accepted as important, valid and crucial parts of each community’s cultural heritage and
must be protected at all costs from these threats.
The development and implementation of new language planning policies can rarely
take place until social and/or political conditions are optimal for their implementation.
Therefore, successful language planning requires changes in attitudes and coordinated
efforts by politicians, the community, special interest groups and language researchers.
Education and public awareness are the keys for this kind of change. Saving the languages
of the Pacific will require cooperative endeavours on the part of educators, academicians,
politicians, the media, the clergy, and the support of the very superpowers that have put
the Pacific languages on this course towards extinction. It is promising that a significant
number of national, regional and international organisations have been founded in recent
years to address these issues. Revitalisation efforts are currently being led by organisations
such as the Maori Language Commission (http://www.tetaurawhiri.govt.nz), the
Hawaiian language organisation Aha Punanaleo (http://www.ahapunanaleo.org), the
International Samoan Language Commission Falaeula o Fatuaiupu o le Gagana Samoa
(http://www.ascc.as/slcce.htm), the New Zealand Samoan Language Organisation
FAGASA (http://sites.tki.org.nz/samoa), the Polynesian Languages Forum and the
Program for Endangered Languages of the Pacific Rim (http://www.elpr.bun.kyoto-
u.ac.jp). There is hope, but more needs to be done.
Perhaps Grimes (2001) provides the simplest and most sage advice for the future of
Pacific Island languages:
There are some groups in the world who, with help from linguists are attempting to
increase their speaker population by publishing pedagogical grammars with audio
tapes, dictionaries, newspapers, having courses taught in schools and community
colleges, evening classes for adults, programs on the radio and television. These are
having some success. But the most important thing that can happen to preserve a
language is for parents to continue passing on their mother tongue to their children in
the home. (2001: 10)
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Notes
1 Portions of this chapter are taken from John Mayer, 1998, ‘Linguistic Change in
Polynesia’, presented at the University of Hawai’i for the Hawai’i Committee for the
Humanities, July 30, 1998.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all language statistics have been taken from Ethnologue:
Languages of the World, 14th Edition (www.ethnologue.com).
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PICTA, PACER and EPAs:
Weaknesses in current 
trade policies and alternative
integration options
Wadan Narsey
Introduction
Most of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are signatories to several overlapping regional
and international agreements, encompassing trade, aid and investment. These agree-
ments are seen by the PICs as instruments to accelerate their economic development,
create employment, increase incomes and generally improve standards of living.
For the western Melanesian countries, there has been the Melanesian Spearhead
Group Trade Agreement;1 for most of the southern PICs, there have been special relation-
ships with Australia and New Zealand in the form of the South Pacific Regional Trade and
Economic Cooperation Agreement; and the American trust territories have their special
relationships with the United States in the form of the Compacts of Free Association.2
However, interesting policy choices are posed by the recently signed regional trade
agreements among the PICs themselves: the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement
(PICTA), the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) — which
includes Australia and New Zealand — and the Cotonou Agreement, which is the
successor to the Lome Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States
(ACP). All these agreements are in place against the backdrop provided by the impera-
tives of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to which a few PICs are signatory,3 while
other PICs have applied to join.4
PICTA and PACER are already binding on those who have signed and ratified,
while the trade aspects of the Cotonou Agreement are in the process of being negotiated
with the European Union, in the form of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs),
which are expected to come into effect after 2007.
It is here argued that the likely medium-term impact of PICTA will be at odds with
PICs’ long-term development paths, with serious potential for wastage of national
resources, given the likely long-term implications of PACER. It is suggested that regional
trade is unlikely to increase significantly, because of political lobbying by domestic
producer groups. From the PICs governments’ points of view, the impact on employ-
ment will be a critical sticking point, with most PICs not prepared for the likely
long-term employment consequences of the trading agreements they have signed, despite
the supposed overall net economic benefits of the regional trade agreement, or even total
trade deregulation.
The crucial importance of ensuring an optimal extraction of benefits from PACER
is underlined by one of the critical negotiating issues for the Pacific states in the Cotonou
Agreement with the EU over the EPAs: fiscal impacts of likely tariff reductions. The
major revenue costs for PICs governments, should the EPAs trigger through PACER
similar tariff reductions on imports from Australia and New Zealand (and the United
States for the Compact countries), suggest that PICs need to negotiate quid pro quo
benefits in return for the likely tariff reductions.
While the current EPA negotiations are focused solely on relationships with the
EU, the Pacific Cotonou signatories need to additionally examine the possibilities of
revamped relationships with Australia and New Zealand through the PACER, which has
much greater long-term potential for leading to sustainable economic growth and devel-
opment in the PICs.
PICTA and PACER
The 1999 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting in Palau ‘endorsed in principle a free
trade area among Forum Members’.5 In August 2001, nine PICs signed6 the Pacific
Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA). And, together with Australia and New
Zealand, they signed the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER),
seen as an umbrella agreement for PICTA.
PICTA is now in place, with nine countries having ratified, while five have not.7
The PICTA signatories made a commitment to trade liberalisation, supposedly as a
means of bringing economic and social benefits and improving the living standards of all
the peoples of the Pacific region. The agreement states that its objectives are to strengthen,
expand and diversify trade between the parties:
— through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade;
— in a gradual manner, with a minimum of disruption, under clear rules for trade,
with conditions of fair competition;
— leading to the eventual creation of a single regional market among the Pacific Island
economies;
— while taking into account the differing economic potentials and the special devel-
opment problems of the least-developed countries and small island states, the
different development objectives, and aspirations of indigenous peoples.
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The parties expect that PICTA should also
— contribute to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade in goods
and services and to the progressive removal of barriers to it;
— promote and facilitate commercial, industrial, agricultural and technical coopera-
tion among themselves.
Fundamentally, PICTA requires8 that all tariffs on ‘originating goods’ be reduced and
eliminated in accordance with the timetables set out in Annex II (of PICTA) for trade
among themselves — essentially falling to zero 10 to 12 years after ratification. Those
PICs classified as least-developed countries and small island states are given a parallel but
higher schedule of reducing import duties, compared with the larger PICs (Papua New
Guinea and Fiji).
For the protection of ‘sensitive industries’ from full competition, and to give them a
longer time frame to adjust, PICTA allows each country to provide an ‘excepted imports’
list with a slower timetable for reduction of tariffs.9 Again, least-developed countries and
small island states are allowed slightly higher schedules of reducing import duties.
The rationale for PICTA
PICTA might be attributed to internal and external economic and political forces. The
internal economic imperative supposedly derives from the recognition by PICs that they
need to become internationally competitive, especially as they see their preferential
markets in developed-country partners eroded by challenges through the WTO.10 As
well, there is an increasing realisation on the part of developed countries that their prefer-
ential agreements constitute bad aid and trade policies in perpetuating developing
country dependence on trade distortions, which hamper internal economic efficiency
and must in any case ultimately be eliminated. The logic articulated by the agreements
has been that, rather than jumping off the deep end into free trade agreements with the
developed countries, PICs might have an easier time if they first develop a free or
regional trade agreement among themselves, as a ‘stepping stone’ to free trade agreements
(FTAs) with the rest of the world — developed and developing countries alike.
The mechanisms whereby the agreements expect the FTAs to encourage improve-
ments in competitiveness are stated as follows:
— enlargement of market size will encourage economies of scale, competition11 and
new investment earlier thought unprofitable;
— competition and adjustment will be introduced gradually so that sudden and desta-
bilising economic disruptions are minimised;
— PICTA will provide a ‘training ground’ for further (and presumably harsher)
economic integration with the wider globalised world: for businesses that will need
to compete with international competitors; and for governments that will need to
implement fiscal reforms (such as tax systems), and enabling legislation (regarding
product standards, phyto-sanitary measures, quarantine requirements, customs
procedures, etc).
While these advantages have generally been internationally recognised in regional trade
agreements elsewhere, their application in the PICs context will be questioned in this paper. 
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There are also seen to be a number of political advantages to the PICTA:
— being able to speak with one voice in international fora, enabling small PICs to
have a greater influence than as individuals;
— being part of a regional FTA (with all the necessary structural and fiscal reforms),
facilitating a ‘lock-in’ of economic policies so as to discourage backsliding by
individual governments responding to political imperatives and lobby groups;
— financial and technical aid incentives provided by the donor countries (specifically
Australia and New Zealand) for being committed to the agreed policy agenda.
These latter advantages, while inherently plausible, are also debatable, in the light of the
results so far.12
There has also been a powerful external impetus to form PICTA. It has been argued
that the post-Cotonou EPAs to be negotiated with the EU will be facilitated if the PICs
are bound by an FTA, which then would facilitate the WTO compatibility of the EPAs.
But the Cotonou Agreement also states that economic and trade cooperation between
the EU and the ACP states will build on the regional integration initiatives of the ACP
states, ‘bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration
of the ACP countries into the world economy’.
This last assumption is debatable for all PICs, but especially for at least two groups
of countries among the PICs with special relationships to metropolitan or developed
countries — the United States and New Zealand.13 The current reality, nevertheless, is
that even those PICs that were previously not part of the Lome Convention have joined
the post-Cotonou development partnerships with the EU.14 There are no doubt long-
term strategic advantages for the EU, vis-a-vis other superpowers, in having most of the
PICs bound to it through EPAs.
The PACER
The PACER, which has been signed and ratified by all the PICs, is seen as an umbrella
framework setting out possibilities for trade relations among all Pacific Islands Forum
members, and specifically inclusive of Australia and New Zealand. While PICTA explic-
itly sets out the framework and timetable for an FTA among the PICs, excluding
Australia and New Zealand, PACER sets out the possibilities, provisions and timing for
including Australia and New Zealand in the FTA.
PACER is not a ‘proactive’ agreement for fostering free (or freer) trade between the
PICs and Australia and New Zealand. It is a ‘reactive’ and essentially defensive agree-
ment, protecting Australian and New Zealand trading interests in the PIC markets,
vis-a-vis other developed countries or groups of countries. Article 6 advises that if any
PIC ‘commences formal negotiations for free trade arrangements’ with any other devel-
oped country or grouping, they should also begin similar negotiations with Australia and
New Zealand.15 Hence, PACER essentially attempts to assure Australia and New
Zealand that they will not be disadvantaged relative to other trading partners in their
trade relations with the PICs.
PACER also requires negotiations with Australia and New Zealand to begin eight
years after the PICTA comes into force, if they are not triggered before that through the
PICTA, PACER and EPAs 75
actions of the PICs described above. In both cases, however, PICs would become parties
to free trade arrangements only if the negotiations are successful.
PACER also contains requirements for the provision by Australia and New Zealand
of financial and technical assistance, for the development and implementation of the
trade facilitation programmes. These are supposed to give special attention to the needs
of small island states and least-developed countries, in the design of the programmes and
funding levels. It is unclear, however, the extent to which the financial and technical
assistance provided to PICs will be additional to existing levels of assistance.
In one important aspect, PACER is not a symmetrical agreement between Australia
and New Zealand on the one hand and the PICs on the other. While PACER provides
the PICs with the right to consultation with Australia and New Zealand if either
Australia or New Zealand were to enter into negotiations for a free trade agreement with
a non-forum country, the benefit to be negotiated would only be for ‘improved market
access’ for PICs — not the equivalent of the FTA being negotiated with the non-forum
country (as would have been the case had the agreement been symmetrical).16
There are two views explaining the signing of PACER. There is a strong view that
PICs agreed to PACER only after they succeeded in keeping Australia and New Zealand
out of PICTA, after they made a belated attempt to join. An alternative interpretation is
that PACER is a symptom of PICs’ recognition and concession that Australia and New
Zealand, for the foreseeable future, will be their most important developed country
partners and donors, and that PICs relationships with other developed countries or
groups of countries should not place Australia and New Zealand at a disadvantage. But
this explanation makes the PACER a ‘reactive’ agreement, not proactive, as would have
been the case had there been political substance to the interpretation.
The EPAs under the Cotonou Agreement
The Cotonou Agreement17 was signed supposedly as an ‘equal’ development partnership
between the EU and the ACP states.18 What cannot be lost sight of is that while the
central objective of the Cotonou Agreement partnership is stated to be to ‘promote and
expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States’ (Article 1), a
new trading regime is explicitly held by the EU to be at least as important an objective.19
Thus, while the Cotonou Agreement expects the ACP development strategies to be
centered on the objective of reducing and eradicating poverty, the provisions state that
this objective has to be consistent with the objectives of ‘sustainable development and the
gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy’. The agreement
commits that ‘regional and sub-regional integration processes which foster the integra-
tion of the ACP countries into the world economy in terms of trade and private
investment shall be encouraged and supported’.
Under the agreement, the Lome IV trade arrangements are to continue until 2007,
while the development aid arrangements will continue for 20 years. The trade arrange-
ments to apply after 2007 are to be renegotiated20 and these will take the form of EPAs
or alternative trading arrangements with ACP countries that are not willing to conclude
EPAs. Article 37.6 of the Cotonou Agreement states that the alternative trading arrange-
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ments will provide these countries with a ‘new framework for trade which is equivalent to
their existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules’ (my emphasis).21
Article 36 of the agreement provides that the ACP states and the EU ‘agree to
conclude new WTO-compatible trading arrangements’. Of relevance is GATT Article
XXIV, which covers preferential trading arrangements between developed WTO
countries and all subsets of developing countries. The current non-reciprocal Lome
Arrangements were covered by a waiver obtained by the EU from the WTO. It is now
perceived that WTO regulations will not allow discrimination between different groups
of less developed countries who have partnership arrangements with the EU and that
reciprocity will be required of the ACP states after 2007.
PICs import duties on EU products are likely to come down or be eliminated. Of
critical importance will be the definition of ‘substantially all the trade’ (SAT), on which
duties will be eliminated. While there is no consensus on how SAT will be defined,
Pacific Cotonou signatories need to prepare for the worst-case scenario: that import duty
might have to be eliminated on 90 per cent of all imports (by value) from the EU.22
Where the EU’s commercial interests are concerned, it is unlikely that they will be
placed subservient to ACP development interests. For instance, the recent kava debacle
must throw grave doubt on the importance placed by the EU on PICs development
based on their genuine comparative advantages. In the past year, EU pharmaceutical
companies, whose sales were threatened by the increasing popularity of kava products,
had little difficulty in obtaining bans against PICs kava exports to Europe. With the
stroke of a pen, PICs exports were decimated, with the consequent destruction of PICs
incomes and employment. There is supposedly official powerlessness to reverse the ban. 
The whole aid relationship underlying the Cotonou Agreement is that the EU sees
itself as a development ‘bigger brother’ to the under-developed PICs. Yet the ‘bigger
brother’ stood by while an industry in which the Pacific ACPs have comparative advan-
tage was decimated by EU multinationals. 
Are expected regional trade agreement benefits likely to be
achieved?
While some of the political benefits of regional integration movements are obvious in the
short term, there is considerable debate about their overall economic usefulness in the
long term. Bhagwati (1991) quite legitimately asked whether regional trade agreements
were ‘building blocks or stumbling blocks’ for developing countries, and the question is
probably even more pertinent in the PICs context, with relatively tiny markets compared
with many other developing countries, where economies of scale might be hoped for in
some industries.
The early studies that led to the formation of PICTA (Filmer and Lawson; Scollay)
all concluded that the largest gains from regional integration would arise from a FTA
including Australia and New Zealand, while FTA encompassing only the PICs (excluding
Australia and New Zealand) would not be expected to provide significant benefits.
These regional conclusions are consistent with the international studies. Vamvakadis
(1998) examined the impact of five regional trade agreements in the ’70s and ’80s, and
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found that none led to faster growth, largely because ‘most of these agreements were
among small, closed and developing economies’.
There has also been serious concern about the unequal sharing of economic benefits
in a regional trade agreement. Venables (2003) concluded that regional trade agreements
between low-income countries tended to lead to divergence of member country incomes,
and that developing countries were more likely to be better served by ‘north-south’ than
by ‘south-south’ agreements. 
These conclusions are likely to be stronger for the small island economies like the
PICs, given their relatively small populations, low incomes per capita, lack of regular
communications links (especially for the transport of goods), lack of developed infra-
structure, and the similarity of their resource endowments (mostly scarce). 
Simply reducing tariffs is unlikely to encourage greater competition among the
PICs producers. It would be necessary to ensure a host of complementary measures and
practical assistance to small PICs producers to encourage them to attack other markets:
cost-effective production of quality goods; ensuring regular and cost-efficient transport
and freight charges; coping with customs regulations; product standards; being able to
satisfy quarantine requirements, etc. Prasad (2003) discusses some of the conditions
under which PICs might be able to benefit from a FTA, and the inherent limitations of
their production bases.
However, it could be argued that if the entire PICTA market is able to be supplied
by one (monopoly) firm utilising economies of scale (as is quite likely in a number of
industries), effective competition might neither be feasible nor desirable, especially if
smaller scale and inefficient operations are encouraged by protection or subsidies. On the
other hand, having a monopoly operating throughout the PICTA region might also lead
to the undesirable result that the benefits of trade diversion would be captured more by
the producer than by the consumers.23
The investment benefits might also not eventuate as expected. Where the PICTA
encourages new foreign investment to operate behind high tariff barriers towards the non-
PICTA countries, there is also the danger that individual PICs might compete with each
other through tax incentives for the investors (foreign or local) to locate within its
geographical boundary. In most cases, the higher the incentives, the lower the retention of
national benefits. The latter in any case might also be small, or even negative, if the costs
of domestic production are significantly higher than the costs of imports. The empirical
evidence in Balasubramanyam et al. (2002) suggests that it is not the presence of regional
trade agreements that determines the size and direction of foreign direct investment, but
the economic characteristics of the investing and host country. Thus the smaller PICs are
unlikely to see any significant increases in investment, either domestic or foreign.
However, PICs ratifying PICTA might need to come to terms with one funda-
mental thorny issue — the assumption that a regional trade agreement such as PICTA is
a ‘stepping stone’ towards eventual full integration with the world economy. Enlarging
the regional market through PICTA might enable some firms in ratifying PICs to
increase their scale of operations, by and large by replacing domestic producers and/or
the imports from non-PICTA countries, assisted by protective tariffs for the PICTA area.
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For many, this will require new investment in plant, increases in employment and
expansion of distribution and marketing networks. While these firms will no doubt
significantly improve their economic efficiency and reduce their unit costs, it is also quite
likely that these firms, serving the enlarged PICTA market, will still be small, relative to
the competing metropolitan multinational companies. Should the extra-PICTA margins
of preferences reduce (as eventually they must), it is quite likely that the majority of the
expanded PICs firms will still find themselves unable to compete with the metropolitan
giants, and will inevitably have to close down.
This will certainly be the case if PACER comes into full effect. The majority of
manufacturing firms in PICs survive on the basis of high levels of tariff protection, with
the effective rates of protection being much higher than the nominal rates legally in
place.24 The annual production runs for most firms could be covered by a few days’
production in the metropolitan countries. In all likelihood, most metropolitan producers
would simply export the finished products to the PICs if tariff protection was removed
from the domestic producers. Rare exceptions might include those where the orders from
the PICTA clients would be too small for the metropolitan companies to bother with,
hence a PICs subsidiary might be left to mop up the small demand.25
This raises three important issues for PICs governments. First, should PICs govern-
ments be encouraging the expansion of PICs firms (with the associated resource costs)
into the enlarged but still protected PICTA market, knowing that within the medium
term (some eight years at the outset) these firms will still not be able to survive in a
globalised competitive market? In other words, if PICTA succeeds, it would paradoxi-
cally be creating an even thornier problem than currently exists, by strengthening an
industry that might be even more difficult to dismantle, because of increased size and
contribution to domestic employment and income generation, and political influence. 
The importance of individual companies in PICs politics and public policy cannot be
underestimated. The Fijian economy, for instance, is characterised by government-granted
and protected monopolies operating in a range of key industries, such as telecommunica-
tions, cement production, television and milk, to name just a few. The Fijian Government
refuses to dismantle the monopolies (for a variety of reasons), despite protracted public
protests for a number of years.
Second, the regional FTA will lead to expansion of production by firms only if the
short-term benefits justify doing so. Clearly, firms would invest their capital and increase
production only if they are able to sufficiently exploit market power (at the expense of
consumers) in order to rapidly return the capital invested, before the further liberalisa-
tion occurs.
Third, and probably the most important given the likely long-term adjustments
that will be required by PACER and the WTO, is the lack of preparedness of PICs, their
industries and their governments. This relates especially to the significant changes in
employment, the demise of local entrepreneurs and the fiscal policy measures that will be
required by the ultimate operations of the EPAs and PACER.
These issues raise serious questions about the appropriateness of the overall mix of
strategies being followed by PICs governments in relation to their major trading partners. 
PICTA, PACER and EPAs 79
This paper suggests that PICs are not pursuing the appropriate mix of international
strategies that would seem to offer greatest promise of future economic benefits.
Reference is made to the Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement, a special case
study of the regional trade agreement implications in the PICs alcohol and tobacco
industries, and the negotiating weaknesses of Pacific ACPs in the EPAs with the EU. The
suggestion is made for a proactive triggering of PACER negotiations, a more urgent
approach to closer economic integration with Australia and New Zealand, towards the
eventual formation of a South Pacific Economic Community.
The PICs integration reality: reversals of liberalisation
There currently seems to have been insufficient acknowledgment among the PICTA
signatories that if economies of scale are to be enjoyed by some PICTA producers, it
follows that producers in other PICs will have their market shares reduced. Some will
close down as the more efficient manufacturers increase their supply in the bigger
markets created by the FTA.
It is natural in such circumstances for producers and workers in threatened indus-
tries to lobby their respective governments against the imports from the other PICTA
countries, presenting the old arguments about protecting local jobs, incomes and taxes.
The domestic consumers who would enjoy the benefits of free trade (usually greater than
the costs) typically do not form a counter lobby group. Most PICs governments, mindful
of the reactions of disgruntled voters at the next elections, have indeed reacted to protect
local lobby groups.
This type of reaction is obvious from trade developments in the Melanesian
Spearhead Group. At recent meetings of that group, the smaller islands expressed
concern about the survival of their industries. In August 2002,26 Solomon Islands
officials referred to their government’s ‘balance of payments’ problems and ‘SOS’ calls
from some of their industries. Vanuatu expressed concern about soap and canned meat
imports from Papua New Guinea and ice-cream from Fiji, which were placing their
domestic industries under stress. This meeting noted that the Spearhead Group
Agreement allowed temporary relief in the form of tariffs (usually 12 or 15 per cent) to
be phased out after three years. The meeting agreed that bilateral arrangements on a
product-by-product basis were needed.
In a later meeting of the Melanesian Spearhead Customs Working Group,27 the
Solomon Islands representatives proposed a three-year ‘temporary’ suspension of duty-
free Melanesian Spearhead Group trade. Vanuatu, referring to its declining exports and
worsening balance of trade with Papua New Guinea and Fiji, proposed an ‘injury tariff
rate’ of 40 per cent on corned beef, chicken, pork, fruit juices, ice-cream, sawn timber,
furniture and toilet paper — the very few items in which group trade had begun. And
Solomon Islands proposed to apply injury tariff rates to 37 items in the next 36 months
from the date of inception of this policy.28
Such reversals of policy are not restricted to Solomon Islands. The 2004 Fiji Budget
saw the Government reducing tariffs on the import of a common essential consumer
item — exercise books. In a matter of weeks, the Government had reversed its policy
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because of strong public lobbying by a major domestic ‘producer’.29 There is currently an
expansion of flour mills in Fiji. All can operate profitably only because of the high
protection afforded the industry, while the current industry leader acknowledges that a
metropolitan plant would satisfy the entire annual Fiji output in a few days. 
It is clear from general government reluctance to reduce import duty protection on
even dubious industries that reversals of free trade policies will also take place if and when
PICTA-induced trade begins, should there be threats to domestic producers.
PICs opposition to regional trade 
The economic logic of making FTAs work and produce the expected benefits requires
that PICs governments must understand the precise economic costs and benefits of their
affected or threatened industries. They need to come to clear conclusions as to the long-
term viability of these industries and firms before making decisions to foster or
perpetuate a protectionist environment. They also need to clarify whether PICs would
benefit more (in consumption and production) by complete unilateral trade deregulation
for some industries, rather than the limited deregulation posed by the regional trade
agreements. There is little indication that PICs in general have proceeded in this direc-
tion, although all have signed PICTA and PACER.30
It seems that while many PICs companies are in a position to aggressively target
other PICs markets, within the ambit of PICTA, few are contemplating doing so. Some
simply do not have the resources to do so. Some have been operating behind protec-
tionist barriers in ‘comfort zones’ for so long that it is virtually a foreign concept to think
of competing regionally or internationally. Some PICs companies simply do not have the
expertise to take advantage of PICTA. For some PICs companies, metropolitan multina-
tional control with conflicting interests in the PICs markets might also inhibit regional
and international aggression by the PICs company. Thus some PICs firms, which have
the capacity to export to other PICs, nevertheless follow company policy not to target
markets being supplied by the metropolitan company.
A recent study (Narsey 2003) on the integration of alcohol and tobacco products
into PICTA throws up a number of contentious issues, which might be examined with
respect to PICTA in general. While alcohol and tobacco products are currently excluded
from PICTA,31 there were serious concerns that some PICs breweries, distilleries and
cigarette manufacturers might not be able to compete in a Pacific-wide FTA. It would
seem that PICs governments have not decided between the trade-offs promised by the
FTAs (including cheaper consumer prices and a better range of goods) and government
revenues, short-term loss of domestic employment and incomes, and the demise of
relatively inefficient domestic firms.
The kinds of difficult decisions that some governments will be required to make
about the extent to which they should keep protecting their respective alcohol and
tobacco industries are exactly the kinds of decisions that they will be required to make
with respect to many industries threatened by the operations of PICTA in general, and
the eventual impact of PACER.
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PICs governments have not prepared for the possibility that when PICTA-induced
exports do begin to succeed in other PICs markets there will be opposition from vested
interests currently entrenched in those markets. A critical sticking point for the integra-
tion movement will be to resort to PICTA ‘Rules of Origin’ regulations to deny access to
competing PICTA products. Yet few PICs governments have examined their existing
industries to see whether their products would qualify under the Rules of Origin.
PICs unpreparedness for Rules of Origin issues
According to PICTA, each party must establish a mechanism to provide, on request, a
binding ruling on the originating status of goods to be imported, available at least six
months in advance of the shipment of such goods, and valid for at least six months after
the arrival of the first shipment. To this end, the parties are required to establish a Rules
of Origin Committee (serviced by Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat), which will consist
of representatives, whether from the public or private sector, from the first five parties to
ratify the agreement, including at least one representative from a least-developed country
or a small island state. Exception from the rules is permitted only where it is established,
on the basis of objective evidence, that the goods concerned have undergone ‘substantial
transformation’ in the territory of the exporting party;32 or are temporarily unable to
qualify as originating goods due to ‘exceptional circumstances’. 
Such a committee has yet to be established, yet almost certainly, any PICTA-
induced trade that threatens domestic industries will give rise to Rules of Origin
challenges. Most PICs alcohol and tobacco products are extremely unlikely to qualify
under the current PICTA Rules of Origin, while some are on the borderline.
Weakness in ACP negotiation strategy on EPAs and trade policy
The overall weakness in Pacific ACP trade policy might be seen as a specific weakness in
the EPA negotiation strategy — that relating to additional resources requested from the
EU, because of the likely losses in Pacific ACP governments’ fiscal revenue because of the
likely EPA requirement for significant reduction in tariffs. While the fiscal costs are
certainly likely to be borne by the Pacific ACPs, the benefits of the tariff reductions will
be enjoyed not by the EU, but by the Pacific ACPs’ major trading partners — Australia
and New Zealand.
For some of the PICs, trade liberalisation and integration into the global economy
has been a stated government policy, a desirable development policy on its own merits.
However, all PICs are concerned that trade liberalisation through the EPAs with the EU
might require PICs to grant reciprocity in tariff reductions, which, through the triggering
of PACER, might have significant negative impacts on PICs’ fiscal positions. This raises
one of the more interesting questions regarding PICs’ international trade strategy.
Table 1 indicates that very little of PICs’ duty revenues will be directly at risk
because of reduction of duties on imports from the EU. The share of the EU in PICs
imports is small. It has also been argued that the EU’s share will probably remain small,
despite the reduction in duties. Scollay (2002) suggests that where a trading partner had
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a large share of the Pacific ACP country’s market, this was an indicator of that country’s
competitive advantage in that market, and was also an indicator of its ability to increase
its market share, if it were granted preferential access via a FTA.33 The opposite would
apply to countries with small shares. While this argument would be applicable in situa-
tions where there was sharp competition between supplying countries, a more relevant
argument here would be the transport costs from Europe to the Pacific.
Thus, while the EPAs with the Pacific ACPs will not pose any great danger to
Pacific ACP fiscal stability, their triggering of PACER will have drastic consequences.
Australian and New Zealand shares of import duties comprise the largest share for most
PICs (and US for the Compact countries). If PACER is triggered, and PICs are required
to eliminate duty on 90 per cent of imports from Australia and New Zealand, there
would be dramatic reductions of import duty revenues for PICs, seriously threatening to
undermine the fiscal stability of PICs.34 Percentages of total import duty lost would be
Samoa 75 per cent, Vanuatu 50 per cent, Marshall Islands 50 per cent, Kiribati 45 per
cent, Niue 43 per cent and Fiji 38 per cent.35
Table 1: Share of trading partners in Pacific ACP Import Duty Revenues36 (2003/03)
Percentage of total import duty revenues collected
Origin Fiji Kiribati Marshall Is Niue Samoa Vanuatu
A/NZ 51 69 8 98 53 60
Australia 42 63 7 0 14 44
New Zealand 9 5 1 98 39 15
EU 1 0 5 4
PICTA
Fiji 13 9 9
PNG 2
United States 1 53 12
Others 47 18 39 2 22 25
All 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Narsey (2004).
One key element of the current Pacific ACP negotiating strategy is to use their reduction
of import tariffs as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions from the EU on the provision
of additional resources over and above that currently envisaged. The difficulty, however,
is that if the PICs with fisheries resources choose to negotiate separate EPAs with the EU,
other Pacific ACPs have very few ‘bargaining chips’ with which they can leverage
additional financial resources from the EU. The removal or reduction of import tariffs by
PICs will generate few economic benefits for the EU and therefore there is little incentive
for the EU to increase aid resources to the PICs. 
One possible argument for proceeding first with the EU EPAs is that the Pacific
ACP states will be able to win major concessions from the EU, which can then be used as
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precedents for winning similar concessions from Australia and New Zealand. Thus it is
hoped that there will be an asymmetrical liberalisation of tariffs, a generous interpreta-
tion of the quantification of ‘substantially all trade’, and major concessions on Mode 4
(movement of persons) on which Pacific ACP states will pose little real threat to EU
labour markets, because of distance. 
But there are two weaknesses in this argument. Firstly, the EU is not likely to give
the major trading concessions that the Pacific ACP states are looking for — especially
since it would run the risk of weakening the EU’s bargaining hand with the far more
important (for them) larger ACP states and the larger developing countries in general.
Secondly, there is currently little economic incentive for Australia and New Zealand to
adopt similar concessionary approaches to the PICs, given the paramountcy of their
trading interests.
The triggering of PACER, however, could offer the possibility of wider economic
quid pro quo benefits for PICs, from Australia and New Zealand.
The need for proactive triggering of PACER?
The current advice being offered to PICs is that in their EPA negotiations with the EU,
they should be careful not to use terminology that might trigger PACER. Thus, they
should insist on non-reciprocal market access and tariff concessions, while making no
reference to FTAs or Customs Unions (which would trigger PACER). This approach is
certainly possible. The EPAs are unlikely to take the form of a Customs Union, and
might be far from becoming a FTA-type of arrangement, especially if the EU grants the
ACP states non-reciprocity. Hence, Article 6 of PACER might not be triggered.
Moreover, even if full reciprocity has to be granted, and even if Article 6 does trigger
negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, there is no time limit to the consultations
required, nor any requirement that an agreement must be concluded. So, theoretically,
PICs can postpone the activation of any FTA created by PACER even while negotiating
fully reciprocal EPAs with the EU. 
But, there is a fundamental flaw in this approach. The Pacific ACP countries have
taken the position that, given the severe impact of the trade deregulation on their fiscal
positions, they will require corresponding benefits (such as additional resources) on the
development cooperation parts of the EPAs.
But, even if the EPAs achieve reciprocal duty-free access to the partners’ markets,
the potential loss of import revenue to the PICs is relatively small, because imports from
the EU are a relatively small part of PICs total imports. Consequently, the EU will itself
derive only marginal benefits from this trade deregulation in the PICs markets and there
is little economic incentive for the EU to grant any improved development package and
resources (over and above what is already granted under the Cotonou Agreement). 
On the other hand, should the duty-free access granted to the EU trigger similar
access to Australia and New Zealand through the PACER, the PICs (other than the
Compact territories) will see a severe reduction in their fiscal revenues and face major
financial costs of adjustment. 
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What is relevant is that there will be a significant expansion of imports from
Australia and New Zealand, which will thereby derive significant trading benefits. And
yet, while Australia and New Zealand would be expected to enjoy the lion’s share of the
benefits of deregulated PICs markets, negotiations with them, for quid pro quo conces-
sions to the PICs, are not on the agenda. 
Of course, once the EPAs are negotiated, the PICs could subsequently negotiate with
Australia and New Zealand on trade liberalisation. But PICs might then have weakened
their negotiating position, given that WTO regulations require that developed countries
(the EU and Australia/New Zealand) not be treated differentially by the developing
countries. It makes more sense therefore for Pacific ACPs to negotiate simultaneously with
Australia and New Zealand for reciprocal benefits to be derived from the deregulation of
Pacific ACP markets to exports from not just the EU, but Australia and New Zealand.
Understanding the extent of benefits that might be received by the PICs from
Australia and New Zealand, and a corresponding understanding of the extent to which
the PICs can grant tariff concessions to the exports of Australia and New Zealand, can
then logically feed into the EPA negotiations with the EU, with a better understanding
of the tariff concessions that can safely be made to the EU.
The economic reality is that the Australian and New Zealand economies will, in the
long term, be the most important economic partners for the PICs — in terms of foreign
investment, markets for PICs exports of goods and services (such as tourism), suppliers of
goods and services, donor assistance and possibilities for the absorption of skilled and
unskilled PICs labour. In terms of geopolitical developments, it could be argued that in
the long term, Australia and New Zealand should be the leaders of a ‘South Pacific
Community’ akin to the EU. It makes more sense therefore, even if Australia and New
Zealand have for the time being given up the initiative, for PACER to be triggered proac-
tively by the PICs, as a logical geopolitical development, which is in the long-term
interests of the citizens of the PICs.
It should be noted that this does not require PICs to choose between closer
relations with Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and the EU on the other.
Closer economic and political relationships with the EU as a global superpower have
much to commend them. Not only are there indications that Europe will be one of the
global economic powerhouses of the next two decades (with the euro likely to supplant
the US dollar as world currency), but economic and political relationships with the EU
do not have some of the negatives associated with a close relationship with the United
States, the other global superpower. For most of the PICs whose economies must depend
crucially on tourism, close association with the United States could make the PICs
vulnerable to terrorist attacks, thus posing grave threat to their economies.
The PACER provides for annual reviews of the operation of the agreement and all
aspects of trade and economic cooperation among the parties. General reviews of the
PACER are to be held at three-year intervals. The first such opportunity should be taken
by the PICs to begin negotiations towards a FTA, in return for tangible and more advan-
tageous benefits than are currently being offered under the South Pacific Regional Trade
and Economic Cooperation Agreement and the bilateral aid programmes.
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The ‘Jekyll-and-Hyde’ relationship between PICs and
Australia and New Zealand
PICs need to reorient their attitudes to Australia and New Zealand, away from the
‘Jekyll-and-Hyde’ relationship that currently exists. While many PICs and PICs regional
organisations37 are almost totally dependent for their recurrent budgets on aid from
Australia and New Zealand, there is national resentment when the latter attempt to
influence policies in the PICs.38 Thus, while national budgets talk of encouraging foreign
investment for economic growth, political leaders often condemn foreign investors as
economic exploiters, while foreign investment is discouraged in many areas of the
domestic economies.
Australia and New Zealand likewise need to examine whether their foreign policy
can move towards creating a genuine Pacific economic and political community, in
which the PICs can see their large neighbours as genuine ‘big brothers’, and not as ‘Big
Brother’. To a large extent, the reactive nature of PACER is an indication of a significant
weakness in the ability of Australia and New Zealand to proactively and sensitively
manage the evolution of economic and political relationships with the PICs. Australia
and New Zealand might wish to examine a perception among trade experts, for instance,
that whatever the logic of Australian and New Zealand aid to the PICs is, when it comes
to trading relationships, ‘no quarter will be given’, no concessions made, unless they
result in a net economic gain for Australia and New Zealand.39
The current EPA negotiations between the Pacific ACP states and the EU are an
interesting manifestation of the importance that the EU places on strengthening its
trade, investment and aid links through the Cotonou Agreement, with the score or so of
small Pacific ACP states. Yet Australia and New Zealand do not see as a priority the
inherent international political and economic advantages of having the PICs under their
wings, in some kind of a Pacific Economic and Political Community, which the PICs
could be encouraged to accept through the right mix of incentives. Were such a commu-
nity a reality, Australia and New Zealand might be able to engage in international fora,
claiming to speak for 20 or so Pacific Island nations, whose territories and exclusive
economic zones cover one-quarter of the world’s surface. Currently, Australia and New
Zealand seem to have lost the high ground to the EU.
Conclusion
The regional and international trading agreements that PICs have signed and are in the
process of negotiating present somewhat paradoxical situations. A major trade and aid
agreement (the Cotonou Agreement) encourages the prior establishment of a free trade
area among the PICs (PICTA). This FTA poses only limited benefits to the PICs.
In their EPA negotiations with the EU, the PICs are arguing for resources
additional to those provided by the Cotonou Agreement, because of the likely fiscal
impacts of the reciprocity in tariff reductions that the EPAs will require. Unfortunately,
the EU is unlikely to benefit significantly from reductions of duties to its exports. On the
other hand, reciprocity granted to the EU will, if PACER is triggered and taken to its
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logical conclusion, be required to be granted to Australia and New Zealand, who will
thereby be the primary beneficiaries of tariff reductions under the EPAs.
The irony is that increased trade, production and employment under a successful
PICTA might have to be reversed should the wider PACER be implemented with Australia
and New Zealand. The costs to the PICs will be substantial as the bulk of their domestic
manufacturing plants will face closure. It makes more sense therefore for the PICs to use
the prospect of reducing tariffs to EU trade not only to leverage development benefits from
the EU, but to simultaneously negotiate with Australia and New Zealand for development
benefits to be derived from closer economic integration and benefits, in return for freer
trade. PACER ought to be a priority area for PICs’ trade policy agendas. It is not currently.
Notes
1 The parties to the Melanesian Spearhead Group are Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji.
2 The Compact is between the United States and the FSM, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau, respectively.
3 Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Solomon Islands.
4 Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga.
5 PICTA does not include Australia and New Zealand.
6 While these countries ‘signed’ the agreement, it did not become binding until they
had ‘ratified’ it.
7 Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, Nauru and Kiribati
have ratified. Vanuatu and Tuvalu have not signed yet, while the three Compact
countries have been given a grace period.
8 Article 7, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.
9 Annex IV of PICTA.
10 A case in point is the recent successful challenge by Australia and Thailand of the
EU’s preferential prices for ACP sugar under the Cotonou Agreement.
11 PICTA (if all the signing countries ratify) is expected to create an expanded market of
some seven million consumers.
12 It might even be difficult to obtain a united front on the EPAs with the EU.
13 Some countries have a special relationship with New Zealand (such as Cook Islands
and Niue) while others have special links to the US (the Compact states of Palau,
Marshall Islands and FSM).
14 These are: Cook Islands, FSM, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue and Palau.
15 Free trade arrangements are taken to mean ‘free trade areas’ or Customs Unions (as
defined by GATT Article 24.8).
16 As PICs currently enjoy duty free (but qualified) entry under the South Pacific
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, the improvements in access
might be through measures such as more lenient Rules of Origin criteria, assistance
with marketing initiatives and assistance with quarantine obligations.
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17 The Cotonou Agreement, successor to the Lome Convention, was signed in Cotonou
(Benin) on 23 June 2000.
18 The extent of disagreements over the modality of proceeding further with the EPA
negotiations suggests that the Pacific ACPs are not being treated as genuine equal
partners. 
19 The extent of balance achieved in the new arrangements between these two sets of
objectives will therefore be an interesting reflection of the degree of ‘equality’ between
the two sets of partners.
20 The negotiations are expected to take place between September 2002 and December
2007, in two phases.
21 It is unclear how the new framework can be simultaneously equivalent to the existing
situation and in conformity with WTO rules.
22 Other definitions being suggested are 90 per cent of product lines, or an optimistic
hope for an asymmetric liberalisation, with 90 per cent being the average.
23 The World Bank (2002) argues that the PICTA member countries should reduce
their external tariffs in order to reduce the costs of trade diversion. However, doing so
would also reduce the incentives for domestic PICTA producers to benefit from the
enlarged FTA market.
24 The effective rates of protection measure, at world prices, the value added, which is
protected by the nominal duty.
25 For example, the requirements of building projects for roofing iron, or structural
steel, might be better served by manufacturing plant in the PICs, able to quickly
respond to specific needs.
26 Informal Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade and Economic Officials’ Meeting,
Forum Secretariat, 5 August 2002.
27 The 11th Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade and Economic Officials’ Meeting (Port
Moresby, 25 October 2002).
28 The minutes of the meeting apparently concluded that ‘The above two (2) resolu-
tions were adopted at the 11th [Melanesian Spearhead Group] Trade and Economic
Officials’ Meeting, subject to the acceptance of the above resolutions by each respec-
tive … Member Country’.
29 With most of the material inputs necessary for the manufacture of the exercise books
being imported, there would be miniscule domestic value adding, the effective rate of
protection would be extremely high, with the costs all imposed on the hapless
consumers.
30 The Samoan Government and its Ministry of Trade seem to be an exception in this
area (see below).
31 There were fears that reduction of duties might have a severe negative impact on some
governments’ excise and custom revenues.
32 The agreement also states that the Rules of Origin Committee should ensure that ‘if
appropriate, [the rules] conform to the guidelines produced by bodies such as the
World Customs Organisation and the World Trade Organisation’.
33 Impact Assessment of Possible Economic Partnership Agreements with the European
Union. A Report for the Pacific ACP States. 2002.
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34 It is ironic that several studies have argued that it would be to the advantage of PICs
to unilaterally reduce import duties. Few PICs governments are convinced of that 35
35 Based on 2003 data.
36 The data are given on shares of import duty rather than shares of imports by value, as
the two can be significantly different for most PICs.
37 The one exception is USP, whose recurrent budget is almost completely funded by
the member governments.
38 A recent case in point was the furor over the appointment of the Secretary-General of
the Forum Secretariat.
39 This was the response given to the author when he first suggested to a Forum Trade
Experts Advisory Group meeting (including experts from New Zealand, Australia and
the Commonwealth) that the PICs should open a negotiating front with Australia
and New Zealand, simultaneously with the EPA negotiating front with the EU.
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Neo-Liberalism and the
Disciplining of Pacific Island 
States — the Dual Challenges 
of a Global Economic Creed and 
a Changed Geopolitical Order
Claire Slatter
Introduction
Post-Cold War development and aid discourses on Pacific Island states reflect an ideolog-
ical struggle for the hearts and minds of political leaders and policy-makers in Pacific
Island states and their traditional benefactors in Australasia by free-market-policy
advocates based in or linked to academia. A pronounced feature of these discourses,
which advocate structural adjustment policies, or what is euphemistically termed ‘reform’
in the Pacific region, has been their employment of positive and negative imagery,
ridicule and praise in analysing Pacific Island states, economies and societies. Seemingly
complimentary references to Pacific Islanders’ ‘risk-loving, enterprising, seafaring
forebears, whose voyages1 opened the vast South Pacific, and who developed a distinct
material culture and civilization in remote, resource poor islands’ (Kasper 1991: 70), like
praise for how well Islanders who have more recently ventured into the outside world
have adapted to ‘an extended individualistic order’ (Kasper 1991: 70), encourage enter-
prise and risk-taking in the unchartered economic seas of a deregulated global economy
and a journeying away from all that Pacific Islanders have known, and held dear. At the
same time, derogatory references in the discourses to Pacific Island states’ economic
dependency on aid (Kasper 1988, 1991; Hughes 2003), and ridicule of their standing as
micro-political entities in the world of larger nation-states deter smaller island govern-
ments from questioning, much less resisting, the new economic wisdom of ‘reform’,
while eroding the notion and value of national sovereignty. In these discourses, enter-
prising citizens — as individuals or as owners/shareholders of corporate bodies — rather
than states, are presented as the primary agents of economic development, and the
growth prospects of islands, as opposed to the viability of nation-states and national
economies, appear as the principal concern. 
Consensus among multilateral and bilateral donors in the region on what the
Pacific Island states’ best economic policy options are has seen the prioritisation of
‘reform’ in donor aid programming since the mid-1990s. The ideological foundation on
which structural adjustment policies are based is neo-liberalism, a philosophy that hinges
on beliefs in free enterprise, deregulated economies and labour markets, private owner-
ship, individual property rights, small government, reduced taxes, a market-friendly state
and global trade liberalisation, or the opening up of the world’s markets, labour pools
and resource bases to all economic competitors on theoretically equal terms. Many of the
most ardent advocates of neo-liberalism are linked to economic policy think tanks that
exist for the primary purpose of influencing political leaders and policy-makers through
strategic dissemination of their publications. The one-size-fits-all economic model that
they advocate is the same as that promoted by multilateral lending institutions and bilat-
eral donors through structural adjustment policies, and there are indeed close
interconnections between the advocacy work of neo-liberal think tanks and the policies
of multilateral agencies and bilateral donors. 
In the past 15 years, free-market advocates within Australian and New Zealand
academia have been producing analyses of Pacific Island economies and states, some of
them commissioned or otherwise supported by their governments, or written for multi-
lateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
The use of ridicule and praise in several of these reports reflects the evident ideological
project in which their authors are engaged and the far from value-free scientific basis on
which their analyses and prescriptions rest. Selling market fundamentalism, like other
variants of extremism, entails securing conversions through the combined strategies of
castigation and shaming for wrongdoing, on the one hand, and promising a better life
after repentance and return to the right path, on the other. The subjection of Pacific
Island states to neo-liberal demagoguery and donor-driven economic and trade liberalisa-
tion constitutes what might be called a disciplining of island states in the post-Cold War,
unipolar world of corporate-driven globalisation where free-market ideas appear to reign
supreme. With the justification and cover for new forms of economic and political
domination provided by the United States’ ‘war against terrorism’, and the continuing
influence of neo-liberal thinking, so-called ‘failed’ and ‘non-viable’ Pacific Island states
could find themselves even more deprived of their sovereignty in the years ahead.
This chapter focuses on the fostering of neo-liberal economic ideas in the Pacific
from the 1990s, the routes through which they have gained entry to and acquired
credence in the region, the economic policy changes that derive from them, and the
changed geopolitical context, global compacts and treaties that are the hallmarks of the
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new global economic order underpinned by neo-liberalism. Attention is drawn to how
neo-liberal ideas and their proponents have been shaping thinking within the Pacific, and
about the Pacific and its future, especially since the 1990s, and to some of the implica-
tions of fully embracing these ideas and the policies they inspire. 
Academic pushers of neo-liberalism in the Pacific 
Neo-liberal economic policies were first advocated in the Pacific region by Australian
economists based at The Australian National University (ANU). In 1988, barely a year
after the first military coup in Fiji, a book entitled Fiji — Opportunity from Adversity
(Kasper, Bennett and Blandy 1988) proposed (in the words of a reviewer) ‘a three-
pronged reform agenda to … transform Fiji into a mid-Pacific Hong Kong’. Published
by the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS), a think tank promoting free markets,
individual liberty, ‘democratic government under the rule of law’, and a ‘free civil
society’, the research on which it was based was initiated by the ANU’s National Centre
for Development Studies (NCDS) and was funded by the Australian Government’s
International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), now known as AusAID. It was
a collaboration that illustrated well the close links between neo-liberal think tanks,
universities and government aid bureaus.2 The book’s chief recommendations were:
constitutional guarantee of civic and economic rights to all Fijian citizens to restore
confidence and security; rapid deregulation of labour, capital and produce markets; and
comprehensive privatisation, to reduce the size of the government and invigorate activi-
ties stifled by bureaucratic and union controls. The authors viewed the break in
Australia-Fiji aid relations, as a consequence of the 1987 coups, as a timely opportunity
for Australia to re-evaluate its aid strategy, given changes in general thinking on
economic and development policy around the world, and the new ‘hard-nosed philos-
ophy’ that was spreading in donor countries (Kasper, Bennett and Blandy 1988: xii).
They advised the Australian Government against providing unconditional aid to post-
coup Fiji, saying it would be tantamount to ‘an outright subsidy to a growing class of
politicians, military and bureaucrats’, who were accountable to neither Australian nor
Fijian taxpayers. The key requirements for economic growth, they argued, were not aid
but ‘economic and social policies and the attitude of the population to work, learning,
and capital formation’. They proposed the introduction of conditionality in Australian
aid and advocated directing more aid through ‘private channels’ (specifically, voluntary
agencies and private companies), and a more openly self-interested approach to using
Australian aid.3 This was the first clearly articulated neo-liberal economic policy guide
proposed to a Pacific state. 
A second CIS publication4 on aid and development policy in the Pacific (Kasper,
Bauer and Siwatibau 1991), blamed aid for inhibiting economic advance and judged it
unnecessary, since capital required for development could be secured through foreign
direct (private) investment. Transfers of wealth from Pacific Islanders living and working
abroad to their families in the Islands were seen as inducing increases in public sector
wages and salaries, exerting upward pressure on national wages and exacerbating difficul-
ties in a number of Pacific Island countries (eg., by raising agricultural wages in Tonga,
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Samoa and Cook Islands and making it increasingly difficult to secure agricultural
labour). Traditional systems (such as the absence of a tradition of genuine private
property), favourable natural endowments (which provide basic necessities with little
effort, encouraging a work ethic that does not link work effort with survival), a benign or
non-traumatic colonial experience and continuing post-colonial patronage through aid
(which subsidised Pacific economies and maintained a level of ‘subsistence affluence’ and
inappropriately large national governments modelled on those of larger states and run as
personal fiefdoms by traditional or new elites) were together seen as inherent constraints
to economic development. 
Pacific Island states were said to be ‘unfamiliar with genuine poverty’ and were
enjoying middle-income status by World Bank definition (with French Polynesia and
New Caledonia ‘exceeding New Zealand’s modest living standards’), which could not be
maintained by local production and productivity without perpetual aid. Fundamental
problems were predicted and ‘peaceful social evolution, cohesion, prosperity and
stability’ were seen as attainable only through the ‘openness, vertical mobility, and scope
for individual rivalry and self-realisation’ that markets, civil rights and equality before the
law could provide (Kasper, Bauer and Siwatibau 1991: 64). Changes in Pacific ways were
considered necessary, namely ‘more work, more systematic work, more savings, and a
longer-term planning horizon’, and the costs to cherished culture and values in
embracing the ‘growth and performance-oriented economic lifestyle’, would be minimal. 
In the first instance of deriding Pacific Island states, Kiribati was ridiculed for
seeking to ‘play a grand international role’ by hosting a regional ministerial meeting in
1989 at enormous cost to Australian taxpayers, who footed the bill for a navy ship, which
was dispatched to provide accommodation for participants. And ‘most of the best-
educated Pacific Islanders’ were disparaged as ‘professional aid seekers who increasingly
regard foreign aid as a right and threaten to make political mischief if they don’t get it’.
Pacific leaders were evidently expected to be shamed by these deprecatory remarks into
accepting the ‘wisdom’ of economic restructuring, and to trust that Western technology,
management and economic modes of behaviour could be adopted in the Pacific, as they
had been in Asia ‘without giving up one’s Chinese, Malay, Korean, Japanese or Indian
identity’ (Kasper, Bauer and Siwatibau 1991: 79). 
The CIS’s analyses of Pacific economies predated the World Bank’s Pacific reports
of 1991 and 1993, which together provided donors with authoritative texts for pushing
‘reform’ in Pacific Island states. Yet, there were obvious echoes of the CIS authors’
perspectives and arguments in the World Bank reports. 
Making structural adjustment policies the new development
framework in the Pacific
In its first report on the state of Pacific Island economies (1991), the World Bank
highlighted the ‘sluggish’ economic growth performance of Pacific Island states compared
with the ‘more dynamic island economies of the Caribbean (5%) and the Indian Ocean
(7%)’, and despite their receipt of ‘some of the highest inflows of per capita development
assistance’ (World Bank 1991: 1, 3). Inward-looking economic strategies, such as protec-
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tion of local industries, state enterprises and over-regulation, were blamed for this. A
number of trade-centred ‘dynamic growth strategies’ were proposed as remedies:
abandoning inward-looking, import-substitution policies and promoting private sector
investment and export production; shifting away from producing primary commodities
toward production of processed products for export; concentrating on a few specialised
areas in which they had ‘a clear comparative advantage’; and introducing greater flexi-
bility in wages. Developing entrepreneurial capacity and expanding private sector
participation in investment and economic activity were especially emphasised as the key
to economic growth, and the primary challenge for Pacific Island economies in the
1990s, according to the World Bank, was providing a policy environment to facilitate
private investment (World Bank 1991: iv). 
Among the recommended macro-economic policies were fiscal adjustment to
reduce fiscal deficits to more manageable levels, appropriate wage and exchange rate
policies to maintain external competitiveness and keep wages in line with economy-wide
productivity, restructuring the tax system to broaden the tax base, lower direct taxes,
eliminate trade-inhibiting taxes, and a shift towards an indirect tax system that ‘does not
discriminate across productive sectors’ (World Bank 1991: iii). Tariff reform, to reduce
high tariff levels and remove protective arrangements, was recommended as an essential
part of tax reform. Corporate taxes were recommended ‘at rates conducive to private
investment and growth’ (World Bank 1991: iv). 
Recommended public sector management policies included reducing the adminis-
trative budget (particularly public sector wages and salaries, which were considered to
have grown excessively and had inflated wages throughout the economy), improvement
of physical infrastructure, and introduction of a programme of privatisation, particularly
for commodity marketing boards and other enterprises that ‘crowd out private invest-
ment’ or that ‘could be more efficiently managed by the private sector’. Additionally, the
report proposed the abandonment of five-year planning and the adoption of a new
approach to national planning — one that ‘emphasises macro-economic assessment and
the preparation of broad development strategies’ (World Bank 1991: viii). 
With expanded export production, economic and labour market deregulation,
privatisation or corporatisation of state-owned enterprises, and a strengthened private
sector as its main policy prescriptions for Pacific Island economies, the World Bank
showed little consideration for the peculiar limitations of small economies suffering
distinct disadvantages in respect of resource bases, physical infrastructure, human
resources and geographical location. The policy package offered to its Pacific member
countries was little different from those offered by the bank to other countries, with
vastly different economies. 
The second World Bank report on Pacific economies appeared more mindful of the
peculiar specificities of its Pacific member countries and even claimed that its objective
was ‘not to impose some model derived elsewhere, but to adapt approaches’. While more
holistic in its coverage, with comprehensive chapters on human resource development
and environmental issues, its economic analysis and policy prescriptions differed little in
substance from those advanced in the earlier report. Public sector reform, efficiency in
Neo-Liberalism and the Disciplining of Pacific Island States 95
the use of foreign aid and the crucial role of the private sector were reiterated as the keys
to attaining sustainable economic growth, with high-growth economies of East Asia, the
Maldives and Barbados cited as models for Pacific emulation. The ‘Pacific Paradox’ was
coined to describe the conundrum posed by the absence of growth in average real per
capita income in the past decade despite favourable natural and human resource endow-
ment, high levels of aid and reasonably prudent economic management (World Bank
1993: ix, 1). A ‘development partnership’ between the state and the private sector was
advocated as the key to achieving economic growth (World Bank 1993: 37). The bank
recommended more effective economic engagement with the rest of the world, enhancing
international competitiveness, broadening trade and investment links, especially with the
East Asian growth centres, and reforming the public sector by restructuring, consoli-
dating, privatising, down-sizing and lowering public sector wages, which were deemed to
be ‘well in excess of average national incomes’ (World Bank 1993: ix–x). 
Neo-liberal development studies 
One of the first agencies to draw on the World Bank’s first Pacific report as an authorita-
tive text was the ANU’s NCDS. This was not surprising, as its director in the early
1990s, Professor Helen Hughes, had worked for many years at the World Bank. In a
series of research papers funded by AIDAB and published under the theme Pacific 2010,
the NCDS aimed to ‘alert Pacific Island governments and those responsible for the
design and delivery of development assistance to the island states of the Pacific’ of the
‘doomsday scenario’ that, in the opinion of the project’s lead scholars, awaited the Pacific
states unless they met the challenge of facing up to their looming economic and social
problems. In assuming this role in the 2010 project, the NCDS revealed itself as an insti-
tution committed to advocacy in support of neo-liberal economic policies, a project to
which its postgraduate training programme targeting future policy-makers in developing
countries especially in the Asia-Pacific region, was also geared. 
The first Pacific 2010 publication (Cole 1993) was introduced by comments from
NCDS’s Islands/Australia Programme Director and former Fiji colonial government
officer, Rodney Cole, who called Pacific Island states ‘adroit players of the aid game’,
which had ensured for themselves ‘a strong and regular flow of largesse, first from former
colonial powers, but now, at the beginning of the ’90s, from the world at large’ (Cole
1993: vi). According to Cole, the inhabitants of South Pacific Island states now ‘want[ed]
more out of life than subsistence affluence’, and Pacific Island leaders ‘and their financial
mentors’ faced enormous difficulties in meeting the wants and needs of their ‘rapidly
expanding populations’. The publication’s lead article provided a futuristic portrayal by
Australian Financial Review journalist Rowan Callick.5 Intended by the project’s leaders to
present ‘a more colourful picture, a grim and challenging picture, but one that is neverthe-
less disturbingly close to the drier portrait available from the data’ (Cole 1993: 1), Callick’s
‘doomsday scenario’ of the Pacific in the year 2010 was based on population projections of
NCDS’s demographers, who predicted a doubling of the region’s population to nine
million in just more than 15 years. Callick’s wild imagining of the Pacific in 2010 was
evidently calculated to shock Pacific leaders (who might not have found the picture
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painted by the demographers ‘easy to read’) into taking steps to avoid what he portrayed as
an otherwise inevitable nightmare: beggars on the streets of every South Pacific town,
endemic malnutrition, a rising incidence of AIDS deaths, lagoons declared unfit for
human activity and public water supplies unsafe for drinking, labour a major export from
the region, modern and traditional narcotics major sources of foreign currency, gangs of
youth extorting their own form of ‘tax’, and (an evident horror for Callick) ‘a greater
number of Asian workers arriving … [with] mosques … now found in almost every island
capital’ (Cole 1993: 5). Underlining the need for reform, Callick wrote: 
Pacific Islanders lack sufficient savings to develop their region in pace with their
aspirations and dreams, as opposed to their nightmares. Most forecasts assume a static
or declining level of direct aid, concessional loans and even commercial capital avail-
able to the region, as other priorities take precedence. The South Pacific, it is said in
such quarters, has had a good enough run, and now is its chance to stand on its own
two feet. (Cole 1993: 7)
In Callick’s view, regional policy-makers needed to accelerate the ‘conceptual shift … from
a traditional emphasis on the importance of distribution of wealth (where a chief or big
man gains stature from his gifts and from the generosity of his feasts) to an emphasis on
production, on building (amassing), managing, and re-investing that wealth’. He wrote: 
A new type of generosity is thus required — one that may mean standing by to make
room for people with special talents, especially to do business profitably. This shift can only
take place through an example being set by the South Pacific leaders themselves —
politicians, senior officials and traditional chiefs. (Cole 1993: 7)
Assuring Pacific leaders that ‘the appropriate domestic policies, implemented wholeheart-
edly by island nations — not just governments, but communities as a whole — … with
the support of a friendly external environment [could] turn the grim trends around’,
Callick highlighted policies that he said were required urgently to be put in place:
population policies to reduce national growth rates, national environmental policies
based on national audits of existing environmental problems confronting each nation,
and economic adjustment (Cole 1993: 8–9). He then itemised the required economic
reforms: tighter budgetary discipline; measures to enhance competitiveness; corporatisa-
tion and privatisation; reform of the financial sector; adjustment of exchange rates;
altering the way wages are determined; and reorganisation of government priorities so
that a greater proportion of the budget is spent on education, health and infrastructure
(Cole 1993: 10–11). 
… [A] greater sense of international interdependence will have to emerge, perhaps
starting within the South Pacific Forum. The success stories, economically and politi-
cally, will be those emphasizing openness and links — trade, investment, even the
movement of skilled workers, foreigners and nationals, in and out of the country —
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rather than those emphasizing a defiant independence. A greater focus within the
region on free trade would help to frame the right mentality. (Cole 1993: 11) 
In the only substantive analysis in the book, education professor and economist Ken
Gannicott discussed the likely higher costs of education within the seven countries in the
next 20 years, showing three different scenarios of the financial burden for each country
of providing primary and secondary education under conditions of moderate enrolment
increases and ‘low GDP’, more rapid enrolment increases and low GDP, and more rapid
increases in enrolment and ‘high GDP’ (Cole 1993: 18–24).6 Gannicott went on to
prescribe ‘what needs to be done’ (Cole 1993: 26): a population policy, a lowering of
school unit costs by World Bank recommended strategies such as cost recovery in higher
education, reallocation of expenditure within the education sector and decentralised
management, and higher economic growth through structural economic reforms (1993:
26–7). Accepting without question the bank’s projections ‘of the faster [economic]
growth that would be possible from structural and policy reform in the region’ (Cole
1993: 21), Gannicott’s tables aimed to show that ‘if the economy grows at the much
faster rates considered feasible if structural economic reforms are carried out … [educa-
tional objectives] can be achieved [at a lower] per cent of GDP’ (1993: 27).
Gannicott also addressed labour force growth and employment, highlighting the
particularly difficult times that lay ahead for Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands and Vanuatu, with high rates of increase of the labour force, the generally ‘poor
record’ of Pacific Island countries in creating employment and the fact that much of the
wage employment in the Pacific region (about 40 per cent) had been in the public sector
(Cole 1993: 30–1). He reiterated the exaggerated employment projections of the World
Bank’s high GDP scenario (with structural reforms) for Papua New Guinea — ‘formal
sector employment could grow from 214,000 in 1990 to 327,000 in 2000’ (World Bank
1991a: 30, cited by Gannicott in Cole 1993: 32) — and cited extensively from the
World Bank’s 1991 report, Pacific Island Economies: Towards Higher Growth in the 1990s,
reproducing its arguments that incomes were too high in the Pacific, that they were
sustained not by domestic savings but by remittances and official transfers, that the large
inflows of aid had fostered growth in the government sector at the expense of the private
sector, and that high wages in the government had ‘disincentive effects’ on other sectors
in the labour market, notably agriculture (Cole 1993: 39). 
Gannicott’s concluding proposals could have been lifted verbatim from the World
Bank report: develop policies to promote a climate for private investment by removing
‘distortions in exchange rates, wages, and tax and trade policies’ as well as ‘regulatory
hurdles to private activity’; channel more aid to the private sector to support the develop-
ment of private sector employment opportunities; improve efficiency in the public
service and improve its capacity ‘to support private sector development’ through public
expenditure restructuring, tax reform, public pricing policy and reduced public sector
involvement in services that the private sector can provide more efficiently; and provide
cost-effective education. 
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Intervening in Pacific Islands states through the 
South Pacific Forum
Greg Fry (1997) has written of how the Pacific 2010 publication gave ‘intellectual
authority’ to the then newly elected Australian Labor Government’s new aid policy for
the South Pacific, enunciated later in the same year by Gordon Bilney, Minister for the
newly established portfolio of Pacific Island Affairs. According to Fry, Bilney’s address
signalled that Australia’s new Pacific Policy would be focused, not on the earlier Cold
War preoccupation with ‘regional security’, but on ‘radically transform[ing] the regional
economic order’ to bring it into line with Australia’s own reform agenda and generally
prevailing policy trends (Fry 1997). Fry’s prophetic assessment was that the new policy
approach would involve ‘an intended level of intervention in Pacific Island societies and
states not contemplated since the colonial period’ and that its purpose would be ‘to trans-
form not only the development model and to reform government procedures, but also to
effect change in cultural structures and traditional practices such as customary land
tenure’ (Fry 1997). 
The selected target for the launch of this new policy thrust towards a regional
agenda of economic restructuring, informed by World Bank and NCDS thinking, was
the South Pacific Forum (now called the Pacific Islands Forum), which met in Brisbane
that year. In the words of Sutherland (2000: 465), the Brisbane meeting of the forum
marked a ‘turning point’ in its history. Three decisions directly relating to a regional
agenda of economic restructuring were made by Pacific leaders at that forum. Firstly,
after agreement that the private sector ‘had an important role to play in the reforms now
being undertaken in the region and needed to be strengthened to enable it to lead the
next stage of growth’, the Forum Secretariat was directed ‘to undertake a greater facili-
tating role in providing policy advice to member governments in these areas’ (Forum
Secretariat News, No. 13, December 1994). Secondly, it was agreed that annual Forum
Finance Ministers’ Meetings be held to consider appropriate aspects of economic reform
and Australia’s offer to fund the first such meeting at the Forum Secretariat the next year
was accepted. Thirdly, it was agreed to encourage the participation in Forum Economic
Ministers’ Meetings of representatives from the international financial institutions, that
is, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the ADB. Two further
decisions made at the Leaders’ Retreat that followed the Brisbane forum, from proposals
put by the Australian Government, were to ‘reform the [Pacific Islands]7 Forum process
to ensure greater effectiveness’ and to restructure its Secretariat (Sutherland 2000: 465).
The latter process, according to Sutherland (2000), was already under way, but clarifica-
tion of its purpose would not have gone astray. The decisions were aimed at creating
optimum conditions for achieving focused discussion on specific issues (highlighted by a
theme), securing prior political agreement on specific reforms and on a programme for
implementation, and narrowing the responsibilities of the Forum Secretariat to the core
business of supporting and facilitating the agenda of economic restructuring. 
The forum has been an effective avenue for the transmission of neo-liberal
economic ideas and thinking to Pacific Island leaders by external agents, and, as the
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members of the forum with the most resources and the considerable leverage of their
donor status, the Australian and New Zealand governments have been in a strong
position to influence agendas, frame debates and propose policy decisions. By 1994,
when the broad outlines of a regional restructuring agenda began to emerge with distinct
coherence within the South Pacific Forum, Australia and New Zealand were themselves
heavily committed to economic restructuring within their own countries, and were
intent on exporting their economic policies to the Pacific region.8 The proposed restruc-
turing of the Forum Secretariat was a crucial step in a multilateral, donor-driven process
aimed at achieving the twin objectives of economic restructuring and governance reform,
and the administrative and programme restructuring that occurred between 1994 and
1995 effectively narrowed the Forum Secretariat’s functions to providing technical and
administrative support for the region-wide implementation of economic policy reforms.9
Indeed, after 1995, the facilitation and oversight of economic, financial and trade
reforms in the region became the core business of the Forum Secretariat. From convening
and servicing annual meetings of Pacific Island finance and trade ministers, attaining
collective, time-bound commitments from them to implement reform targets, and estab-
lishing monitoring mechanisms to ensure these commitments were met, to advancing
trade liberalisation through the mechanisms of regional trade agreements, the Forum
Secretariat’s role has been central to implementing the externally driven programme of
economic, financial and trade reforms aimed at achieving region-wide economic, finan-
cial and trade liberalisation. 
At the 26th South Pacific Forum meeting in Madang in 1995, and at the Leaders’
Retreat that followed it, discussions were guided by the theme, ‘Securing Development
Beyond 2000’, and a plan of action and a vision statement were adopted (Annexes 1 and
2 of the Forum Communiqué, 1995). A comprehensive list of national economic policy
measures and regionally based activities were endorsed by the Pacific Leaders as key to
securing development beyond 2000, and, not surprisingly, it read like a checklist for neo-
liberal policy measures: 
— securing the potential benefits of globalisation by enhancing competitiveness
through promoting price stability (low inflation); 
— avoiding artificial distortions to the prices of domestic resources (land, labour and
capital); 
— reducing trade taxes and import duties, which adversely affect export competitiveness;
— removing implicit and explicit barriers to foreign direct investment;
— adopting and implementing the investment principles agreed to by APEC members
as a signal to potential investors of the region’s serious intentions to promote and
encourage foreign direct investment; 
— working towards implementation of trade reform measures as requested by
GATT/WTO, including by replacing non-tariff barriers with tariffs and setting
timeframes for minimising tariff levels; promoting trade within and outside the
region by standardising administrative procedures in areas of customs and quaran-
tine, labelling and packaging, export and import controls, exchange controls and
technical standards; and
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— improving pubic sector efficiency and cost effectiveness through the rationalisation
of public services, policy coherence and commitment to the principle of good
governance. (Communiqué, South Pacific Forum [95] 16: 16)
By 1995, there was an evident convergence in World Bank and South Pacific Forum
thinking. Sutherland (2000) reported that by the time the World Bank published its
third report on its Pacific member countries in 1995,10 ‘the task of convincing the islands
to undertake reforms had been achieved’ and the ‘pleadings and urgings’ of its earlier
reports had given way to ‘specific, sector-focused advice and even a statement of
“Priorities for Regional Actions” in the 1995 report’ (Sutherland 2000: 462). By the
second half of 1998, he said, the regional reform agenda was reportedly ‘well and truly in
place’ (Sutherland 2000: 468). 
Between 1995 and 1998, programme lending by the ADB in support of ‘economic,
public sector and governance reforms’ assumed a significant proportion of the bank’s
lending in the Pacific (Knapman and Saldanha 1999: 1), a change in ‘operational focus’
that saw the ADB funding policy reform implementation in six Pacific Island states —
Cook Islands, FSM, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. By 1998,
no less than 11 other donor agencies were funding or had assisted public sector reform
projects in one or more of the following seven countries of the region — Cook Islands,
FSM, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga (AusAID/NZMFAT 1998: 1).11
From 1995 onwards, regular meetings of Forum Finance Ministers — from 1997,
Forum Economic Ministers’ Meetings — effectively charted the course for the systematic
implementation of structural adjustment in the region. Pacific Islands Forum meetings
from 1995 were clearly being provided with direction and leadership by this grouping of
Finance (and, after 1997, Economic) Ministers. The institution of this strategic political
mechanism involving the political heads of national treasuries was an effective mecha-
nism in advancing the regional reform agenda. Meetings of Finance Ministers functioned
as a sub-council of the forum, carrying out advance planning of national economic and
trade policies for implementation across the region. Later, through reporting mechanisms
that were adopted, they monitored policy implementation. The institution of Finance
Ministers’ meetings effectively moved national economic planning and decision-making
beyond the domain and purview of national constituencies. And the inclusion of repre-
sentatives of international financial institutions in the annual meetings of Forum Finance
(and Economic) Ministers from 1995, at the suggestion of the Australian Government,
placed donor agencies and international financial institutions in a strategically advanta-
geous position to influence economic policy decisions and to follow up policy advice
with financial and technical assistance to facilitate national implementation of policy
reform. More importantly, it facilitated the development of an integrated, multilateral
approach to restructuring Pacific economies and states. The high level of coordination
and collaboration in designing and implementing economic restructuring in the Pacific
Island states achieved between 1995 and 1998 was grounded in what the ADB described
as a consensus among donors in respect to development assistance to the Pacific Island
states (Knapman and Saldanha 1999: 9). 
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Ensuring participation and ownership — the ADB approach
to reform 
The political neutrality and considerable financial and technical resources of the ADB
favoured it as the lead designer/coordinator and financier of economic restructuring
within the island states of the Pacific, as evinced in the following explanatory note
provided in the report of a joint Australian and New Zealand government review of the
ADB’s role in Regional reform, undertaken in 1998: 
Bilateral donors are unable to respond in the same way [as the ADB] because of
historical links with Pacific Governments or inability to mobilise sufficient resources
and the broad range of expertise required to address financial management, macro
economic policies, public service restructuring, debt, legislative and governance issues
as well as the social impact of reforms. (AusAID/NZMFAT 1998: 1) 
A shift in the ADB’s strategic focus for Pacific Developing Member Countries in October
1995 to accommodate the lead role it was to assume for macro-economic policy reform
in the Pacific Islands states appears to be the outcome of Australian and New Zealand
government intervention. Both governments, out of a concern to ‘foster a high level of
coordination and collaboration’, had commissioned a joint review of the ADB’s technical
assistance programmes in 11 Pacific Island countries in 1995 (AusAID/NZMFAT 1998:
1). This followed the creation of an Office of Pacific Operations within the bank’s Manila
headquarters in January 1995. The subsequent shift from ‘sector and project lending’ to
‘support for macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment, and public sector
and governance reform’ (Knapman and Saldanha 1999: 1) saw the ADB take on the role
of supporting government policy reform efforts through the provision of Public Sector
Reform Programme Loans and chairing new consultative group processes in the Marshall
Islands, the FSM and Cook Islands (Terms of Reference, Joint Australia/NZ Review
1998: 38). By 1999, the ADB was designing and underwriting restructuring programmes
in no less than seven Pacific Island states with the support of bilateral donors, namely
New Zealand (in Cook Islands and Samoa) the United States (in FSM and Marshall
Islands), Australia (Solomon Islands), France and the EU (Vanuatu and Solomon
Islands). 
The ADB’s view of what it has been doing appears disinterested and technocratic,
its interventions presented as necessary responses to restore macro-economic stability in
Pacific Developing Member Countries facing fiscal crises. In the words of Knapman and
Saldanha, the response to crisis by Pacific Island states and donors usually followed a
pattern: 
… the first step of government has been to appeal to external funding agencies for
initial and urgent fiscal support to tide over the crisis. Such agencies, including the
Bank, have taken the opportunity to engage the government in examining the root
causes of the fiscal crisis, viz. economic policy and management, poor governance and
an out of control public sector. In most cases this process has culminated in the prepa-
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ration of a reform framework that includes a conditionality matrix covering the key
factors that need to be addressed (in the case of Cook Islands, RMI, FSM, Vanuatu)
or a more informal meeting (as in the case of the Solomon Islands) at which the
government and external funding agencies have agreed on the framework for reform
and related external support. (1999: 6)
The ADB puts an emphasis on achieving what it calls ‘participation and ownership’,
usually through national summit meetings (Cook Islands, Vanuatu, FSM and Fiji).
These have played a critical role, according to Knapman and Saldanha, in engendering
national consensus on the need for reform, thereby enabling governments to ‘proceed
with reform agendas that would otherwise have been unpalatable to the general popula-
tion’. Summits, they said, presented opportunities (in Cook Islands, FSM and Vanuatu)
for representatives of the people to not only ‘express their unhappiness with the state of
governance’, but to ‘vent their frustrations with continued misgovernment’ (Knapman
and Saldanha 1999: 13). These exercises of setting governments up to receive strong
public criticism and of giving ‘representatives of the people’ an understanding that they
were being consulted and listened to helped soften up governments and national
constituencies for reform. In Knapman and Saldanha’s words, ‘the messages offered were
accepted and provided a strong basis for developing and ensuring public acceptability of
the reform programmes’ (1999: 13). Equally as significant as summit meetings for
engendering ownership and participation is having a ‘champion or group of champions
of the reform process’. In all six Pacific countries, they reported, ‘the top political leader-
ship’ championed the reform, thereby engendering ‘strong political and public
commitment’ (Knapman and Saldanha 1999: 9). 
The Forum Secretariat and the push for regional trade 
liberalisation 
Structural adjustment policies are now widely recognised as paving the way for a global
regime of free trade, a ‘borderless world’ in which free access to the resources and markets
of the globe will theoretically be enjoyed equally by all competitors, irrespective of where
they are located. As Gita Sen of feminist network DAWN12 has put it, structural adjust-
ment policies were evidently the ‘battering ram’ for trade liberalisation. The strategy of
achieving global trade liberalisation incrementally through the imposition of structural
adjustment policies and bilateral and multilateral treaty processes or social contracts
between or among states, with resulting agreements emerging as enforceable global trade
laws under the multilateral trading system of the WTO reflects the current geopolitical
order, dominated by advanced capitalist states and the transnational corporations that
run their economies. As the growing conflict between developed and developing states
within the WTO at the past three Ministerial Conferences amply signals, the global
architecture of free trade is being framed in the interests of the economies of developed
states and the corporate interests that dominate them, to the detriment of developing
countries. In this context, what Pacific Island states have to gain from the end point of
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reform or structural adjustment, which is to say global free trade, is open to contention.
Yet, Pacific Island states continue to pursue liberalisation policies as if there were no alter-
native, a response that has resulted from the apparent conversion of key political leaders
and policy-makers in the region to neo-liberal economic ideas, and from the role played
by the Forum Secretariat in advancing the agenda of trade liberalisation. 
From 1999, the Forum Secretariat worked to secure Pacific Island states’ compli-
ance with WTO trade principles and rules through the modality of two regional free
trade agreements. One of these, the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA),
was portrayed as the realisation of a regional dream and the answer to the Pacific’s
economic woes; the other, the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
(PACER), as a benign ‘umbrella agreement’ aimed at ‘keep[ing] the Forum family
together’. Region-wide political support for PICTA was mustered on the basis of the idea
that regional (as opposed to external) interests underlay the agreement and would be
served by it. The bullying by Australia and New Zealand within the Pacific Islands
Forum that led to the establishment of PACER, and its implications for the Pacific Island
economies, remained a closely guarded secret until a study of the origins, content and
implications of the PACER, commissioned by the Pacific Network on Globalisation,
exposed them (Kelsey 2004). The Forum Secretariat’s fast-tracking of the free trade
agreements from conceptualisation to ratification was a feat accomplished by skilful
marketing of PICTA, engagement of free trade advocates as consultants/advisors, speedy
drafting of the agreements by New Zealand consultants, and successful lobbying of
Pacific Island governments for their signature and ratification. 
Although PACER was not supposed to come on stream until after PICTA had been
in force for eight years, PACER was more speedily ratified than PICTA (by the requisite
six Pacific Island states plus Australia and New Zealand), and so came into force in
October 2002, ahead of PICTA.13 This development, which was anticipated by the
Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG) in its critique of the Forsyth and Plange social
impact study (PANG 2002), threw into question the ‘stepping stone’ that PICTA was
supposed to represent and the two consultants’ blithe assurances that PICTA’s impacts
would be minimal.14 As a member of PANG wrote, in February 2002;
… the Social Impact Assessment on PICTA is being cleverly used to give the impres-
sion that since PICTA will have minimal impact on Pacific Island countries, PACER
will also have minimal impact. A used car salesman could not have done a better job
… the money spent on … the PICTA study is money down the drain … what Pacific
Island countries need to see is a Social Impact Study on PACER.
In July 2003, University of the South Pacific economist Dr Wadan Narsey confirmed
that once the free trade pact with Australia and New Zealand came into effect it would
be ‘catastrophic for local businesses’. ‘I would estimate that over 80 per cent of local
businesses here in Fiji would fold,’ he was quoted as saying, adding: 
I think governments have not thought through the consequences of joining a free
trade area … We hear all this talk of … efficiency and economies of scale. But the
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reality is, small companies will be forced out once the big players come to town ...
Governments have not worked out an alternative plan on how to re-employ people if
factories close and people are left without jobs. (Narsey, cited in Tavita 2003)
Narsey’s study on the implications of including alcohol and tobacco in PICTA, commis-
sioned by the Forum Secretariat,15 concluded that once PACER was operational and
duties against Australian and New Zealand exports were removed, British American
Tobacco, which owned all tobacco production in the Pacific, would likely concentrate
production in just one forum island country. Parent companies of foreign-owned beer
factories in the smaller Pacific Island countries will likely also take advantage of
economies of scale and market access to concentrate on marketing their highest-selling
products, with Fiji, Papua New Guinea and possibly Samoa benefiting at the expense of
Vanuatu, Tonga, Palau and Cook Islands in the short term. Once Australia and New
Zealand are included in the free trade area, all Pacific beer consumption is likely to be
supplied from Australia. Narsey suggested that this could be the scenario for other
manufacturing industries and cautioned Pacific Island governments against encouraging
firms to expand to take advantage of PICTA if the benefits to be derived from doing so
are to be lost once PACER kicks in. 
The negative implications of trade liberalisation for the Pacific Island states go
beyond expected contractions and closures in the manufacturing sector. Aside from the
loss of revenue from tariff cuts, and the increased indirect tax that will likely be imposed
to compensate governments for this revenue loss, the push to open up services under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has seen formal requests being made by
the EU for the opening of land for purchase by non-citizens in Melanesia and the elimi-
nation of work permit restrictions on foreign companies. The GATS holds serious
implications for public health and education systems in the Pacific (reduced subsidy,
lowered quality and lower access), as do any future WTO agreements on the so-called
‘Singapore Issues’ of government procurement, investment and competition policy. 
The challenges of neo-liberalism 
Despite growing doubts about the benefits to be derived by Pacific Island economies
from trade liberalisation, advocacy for trade liberalisation continues unabated in the
region. And neo-liberal analyses of Pacific states and societies continue to influence the
way the Pacific and its future are perceived by donor governments, and the interven-
tionist strategies being pursued in the region. 
A recent article offering a ‘roadmap for rapid growth and development in the
Pacific’ argues that ‘the best way to support the Pacific is through continuing trade liber-
alisation to reward the steps necessary to increase exports from the Pacific and thus create
incomes and growth’ (Hughes 2004: 1). Published by the CIS and titled The Pacific Is
Viable, the paper is the second on the Pacific written by former NCDS Director Helen
Hughes and published by the CIS in the past two years. In addition to restating her
arguments on the negative effects of aid and resource rents, and the absolute necessity of
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abandoning communal land ownership in favour of individual property rights,16 Hughes
continues her ridicule of smaller island states and advocacy for their integration into a
federation, to avoid costly national and bureaucratic structures and ‘inappropriately
elevated international representation’ (Hughes 2003). Not surprisingly, given Prime
Minister John Howard’s known support for the work of the CIS,17 the federation idea
has found favour with the Australian Government, which has advanced a proposal for a
Pacific Economic Community, with a single (Australian) currency and a regional central
bank, together with a regional legal and administrative structure to respond to law and
order breakdowns. The prospects for the Pacific Island states of joining such a commu-
nity, dominated politically and economically (under PACER) by Australia, are hardly
advantageous. Australia’s recent intervention in the Solomon Islands, justified by the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), another neo-liberal think tank, on the
grounds of the ‘failed state’ thesis, has already been shown to be about more than
restoring law and order and security. And the presence of RAMSI has ensured an orderly
return to the implementation of structural adjustment policies in the Solomon Islands.
Many speculate that direct intervention by Australia in Papua New Guinea will follow. In
July 2004, the CIS published a report on Papua New Guinea by Hughes (Hughes
2004a), which offered a free-market blueprint for more aggressive Australian interven-
tion in that country. The report was released as 230 Australian officials and police were
preparing to take over key posts in the PNG police force, courts, finance and planning
ministries, customs and civil aviation. In other Pacific countries, large numbers of
Australian and New Zealand consultants on contracts financed by bilateral aid
programmes already occupy positions within key ministries and state agencies, advising,
supervising or drafting legislation for reform implementation. 
In an evident downplaying of sovereignty, Hughes’ argument that Norfolk Island,
which without aid has a per capita income nearly twice that of Australia, is a model for
emulation (Hughes 2003: 4) is restated in her more recent article. The inclusion of
Norfolk Island in a comparative table on Pacific Island states and territories, and the use
of the term ‘islands’ as referents, rather than states or countries (as in ‘All Pacific islands
could be viable at high standards of living within a generation if they adopted policies
that matched their endowments’ and ‘The policy measures needed to make every Pacific
island viable are well known …’) reflect the neo-liberal bias against states as political
entities with regulatory and other powers that can be used against the interests of free
enterprise. The conceptualisation instead of ‘islands’ as economic entities, presumably
run by free market technocrats, suggests island populations not of citizens with rights,
but simply of producers and consumers, or buyers and sellers — in other words, societies
defined and governed by the market. This raises a number of fundamental questions
about the future being envisaged for us by neo-liberals such as Hughes. Firstly, is the
emphasis on islands as opposed to states in Hughes’ neo-liberal discourse calculated to
prepare Pacific Island states for an even more reduced role in future years? If so, how will
Pacific citizens in such societies exact accountability from those who make economic and
social policies that severely impact on their lives? And what meaning will we attach to
elections, or to the implicit social contract between democratic states and citizens, which
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obliges states to protect the interests of all their citizens, and which assures them of a
broad range of rights and entitlements, not least those enshrined in long-standing protec-
tive laws? And how are Pacific Islanders, dispossessed of the communally held land that is
the basis of their semi- subsistence livelihoods, expected to respond to a rash of land sales
to wealthy foreigners and corporations? The aggressive marketing of neo-liberalism and
its core values of individual advancement, private wealth accumulation and open access
to resources, strikes at the heart of things that have long been enshrined in law, cultural
value systems and social practice in the Pacific Islands. The time is long overdue for
critical investigation and public debate on the long-term implications of following a
course set by outside navigators whose final destination is not of our choosing. 
Notes
1 References to voyages and voyaging appear in Bauer, Kasper and Siwatibau 1991;
Hughes 1998; and the World Bank 2002. 
2 The CIS then had offices in New South Wales and Auckland. From the mid-1980s to
the early 1990s, many of its members were also members of the powerful New
Zealand Business Roundtable, whose proposals, according to Kelsey (1993: 135–6),
were indistinguishable from those of Labor and National governments from 1984,
when New Zealand’s economic reform programme began to be implemented. 
3 Eg., inducing (private) Australian health clinics and hospitals to set up branches in
Fiji and encouraging pre-retirement Australian health personnel to undertake two- or
three-year contracts there; reducing assistance to the University of the South Pacific
and providing a larger number of scholarships to Fijian citizens to study in Australia;
using aid to provide Australian supervision and technical advisors in private schools
and training schemes; and supporting the establishment of ‘cheap community
colleges’ to help improve racial balance in economic life (Kasper, Bennett and Blandy
1988: 146).
4 The volume brought together papers presented at a session on development in the
South Pacific of a Pacific Regional Meeting in Christchurch in November 1989
sponsored by the Mont Pelerin Society, a highly influential, private think tank
founded in Switzerland in 1947 by European and American intellectuals strongly
opposed to socialism, central planning and the regulatory state, and dedicated to
promoting the ideas of economic liberalism. The moving force behind the formation
of the society was Austrian-born British economist Fredrich Von Hayek, and one of
its 39 original founders was Milton Friedman. Kasper and other members of the CIS
were members of the society in 1997, as was Ruth Richardson, former National
Government Finance Minister in New Zealand. 
5 See Rowan Callick, ‘A doomsday scenario’, in Cole 1993.
6 See Ken Gannicot, ‘Population, Development and Growth’, in Cole 1993.
7 The Pacific Islands Forum was then known as the South Pacific Forum. 
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8 Neo-liberal ideas, termed ‘economic rationalism’ in Australia, began to take hold
under Bob Hawke’s Labor Government in the 1980s and early 1990s; more radical
commitment to structural adjustment emerged under the government of Paul
Keating from 1993–95 (Fry 1997: 317). New Zealand’s experiment with structural
adjustment began in 1984, with the application of ‘Rogernomics’ (the neo- liberal
economic policies of Treasurer Roger Douglas) under the Labour governments of
David Lange and Mike Moore. It was continued, with even greater vigour, by succes-
sive National Party governments.
9 The restructuring of the Forum Secretariat followed a review and regional consulta-
tion exercise by three consultants — Savenaca Siwatibau, then Director of the
ESCAP-Pacific Operations Centre based in Vanuatu and a strong advocate of
economic restructuring in the Pacific Island states; Bruce Davis, an Australian
national, former Deputy Secretary-General of the Forum Secretariat, and, at this
time, a senior officer within AusAID; and Makarita Baaro, a sociology graduate of the
University of the South Pacific and then Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Kiribati.
Their report is not a public document, but the reorganised Forum Secretariat that
resulted from their review indicates the evident intention to streamline the secre-
tariat’s functions and narrow its scope and programme to support reform. 
10 World Bank. 1995. Pacific Island Economies: Building a Resilient Economic Base for the
Twenty-First Century. Report No. 13803. EAP. February.
11 These included the IMF, the Pacific Financial Technical Advisory Centre, WHO,
UNDP, the European Union, AusAID, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, the Japanese Development Agency, French Aid Agencies, USAID and
other US agencies and ESCAP Pacific Operations Centre. 
12 Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era, a global feminist network that
analyses global policies and issues that impact on poor women in the developing
world. 
13 Moreover, an in-built provision in PACER (Article 6) triggers ‘mandatory consulta-
tions or free trade negotiations with Australia and New Zealand’ if any forum island
country that is a party to PACER enters into negotiations for a new free trade
arrangement with either ‘an outside developed country’ or a developing country with
‘a per capita GDP higher than that of New Zealand’. If the forum island countries as
a group begin free trade negotiations with any outside country, consultations with
Australia and New Zealand have to be held. The provisions of Article 6 were expected
to trigger negotiations on PACER as early as September 2002, when EU-ACP negoti-
ations for Economic Partnership Agreements under the Cotonou Agreement were
expected to begin (PANG 2002: 10–11).
14 The Forsyth and Plange study, commissioned by the Forum Secretariat, relied on the
findings of Scollay (1998) that the impacts of PICTA would be minimal, and that the
benefits would outweigh the costs. 
15 The forum study has not been released but its findings are summarised in Narsey
(2004). 
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16 Hughes’ earlier article, published in 2003 and titled Aid Has Failed the Pacific, elicited
much criticism within the region and in Australia and New Zealand, and many of the
critical responses to the paper are available on the Internet. 
17 Howard paid tribute to the CIS at its 20th anniversary dinner in 1996 in Sydney, as
recorded on the CIS’s web site, www.cis.org.au. 
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A Single Currency for
the Pacific Countries? 
T. K. Jayaraman
Introduction
Efforts towards the economic integration of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific
Island countries (PICs)1 received a major boost in March 2003 when an Australian
Senate Committee (2003) made a recommendation to usher in a Pacific Economic and
Political Community. The Senate Committee, which studied Australia’s relations with
the PICs, specifically suggested adoption of the Australian dollar as the common
currency. The inspiration behind a single currency came from the successful introduction
of the euro in Europe, just a year before the new millennium.
The subject of the integration of PICs, most of them having been found to be less
than viable, despite substantial decades-long aid inflows (Hughes 2003), has, however,
been under consideration for a while. Trends in economic integration — ranging from
preferential trade to free trade arrangements and to economic and monetary union,
especially in developing regions2 — have given further impetus to such attempts in the
Pacific (Jayaraman 2001). Two major initiatives were launched in 2002, one towards
achieving free trade by 2010 exclusively among PICs and free trade by 2015 with
Australia and New Zealand.3 Gradual trade liberalisation in the next few years was
considered as a stepping stone to promote regional economic integration. 
Chand (2003) has noted that the response to the Australian proposal was not
enthusiastic. It appeared that Australia was too quick to propose a currency union since a
strong sense of regional solidarity, which evolved over 50 years in Europe, was singularly
absent in the Pacific region. Aside from a political case, one has also to assess whether
there is an economic case for a single currency. This chapter, which seeks to examine the
feasibility of a common currency for the region as a whole, covering Australia and New
Zealand and the PICs, as well as exclusively for the PICs, is organised into three sections:
the first section provides a theoretical background of monetary integration; the second
investigates the readiness of PICs for a single currency; and the final section presents
conclusions with policy implications.
A brief theoretical background
The economic integration of sovereign states usually begins with freer trade through the
dismantling of trade barriers, with freedom to retain their existing but varying tariff and
non-tariff barriers against imports from the rest of the world. The next step is agreeing to
impose a set of common tariffs against imports from outside the region, an arrangement
known as a customs union. If this arrangement were accompanied by perfect mobility of
capital and labour, there would emerge a single economic space, known as a common
market. The logical next step is monetary integration. Some member states might not
proceed further and would prefer to postpone the decision on joining a single regional
currency. In between these upward movements, the member states build up the required
political will towards monetary integration. The evolution of the euro is a case in point.4 
Institutional arrangements for monetary integration take different forms. The
degree of rigour varies from highly restrictive to flexible (Masson and Pattillo 2001b). At
one end, it is a currency union, in which a single currency, either through creation of a
new currency or adoption of the existing national currency of a leading member country,
prevails with a common monetary policy for all members. A common currency is the
ultimate or the nirvana of the economic integration of states, without having to
surrender their sovereignty. Known as a currency union, it is a zone of countries, where
(i) a single currency circulates; (ii) a single monetary authority operates; (iii) a single
exchange rate policy prevails; (iv) the single monetary authority maintains a common
pool of reserves; and (v) free trade takes place within the region. 
An intermediate arrangement is known as monetary union. Under this, national
currencies coexist with common monetary and exchange rate policies. However, under
currency and monetary union arrangements, a supranational monetary authority is
established for pursuing a common external exchange rate and monetary policy, with
national central banks relinquishing individual control over international reserves by
vesting them in the common monetary authority. The monetary union permits the
possibility of an exit should a member country want to return to its previous regime, as it
can easily fall back on its own currency. An exit from a currency union is far more diffi-
cult. It has to face substantial costs involved in restoring its discontinued national
currency and reviving the central bank and related arrangements. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there might be pseudo exchange rate arrangements
of monetary integration. In a pseudo exchange rate union, a permanently fixed relation-
ship between national currencies might be assured. There is, however, no explicit
integration of economic policy, no common pool of foreign exchange reserves and no
single central bank. In the absence of these mechanisms for maintaining fixed exchange
rates, there are possibilities of member countries deliberately depreciating or appreciating
their currencies against each other (Corden 1972). 
Cohen (1998) emphasised the need for a strong bond of solidarity among the
participating member countries. A long period of close cooperation as well as the continued
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existence of regional institutions would contribute to the strengthening of such a bond.
There should be at least one leading member, such as Germany in the case of the euro,
having a good record of central bank independence. An independent central bank would
not permit any fiscal expansion unsupported by domestic resources. Thus, it would act as
an ‘agency of restraint’ to fiscal indiscipline (Masson and Pattillo 2001a). The ‘agency of
restraint’ solution need not be in terms of a monetary union.5 In fact, no such country
with fiscal indiscipline would be admitted to any union in the first place, unless some
semblance of fiscal order is restored and maintained over a period. The prerequisites are
known as convergence criteria,6 by which the country’s suitability would be evaluated. 
Gains from a common currency, in addition to reinforcing fiscal discipline and
strengthening the credibility of monetary policy, arise from elimination of (i) transaction
costs involved in currency conversion, and (ii) risk from uncertainty in the movements of
exchange rates between trading partners (McKinnon 1963). The disadvantages are the
loss of two important macro-economic adjustment tools: independent monetary and
exchange rate policies. The member country has to abide by a union-wide, common
monetary policy. It has to relinquish its exchange rate, an instrument for protecting itself
from economic shocks. However, the costs are less severe if the shocks affect all member
countries in a similar fashion. A union-wide, common set of policies would then be
appropriate. If the shocks were asymmetric, common policies would be least desirable, as
the inability to use the exchange rate for making necessary adjustments would result in
greater volatility in output and employment. Disadvantages can be substantially reduced
if there is perfect labour mobility between member countries (IMF 2001). 
The literature on optimum currency areas (OCA) thus identifies the following as
key deciding factors for a currency union: (i) openness, defined in terms of percentage of
a country’s total exports and imports to its gross domestic product (GDP); (ii) intra-trade
volume; (iii) degree of product diversification; (iv) similarity of industrial structures; (v)
high correlation in economic activities; (vi) similar inflation rates; (vii) flexibility in wages
and prices; and (viii) perfect factor mobility (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Kenen
1969; IMF 1997). 
If an economy is open, it is easier to enter into a currency union arrangement since
the nominal exchange rate has already become a redundant instrument (McKinnon
1963). The higher the pre-union intra-regional trade, the greater the benefits. The
composition of trade is another important factor. The higher the share of trade in
manufactured goods, the greater the appeal of a currency union among trading partners,
since their prices, unlike the prices of primary commodities being determined in world
markets, are determined largely by producers (Bayoumi and Mauro 1999). 
If an economy were more diversified, it would export a wider variety of products. If
a fall in the demand for some of its products occurred, the effects of such external shocks
would not create large-scale unemployment. On the other hand, if an economy depends
on one or two export products, fall in demand would be more disastrous, needing
exchange rate adjustments. In a more diversified economy, if independent shock affected
each of its products, the law of averages would ensure that the economy remained stable.
A more diversified economy is more suitable for a currency union than a less diversified
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one (Masson and Pattillo 2001b). Similarities in industrial structures of the candidate
countries would strengthen their eligibility, since they are likely to be affected in a similar
way by sector-specific shocks. 
Formal OCA criteria do not include the requirement of similarity in the levels of
development in the candidate countries for a currency union. Similar levels of economic
and financial sector development in the countries concerned would make it easier for
them to enter into a union.7 Regardless of differences in their industrial structures, if the
candidate states display a high degree of correlation in economic activities, they are likely
to experience similar economic shocks. Similarity in inflation rates of countries would
lead to an inference that they have been pursuing a similar set of economic policies and
their economic structures are also similar. Such states are eligible candidates for a
currency union (Bayoumi and Ostry 1997). 
The next section examines how far OCA requirements, either for a currency union
exclusively among PICs or a larger union with Australia and New Zealand with a
common currency — say, a Pacific dollar or the adoption of the Australian dollar — have
been fulfilled. 
Empirical investigation
The PICs exhibit considerable diversity in physical endowments and human resources.
Land area varies from country to country: 24 sq. km in the case of Nauru to 462,840 sq.
km in the case of Papua New Guinea. So too does population (Table 1), the most
populous nation being Papua New Guinea (5.1 million) and the least being Niue
(2,000). While Kiribati and Tuvalu are atolls with poor soils and limited agricultural
possibilities, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa and Tonga have
relatively large tracts of fertile land. However, the economic challenges before PICs are
similar (Urwin 2004). They rely on a few exports, such as fish, copra, timber and tourism
(Table 2) to finance their imports, which cover basic necessities and essential goods,
including transport and capital and intermediate goods. Almost all PICs depend heavily
on foreign aid and have large public sectors with weak private sectors. Further, most of
the PICs are prone to natural disasters, including cyclones. 
The exchange rate arrangements of PICs differ, spanning the continuum, from the
use of a foreign currency as legal tender to an independent and free-floating domestic
currency (Table 3). Eight PICs have adopted the national currencies of Australia, New
Zealand or the United States: Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu (the Australian dollar); the
Cook Islands and Niue (the New Zealand dollar); and FSM, Marshall Islands and Palau
(the US dollar). Five PICs (Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu) have
independent currencies. Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, has a freely floating
exchange rate regime. Rosales (2001) notes that inflation has been higher in Papua New
Guinea and in the dollarised PICs. The PICs with independent currencies seem to have
done better on the inflation front. 
The PICs are open economies with large import flows. Their trade volumes in
commodities (exports and imports) expressed as percentages of GDP are high. In 2000,
they ranged from 120 per cent in Kiribati to 68 per cent in Marshall Islands. Exports are
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limited in range. While Papua New Guinea’s major exports are gold, petroleum, copper,
timber and coffee, Fiji’s main exports are sugar, garments and gold. For smaller island
countries, which have negligible manufacturing capacity, reliance on primary exports is
much greater. For Samoa, exports are fish, copra and related products; for Tonga, squash,
fish and root crops; and for Vanuatu, beef, copra and cocoa. 
Intra-PICs trade has been small (Table 4), with low product diversity. The major
intra-regional trading partners are Fiji and Papua New Guinea, which are relatively more
diversified because of their significant manufacturing bases. Fiji has been exporting to
other PICs processed consumer goods, including wheat flour, cooking oil and biscuits.
On the other hand, Fiji’s imports from other PICs are confined to a very small volume of
agricultural commodities. Papua New Guinea’s exports are coffee and manufactured
goods. In terms of percentages of GDP, intra-regional trade volume in 2000 varied from
59 per cent in Tuvalu, which imports substantial consumer goods from Fiji, to 0.01 per
cent in FSM. In terms of percentages of total trade, intra-regional imports range from
56 per cent in the case of Tuvalu to 0.02 per cent in the case of FSM. 
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Table 2:  Main Merchandise Exports and Tourism Earnings of Pacific Islands Forum Countries 
(Averages of 1996–99)
Country           Main Merchandise Exports Tourism Earnings
(% of Total Merchandise Exports) (% of Exports of Goods & Services)
Fiji Sugar 27.1 25.1
Garments 23.1
Kiribati Copra 52.1 14.2
Seaweed 7.8
Marshall Islands Fish 66.1 8.3
Coconut oil 12.1
Micronesia Fish 88.1 7.6
Garments 6.2
Papua New Guinea Gold 30.1 –
Copper 19.4
Crude oil 18
Samoa Coconut oil 28.1 51.3
Copra 15.9
Solomon Islands Timber 51.1 –
Palm oil 11.1 –
Tonga Squash 44.4 29.1
Fish 19.6
Vanuatu Copra 40.2 41.7
Beef 12.1
Source: Asian Development Bank (2003)
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On the other hand, PICs’ major trading partners in the region have been Australia
and New Zealand and outside the region are the EU and Japan. Imports cover a wide
range of commodities, inclusive of basic necessities and capital and intermediate goods.
The PICs’ imports from Australia were about 34 per cent of their total imports and their
exports to Australia were 23 per cent of their total exports. The rest from the various
other partners were well below the Australian percentages. On the basis of present pre-
union trade volume, a currency union exclusively among PICs would not result in as
much gain as would result from a larger sized union with Australia and New Zealand (de
Brouwer 2000; Jayaraman 2003). 
The next aspect for examination is whether the growth rates experienced by PICs
and the two advanced countries have been similar. The evidence is to the contrary. Studies
of simple correlation of growth rates of Australia and New Zealand and 11 PICs, over two
decades, reveal that there is far greater divergence than convergence.8 The growth rate of
Australia is significantly correlated only with that of Samoa, while New Zealand’s growth
rate is not significantly correlated with any country. Similarly, the growth rates of Fiji,
Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands and Solomon Islands are not correlated
with any country. Correlation exists only between the growth rates of the following pairs
of countries: Cook Islands and FSM, Cook Islands and Tonga, FSM and Tonga and
Tuvalu and Tonga. The results indicate the absence of any coherent pattern in growth
performance between PICs and the two advanced countries (Jayaraman 2004a).
Our attention now turns to real effective exchange rate (REER) indices. The
REERs are endogenous prices, since they are the outcome of the structure of the
economy as well as of domestic and external shocks (de Brouwer 2000). If countries were
similarly placed in terms of their economic structure and if they had experienced similar
external and domestic shocks, movements in their REERs would display common
trends. The study results indicate that the co-movements in REERs are confined to two
sets of countries: Australia and New Zealand; and Australia and Papua New Guinea.
New Zealand’s REER is not correlated with the REER of any PIC. Thus, there is
substantial divergence, indicating that PICs do not share any common pattern in REER
movements with Australia and New Zealand. 
The conclusion is that in the absence of convergence in key indicators, a currency
union either among 14 PICs or all 16 countries, including Australia and New Zealand,
would be premature. 
Summary and conclusions
The case for a single currency for PICs was examined on the basis of OCA criteria.
Empirical analysis indicates that lack of product diversity has led to low intra-trade volumes
in absolute and percentage terms. On the other hand, trade with the two other forum
partners, Australia and New Zealand, is substantial. However, the PICs and Australia have
different levels of development. Growth and development challenges facing the PICs are
different from those of Australia. Further, there was no convergence of macro-economic
policies pursued by PICs, and Australia and New Zealand. Since economic shocks hitting
both sets of countries were dissimilar, there would be no gains for PICs agreeing to
Australia’s set of monetary and exchange rate policies being adopted for the region as a
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whole. Union-wide policies, which are likely to be dictated more by Australian growth
priorities than by those of New Zealand, would not be suitable for PICs. 
A former governor of New Zealand’s central bank went on record as saying that the
time for adopting the Australian dollar as a common currency by New Zealand was not
ripe. Arguing on the basis of OCA conditions, Governor Brash (2000) observed that
there had been a lack of synchronisation of business cycles between Australia and New
Zealand during the recent past.9 For the same reasons, one can conclude that there is also
no case for a currency union among the PICs. 
However, one can argue for a currency union with Australia on the grounds that
OCA criteria are to some extent endogenous and a currency union might help make the
shocks hitting member countries more symmetric in the future and might also expand
intra-union trade. This is similar to an argument put forward by Scitovsky (1958) when
the European Common Market was born. However, EU member countries did not
plunge into a currency union arrangement until after nearly four decades of common
market experience and fulfilment of convergence criteria (Padoa-Schioppa 2004). 
In the alternative, a stepwise approach could be suggested. The dollarised PICs might
consider a currency union with the countries whose respective currencies they are using
and, by extension, with the other countries who use that currency as sole legal tender. Three
subsets of PICs — (i) Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu; (ii) Cook Islands and Niue; and (iii)
Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau — are, in a way, in monetary union respectively
with Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Thus, these eight PICs might consider
entering into formal arrangements with the above named developed countries. 
If Australia was keen about the dollarisation of PICs, the latter are likely to seek and
secure some assurances from the former. Since dollarisation would result in discontinuance
of their independent currencies, PICs would lose the current revenue flowing from the
sovereign right of printing their own currencies. The PICs would then like to have a share
in the seigniorage revenue, which otherwise would accrue only to Australia. Secondly, since
there would be only one common central bank in a currency union, a given PIC would not
be able to support its domestic banks in the event of a bank crisis. In such circumstances,
PICs would like to be assured of liquidity support from the Reserve Bank of Australia
(RBA), as a lender of last resort for rescuing their crisis-affected banks. Thirdly, if the RBA
finds it inopportune to follow an expansionary monetary policy or would not like to use
the exchange rate as the policy tool to fight unemployment in one or more of its member
countries, the PICs would prefer the mechanism of fiscal transfers to the needy member
countries. Finally, a currency union without perfect mobility of labour and capital would be
a failure since PICs would lose the exchange rate as a policy tool to effect corrections in
domestic pricing of goods and other factors of production (Jayaraman 2004a, 2004b). 
The issues including labour mobility and fiscal transfers have far-reaching implica-
tions, which can be resolved only at political levels. The Caribbean experience (Farrell
and Worrell 1994; Worrell 2003) is relevant in this regard. A single currency for the
Caribbean region has yet to become a reality for obvious reasons. Three decades ago,
William Demas, a former Governor of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, who
later became the first Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community and Common
Market, articulated it thus: 
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A single independent currency entails a single set of economic, monetary, financial
and fiscal policies designed to influence the balance of payments. Such a single set of
policies is possible only with a high degree of economic union tantamount to a polit-
ical union. (1974: 54)
Notes
1 The 14 PICs are: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of Marshall Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM), Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. These 14 PICs and the two metropolitan
powers in the region, Australia and New Zealand, constitute the Pacific Islands
Forum, which is the major regional organisation. 
2 These include: Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA), consisting of two zones,
West African Monetary Union and Central African Economic and Monetary Union
in Africa, the rand zone; the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) within the
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS); and the Caribbean Community
and Common Market (CARICOM) in the Caribbean region.
3 The initiatives are the signing of two agreements in 2002, known as the Pacific
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) and the Pacific Island Countries
Trade Agreement (PICTA). The PACER was signed by all 16 forum countries,
including Australia and New Zealand, for starting negotiations by 2011 aimed at
freer trade among all. The PICTA was signed by only 14 PICs for setting up a free
trade area among themselves by 2010. PACER and PICTA received the necessary
number of ratifications and became duly effective in late 2003.
4 Gathering political support and securing consensus for achieving monetary integra-
tion in Europe took nearly five decades. There were several notable milestones. The
setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community was the first one in 1950,
which aimed at free trade in coal and steel by 1954. Establishing the European
Economic Community under the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957; European Free
Trade Association in 1960; and several regional institutions and harmonising
measures for facilitating movement of capital and labour under the Single European
Act of 1987 followed these. The creation of a single market was achieved in 1992.
Along with these measures, there were parallel efforts in monetary integration. These
included introduction of the European Monetary System in 1979 for creating an area
of exchange rate stability among members by ushering in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism and the European Currency Unit, paving the way for monetary union
within the European Community. In 1989, the Delors Report recommended the
introduction of a single currency by setting out stages including the establishment of
the European Central Bank System. The stages included the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty of 1993, which laid down the criteria for reaching convergence and enactment
of the Growth and Stability Pact of 1996. The latter levied a fine of 0.1 per cent of
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GDP on members in case of fiscal deficits in excess of the three per cent of GDP
ceiling. These measures, which were introduced and implemented through political
consensus, eventually prepared the members to become eligible for adopting the
single currency. The euro was ultimately born on 1 January 1999. 
5 There are two alternative solutions: (i) currency board arrangement (CBA); and (ii)
dollarisation. Under CBA, while the national currency would continue to exist, the
monetary authority would be required to hold reserves in a foreign currency (the
anchor currency to which the national currency will be firmly pegged) sufficient at
least to cover the entire narrow money supply. Thus, every domestic currency bill is
backed by an equivalent of foreign currency. The central bank can increase money
supply only by adding to the international reserves through external borrowing or
building trade surplus. Under ‘dollarisation’, the national currency would be replaced
by the currency of a country with which trade and economic relations have been close
in recent years. Advantages of dollarisation are: (i) absence of speculative attacks on
the domestic currency; (ii) no possibility of inflationary finance; and (iii) closer
integration with the country whose currency has been adopted as legal tender.
Disadvantages of dollarisation are: (i) loss of a national symbol; (ii) central bank of
the country of anchor currency might not support the domestic banking system in
times of crisis; (iii) loss of seigniorage revenue; and (iv) difficulty in exiting from
dollarisation compared with other regimes.
6 In the case of the euro, the following five preconditions, which are known as conver-
gence criteria, were provided under the Maastricht Treaty of 1993: (i) each country’s
budget deficit has to be below three per cent of its GDP; (ii) each country’s public
debt has to be less than 60 per cent of GDP; (iii) countries should have an inflation
rate within 1.5 per cent of the three EU countries with the lowest rate; (iv) long-term
interest rates must be within two per cent of the three lowest interest rates in the EU;
and (v) exchange rates must be kept within ‘normal’ fluctuation margins of Europe’s
exchange-rate mechanism. Greece was the only member of the EU that was told that
it was not ready to join the single currency with the first wave of countries in 1999. It
had to wait for two years before joining the Eurozone at the beginning of 2001.
7 It makes sense to look at the nearly five-decade-old progress made towards economic
integration in Europe, where the process of forming a currency union was associated
with a significant degree of economic convergence in real GDP per capita over the
years. This process was further supported by steadily growing intra-trade and labour
mobility, culminating in the formation of a common market. These efforts were also
accompanied by attempts to effect fiscal transfers to the poorer members (Greece,
Ireland and Portugal) of the EU. In this connection, one might refer to a parallel in
the developing world. India, with a federal constitution, is also a currency union of 22
states with varying levels of development. A combination of free interstate trade in
goods and services, together with factor mobility and constitutional provision of
federal fiscal transfers to economically backward states, has kept the Indian union
going (Fabella 2002).
8 Results will be made available on request.
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9 The most recent study by Crosby and Otto (2003) has concluded that (i) Australia
and New Zealand were not suitable candidates for the currency union; (ii) benefits of
a currency union for Australia would be small; and (iii) it would be worthwhile for
Australia to consider currency union with the United States rather than with New
Zealand.
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Labour Mobility for Sustainable
Livelihoods in Pacific Island States1
Satish Chand
Introduction
What Pacific Islanders need is a source of sustainable livelihoods. Subsistence agriculture
has historically served this purpose, but population pressures on limited natural resources
makes this an unlikely candidate to bank on for the future. Pockets of poverty have
emerged in nearly every island community; in some, the rate of increase of poverty is
alarming. Donors have been particularly generous with aid to Pacific Island countries
(PICs) as a group. Palau, despite being a middle-income country, received the highest
amount of aid at $US1,753 per capita in 2001 (see Table 1). Many other PICs rank high
among developing countries in terms of aid receipts on a per capita basis, partly so
because of their small size, as aid delivery is subject to economies of scale. Donors can
keep tiny island communities with limited resources ‘afloat’ with aid, but this would be
contrary to the concept of a sustainable livelihood. Charity is neither sustainable nor
desirable; continuing aid can create dependency. 
The rate of growth of income for the Pacific Island economies has, on the whole,
been weak (see Table 1). In the 30 years to 2001, annualised growth rates of per capita
income in constant local currency units have ranged from -1.92 per cent for Kiribati to
1.4 per cent for Fiji. The level of per capita income for Vanuatu in 2004 was the same as
that at independence in 1980. Social problems are rising in nearly every major urban
centre within the PICs, which is not surprising given high rates of population growth with
stagnant income-earning opportunities. We know that high population growth and low
incomes are jointly determined, thus, continuing economic stagnation might provide little
respite from rising populations. Given the build up of pressure on the physical environ-
ment, a return to sustainable livelihoods from subsistence alone is not an option for several
of the island economies. New threats, particularly in the form of HIV/AIDS, which is
spreading at an alarming rate in Papua New Guinea, and changes in global weather
patterns, might test the environmental and economic resilience of small states. 
Pacific Futures128
Table 1: Basic Indicators for Pacific Island Countries (PICs), Australia, New Zealand, the
Maldives, Malta and Mauritius
Land Popu- Density Aid per GDP per 
area lation people capita capita
(’000 (’000) per sq.km Real GNP ($US) (PPP $US)
sq.km) (2001) (2001) Population per capita (2001) (2001)
Australia 7,682 19,387 3 1.06 2.22 — 25,370
Cook Islands 0.24 21 88 — — — 5,000
Federated States of Micronesiac 0.70 120 171 1.78 -2.00 1,145 2,000
Fiji 18 817 45 0.92 2.06 32 4,850
French Polynesiaa 4 237 65 1.19 2.39 1,636 17,500
Kiribatia 1 93 127 2.30 -1.85 134 800
Marshall Islandsb 0.18 53 293 2.29 -1.05 1,410 1,600
Naurud 0.021 12 610 1.87 — 5,000
New Caledoniaa 18 216 12 1.72 -0.35 1,359 15,000
New Zealand 268 3,849 14 0.51 2.92 — 19,160
Niued 0.26 2 8 0.01 — — 3,600
Norfolk Islandd 0.035 2 53 -0.01 — — —
Northern Mariana Islandsa 0.48 80 167 2.71 — — 12,500
Palauc 0.46 20 42 1.46 -0.78 1,753 9,000
Papua New Guinea 453 5253 12 2.36 -1.50 39 2,570
Samoa 3 174 61 1.12 5.73 248 6,180
Solomon Islands 28 431 15 2.77 -9.58 137 1,910
Tokelaud 0.01 1 141 -0.01 — — 1,000e
Tongaa 1 101 140 0.52 3.42 201 2,200
Tuvalu 0.026 11 441 1.44 1.56 — 1,100
United States 9,159 28,5320 31 1.14 1.63 — 34,320
Vanuatu 12 201 17 2.10 -3.37 157 3,190
Maldivesa 0.30 280 934 2.28 2.29 89 3,900
Malta 0.32 395 1,234 0.76 2.07 4 1,3160
Mauritius 2 1,200 591 1.06 3.84 18 9,860
Notes: — indicates unavailability of data; The World Fact Book was used to source the following information as it was
unavailable from the World Bank: a. GDP per capita; b. land area and GNP per capita; c. population growth (datum is
estimate for 2004) and GDP per capita; d. land area, growth rate of population and per capita GDP, and GDP per capita
(for 2000); e. figures for 1993.
Source: Unless otherwise stated, the source for all data is World Development Indicators via the International Economic
Databank (IEDB), The Australian National University, Canberra.
Annual growth %
1999-2001
 
The PICs, to improve their wellbeing, must integrate more deeply with the global
economy. For the smallest and remotest of the island communities, access to industrial-
country labour markets is perhaps the only viable option. There is merit in broadening
this access, on a controlled and reciprocal basis, for the region as a whole. A transient
population of workers rotating between the remote regions and the metropolis will
induce demand for better governance within the islands while cementing closer regional
ties. The benefits from such flows are likely to be the largest for unskilled labour as this
group suffers the greatest restriction. Income-earning opportunities for unskilled workers
from the islands have the potential to lower poverty at home while raising worker
productivity through the transfer of skills. 
Income earned from workers abroad, unlike aid, is likely to provide a sustainable
source of revenue, thus relieving the resource constraints currently faced by several of the
PICs. Remittances already constitute a significant part of the economies of Cook Islands,
Fiji, Niue, Samoa and Tonga (Narsey 2004). Easing conditions for the (temporary)
movement of unskilled workers will give remittances an even greater role in the suste-
nance of island economies (and remote communities) of the Pacific. Such flows, if
temporary, will prevent depopulation of the smallest of the communities. Reverse flows
of retirees, tourists and volunteers, moreover, will generate employment opportunities
within remote communities. Allowing for reciprocal arrangements on temporary flows
between developing and industrial country partners will assist such a process while
deepening cultural, economic and political ties across the region. This is not to suggest a
policy of unrestricted labour mobility, but a strong case exists for a well-managed
program allowing for a more fluid labour market for the Pacific region.
Industrial-country partners have much to gain from deepening economic ties
within the region. International security concerns have already increased Australian, New
Zealand and United States involvement in the Pacific region. This follows recognition of
the potential for cross-border spill-overs, such as from a large-scale domestic conflict or
from an economic collapse in a neighbouring state. Australian intervention in Nauru and
Papua New Guinea in 2004 and its leadership of a regional intervention into the
Solomon Islands were motivated principally by security concerns. The above-mentioned
donors have historically taken an active interest in the funding and provision of basic
services in the PICs, which lack the capacity and resources to do this on their own. We
premise the subsequent discussion on the (plausible) assumption that it is in the donors’
interests to see the PICs achieve sustainable livelihoods.
Denying Pacific Islanders access to labour markets in the surrounding metropolis
might threaten the very existence of small far-flung island communities, particularly as
sovereign states. This in turn will threaten the survival of the culture of the smallest of the
communities, particularly those facing threats of depopulation. There is a great deal of
literature showing that the largest gains in global welfare would accrue from freeing up
movement of unskilled labour (see Winters et al. 2003; Athukorala 2004; and references
contained therein); the Pacific is not an exception in this context. Growing shortages of
labour within the neighbouring industrial countries, moreover, will over time increase
economic incentives for out-migration from the islands.
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While population growth rates are falling sharply in the surrounding rich nations,
Pacific Island nations continue to experience high rates of population increase. The
population of the island region in 2001 was 7.8 million, more than double the figure of
3.8 million in 1971.2 The rate of population growth between the PICs has differed
significantly. Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Marshall Islands have recorded annual
growth rates of 3.25 per cent, 2.89 per cent and 2.79 per cent respectively. The popula-
tions of Tonga and Samoa, in contrast, have increased at an annual rate of 0.5 and 0.6
per cent respectively. The difference between these two groups of countries is explained
by out-migration rather than differences in fertility rates (see Table 2). A large proportion
of the population is young (that is, below the age of 15 years), thus the high rate of
population growth is likely to last at least another generation. Some 45 per cent of the
total population of Solomon Islands, for example, is below 14 years of age (see Table 2). 
Depopulation is the least of concerns for countries such as Samoa and Tonga, which
have historically experienced large outflows of labour. This is because there already exist
large Islander communities in the surrounding metropolis. Samoans and Tongans living
in Auckland, Sydney and Los Angeles maintain regular contact with their kin at home.
These overseas communities form the basis of regular trade and commerce across
national borders. Thus, neither Samoa nor Tonga face the prospect of depopulation
and/or loss of their cultural identity. There is even a good prospect of large reverse flows
of retirees once the current generation of migrants complete their working life abroad.
The link with their homeland is strengthened by communally owned land, to which
many of the migrants retain claims while living abroad. Remittances are often exchanged
for cultural and communal obligations so as to sustain links with family and the wider
community, not least to protect claims on communal property. 
Pacific states display considerable heterogeneity in nearly every respect. For the
purposes of the discussion on sustainability here, the major concerns include population
pressure in the smallest of the states, which has the potential to destroy the natural
environment; rural to urban migration within a context of limited growth in employ-
ment opportunities, thus threatening social stability; and deteriorating governance at all
levels of society, with the possibility of the region becoming a collection of failed or
failing states, posing a security risk to others. Given resource endowments, the sustain-
ability of Pacific Islands need not be depressing. The region’s people are among the most
hospitable in the world, much of the marine environment spanning large exclusive
economic zones of the individual PICs remains pristine, and even population densities
are low relative to the far more prosperous island economies of the Maldives, Mauritius
and Malta. The ‘hula’, the ‘haka’ and the ‘happy grass-skirted people’ are brand images of
the Pacific that are known with affection within tourism circles around the globe.
Technological developments — in terms of rapidly falling aviation, shipping and
telecommunications costs — offer increased opportunities for isolated peoples to
improve their livelihood via trade with the rest of the world. 
Sustainable livelihoods for the PICs will involve deeper integration with the global
economy. Regional labour market integration will be a key component of this. The rest
of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a summary of the
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constraints on and opportunities for sustainable livelihoods for the Pacific Islands region.
Section three discusses the role and significance of labour mobility in the context of
sustainable livelihoods of island communities of the Pacific. Section four sketches some
of the logistics of deepening labour market integration for the region as a whole.
Conclusions and lessons for policy draw the chapter to a close. 
Sustainability of livelihoods in individual PICs
Pacific countries, in terms of economic development and sustainability of livelihoods,
can be categorised broadly into five groups. The first group comprises the large rich
nations of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. These countries
are characterised by high levels of (purchasing power parity adjusted) per capita GDP,
large populations relative to the rest (New Zealand relative to PNG is slightly different in
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Table 2: Demographic indicators, Pacific Countries
Fertility Life expectancy Population Urban 
rate (births  at birth ages 0–14 population
per woman) (years) (% of total) (% of total) 
Australia 1.75 79 20 91
Cook Islands — — — —
Federated States of Micronesia 3.56 68 37 29
Fiji 2.68 69 33 50
French Polynesia 2.57 73 32 53
Kiribati 3.72 62 38 39
Marshall Islandsa 4.02 70 39 66
Naurua 3.29 62 38 —
New Caledonia 2.54 73 29 78
New Zealand 2.01 78 22 86
Niue — — — —
Norfolk Island — — 20 —
Northern Mariana Islandsa 1.33 76 20 53
Palaua 2.46 70 27 69
Papua New Guinea 4.36 57 40 18
Samoa 4.13 69 36 22
Solomon Islands 5.33 69 45 20
Tokelau — 69 42 —
Tonga 3.52 71 34 33
Tuvalu 3.02 68 31 —
United States 2.12 78 21 77
Vanuatu 4.35 68 41 22
Notes: a. Data for fertility rate, life expectancy and population 0 to 14 years are for 2004, extracted from The World Fact
Book (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/) accessed on 11 October 2004. Data are for 2001 and
sourced from World Bank Development Indicators, unless otherwise stated.
 
this regard), and favourable social indicators of development in comparison with the rest.
Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand and the United States are the major donors to the
region (Chand 2004).
The next broad grouping comprises French Polynesia and New Caledonia, colonies
of France, which share the features of the first group but for the fact that the high
incomes and accompanying social indicators of development are sustained via large net
transfers from the mainland. Per capita aid to French Polynesia and New Caledonia for
2001, for example, amounted to $US1,636 and $US1,359 (see Table 2). It is, however,
arguable whether such high living standards for the respective island communities can be
sustained without the large transfers from France. Countries with strong links with their
former colonial rulers/administrators, such as those governed under the Compact of Free
Association with the United States (this includes FSM, Palau and Marshall Islands) and
in free association with New Zealand (this includes Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau),3
have large transfers from their rich country partner as well as access to their labour
markets. Under the arrangement of being governed in free association with New
Zealand, the respective island states are fully responsible for internal affairs while New
Zealand retains responsibility for external affairs and defence. Such an arrangement
allows the inhabitants of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau access to New Zealand
passports and thus to the New Zealand and Australian labour markets. Inhabitants of
FSM, Marshall Islands and Palau carry their own passports but are allowed to work and
live in the United States as ‘non-immigrants’.4 The above-mentioned island states have
had privileged access to rich-country labour markets due to their historical links, and their
more favourable social indicators of development are principally due to this privilege. 
The third grouping is made up of the Melanesian states of Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. These countries have relatively large populations but an
even larger landmass; thus, they have low population densities. The economic perform-
ance of this group as a whole has been poor, particularly in the recent past as shown by
low rates of growth of per capita GDP in the 1999 to 2001 period (see Table 1). Life
expectancy for this group is low, particularly so given rich natural resource endowments.
Papua New Guinea provides an extreme case; it is the largest country within the PICs,
with a population and landmass (and potential mineral, marine and timber resources)
greater than New Zealand, but with the lowest life expectancy of 57 years (see Table 2).
Importantly for the discussion here, none of the Melanesian countries have special
arrangements for access to the labour markets of their former colonial powers. All of the
countries in this group face varying degrees of social and political instability.
At the bottom of the ladder of economic development lie the two Micronesian
states of Kiribati and Nauru, together with the Polynesian Tuvalu (the last two are not
members of the World Bank, thus economic information on them is scarce), which have
limited resources, high population growth rates and rising pressure on their limited
natural resources. Even though population density within a few of the PICs is high, on
the whole, the PICs have low population densities relative to economically successful
island economies such as the Maldives, Malta and Mauritius (see Table 1). This is true
even if the limited amount of agricultural land available in the respective island states is
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taken into account. Malta, as an example, has minimal arable land and yet is able to
sustain in excess of 1,200 people per square kilometre, while the Maldives, at 934, has
more than three times the population density of Marshall Islands, the most densely
populated PIC. What is clear for the PICs is that population densities have risen several-
fold in the past century. 
The ability of the natural environment to support subsistence living has diminished
over time and, in some cases, the sustainable carrying capacity has been overwhelmed.
Nearly every PIC faces poverty of some degree. The capacity of the natural environment
to sustain subsistence living in Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu might have even declined as
population pressures (and mining, in the case of Nauru) have led to degradation of the
natural environment. For example, due to urban pollution, the fish caught in Tarawa
Lagoon are no longer considered fit for human consumption. Populations in Kiribati,
Nauru and Tuvalu have reached a stage where subsistence living for the current genera-
tion is not feasible. These communities have little choice but to open up to trade with the
rest of the world. 
The annual supply-demand imbalance in formal sector employment is alarming,
particularly for the Melanesian countries that lack access to foreign labour markets. The
Solomon Islands’ formal sector employment stood at 14,300 in 2000, accounting for less
than 15 per cent of the total working-age population. Unemployment build-up will
continue with associated social problems unless some 14,700 new jobs are created each
year. This is not an easy task for an economy that is just beginning to recover from a
devastating civil conflict. For many of the PICs in economic strife, labour migration in
the short term is perhaps the only viable option for sustainable livelihoods. Urban
populations are likely to grow given that the bulk of the population in the majority of the
PICs reside in rural areas and draw their livelihoods from subsistence farming. The
proportion of the total population dependent on the rural sector (figures for 2001 are
provided in parentheses) has been the highest for Papua New Guinea (87 per cent),
Solomon Islands (84 per cent) and Vanuatu (79 per cent). Rural to urban migration has
been rapid and, at current rates, Tarawa’s population will double to 73,400 by 2013,
while that for Honiara and Port Vila will reach 98,000 and 60,000, respectively, by 2016.
None of these cities are built to carry such large populations; the pressure this will put on
the natural environment could be extreme. The challenges faced by Cook Islands and
Niue, in sharp contrast, is that of depopulation as an increasing number of residents
move to New Zealand on a permanent basis. 
A number of governments are facing budgetary problems that in turn limit their
ability to provide basic services. Access to public goods, primary education and basic
health care, in particular, differs as much between the individual countries as across
regions within PNG, the largest country. According to World Bank data for 2001, the
most recent available, some 24 per cent of PNG youth in the 15 to 24 age group and
some 35 per cent of those above 24 years were illiterate. This, assuming a life expectancy
of 60 years, implies that nearly one-quarter of the next generation of workers, parents
and voters will remain ill-equipped to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by
the modern, global economy. The trends are equally worrying for other PICs. Life
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expectancies in Nauru and Tuvalu have fallen in the decade to 1994.5 HIV is a pressing
issue in Papua New Guinea, where the rate of new infections — 20 per cent — is
alarming and could have severe consequences for the nation as a whole. 
Subsistence affluence for a majority of Pacific Islanders might be a distant and
rapidly fading memory. While population density, at less that 15 per sq. km, for the PICs
as a whole is low, the spatial distribution of population across the individual PICs is far
from uniform. This holds true within individual PICs. Even in the Melanesian countries
where population densities are low, communal land tenure arrangements have impeded
long-term and secure access to this resource. The contrast between Fiji and Mauritius on
this front is most instructive. Fiji has nine times the land area but a population that is
only 70 per cent to that of Mauritius; population density in Mauritius, consequently, is
13 times that of Fiji. Yet, per capita income in Fiji is approximately half that of
Mauritius. Land tenure arrangement is the key distinguishing feature between the two
island nations. While in Mauritius all land is held in individual title, some 90 per cent of
the land in Fiji is communally owned. The uneven distribution of natural resources, and
land in particular, even in Melanesia has wedged some of the communities into positions
untenable with subsistence living. The many squatter settlements around the urban
fringes in the major capital cities are testimony to the fact that long-term secure access to
land is a serious problem. Lack of secure long-term access and individual title rather than
lack of land might be a major hurdle to private investment in the PICs.
The role and significance of labour mobility
The PICs face the challenge of creating the conditions at home that will lead to invest-
ment and job creation. The resource-rich members are in a position to achieve such a
goal. Impediments to investments at home include regulatory barriers, the high cost and
limited availability of land for long-term investment, and the high cost of trade given
small domestic markets and their remoteness from the major industrial-country markets.
For example, in its 2004 survey on the business environment for 145 countries, the
World Bank notes that to enforce a debt contract in Papua New Guinea involves 22
procedures, taking some 295 days to resolve and costs an average of nearly 110 per cent
of the value of the debt. This compares with the average for East Asia and the Pacific
(corresponding figures for the OECD in parentheses) of 27 (19) procedures, 316 (229)
days, and 54 (11) per cent, respectively.6 In many cases, resources for the necessary
investments are either unavailable or the returns from such investments are insufficient to
justify, on commercial considerations, the requisite investments. In some cases, social
returns are considerably higher than private returns, but a lack of funds to the public
sector has meant that such investments have not taken place. Labour mobility, thus,
provides a way out of the current malaise. 
Permitting unskilled workers access to industrial-country markets on a temporary
basis offers a way out for island nations trapped in a position of economic stagnation. Six
specific advantages arising out of a scheme allowing for a rotating pool of unskilled
workers into industrial-country markets are enumerated next. First, it enables access to
training, including exposing the workers to the disciplines of formal sector work in an
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advanced country. Reporting to work on time, spending the whole day at the work site
and observing the disciplines of the workplace all constitute training for an unskilled
subsistence-sector worker from the PICs. Second, such placement enables workers to
earn financial capital that in turn could be invested in productive activity on returning
home. Workers often lack capital and exposure to the opportunities offered by the
market. Third, the departure of a group of unemployed people relieves pressure on the
physical and social environment at home. Fourth, a rotating pool of workers from small
developing Pacific Island states into large industrial-country counterparts exposes the
population to the operation of efficient governments and a competitive private sector.
Such exposure will raise the returnees’ expectations of their governments and private
sector service providers, thus creating demands for better governance at home. Fifth, a
rotating pool of workers from far-flung communities will build regional cohesion and
promote cultural exchange at the community level. There is a strong case for reverse
flows; that is, from the rich nations into the islands, to consolidate the gains from such
exchange. Last, the workers contribute to output in the labour-receiving country, thus
the earnings constitute a sustainable source of income for the sending country. The
challenge is in the design of such a scheme that maximises net benefits from the tempo-
rary movement of unskilled workers. 
Temporary-worker schemes do entail risks. (1) Concern is being raised of a ‘brain
drain’, that is, loss of the skilled and professional workers to the neighbouring industrial
countries. In the cases where the education and training of the emigrants is supported
through public sector subsidies, a ‘brain drain’ could constitute a transfer from the
sending country to the receiving country.7 This problem is not an issue for unskilled
labour. (2) There is a risk of depopulation of some of the smaller PICs. PICs such as Niue
and Cook Islands, which have unlimited access to industrial-country labour markets,
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Table 3: Annual supply-demand imbalance for formal sector employment.
Country Total formal sector Formal sector share Fresh entrants into 
employmenta in work-age the workforce 
(’000) population(%) per year (’000)
Fiji 131.5 26.6 19.3
FSM 30.9 49.1 3.7
Kiribati 7.9 15.8 2.6
Marshall Islands 10.3 37.4 1.6
Palau NA NA 0.4
Samoa NA NA 5.0
Solomon Islands 34.2 14.6 14.7
Tonga 33.9 59.5 2.7
Vanuatu 14.3 14.4 5.6
Note: a. data are for 2000 except for Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tonga, where the most recent data available, that for
1996, have been reported. Work-age population defined as those in the 15- to 64-year age cohort. Data for column 3 are
calculated assuming a uniform distribution of the population of under-14s.
Source: ADB 2001.
have not yet been depopulated, suggesting that such an outcome is not likely in the
foreseeable future. Policies such as allowing for portability of pensions from the labour
receiving countries, moreover, can reduce the risks of depopulation. (3) Labour unions in
receiving countries have expressed concern about the depressing effect on wages of a large
influx of foreign workers. This is less likely to be an issue given the relative size of
the PICs, and even less so if the number of entrants is controlled and their impact on
domestic labour market conditions closely monitored. (4) Receiving countries have
voiced concern about risks of letting in criminals, and (5) the entrants accessing taxpayer-
funded services. The last two concerns can be addressed through an efficient vetting
process for applicants and an effective tracking system for those allowed into the country.
Guest-worker schemes in Europe and North America demonstrate that the above-identi-
fied risks can be contained.
Deepening labour markets can be welfare enhancing for the region as a whole.
Martin (2003: 2), for example, notes that ‘properly managed guest worker schemes can
contribute to economic growth and development in sending and receiving countries’.
There is already a large and growing literature on the potentially large gains from
allowing temporary movement of people from developing countries to developed
countries (see Winters et al. 2003; Martin 2003). The main difference in the case of the
Pacific Islands is that the population of workers from the region is small, and particularly
so relative to the size of the labour market in the host nations. The policy challenge is to
design a scheme that will maximise the benefits of a temporary-worker scheme. We next
draw on the international experience to sketch out how a temporary-worker scheme of
the nature canvassed above could be made operational. 
Logistics of enabling the movement of unskilled workers 
from the PICs
Firms in host countries could be allowed to subcontract work to Pacific Islanders for a
fixed term not exceeding the legal ceiling. These firms would be required to comply with
home country regulations and be liable for any violations of the entry conditions in
relation to the work visa. In the case of German guest-worker schemes, for example, fixed
quotas of foreign workers without families are allowed into the country for a maximum
of two years.8 The United States has a similar scheme in which unskilled workers are
allowed into the country under their H-2 visa programme. PICs given access to indus-
trial-country labour markets could be required to give similar access to workers from the
partner industrial country. The latter scheme would be attractive to tourists on working
holidays and to retirees and volunteers wishing to work and travel in the region. 
Incentives would have to be created to induce workers to return home on the expiry
of their work visas. This could entail employers being required to hold a mandated
portion (say, 20 per cent) of after-tax wages of their guest workers in a trust fund that can
be accessed by the worker only on returning home. Visa conditions could specify the
duration of stay, the unique employee number (much akin to the Australian tax file
number), an explicit commitment by the applicant to return to the country of origin on
the expiry of the visa, and the conditions of employment and remuneration. The trust
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fund, in addition to being an incentive to return home, will act as a compulsory savings
device and a potential resource to draw on to enforce compliance should the worker
break the conditions of their visa. Any social security and tax contributions could be
added to the fund after the worker had satisfied all of the visa conditions.
Since demand for places is likely to exceed supply, country quotas would have to be
devised under a government-to-government memorandum of understanding. While the
size of the country quota would have to be negotiated, the broad principle would be to
ensure equity across the PIC members while maximising gains to the relevant parties
from such flows. The availability of job opportunities at home and the potential gain to
the sending and receiving countries would be the key considerations here. The latter
could be inferred from the wage difference for unskilled workers between the sending
and receiving country. The above conditions would apply to trainees should the scheme
be expanded to include them. 
The quota could be applied to the stock of workers from each PIC. The host
nations could make a commitment not to reduce the quota such that sending countries
have certainty of access to the industrial-country labour market for their workers. The
vetting process could require workers to pass a security clearance. The potential employer
might be required to provide cover for medical and accident insurance, the costs of which
might be recovered from the wages of the prospective employee. In addition to the above,
a written offer of employment would be required for the issue of a visa. The Canadian
seasonal-worker program provides a model in this regard. Germany’s guest-worker
scheme places responsibility for enforcement of visa conditions, and the return of the
temporary worker to their home countries in particular, on the local hiring company.
Coordination between prospective employees located in distant communities and
employers in industrial nations will require intermediaries to make the market.9 Such
intermediation will require seeding and some level of continuing supervision. Labour-
importing nations such as Canada, Germany and the United States have a well-developed
migration infrastructure for temporary workers and one that should be encouraged to
expand its services into the Pacific.10
To attract the best workers and induce compliance with the stipulated regulations,
rules regarding access to foreign labour markets for the unskilled workers would need to
be transparent and publicly accessible (possibly on the World Wide Web) across the
region. Cross-border networks including community groups and NGOs, which have
traditionally played a major role in facilitating cross-border movement of people, could
be given government certification as intermediaries between prospective workers and
employers. Such community groups are likely to be helpful in assimilating entrants into
the workforce and in providing continuing support. Rewards in terms of access to
country quotas to such networks could be made on the basis of past success in recruit-
ment (and returnees); this in turn will lead to the development of a self-enforcing and
monitoring system with minimal overheads for the taxpayer.
Immigration authorities have raised the possibility of workers overstaying their
visas, a claim supported by the high rates of visitors from the region overstaying their
visas. Australian overstay rates as at June 1999, the latest for which figures are available,
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show an average ‘non-return’ rate for all visitors at 2.18 per cent; Tonga and Samoa had
non-return rates of 19.1 per cent and 14.2 per cent, respectively, and were ranked fourth-
and eighth-worst in the world (see data in Table 4). Drawing inferences on the overstay
rates for temporary workers from historical records on overstay rates for visitors, however,
is flawed. This is so for at least three reasons. First, visitors who breach their visa condi-
tions often have this as their intention when making their initial application.11 Moreover,
many are compelled to take this path as the only option for gaining access to a rich-
country labour market. Second, those who do breach conditions of their visa do so at
little personal cost since all of the costs of enforcement of the visa conditions are borne by
the host nation. Third, a revolving door for temporary workers provides the incentives to
return home on the expiry of the work permit. Data on guest-worker schemes that have
operated within the EU and the United States show ‘that most migrants did rotate in and
out of labor-receiving countries as expected’ (Martin 2003: 7). In the case of the 22-year-
old US-Mexico guest-worker scheme, apprehensions for violation of visa conditions fell
when access was made easier. The Italian Interior Minister is reported to have asserted
that a bilateral deal with Sri Lanka allowing for 1,000 young Sri Lankan migrants to
enter for work and training in Italy had stopped the flow of illegal Sri Lankan immigrants
(as reported in Martin 2003: 8). 
Finally, any temporary-worker scheme would have to be consistent with interna-
tional treaties. Two that are most pertinent include the WTO (and GATS in particular)
and International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions relating to the rights of
migrant workers. The scheme proposed here deepens regional trade, thus is consistent
with the broader principles of the WTO. Allowing local labour regulations to apply to
migrant workers, thus providing national treatment to such workers, is also consistent
with ILO principles. The details of any proposed agreement, however, would need to be
thoroughly checked to ensure conformity with international treaties. 
Conclusion
The PICs face the challenge of ensuring a sustainable livelihood for their growing
populations. Economic performance in the majority of the PICs has remained weak in
the past two decades, trapping the poor in a difficult situation. Subsistence agriculture,
which has sustained small remote island communities, is under increasing pressure given
the limited natural resources and expanding populations. These pressures have led to
urban drift as migrants from rural areas have moved to areas with greater public services
and employment prospects. Further, job growth within the islands has lagged behind the
number of entrants into the workforce. It would be wrong to claim that the seriousness
of poverty problems is uniform across the individual PICs; what is clear, however, is that
those PICs with access to industrial-country labour markets have done better in terms of
social indicators of development than those without.12 It can be asserted that it is the
privileged access to industrial countries — as a function of historical and colonial links
— that causes the better income and social indicators.
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Given the growing problems in several PICs that do not have access to industrial-
country labour markets, could the extension of such privilege by Pacific Rim industrial
countries be a means of generating sustainable livelihoods in these small remote commu-
nities? The analysis presented here suggests this might indeed be the case. Donors could
keep small remote communities such as Nauru afloat with aid; they have been very
generous to date with aid to the PICs relative to other developing countries. But such
support is inimical to the very notion of sustainable livelihoods. Generosity in the future
cannot be assumed; such generosity, in any case, is counterproductive as it creates
dependency. Relaxation of regulations governing the mobility of unskilled workers from
the PICs to neighbouring industrial countries offers standard gains from such arrange-
ments with the bonus of inducing demand for better governance at home. A
well-managed program that facilitates the rotation of a given number of workers from
the PICs into the neighbouring metropolis accompanied by reciprocal movement of
visitors on working holidays, retirees and volunteers is likely to offer significant economic
benefits while deepening cultural ties across the wider region. Allowing workers to circu-
late between the island nations and the surrounding metropolis benefits both societies by
increasing the pool of unskilled workers available to the metropolis, easing population
pressures in the island nations and creating a bridge between the communities.
International experience with migrant-worker schemes offers several lessons on the
design of a temporary-worker scheme for the PICs. Some of the core features of the
design would be transparent rules governing the scheme so that costs of compliance are
minimised. An efficient vetting process is a necessary prerequisite to ensure that those
who enter as temporary workers do so at minimal costs to the host economy. An equally
efficient tracking system to guarantee compliance with regulations would be necessary.
Finally, individual governments would need to build incentives into any temporary-
worker scheme in order to ensure, and reward, voluntary compliance with the scheme.
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Table 4: Non-return rate from Australia by country of citizenship, at 30 June 1999.
Country Non-return rate (%)
Vietnam 24.3
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 21.6
Lebanon 20.7
Tonga 19.1
Turkey 15.1
Pakistan 15.0
Philippines 14.4
Samoa 14.2
Poland 13.9
People’s Republic of China 12.8
Source: Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) Annual Report, 1998–99.
Notes
1 Helpful comment on an earlier draft of this paper from Carla Adami is gratefully
acknowledged, though the views expressed are those of the author alone.
2 Due to lack of data, the 1971 population total does not include populations of FSM,
Northern Marianas and Palau, while the 2001 total omits Nauru, Niue, Tuvalu and
Tokelau. 
3 Tokelau, as of 2004, was a self-administering territory of New Zealand, but is in the
process of moving towards being governed in free association with New Zealand.
4 See section 141 of The Compact of Free Association. US citizens do not have similar
rights to the labour markets of the Compact countries; Clause (b) of Section 142 of
the Compact states that: ‘The Government of the Marshall Islands or the Federated
States of Micronesia shall accord to citizens and nationals of the United States treat-
ment no less favorable than that accorded to citizens of other countries.’ Section 311
of the Compact states that: ‘The Government of the United States has full authority
and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the Marshall
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia.’ 
5 Males in Nauru as of 2004, for example, had a life expectancy of 52.5 years
(compared with 55 years in 1994), the lowest in the region (data from Haberkorn
2004) and falling!
6 Data drawn from http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/ExploreEconomies/
BusinessClimateSnapshot.aspx?economyid=150 accessed on 5 November 2004.
7 Remittance flows would have to factor in such calculations.
8 The 1992 quota was 100,000 for the country as a whole, which was made up of
industry-level quotas.
9 Amigos Labour Solutions, a US-based company specialising in recruiting seasonal
workers for the United States from Mexico, is a model in this regard (see
http://www.amigos-inc.com/index1.htm). The Canadian Foreign Agricultural
Resource Management Services (FARMS) is a user-fee model that facilitates recruit-
ment of Caribbean and Mexican seasonal agricultural workers (see
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/asp/gateway.asp?hr=/en/on/epb/agri/overview.shtml&hs=hze).
10 The United Kingdom, Switzerland and France all have had successful and long-estab-
lished seasonal-worker schemes. Though they offer several lessons for design of any
user-pays temporary-worker scheme, it is unlikely that private providers from Europe
will expand their services to the Pacific.
11 That is, there is a selection bias in the data.
12 This observation is consistent with a detailed household-level study for Guatemala
showing that remittances reduce the breadth and depth (severity) of poverty (see
Adams 2004).
Pacific Futures140
References
Adams, Richard H. 2004. Remittances and Poverty in Guatemala. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper, No. 3418, September.
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2001. Growth and Change in Asia and the Pacific: Key
Indicators. Manila.
Athukorala, P. 2004. ‘International labour migration in East Asia: Trends, economic
impact and policy issues.’ Paper presented at Trade and Development Seminar at The
Australian National University, 3 August.
Central Intelligence Agency. 2004. The World Fact Book. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publica-
tions/factbook/geos/. Accessed 11 October 2004.
Chand, S. 2003. ‘An assessment of the proposal for a Pacific Economic and Political
Community.’ Pacific Economic Bulletin, 18 (2). pp. 117–24.
Department of Immigration and Mulitcultural Affairs. 1999. Australian Department of
Immigration and Mulitcultural Affairs (DIMA) Annual Report, 1998–99.
Haberkorn, G. 2004. ‘Current population dynamics and recent trends.’ Secretariat of the Pacific
Community, draft dated 11 July 2004, accessed from http://www.spc.org.nc/demog/ on 9
August 2004.
Markusen, J. R. 1983. ‘Factor movements and commodity trade as complements.’
Journal of International Economics, 14. pp. 341–57.
Martin, Philip L. 2003. ‘Managing labour migration: temporary worker programs for
the 21st century.’ Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies.
Narsey, Wadan. 2004. PIC Development: Remittances and other alternatives to regional
integration. Brisbane: Federation for Development Cooperation.
Rodrik, D. 2002. Feasible globalisation. National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper Number 9129. Cambridge, Mass.
Winters, A., T. L. Walmsley, Z. K. Wang and R. Grynberg. 2003. ‘Liberalising tempo-
rary movement of natural persons: An agenda for the development round.’ The World
Economy, 26 (8). pp. 1137–61.
World Bank. 2002. Regional Economic Report. Washinton, DC.
Labour Mobility for Sustainable Livelihoods in Pacific Island States 141
Development 
Assistance Challenges1
Vijay Naidu
IN THE FIRST DECADE of the 21st century, Pacific Island countries (PICs), with the
exception of Samoa and Tonga, are still only a generation away from independence from
direct colonialism. Indeed, there are still a number of vestiges of colonial rule present in
the region.2 In the past 20 to 30 years, these countries have sought to develop as periph-
eral capitalist societies with varying degrees of ‘traditional’ forms of societal organisation
and cultures still in existence. Development has meant for their peoples improving
material standards of living and greater participation in political processes, access to
public utilities such as potable water, electricity, sanitation, educational and health
services. Disadvantaged groups in society such as women, youth, ethnic minorities, the
disabled, rural dwellers and the poor have been recognised as needing attention. Not
infrequently some of the latter categories have been reluctantly put on the development
agenda as a result of the insistence of external development partners, donor countries and
agencies.3 PICs’ efforts at development can be described as having had mixed success and
their place in global development, characterised by an unbridled thrust toward free trade,
is disconcerting. 
This chapter will examine development assistance in a holistic way, situating it
within the broader framework of development and development assistance to developing
countries. International trends in overseas development assistance or aid will be outlined.
Significant donor countries will be identified, as will the nature of aid provided. Donor
countries tend to be most supportive of their former colonies and territories that
continue to be politically integrated with them.4
Besides unravelling some of the complexities of development assistance, the chapter
will challenge existing stereotypes about overseas aid and island country dependency.
Issues such as geopolitical strategic rent and interdependence between island and Pacific
Rim countries will be highlighted. Of significance in terms of overall development trajec-
tory, it will be pointed out that some island countries do not have prospects for
meaningful ‘independent’ development and that there are degrees of ‘independence’
feasible for others. However, it will also be pointed out that the trade imbalances against
island countries signify an extent of interdependence between them and donor country
interests. It is not all one-way traffic.
The contradictory Pacific reality
Pacific Island people appear to continue to enjoy relatively high standards of living in the
context of numerous traits that they share with other post-colonial states. In the recent
past, these have included exposure to a downward trend in commodity exports, natural
disasters and the diminishing capacity of the state in managing externally induced social
transformation.
In the absence of a strong capitalist class in most island countries, the state played a
lead role as a facilitator of private enterprise and as an owner/operator of enterprises in its
own right. Areas of non-subsistence economic activities, such as plantations, mines,
tourist resorts, urban centres that were centres of administration, wholesaling and
retailing outlets as well as services such as central hospitals and elite schools, drew island
people from all over the interior and outer-island hinterland. The use of local resources
for ‘national development’ in a less than transparent and equitable manner, the presence
of strangers in territories claimed by resident ‘indigenous’ groups, competition over land
and jobs, the destruction of natural habitats for subsistence livelihoods, the lack of partic-
ipation by local communities in decision-making about the use of their resources, and
the use of repressive measures by state power-holders against those who protest their
legitimate concerns, have caused conflicts in a number of island states.
As very small and non-competitive producers of raw materials, these island states are
extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices. Most are heavily dependant on
one or two commodities. They are price takers rather than price makers. They are
producers of much that they do not consume and consumers of much that they do not
produce. Human capital loss is a major concern for some of them. They are variously
subject to a full range of natural hazards such as cyclones, droughts, flooding and tidal
surges, earthquakes and tsunamis as well as volcanic activity. Brindley (2004) discusses three
different vulnerability indexes, which show that PICs are among the most vulnerable
countries in the world. A composite vulnerability index, which takes account of a country’s
openness (export dependence), lack of economic diversification and its susceptibility to
natural disasters, to measure vulnerability places PICs and other small island states among
the top 30 of the most-vulnerable of 111 countries. ‘Vanuatu is ranked the most vulnerable
of any of the 111 states; Tonga comes in 3rd, Fiji 8th, the Solomon Islands 11th, Samoa
20th, Papua New Guinea 30th, and Kiribati 59th’ (Brindley 2004: 23).
As if economic vulnerability and natural hazards are not enough to deal with, ‘man-
made’ disasters abound. These include lack of accountability by state power-holders,
serious shortcomings in the rule of law, public finance mismanagement, outright corrup-
tion and military intervention in democratic processes. In a number of the largest
countries, security forces have become the primary sources of insecurity.5 Poor leadership
and lack of vision and the processes of peripheral capitalism have led to growing social
Development Assistance Challenges 143
inequality and poverty. In the larger island countries, significant numbers of children do
not attend schools as these are not accessible or affordable. The lack of opportunities for
gainful employment and amenities for recreational activities have spawned counter-
cultures of delinquency, crime and drug abuse among unemployed young men and
women.6 Sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS are becoming widespread. Idle
young men have become the foot soldiers for unscrupulous leaders in Fiji, Papua New
Guinea, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands.
The World Bank has pointed to the ‘Pacific paradox’ and to a ‘doughnut effect’ in
Oceania with respect to economic growth. PICs are perceived as the hollow of the
doughnut, the rim of which is made up of the more vibrant Asia–Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) countries. For much of the past two decades, PICs have experi-
enced stagnating and even periodically declining rates of economic growth (see Table 1),
even though in per capita terms a number of countries and the region as a whole have the
highest development assistance flows. Hence the paradox. 
Table 1: Pacific Islands: Summary of economic aggregates
Aid per Average growth
capita ($US, of real income
Population GNI per capita 1982–2001 per capita
(2001) ($US 2001) average) (1982–2001)
American Samoa 70,000 –a – –
Cook Islands 18,000 4,272b – –
Federated States of Micronesia 120,000 2,150 802 -0.15%
Fiji 817,000 2,150 56 0.74%
French Polynesia 237,000 –c 1,517 1.58%
Kiribati 93,000 830 223 0.05%
Marshall Islands 53,000 2,190 1,016 0.44%
Nauru 12,700 2,830b – –
New Caledonia 216,000 –c 1,642 1.95%
Niue 1,900 – – –
Northern Mariana Islands 80,000 –c – –
Palau 20,000 6,780 1,779 1.30%
Papua New Guinea 5,253,000 580 80 0.50%
Samoa 174,000 1,490 213 1.27%
Solomon Islands 431,000 590 129 -0.17%
Tokelau 1,500 – – –
Tonga 101,000 1,530 241 2.06%
Tuvalu 10,000 1,560b – –
Vanuatu 201,000 1,050 237 -0.01%
a. Estimated to be upper-middle income ($2,976-9,205). b. GDP per capita. c. Estimated to be high income ($9,206 or more).
Source: World Bank (2003)
Brindley, D. 2004. Aid, Governance, and Economic Development in the Pacific. p. 3.
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Despite the size of these aid flows, real per capita growth rates over the period have
been disappointing. The average for the Pacific over the 20-year period to 2001 was
0.8 per cent per annum, compared to 1.1 per cent for the rest of the world. However,
the last decade has been even worse, with the Pacific averaging a contraction of 0.1
[per cent] per year, compared to the world average of 1.4 per cent growth. (Brindley
2004: 4)7
PICs are perceived as dependant, especially on aid, have negligible economic growth and
increasingly pose problems for the larger rim countries. The ‘MIRAB’ model (Bertram
and Watters 1985) highlights PICs economies that are dependent on migration (MI),
remittances (R), aid (A) and a large bureaucracy (B) or public sector for employment.
The countries included were Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Tuvalu and Kiribati. To these
can be added the Micronesian countries of FSM, the Marshall Islands and Palau. 
According to Bertram and Watters,
‘Aid’ to these communities, although usually described as ‘development aid’, has in
fact tended to have the character of a straightforward supplement to local incomes
and consumption, and accounts for a large proportion of both. Up to half the budget
of local governments is financed from offshore donors and the share of government
employment in total cash employment on the islands ranges from about half to over
90 per cent. In balance-of-payment terms, aid inflows finance between 40 per cent
and over 100 per cent of imports. Aid is, clearly, crucial rather than peripheral in the
determination of incomes and consumption levels. (1985: 499)
An extent of ‘MIRABleness’ also afflicts other Pacific states that have large bureaucracies,
high rates of emigration and that are aid dependent. This might give the wrong impres-
sion that the model is widely applicable to Pacific people. This is not the case as migration,
remittances, aid and even a large bureaucracy (relative to population size) have not been
significant to the same degree in Melanesia, which has nearly seven million of the eight
million Pacific Islanders resident in PICs. Table 1 shows the enormous variations in devel-
opment assistance to individual PICs, with Fiji receiving on average $US56 per capita on
the one hand and Palau averaging nearly $US1,800 per capita for the 1982–2001 period.
Despite this high level of capital inflow, it is anticipated that Oceania will lag behind
sub-Saharan Africa in achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. These
include reducing by half the number of people in extreme poverty and hunger; universal
education; gender equality in access to higher education, wage employment and the propor-
tion of seats in parliament; reducing child mortality by two-thirds; reducing maternal
mortality by 75 per cent; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring
environmental sustainability (reversing loss of environmental resources); halving the number
of people without access to safe drinking water; and improvement in the lives of slum-
dwellers. While PICs statistics with respect to these goals and indicators are distorted by the
Melanesian countries in general, and Papua New Guinea in particular, with almost three-
quarters of the population, it is nevertheless a sobering reminder of a paradise lost.8
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Global warming is likely to have a disproportionate effect on atoll states such as
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu. It will have consequences for all island
countries, further reducing the ability of their people to literally keep their heads above
water. They will suffer from salt water inundation with rising sea levels — the conse-
quences of activities in the industrialised world. The question is, will the latter take
responsibility?9
However, Pacific Islanders themselves have been most resilient in dealing with the
challenges their countries face. Islanders have sought education. They have migrated
from the context of limited opportunities in their homelands to many parts of the world,
but especially to New Zealand, the United States, Australia, France, Canada and
Holland. Export earnings, remittances from relatives abroad, tourism-related income and
aid have contributed to relatively high standards of living and per capita income levels
compared with other developing countries. This is another dimension of the ‘Pacific
paradox’ — being able to enjoy relative wellbeing without the necessary expansion in in-
country productivity. 
A sector that is regarded as posing considerable impediment to economic growth is
agriculture and especially subsistence agriculture. In virtually all PICs, customary forms
of land tenure are intimately bound up with small-holder production. Customary land
tenure is perceived as a major fetter to increased productivity, as group ownership does
not allow land to be used as collateral in securing bank loans for investment in equip-
ment, fertiliser and pesticides. Moreover, investments in other areas, such as tourism,
housing, renewable energy and waste disposal, are seen as being unnecessarily stalled by
land not being a factor of production that can be bought and sold in the market.
However, it is also widely recognised that without the access that most (not all) Islanders
have to plots of cultivable land, guaranteed by their membership of landowning groups,
poverty levels would be much higher.10
Aid paradigms and development assistance trends
In terms of the overarching conceptual paradigm of aid, there have been several shifts and
changes. These paradigm changes have been determined by developed countries with
minimum regard to developing countries’ perspectives. Indeed, with little regard to their
own commissions on overseas development assistance (ODA). Thus, just on the release
of the report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues
(1980), the Brandt Report, the United States and the United Kingdom substantially
reduced ODA contrary to the report’s core recommendations. Without immediate
tangible returns to the donor country, international aid did not fit into the monetarist
and market-centred policies of Reaganomics and Thatcherite economics (Gounder
1995).11 OECD countries and the multilaterals that are largely their instruments have
determined the modalities, ebb and flow of aid. 
From aid as overseas development assistance for the purpose of addressing many of
the ‘gaps’ left behind after the colonial experience of most developing countries, thereby
ensuring the continuing influence of the former imperial powers, aid, in the current era
of ‘conditional aid’, has become a significant instrument for compelling structural adjust-
Pacific Futures146
ments. The quantum of aid and the mode of delivery have never been adequate to bring
about systemic ‘people-centred’ changes in recipient countries. More broadly, after
colonialism established patterns of raw material production in the Third World, the
Bretton Woods institutions have pushed post-colonial states the world over to produce
the same export commodities, thereby triggering an oversupply, reducing their foreign
exchange earnings and leaving them in their current predicament of dependence. A good
example of this is the current predicament of coffee producers. The 1980s debt crisis and
the imposition of stabilisation and accompanying conditionalities have further aggra-
vated their situation (Ould-Mey 1994; Reality of Aid 2004).
In the past two decades, the ability of a post-colonial state to foster its ‘national
economy’ has been seriously undermined.12 This is the bigger picture within which
ODA is better understood. 
In broad terms, ODA increased from the 1960s to the 1980s, but declined in the
1990s. In real terms (using 2001 prices), in 1992, ODA from all Development
Assistance Countries (DAC)13 stood at close to $US58 billion, declining to $US44
billion in 1997 and increasing to $US58 billion in 2002. ‘In fact aid fell in real terms by
24 % between 1992 and 1997’ (Reality of Aid 2004: 181). This dramatic decline did not
mean that the need for ODA had diminished but that domestic policies of donor
countries took overriding priority. It is apparent that even after the Financing for
Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002, the pledges of donor countries
of about $US16 billion will be far short of the $US50 billion per annum needed to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals.
When one considers that the world’s countries spend more than $1,000 billion on
armaments and militaries, $350 billion on agricultural subsidies and only $57 billion on
ODA (Wolfensohn cited in UNANZ Newsletter, April 2004), the huge gulf between
rhetoric and reality is striking. The total aid figure is significantly reduced when tied aid
and the ‘boomerang effect’ of aid is considered. Substantial proportions of Australian and
New Zealand development assistance is tied aid. The amount of aid funds transferred
offshore can be minute.
Very few OECD countries have achieved the UN’s target of 0.07 per cent of GNI
ODA. Holland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden are the exceptions (Reality
of Aid 2004). During the Marshall Plan period, the United States provided up to two per
cent of its GDP in aid for the reconstruction of Europe; this volume of ODA from one
country was unprecedented. Despite the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals
and the global consensus to increased ODA at the Financing for Development
Conference in Monterrey, significant increased development aid is yet to be seen.14 In the
current period, the following excerpt provides a succinct picture of the context of ODA:
[Developed–developing world] resource transfers are declining and [developed-world-
dominated]–global institutions are consolidating a system of highly unequal relations
between countries.
NGOs have been increasingly angered by the cynical exercise of power by [developed
world] governments promoting ‘good governance’ and ‘aid effectiveness’, while
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defending narrow political and economic self-interests. Industrialised countries
devoted US$353 billion (seven times total ODA spending) to protecting agriculture
in 1998, according to UNDP. At the same time, the policy choices available to poorer
countries are narrowed by conditionalities imposed by international finance institu-
tions and bilateral donors. As reports from NGOs in Asia illustrate, southern
governments are forced to privatise and liberalise, while OECD restrictive practices,
tariff and non-tariff barriers cost developing countries US$160 billion a year. This
translates into real human suffering which the World Bank recently quantified as
welfare losses of US$19.8 billion. (Reality of Aid 2002: 2; emphasis in the original.)
Development assistance post-September 11
It is apparent that the terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre on
11 September 2001, have changed significantly the context of international politics and
international aid. September 11 has caused a sea change in the United States, which has
replaced communism as public enemy number one with the more amorphous ‘terrorism’
as the biggest threat to its security. The United States has indicated its willingness to take
unilateral action against perceived threats to its security without the endorsement of the
UN. There are many ramifications of this superpower’s approach to ‘go-it-alone’ with a
number of hangers-on. The geopolitics of bigger powers have significantly influenced aid
flows and it is likely that the United States will reward those countries that its leadership
sees as being supportive and/or of strategic value. Oceania has been a beneficiary of the
change. Prior to this tragic event, the Pacific Islands were no longer perceived as strategi-
cally important. This applied especially to northern Pacific Micronesian states, and also
to the US Territory of Guam; this perception has since been reversed drastically.15
September 11 has also triggered the more interventionist phase in Australian
foreign policy and development assistance. It appears that there is a process under way of
re-marking the boundaries of its backyard with an emphasis placed on the national inter-
ests and stability of countries in the neighbourhood. According to Bruce Davis, the
Director-General of AusAID:
The aid program is a long-term tool to address long-term problems. In particular, we
need to persist with support for stability and for economic and governance reform
over the long haul — strengthening the hands of reforming governments and
supporting reform champions within struggling governments (noting that genera-
tional change may be required before benefits are fully realised).
We don’t have the luxury of walking away. These states are on our doorstep and our
engagement with them is core business for our development cooperation program.
Our national interests are inextricably linked to stability and peaceful development in
the region. (Davis 2003)
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Implied in this excerpt is a growing preoccupation with Australian security and proactive
development assistance to ensure stability. This will have repercussions for the nature of
aid and aid delivery to PICs.
The Pacific context of aid
ODA in the South Pacific has undergone a number of shifts in the fashion of aid world-
wide (see Hjertholm and White 1998). Former colonial rulers in the region, such as
Britain and the United States, began to shift their interests before September 11 to other
areas where their strategic and economic interests were seen to be better served.16 Japan,
China and Taiwan have begun to play an increasingly important role as bilateral donor
countries. For these countries and the ANZUS partners, aid to island countries has been
and continues to be an important foreign policy instrument (Tarte 1998; Teaiwa et al.
2002). For the duration of the Cold War era, aid was one of the ways in which the white
Pacific influenced and controlled the black Pacific. Regional organisations wittingly and
unwittingly learned how to play the aid game, becoming conduits of such influence. On
the economic front, aid has ensured the consolidation of the linkages forged during
colonial rule and the patterns of economic subordination remain. Politically, room to
manoeuvre existed insofar as some island countries could threaten that they would go to
the Soviets if certain of their requests were not met. However, any real attempts to estab-
lish such relationships were strongly opposed by ANZUS with the Australasian media
going into bouts of hysterical frenzy. Kiribati’s fishing agreement with the USSR is a case
in point (Neemia 1988).17 Vanuatu’s ties with Libya received strong condemnation. 
In the current period, aid in the South Pacific ranges from the competitive cheque-
book diplomacy practised by China and Taiwan, to the marine resource-related ODA by
Japan and the more conditional aid of Australia and New Zealand. International finance
institutions, namely the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian
Development Bank, likewise continue to push for reform, entailing structural adjust-
ment conducive to market-centred development (Teaiwa et al. 2002; Slatter 2004).
These bilateral and multilateral agencies have now shifted to a common rhetoric of
poverty reduction requiring a continuation of vigorous reforms. There is a concern that
the efforts to harmonise ODA in the region will lead to the homogenisation of aid in line
with the agenda of the international financial institutions. Numerous contradictions
abound. The one-size-fits-all structural adjustment programmes have contributed to
political instability in the complex multi-ethnic states. The ‘blame the victim’ syndrome
is manifested in terms such as ‘failed states’ and ‘arc of instability’ (Fry 1999).
Geopolitical interests continue to be the primary motivation among Pacific Rim
donor countries for aid (see Table 1). An examination of aid flows from donor countries
to recipient countries shows a clear preponderance of aid to current and former colonies
and to areas of influence. French aid is provided largely to French Polynesia and New
Caledonia; US aid to its former Trust Territories — the Marshall Islands, the FSM and
Palau; Australian aid to Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and East Timor; New Zealand aid
to Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau; Japanese aid to other Asian countries.
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In terms of what donor countries receive in return, Poirine (1993) has written
about ‘military rent’ and ‘atomic rent’ with respect to American interests in Hawai’i and
Guam and French interests in French Polynesia. He has identified the importance of
military rent or geopolitics in ODA and aid as ‘geopolitical rent’. ANZUS interest in
much of the Pacific can be regarded in a broadly similar way. Moreover, the eight million
people in Pacific Island states, small by world standards, do provide an almost captive
market for goods and services from Australia and New Zealand. There is a huge trade
imbalance in favour of the latter countries. Pacific Island economies are also tied up with
these larger economies because of labour migration and remittance flows.
Forms of development assistance and donor agencies
Development assistance to Pacific Island countries takes several forms and includes
monetary grants, soft loans, technical assistance, technology transfer and other in-kind
contributions. At the broadest level, it can be bilateral or multilateral involving govern-
ment-to-government transfers and transfers by donor governments to international and
regional multilateral organisations, which then transfer aid to island governments. In the
past, virtually all overseas development assistance was official, involving government-to-
government transfers. More than 80 per cent of development assistance continues to be
bilateral. Much of the remainder is transferred to PICs through multilateral agencies —
international and regional. Prominent among the regional organisations in this regard are
the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community.
The relative autonomy of island states also gives them some room to manoeuvre
with respect to development assistance. This manoeuvrability can be used strategically for
longer-term development or it can be abused. Contradictions emerge between those
seeking ‘good governance’ and those engaged in old-style chequebook diplomacy.
Taiwan’s competition with China in gaining recognition among island states has meant
that both these countries readily provide funds to unsavoury leaders. How the funds are
used appears to be of little concern. Thus, much of the multi-million dollar assistance
given by Taiwan after the conflict in the Solomon Islands in 2000 was used to pay
compensation to politicians and gang leaders. Recently, it was reported that Vanuatu was
pledged $9 billion by Taiwan for granting it diplomatic recognition (The [Hobart]
Mercury, 9 November 2004).18 Australia meanwhile has warned the Vanuatu Government
that it will reduce bilateral aid if good governance is not given priority.
These days, donor agencies also make aid transfers directly to non-governmental
organisations in developing countries and/or through development, relief and humani-
tarian NGOs based in metropolitan countries. The latter often network and form
umbrella organisations to better coordinate their activities, share resources, engage in
advocacy and campaigns. Eighty Australian development NGOs are affiliated with the
Australian Council for International Development and 64 such NGOs are affiliated with
the Council for International Development in New Zealand.
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Development assistance challenges
There are numerous challenges to development assistance in the contemporary period,
which are likely to extend for at least the next 10 to 20 years. These include donor
countries prioritising national interests over international concerns; their preoccupation
with security matters and development-related conflicts; bilateral versus multilateral aid;
structural adjustment programmes to promote ‘governance’ denoting marketisation and
democratisation; engagement with civil societies; and participatory development and
long-term partnerships. The biggest challenge for PICs is to deal with the forces of
globalisation pushing neo-liberal reforms that will erode the preferential access they have
to overseas markets. PICTA, PACER and Economic Partnership Agreements with the
EU are designed to move PICs into the ‘rules-based’ free trade regime of the WTO.
ODA will be required to provide support to PICs as they seek to engage competitively
with the economic giants of the world on a supposedly level playing field.
Maintaining and increasing aid flow
There are many challenges to international aid in the Pacific region. A number of these
are shared with other developing countries of the world. Central to these concerns is
whether the coming decades will see an increase in ODA and a genuine long-term
movement towards achieving 0.7 per cent of GNI of OECD countries. The massive drop
in aggregate ODA in the 1990s is a precedent that could be repeated. This was explained
as aid fatigue. Since 2002, Japan and Italy have significantly reduced aid (OECD 2003).
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific Islands are severely constrained in their ability to
attract foreign direct investment. These constraints are structural: limited resource
endowments, small population size and therefore minute markets, human resource
limitations and institutional constraints including rule of law and capital market issues.
To maintain and improve the quality of life of people in these regions, ODA needs to
meet the savings-investment gap as well address social development areas such as educa-
tion, health, housing, safe water and public utilities, which are of no interest to private
investors if user-pay principles cannot be applied.
On per capita regional terms, the Oceania region is the highest recipient of aid,
with $US183 per person. Sub-Saharan Africa received $US27 by comparison in 2002
(OECD 2003: Chart 1, Appendix A). In aggregate terms, however, the region received
only about two per cent of world development assistance funds (OECD 2003: Chart 2,
Appendix B). The largest donors have been France, Australia, the United States, Japan,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and various UN agencies. As is to be expected, the
biggest recipients of aid were the French colonies of Tahiti Polynesia and Kanaky (New
Caledonia), followed by Papua New Guinea with development assistance from Australia.
The US Compact countries of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands come third, with the
French territory of Wallis and Futuna next. Sectoral allocation of aid included education,
health and population programmes, other social sectors, economic infrastructure and
services, production, programme assistance and emergency assistance.
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With concerted efforts to halve poverty worldwide and to achieve other
Millennium Development Goals, it is likely that donor interests will shift towards those
countries and regions that are especially impoverished. A number of PICs classified as
least-developed countries are hard pressed to justify their membership of this category of
countries. Extreme poverty and hunger are emerging in the region but they are nowhere
near comparable with sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
Ironically, issues less directly related to poverty reduction, such as the security
concerns of Australia and New Zealand as well as the maintenance of their sphere of
influence, will ensure that aid from these donor countries remains focused on Oceania.
They currently direct 39 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively, of their total ODA to
PICs (AusAID and NZAID web sites). However, there are likely to be shifts in develop-
ment assistance within the region towards Melanesia. Poverty reduction will also mean
that aid funds will be targeted more to the poor. Already, NZAID has overhauled its
education sector funding with very significant increases in the proportion allocated for
basic education. 
Securitisation of aid
Oceania is perceived variously as an American lake and ANZUS’s backyard. Besides the
tensions on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s supposed membership of the ‘Axis
of Evil’, China is emerging as a major player in the region. This is coupled with the ‘look
north’ foreign and trade policy change in a number of PICs. For instance, Fiji’s political
leadership has been positively inclined to Japan and China, as neither of these countries’
governments opposed the military coups of 1987 and 2000 and do not take a position
on human rights violations.
With the US-conceived and led war on terror, there has been a tendency to perceive
all kinds of open violent conflict as being motivated by terrorism or at least providing
fertile ground for terrorist organisations. Resources formerly used for humanitarian and
developmental aid are now increasingly diverted to security matters. These include
building security organisations and training and equipping military and police personnel.
Legal and institutional frameworks might be established or modified using aid funding.
There appears to be a significant reorientation of Australian development assistance to
the region in this regard (Pacific Outlook September-October 2002).
Australia has adopted a more aggressive foreign policy approach, which includes
how aid is used. The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) from
mid-2002 has marked a remarkable change from Australia’s ‘hands-off the internal affairs
of its neighbours’ position to one that seeks early intervention. Thus, with other regional
countries, Australia is currently reforming the Solomon Islands’ political and economic
institutions to address possible future problems of instability. The ‘help ’em friend’
approach has been extended to Papua New Guinea in the Enhanced Cooperation
Programme (ECP). Australian public servants, including police personnel, have begun to
hold ministerial and administrative positions. A regional police training facility and
programmes, based in Fiji, are envisaged.19 Australia and New Zealand have increased
their funding of ‘governance’: Australia from 15 per cent in 1999–2000 to 33 per cent of
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its ODA in 2003–04 (AID/WATCH May 2004) and, in New Zealand, approximately
40 per cent of the aid budget to the Pacific was spent supporting ‘governance’ related
activities (NZAID September 2004).
Australia’s more interventionist approach as the self-appointed regional sheriff has
markedly affected its development assistance to the region. Although in aggregate terms
it is reported that Australian aid has increased to the region in general and to Papua New
Guinea and the Solomon Islands in particular, closer scrutiny reveals that additional
funds are used to pay Australian public servants, police personnel and private companies
(AID/WATCH November 2004). The current phase and style of Australian ODA to
PICs raises the challenge of neo-colonialism in the region.
Aid actors
ODA in the earlier phase involved government-to-government transfers. International
financial institutions also dealt with governments. While government-to-government
interrelationships remain central, there have been changes in aid objectives and agencies.
The reform agendas of OECD countries emphasise the promotion of the private sector
and market. Human rights and the adoption of democratic institutions are also pushed.
The role of the state as the ‘lead actor’ in development and of state planning for develop-
ment is de-emphasised and even openly criticised and ridiculed. International financial
institutions have become leading advocates of private sector promotion and of
minimising the economic role of the state.
In the smallest Pacific countries, the private sector is miniscule because the
domestic market is so small. The attempt to drive home the neo-liberal dogma is not
likely to produce any significant positive outcomes. Such countries might have difficul-
ties in accessing aid because of conditionalities linked to marketisation.
Besides the emergence of private business as a development partner in the use of
aid, there has emerged in the past two or three decades a new category of agencies in the
development arena. NGOs, together with community-based organisations, constitute
‘civil society’ and have taken up various degrees of active work in advocacy, provision and
implementation of development projects. Developed-country NGOs have become vocal
critics of their governments, the international financial institutions and grossly unequal
international economic and political structures. Globalisation and unfair trade rules
pushed by the WTO have induced a global network of civil society organisations that
share information, resources and strategies to counter the policies of the G8, OECD and
international finanacial institutions.
Developed-country NGOs have also become recipients of ODA funds as well as
donations from citizens of OECD countries to engage in relief, humanitarian and devel-
opment aid. In the Pacific, international NGOs such as OXFAM, the Red Cross, World
Vision, Greenpeace, Save the Children Fund, World Wide Fund and DAWN are playing
a number of roles. It is anticipated that autonomous organisations backed by govern-
ments and the private sector, such as the Pacific Cooperation Foundation, can facilitate
greater understanding of the development challenges faced by island states. 
Development Assistance Challenges 153
As in most other developing regions of the world, Oceania has also seen a significant
growth in NGOs. The older church-based groups have been supplemented by women’s
organisations and youth and environmental groups. Many of these groups are perceived as
bringing support to their communities more effectively than government. Thus, domestic
violence, which is widespread in the region, has been tackled largely by women’s groups.
Donor countries and agencies promote NGOs and seek partnership with them in some
situations because government officials are seen to be corrupt and ineffectual. 
Thus, the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, in announcing new
strategies for the delivery of aid, asserted that they included ‘a plan to bypass failed
governments. The breakdown and corruption of governments, particularly in Melanesia,
means more of Australia’s aid will go directly to community and church groups’ (Pacific
Outlook September–October 2002).
A challenge for donor countries and recipient country governments is how best to
accommodate NGO participation in development. This is particularly so when NGOs
have taken positions that are opposed to governments or when NGOs challenge govern-
ment policies and actions. 
Bilateral versus multilateral
As mentioned earlier, the bulk of ODA has hitherto been government-to-government
transfers with aid to multilateral or regional organisations being relatively limited.
However, it is likely that in the near future there will be a shift towards greater funding of
regional-level initiatives and programmes. There are several areas of common interest in
the region, which include shipping, fisheries, transport and communication, higher
education, environmental management and security, which benefit from a broader
regional approach. The EU is already funding programmes centred on the Pacific Islands
Forum, the Pacific Community and the University of the South Pacific. These institu-
tions also draw considerable support from some of the larger bilateral donors such as
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and France. 
Some intergovernmental regional organisations face difficult challenges. The Forum
Fisheries Agency (FFA) in the past was hindered by distant water fishing nations (DWFNs)
approaching PICs on a bilateral basis. Although PICs’ exclusive economic zones have the
most richly endowed tuna fisheries in the world and account for one-third of the world’s
tuna catch, the returns to island states are very small. Only 11 per cent of the total catch of
one million metric tonnes each year is caught by PIC-owned vessels. While the value of the
total catch is $US2 billion, the fees paid to island countries in the late 1990s amounted to
$US54 million (Pacific Regional Strategy Paper 2002–07: 20). Without the efforts of FFA,
many of the agreements with DWFNs would not have been possible, but in the negotia-
tion process DWFNs have tried to weaken the regional approach. 
All-of-government approach, harmonisation and sector-wide
approach
Just as regional approaches to certain common problems faced by PICs are seen as the
most appropriate, there is increasing discussion about an ‘all-of-government approach’ in
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evolving common strategies towards the region and to individual PICs. While such an
approach is seen as being more effective, as it reduces duplication of efforts and wastage
as well as minimising contradictory directions in development assistance, there is a
danger that it will also contribute to a lead government agency overshadowing the legiti-
mate concerns of other departments. Thus, the orientation and thrust of AusAID,
NZAID and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) might become even
more closely tied up with foreign affairs and trade as well as security matters serving the
donor country’s ‘national interest’ rather than meeting the development aspirations of
aid-receiving countries.
Harmonisation has become a buzz word among donor countries and agencies.
Again, there appears to be a commonsense rationale for all donors to engage with each
other in deliberating on and sharing approaches, resources and programmes. This
reduces duplication and promotes a sharing of ‘best practice’ in development assistance at
macro and micro levels and sectorally. Thus, a common approach to achieving
Millennium Development Goals among donors might result in a pooling of resources, a
more efficient allocation of funds to areas of need and a sharing of the different tasks on
the basis of expertise. However, there are a number of fundamental issues with harmoni-
sation. First, donor agencies do not necessarily have identical agendas with respect to
their overall development goals and methods of achieving them. The question is whose
approach will prevail. Allowing the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank to get
the lead role in poverty reduction might not be the best outcome of such efforts at
harmonisation.
The ‘sector-wide approach’ has also been in vogue in recent times and is likely to
become important in the future. This entails minimising the time and effort spent by
government personnel in recipient countries making numerous reports to several donor
agencies. For instance, civil servants in the Ministry of Health do not continue to report
back separately to WHO, AusAID, NZAID, JICA, the Food and Agriculture
Organisation, EU, etc., on how their funds were used. Instead, supporting programmes
in a sector of a recipient country would be on the basis of budgetary support for that
sector. This would not only significantly reduce the time and effort of senior government
personnel in the paperwork for reporting back, but would release them to do the policy
and supervisory work that they are supposed to be engaged in. 
The danger of the sector-wide approach is that it reverts to official channels as the
primary conduits for development aid and in doing so provides support to government
as against wider civil society. It also harkens back to the top-down approach to develop-
ment. Given the politics of a government, it is likely that the consolidated support of
donor countries and agencies might not be equitably used. It is not clear that the poorest
of the poor will benefit or indeed that such an approach will help women and disadvan-
taged minorities. In this regard, the extent to which the sector-wide approach will ensure
participatory development and empowerment is open to question. There is also the
concern from smaller donors’ points of view that in the pooling of resources their distinct
contribution will not be given due recognition.
Local government in PICs has been a neglected area, which may or may not benefit
from the sector-wide approach. In the aftermath of RAMSI, the discussion over a federal-
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type constitution for the Solomon Islands has rekindled issues relating to local govern-
ment in the region. Decentralisation of power away from the capital city is a major
development challenge in most PICs that will draw on the support of donor countries
and agencies.
Participatory development and partnerships
In the development community there is recognition that for development to be sustain-
able it requires the participation of people who are its beneficiaries. Considerable thought
needs to be directed at how their knowledge, skills, views and aspirations are to be incor-
porated in activities designed for their benefit. Participatory Rural Appraisal and
Participatory Learning and Analysis, and a range of other participatory approaches and
techniques, have shown that people who are the ‘grassroots’ recipients of aid can and do
make a significant contribution to the analysis of their situation and the strategies that
could improve their lot. With decisions being made about development assistance by
donor countries and agencies thousands of kilometres away, and through governments
that often have little to do with the poorest of their citizens, there is a huge challenge of
nurturing participation. This in turn gives ‘local ownership’ and ensures a greater degree
of sustainability. 
In this regard, NZAID’s support for the ‘Rethinking Pacific Education’ project is
quite remarkable and might provide a good framework for ensuring a participatory
approach to development assistance. This project, led by Dr Kabini Sanga, a Pacific
educator and senior lecturer in education, with colleagues at the Institute of Education,
University of the South Pacific, has been providing meeting grounds for discussion,
research, critical evaluation and alternative policy formulation for educational develop-
ment in PICs. Funded by NZAID, which does not interfere in the process, the project
has generated new ways of conceptualising Pacific education, building capacity and
confidence among island educators, bringing academics, policy-makers and practitioners
together in the task of creating more country- and regionally- relevant education. This
type of donor-recipient relationship is a productive partnership.
Another significant point that emerges out of this project is the recognition of not
only the existence of potential local partners in all projects, but of using the expertise that
Pacific Islanders have acquired through years of research and reflection as well as by living
in PICs on a continuing basis. It is vital that as part of generating ‘local ownership’ more
local people are used as expert consultants on matters that affect them and their societies.
From a situation of relative unequal standing between the giver and the receiver,
there has been a trend towards an approach of ‘we are in this together for the long haul’
and that there are mutual benefits for both parties. This has engendered mutual respect
and longer term strengthening of relationships well beyond project or programme cycles.
As in all relationships, there will be ups and downs, but there is a willingness to keep
channels open for dialogue and discussion.
Building national-level capacities in PICs so that there is leadership and the
capacity to negotiate with donor agencies and in deliberations over international treaties
on relatively equitable terms is critical to long-term partnerships. This means that human
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resource development is also a core issue in development assistance. Opportunities for
tertiary and postgraduate education continue to be important in the emerging prioritisa-
tion of basic education.
Conclusion
PICs are relatively poor and powerless in the global community. As part of the devel-
oping world, Oceania will be subject to the outcomes of negotiations over international
trade, environmental (especially marine), security and labour agreements. Individual
countries have different prospects depending on their human resources, institutional
capacities, natural resource endowments and the nature of their incorporation in the
global system. Their relative poverty means that on many fronts, including managing
their limited resources, they need development assistance.20 Regional approaches have
served a number of useful purposes in the past and will need to be consolidated to meet
common challenges.
The current push for a free-trade regime will have serious repercussions for island
economies and government revenues. Donor countries and agencies will need to work
with PICs to provide buffers against the negative repercussions. Such support will have to
be seen as assisting PICs as partners in development who need a ‘leg up’ in particularly
difficult circumstances. The beneficiaries of such assistance will not only be Islanders but
donor countries. Instability and out-migration would be minimised and PICs and tradi-
tional donor countries would benefit.
There is a need to ensure that beyond providing resources for policing and law and
order institutions, the participation of Islanders is enhanced in the decision-making
processes of their countries. Development assistance needs to address issues of human
capacity in PICs as a core dimension of development.
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Appendix A: Gross Bilateral ODA, 2001–02 Australia
Adapted from Australia: Gross Bilateral ODA, 2001–2002, Aid Statistics, Donor Aid Charts,
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/donorcharts, © OECD
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AUSTRALIA
 Change
Net ODA 2001 2002 2001/02
Current (USDm) 873 989 13.3%
Constant (2001 USDm) 873 916 4.9%
In Australian Dollars
    (million)  1 689 1 821 7.8%
ODA/GNI 0.25% 0.26%
Bilateral share 76% 78%
Net Official Aid (OA)
Current (USD m) 5 7 53.0%
1 Papua New Guinea 169
2 Indonesia 65
3 Timor-Leste 37
4 Viet Nam 37
5 Philippines 32
6 China 27
7 Solomon Islands 20
8 Bangladesh 20
9 Cambodia 19
10 Vanuatu 10
Top Ten Recipients of gross ODA/OA 
(USD million)
By Income Group (USD million)
By Region (USD million)
By Sector
LDCs
Other Low-Income
Lower Middle-Income
Upper Middle-Income
High-Income
Unallocated
Sub-Saharan Africa
South and Central Asia
Other Asia and Oceania
Middle East and North Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
Europe
Unspecified
Education, Health & Population
Production
Debt Relief
Other Social Infrastructure
Multisector
Emergency Aid
Economic Infrastructure
Programme Assistance
Unspecified
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Source: OCED
Appendix B: Gross Bilateral ODA, 2001–2002 New Zealand
Adapted from New Zealand: Gross Bilateral ODA, 2001–2002, Aid Statistics, Donor Aid Charts,
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/donorcharts, © OECD
Notes
1 I would like to acknowledge the support of Andrisha Kambaran, my research assis-
tant, in the collection of documents relating to ODA.
2 France continues to practice direct colonialism in Kanaky (New Caledonia),Tahiti
Polynesia (French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna). The ‘Compact’ ties the former
US Trust Territories of FSM, the Marshall Islands and Palau to the United States. The
Cook Islands and Niue are closely linked to New Zealand and Tokelau remains under
NZ’s control. Indonesia occupies West Papua.
3 Middle-aged and old men (‘unimane’ in Kiribati) dominate decision-making in the
patriarchal systems that characterise much of the region.
4 A view has emerged that closer political and economic integration and the lack of
sovereignty have contributed materially better standards of living and human rights in
such countries compared with those that are politically independent (Bertram and
Watters 1985; Crocombe 2004).
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NEW ZEALAND
 Change
Net ODA 2001 2002 2001/02
Current (USD m)  112  122 9.1%
Constant (2001 USD m)  112  110     -1.1%
In NZL Dollars (million)  266 264 -0.9% 
ODA/GNI  0.25% 0.22% 
Bilateral share 76% 75% 
Net Official Aid (OA)
Current (USD m)  0  1 192.0%
1 Papua New Guinea  6
2 Solomon Islands  5
3 Samoa  4
4 Tokelau  4
5 Indonesia  4
6 Tonga  4
7 Vanuatu  3
8 Niue 3
9 Cook Islands  2
10 Fiji  20
Top Ten Recipients of gross ODA/OA 
(USD million)
By Income Group (USD million)
By Region (USD million)
By Sector
LDCs
Other Low-Income
Lower Middle-Income
Upper Middle-Income
High-Income
Unallocated
Sub-Saharan Africa
South and Central Asia
Other Asia and Oceania
Middle East and North Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
Europe
Unspecified
Education, Health & Population
Production
Debt Relief
Other Social Infrastructure
Multisector
Emergency Aid
Economic Infrastructure
Programme Assistance
Unspecified
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Source: OCED
5 The ethnically exclusive Fijian military has engaged in three military coups under-
mining democratic electoral outcomes; the Solomon Islands police were involved in
the 2000 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Bart Ulufa’alu’s government; the PNG
and Vanuatu security forces have mutinied periodically.
6 Region-wide, there is only one job for every seven people looking for employment
(Pacific Regional Strategy Paper 2002–2007, p. 22).
7 The heavily remittance-dependent economies of Samoa and Tonga have experienced
growth. Samoa has engaged in the reform process most consistently and has shown
annual growth rates in the past five years. With the collapse of its squash exports,
Tongan economic prospects are not positive.
8 HIV/AIDS has spread through virtually all PICs, but the situation in Papua New
Guinea is especially worrying, with an estimated 40,000 HIV-positive cases. Illnesses,
such as malaria, TB, respiratory and infectious diseases, remain significant threats in
Melanesia. Lifestyle diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular problems have
become rampant in Micronesia and Polynesia.
9 Australia sided with the United States in downplaying the environmental impacts of
human activities and sought to dilute the Kyoto Protocol, much to the chagrin of
PICs representatives.
10 Some Pacific experts continue to subscribe to the notion of ‘subsistence affluence’,
which in my view is not present equally in all PICs and in any case raises the issue of
what is defined as affluence.
11 From 1977 to the early 1990s, the British Government had an Aid and Trade
Provision system that ensured that development assistance was to benefit the British
economy (Yamauchi 2003).
12 International financial institutions have a powerful invasive role where a country has
fallen into the debt trap as well as a missionary role in determining macro-economic
policies.
13 Comprises 30 OECD member states.
14 A recent OECD news release (14 May 2004) stated that aid volume had risen by 11
per cent in the past two years, after a decade of decline.
15 Presentation by former Congressman Robert Underwood, ‘Pacific Security — A
Micronesian Perspective’, at Securing a Peaceful Pacific Conference, University of
Canterbury, Christchurch, 15-17 October 2004.
16 While the British contribution is partly incorporated in EU aid to the region and the
United States makes direct subventions to the ‘Compact’ states, these donor countries
have shifted their interest to the former Soviet Bloc countries in transition, which
have bigger markets and natural resources.
17 Australia and New Zealand had agreements with the Soviet Union allowing the
latter’s fishing boats into certain ports. This raised the issue of the white man’s burden
and continuing paternalism towards black Islanders! 
18 The Los Angeles Times, in an article headlined ‘China, Taiwan court tiny group of
islands’, reported that Vanuatu had ‘become the belle of the cross-straits ball as China
and Taiwan open their chequebooks and compete for its loyalty’. Taiwan had
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promised $30 million against China’s $10 million. The article further reported that
26 countries recognised Taiwan — ‘mostly impoverished nations in Latin America,
Africa and the Pacific. An additional 160 recognize Beijing.’
19 A matter that is critical in development assistance, which can be the subject of a
separate paper, is aid and ethnicity. With respect to training and equipping police and
military forces, donor countries and agencies (such as the UN) must take cognisance
of the ethnic composition of security forces. In Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Papua
New Guinea, as well as in Vanuatu, ethnicity has been a factor in political destabilisa-
tion by and within security forces. In Fiji’s case, it appears that in pursuit of their own
interests, the UN and Australia are not prepared to reflect on the morality of arming
one ethnic group in a multi-ethnic society. This in the context of a military that has a
track record of three military coups and a mutiny in the past 17 years.
20 This chapter has not addressed the use of ODA to meet the dangers posed by unsus-
tainable exploitation of natural resources such as fisheries and forestry. Australia and
New Zealand, together with the Global Environment Facility and the South Pacific
Regional Environmental Programme, have made efforts to mitigate the destruction of
natural resources and biodiversity in PICs.
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Climate Change and Development
in Pacific Island Countries
Graham Sem
Introduction
Climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise are not just environmental, but
economic, social and political issues for Pacific Island countries (PICs). The impacts and,
in particular, the related economic and social shocks, pose serious political and national
financial management issues for PICs. Extreme climate events can adversely affect gross
domestic product, balance of payments, budget deficits, foreign debt, unemployment
and living standards. Many communities and the resources they depend on for their daily
livelihood and income tend to be badly affected by the changing climate. 
As with other small island developing states, PICs are particularly vulnerable to
global climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise. Given their smallness and the
location of their populations, agricultural activities, socioeconomic activities and infra-
structure at or near the coastal zone, any rise in sea level will have significant and
profound effects on their economies and living conditions. In some situations, the very
survival of communities is already being seriously threatened.
Current work in helping vulnerable populations adapt to climate variability has
shown that socioeconomic, environmental and climatic stresses are all connected and
therefore the full range of potential future stresses must be considered in adapting to the
adverse impacts of climate change. Given the lack of human and economic resources due
to geography, accessibility, the smallness of the economic base and a fragile economy
vulnerable to external shocks, PICs ability to adapt to extreme changes in climate
remains a major challenge.
In this paper, it is shown that despite the generally low adaptive capacity for PICs to
respond effectively to the negative impacts of climate change, climate variability and sea-
level rise, a significant effort has been devoted to understanding the impacts of,
vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. The paper is underpinned by the science
of climate change and the evidence it provides for future climatic conditions and issues of
vulnerability and adaptation. The last section covers some of the priority response
options that are pertinent for policy development relating to climate change and sea-level
rise in the PICs. Some of the priorities for action identified in numerous documents,
meetings, workshops and conferences in the past two decades are presented to encourage
interventions by governments and other stakeholders.
Context
Pacific Island countries are continuing to experience the impacts of a changing and variable
climate. Many of these are consistent with the anticipated impacts of global human-
induced climate change. A growing body of quantitative and qualitative information and
strong anecdotal evidence from across the Pacific region supports this. Collaborative efforts
among regional and international scientific and technical organisations are providing
valuable information that is being used to better predict human-induced climate change
and natural climate variability and to establish more conclusively the magnitude of
climate change and likely impacts in this region. Pacific Island policy-makers require
answers to critical questions relating to their vulnerability and their sustainable develop-
ment. Providing these answers will require stronger links between science and policy and
a well coordinated effort among all stakeholders.
Some capacity for this has been developed in the region in the past decade. This is
reflected in the considerable efforts by PICs in recent years to prepare national technical
studies and the development of policy-relevant guidance for key sectors. Significant
challenges for policy development have been identified in relation to a range of likely
impacts, including the loss of revenue across productive sectors, damage to coastal infra-
structure and accelerated coastal erosion, damage to coral reefs, impacts on water
resources for local communities and tourism, and social and cultural disruption,
including displacement and adverse effects on traditional systems.
Science of climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise
At the international level, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
concluded in 1995 that ‘the balance of evidence suggests there is a discernable human
influence on global climate’. Experts from PICs have worked with the IPCC on the
regional assessments for the Second Assessment Report and made important contribu-
tions to the Third Assessment Report.
The IPCC Second Assessment Report concluded that global surface temperatures
increased by 0.4–0.6°C during the 20th century and would increase by 1–3.5°C between
1990 and 2100. The report also concluded that between 1990 and 2100 global average
sea level would rise by between 0.13 and 0.94 metres. It also noted that more El Niño’s
occurred after 1975 than before. 
The IPCC Third Assessment Report concluded that, based on the full range of 35
climate-change scenarios published in a special report on emission scenarios, known as
SRES scenarios, the globally averaged surface temperature was projected to increase by
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1.4 to 5.8°C in the 1990 to 2100 period. The higher projected temperatures, compared
with those in the second report, were due to the lower projected sulfur dioxide emissions
in SRES scenarios relative to the other scenarios. Based on observations in the Pacific
Islands region ‘east of about 160°E and south of the equator, surface air temperatures
have increased by between 0.3 and 0.8°C during the twentieth century, with the greatest
increase in the zone southwest of the South Pacific Convergence Zone (SPCZ), which
runs from Solomon Islands southwest to Cook Islands’. 
The rate of global average sea-level rise during the 20th century, based on tide-
gauge data, is in the range 1.0 to 2.0mm/yr, with a central value of 1.5mm/yr. (As
with other ranges of uncertainty, it is not implied that the central value is the best
estimate.) The average rate of sea-level rise has been larger during the 20th century
than the 19th century (based on very long tide-gauge records), but no significant
acceleration in the rate of sea-level rise during the 20th century has been detected,
although decadal variability in extreme sea levels has been detected with no evidence
of widespread increases in extremes other than that associated with a change in the
mean.
The IPCC third report concludes that ‘it is very likely that 20th century
warming has contributed significantly to the observed sea level rise, through thermal
expansion of sea water and widespread loss of land ice’. However, an estimated rate of
sea-level rise from anthropogenic climate change from 1910 to 1990 (from modelling
studies of thermal expansion, glaciers and ice sheets) ranges from 0.3 to 0.8mm/yr.
This rate of sea-level rise is less than that based on observations in the Pacific Islands
region where sea levels in the tropical Pacific have risen by approximately 2mm, but
trends in short sea-level records in the tropical Pacific are complicated by El Niño and
La Niña events.
Evidence from the analysis of annual temperature and precipitation by country
derived from the Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia, indicates that
climate variability is more pronounced in small island developing states than in compa-
rable locations of the continental areas. Thus PICs are likely to experience greater
variability in ocean-atmosphere conditions, which would make it difficult to respond to
its adverse effects. 
Regionally, there have been numerous studies and conferences on climate change,
climate variability and sea-level rise. There are a number of significant scientific findings
of particular importance to the region, which are as pertinent today as they were five
years ago. These include:
• Impacts of climate change and climate variability are possibly the most critical
environmental issue facing PICs;
• Regional surface temperatures have increased by 0.5–0.8˚C during the 20th
century, with less warming in the north, and greatest warming in the south-west of
the region. Since the mid-1970s, it has become wetter in the north-east, and drier
in the south-west; 
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• Results for the Pacific region from global climate modelling indicate future
warming rates would be likely to be similar to or higher than the projected global
warming rate. Rainfall changes are less certain but the majority of general circula-
tion models show increased rainfall in the north-east of the region. There are some
results indicating more frequent El Niño-like conditions and more intense tropical
cyclones; 
• Observations and some studies indicated a rise in global sea level of 1 to 2mm per
year in the 20th century. Available evidence suggests that the rate of sea-level rise in
the Pacific region is greater than the global average, although this rate is compli-
cated by the influence of El Niño and La Niña;
• Some studies suggest movements of land levels can be of the same order of magni-
tude as that of sea-level change and can vary among individual islands,
complicating local effects of sea-level changes;
• In the past 100 years, global sea level has risen by about 10 to 25cm, based on
analyses of tide-gauge records. A major source of uncertainty in estimating the rate
of rise is the influence of vertical land movements, which are included in sea-level
measurements made by tide gauges. 
• Climate and sea level variability are linked with the well-documented El Niño-
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon, but there is new evidence emerging of
an ocean basin-wide Interdecadal Pacific Oscillation (IPO), which contributes to
decadal climate variability;
• Measurements from space are critical, to combine with long-term tide gauges,
for the determination and prediction of absolute and relative sea-level rise
(seasonal, ENSO and secular) along with the associated land motion in the
Pacific region;
• Although climate and sea-level variations have the most immediate and direct
impact on atoll countries, they also can have profound impacts on virtually all PICs
in areas such as health, agriculture, fisheries, coastal ecosystems and damage to
infrastructure;
• Recent scientific observations indicate that the upper 1,000m of the Pacific Ocean
are warming, resulting in thermal expansion equivalent to a rate of about 1mm per
year sea-level rise, and, from this contribution sea-level rise will accelerate;
• Droughts, tropical cyclones and other extreme climate events cause large impacts
on PICs and these are strongly influenced by ENSO events which can be forecast;
• Vital to the continued progress in understanding and adapting to climate and sea-
level change and variability is the maintenance and enhancement of atmospheric,
oceanographic and geodetic monitoring systems to ensure climate records reach
agreed international standards.
Impacts of climate change and vulnerability 
As with other small island states of the Caribbean and Indian Ocean regions, the PICs
display a great deal of diversity in their attributes; they can be single islands or groups of
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islands; they differ in geologic type, size, elevation, soil composition, drainage character-
istics, natural resources and can have barrier islands, continental islands, coral/atoll
islands, volcanic islands, and islands of mixed type ranging in altitudinal elevation of less
than one metre (eg., Tuvalu) to more than 4,500m (eg., Papua New Guinea). Social,
cultural and economic settings vary with different levels of development. Human
communities range from large, densely populated cities to small villages and dispersed
populations. Some islands have large commercial or industrial centres and others have
extensive agriculture and infrastructure. In others, infrastructure, including health infra-
structure, is poorly developed.
One of the major environmental challenges facing the Pacific region today is that of
climate change, increased climate variability and extremes. Widespread implications are
predicted for agriculture, water resources, fisheries, forestry and human health, as well as
social, economic and political systems. Projections include a decrease in crop yields,
exacerbation of desertification and a possible increase in vector-borne and waterborne
diseases. The projected sea-level rise of 50cm in the next 100 years could cause enhanced
coastal erosion, loss of land and property, dislocation of people and increased risk from
storm surges and wind damage.
The PICs view climate change and sea-level rise and their consequent negative
impacts on biophysical and human systems as posing serious threats to their liveli-
hoods and long-term survival. They have been critical of industrial nations for failing
to take definitive steps towards reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions. They
argue that despite a firm commitment at the UN Conference on Environment and
Development in 1992 and at subsequent meetings, and at annual meetings of the
Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
there has been very little progress towards reduction of greenhouse gasses by industri-
alised countries.
PICs are particularly vulnerable to these changes and, given their limited adaptive
capacity, anxiety has reached the highest echelons of government, including Pacific
Islands Forum Leaders’ meetings. With the Pacific’s unique combination of geographical,
biological, sociological and economic characteristics, which can be found nowhere else in
the world, the effects of climate change and extreme events are threatening the very
existence of these vulnerable ecosystems and people.
Global climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise are already damaging
coral reefs, altering the distribution of zones of upwelling and affecting subsistence
and commercial fisheries production. The increased frequency and intensity of storm
events have had profound effects on the economies and the environments of the PICs
and the survival of small and low-lying islands and coastal countries are threatened.
Most studies so far have indicated that these effects will be exacerbated by climate
change in the long term and could seriously affect the ability of the PICs to cope with
or adapt to them.
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Reviews of previous assessments of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change,
climate variability and sea-level rise have highlighted the following: 
• Climate variability, development and social changes and the rapid population
growth being experienced by most PICs are already placing pressure on sensitive
environmental and human systems and these impacts will be exacerbated if the
anticipated changes in climate and sea level (including extreme events) did
materialise;
• The future health and productivity of coral reef and mangrove ecosystems will have
a significant influence on the wellbeing of many PICs — the anticipated detri-
mental effects on coral reefs arising from higher sea surface temperatures and CO2
levels will be worsened by the degraded nature of these ecosystems;
• Land-use changes, including settlement and use of marginal lands for agriculture,
are decreasing the natural resilience of environmental systems and hence their
ability to accommodate the additional stresses arising from changes in climate and
sea level;
• Given the limited area and low elevation of inhabitable lands, the most direct and
severe effects of climate and sea-level changes will be increasing risks of coastal
erosion, flooding and inundation; these effects are exacerbated by the combination
of seasonal storms, high tides and storm surges;
• Other direct consequences of anticipated climate and sea-level changes will likely
include: reduction in subsistence and commercial agriculture production of crops
such as taro and coconut, decreased security of potable and other water supplies,
increased risk of dengue fever, malaria, cholera and diarrhoeal diseases, and
decreased human comfort;
• Ground water resources of the lowlands of high islands and atolls might be affected
by flooding and inundation from sea-level rise, water catchments of smaller, low-
lying islands will be at risk from any changes in the frequency of extreme events;
• Climate and related oceanic variations already have had significant impacts on fish
catches, subsistence and commercial; anticipated changes in climate and ocean
conditions will reduce the security of this resource;
• The overall impacts of changes in climate and sea level will likely be cumulative
and determined by the interactions and synergies between the stresses and their
effects.
An ensemble of seasonal climate change scenarios for small islands for the 2050s and
2080s (IPCC 2001) show that temperature increase is projected for all the regions and all
seasons. Projected warming over the Mediterranean and the Caribbean Sea areas is higher
during the Northern hemisphere (NH) winter for both time periods, while warming in
the other two regions exhibits different seasonal patterns for the 2050s and 2080s. For
the 2080s, small island developing states in the Mediterranean Sea are projected to
experience the highest warming, with surface air temperature rising by 3.9°C and 4.5°C
for December– February and June–August, respectively.
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Projections show a dominantly increased pattern in seasonal rainfall for the four
small island regions, with the islands in the Mediterranean Sea getting the most increase
in rainfall in the NH winter (16 per cent higher than the 1961–1990 average level for the
2080s). The largest decline in seasonal rainfall is projected for the Caribbean Sea, with a
reduction of NH summer rainfall of nearly 20 per cent.
These projected changes in seasonal climatologies are likely to aggravate the current
climate-related stresses in various small island states. Higher temperatures still are
expected to adversely affect the health of some island inhabitants who are already experi-
encing heat waves, and their associated increased outbreaks of vector-borne diseases; and
will also affect important marine species such as coral reefs. Changes in seasonal rainfall
patterns might manifest in the form of increased frequency and intensity of droughts and
floods for many of the already troubled small island states.
Responding to climate change, climate variability and 
sea-level rise
The small island developing states of the world formed an Alliance of Small Island States
during the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 and played a central role in
shaping international policy on climate change in the past 15 years. The alliance has
always pushed for industrialised countries to begin meaningful reductions of greenhouse
gas emissions without further delay. Without meaningful reductions, many alliance
countries will be unable to sustain themselves in the longer term, and they will be
rendered uninhabitable because of sea-level rise. 
The Barbados Programme of Action further recognised the special situation of the
small island developing states and their vulnerability to global climate change, climate
variability and sea-level rise. The Barbados programme provides for international support
to small island states across a number of sectors to assist them in adapting to climate
change. The 22nd Special Session of the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the commit-
ment of the international community to the Barbados Programme and sought to
accelerate programmes of assistance.
Since 1990, considerable effort has been made in PICs to: (i) raise awareness of
climate change; (ii) participate in research and systematic observation; (iii) develop
methodologies for vulnerability assessment; (iv) monitor climate and sea-level rise; and
(iv) strengthen national capacity to understand the science, impacts of and responses to
climate change and sea-level rise. These efforts have involved environmental officials,
planners, meteorologists and the general public.
Since the entry into force of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), 10 years ago, to which 14 PICs are parties, significant progress has been
made in the elaboration and definition of responsibilities and commitments. This gave
rise to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, which is designed to limit the growth of
emissions of greenhouse gases in developed countries. However, with the entry into force
of the Kyoto Protocol on 16 February 2005, the responsibilities and commitments of the
parties will become stronger.
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In preparation for the 10-year review of the Barbados Programme, the PICs noted
that the vulnerabilities have increased in the past decade. In a globalised world, the situa-
tion of PICs remains one of extreme exposure and growing vulnerability with an
increasing inability to cope or adapt to these situations.
Given the growing number of reporting requirements under various multilateral
environmental agreements, PICs called for simplified reporting procedures and harmon-
isation of reporting requirements. PICs continue to strongly reaffirm their deep concern
in regard to the impacts of climate change, climate variability, sea-level rise and extreme
weather events as an impediment to sustainable development. They urged the interna-
tional community to support the implementation of the Regional Framework for
Climate Change, Climate Variability and Sea-Level Rise.
In the past decade, PICs have continually urged the international community to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, however, global emissions continue to grow. While the
Kyoto Protocol is a first step towards cutting back on these emission trends, the targets
contained in the protocol are considered to be inadequate to fully meet the objectives of
the UN framework.
Given their vulnerability, the PICs need to improve their understanding of and
strengthen their capacities to respond to human-induced climate change, natural climate
variability and sea-level rise. This has been reflected in their national communications in
numerous statements by the region’s leaders and it continues to be a priority for PICs at
all levels.
In response, support has been received from the international community to assist
the region with programmes of research, technical studies, capacity building, planning and
the development of policy relevant advice. PICs have also committed significant resources
of their own to address problems of climate change, variability and sea-level rise.
Despite support from the international community in helping the PICs to under-
stand the impacts of changes in climate, PICs have identified many critical areas where
better understanding and response interventions are necessary. The reports of the
regional technical meetings, activities, programmes and projects on climate change in the
region form a necessary point of reference since they contain a wide range of actions that
are required in pursuit of sustainable development.
Climate change and development in the Pacific Islands
There has been growing support from the international and donor community for the
concern of PICs that climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise continue to
pose a major threat to the sustainable development and, even, the survival of a
number of these countries. Some donors have stressed the importance of renewable
energy initiatives, and have offered to share their experiences and expertise in this
regard. 
At a recent meeting on the Barbados Programme 10-year review preparations, it
was noted that the vulnerability of PICs might be even higher now than 10 years ago
because of threats from natural disasters. In addition, the important work of relief organ-
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isations such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was recognised, noting that
such organisations can give immediate help on the spot to help defend small island states
against vulnerabilities and disasters. The targets and goals of the UN Millennium
Declaration are considered as providing a broader framework for addressing sustainable
development.
A number of needs and priorities will have to be overcome and implemented by
PICs in the next few decades in order to enhance their adaptive capacity to respond effec-
tively to and mitigate the effects of climate change in a sustainable manner. The
following are key priorities that have been identified in the past decade through various
climate change-related processes: the need for enhancing effective participation and
contribution to research and systematic observation; improving policy development
relating to climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise; capacity building; educa-
tion, training and public awareness; better understanding of climate change impacts and
vulnerabilities; developing adaptation options, strategies and measures; and mobilising
resources to implement policies and measures.
Research and systematic observation
Climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise, being global concerns, now have a
well-developed international support infrastructure that ensures international planning
and coordination of scientific programmes and exchange of scientific information.
Of particular relevance is the work of a number of international and regional
agencies such as the World Meteorological Organisation, the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP)
and the International Council for Science, FAO, and all of the Council of Regional
Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) agencies. These organisations have put in place
programmes under the Climate Agenda, including the World Weather Watch, the World
Climate Program, the Integrated Global Observing Strategy, the Global Climate
Observing System, the Global Ocean Observing System and the Global Terrestrial
Observing System.
Climate observations from the PICs region are of utmost importance to the
understanding of the physical dynamics of the Pacific Ocean atmosphere. The
existing network of island-based climate observations has deteriorated in quantity and
quality to a point where data are insufficient to conduct even the most basic trend
analyses. The importance of climate observations was recognised by the UNFCCC
and, since 1998, it has urged parties to undertake programs of systematic observations
and to strengthen their capabilities in the collection, exchange and utilisation of
environmental data and information.
In response to the UNFCCC, a Pacific Islands Global Climate Observing
System Regional Action Plan was developed to address priority needs for a climate
observation system for the region that included atmospheric observations, oceano-
graphic and terrestrial components. The action plan includes a detailed
implementation plan addressing strategies that support development activities. The
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system is led by an officer based at the South Pacific Regional Environment
Programme and the Pacific Islands Global Climate Observing System
Implementation Team, which facilitates the implementation of the system’s develop-
ment and its sustainability within the region.
The Pacific is well served in these activities through regional counterparts in the
Regional Environment Programme, the Forum Secretariat, the South Pacific
Geosciences Commission, the Secretariat for the Pacific Community, the University
of the South Pacific, the University of Guam, the Forum Fisheries Agency, the Pacific
Islands Development Program, the University of Papua New Guinea, the World
Meteorological Organisation Sub-Regional Office in Apia and the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission office in Perth, Australia.
Policy initiatives on climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise
At the international level, PICs, as members of the Alliance of Small Island States, have
actively participated in and made contributions to the negotiating processes on the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. As far as policy development is concerned, climate
policies are still in their developmental stages, although some countries developed initial
policies when they undertook the National Environmental Management Strategies in
1992 and the national communications under the UNFCCC in 1999.
The preparation of national communications under the UNFCCC by PICs
through the Pacific Islands Climate Change Assistance Programme has catalysed efforts
to implement the UNFCCC, particularly in terms of developing policy response options
and measures to climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise. National communi-
cation is an important strategic tool that will assist countries to align their needs and
priorities. It will also provide for:
• Highlighting and disseminating the specific needs and concerns of the PICs;
• Strengthening participation by all stakeholders, nationally and locally;
• Involving those stakeholders in a long-term consultative process to develop relevant
policies;
• The development and strengthening of sector policies as they relate to climate
change, climate variability and sea-level rise;
• The development and strengthening of national policies on climate change, climate
variability and sea-level rise as they relate to the negotiation process of the
UNFCCC.
In the context of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, a number of
voluntary, multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development have been initi-
ated to contribute to the implementation of the intergovernmental agreements in
Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. In the PICs region, a number of World Summit
Type II initiatives on climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise have been initi-
ated. These initiatives include:
• Pacific Islands Energy for Sustainable Development to increase the availability of
adequate, affordable and environmentally-sound energy for the sustainable devel-
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opment of all Pacific Islanders and to accelerate the transfer and adoption of clean
and renewable energy technologies.
• South Pacific Vulnerability and Adaptation Initiative to enable Pacific Island
countries to adapt to the future impact of climate change, climate variability and
sea-level rise, and to strengthen regional collaboration between relevant multilateral
and regional technical agencies and other bilateral donors, and to enlist the support
of key government, community and private stakeholders.
• Developing capacities to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters by providing
technical assistance and building the capacities of small island developing states
for the integration of comprehensive risk-management including disaster
prevention, mitigation and preparedness into sustainable development planning
and help relieve the consequences of disasters, extreme weather events and other
emergencies.
• Capacity building in small island developing states to manage vulnerability and develop
resilience, particularly to disasters by providing technical assistance and building the
capacities of small states to manage vulnerability and build their resilience through
integration of a comprehensive hazard and risk-management approach into sustain-
able development planning.
• Enhanced application of climate prediction in PICs project to enhance climate predic-
tion capability, and strengthening and comprehension of climate prediction needs
of national meteorological services. 
In addition to the initiatives indicated above, the South Pacific sea level and climate
monitoring project was initiated in 1991 in response to PICs concerns about climate
change, climate variability and sea-level rise. The project is aimed at assembling an
archive of sea level and related climate data that provides information about sea-level
variability and change in the region. The project provides information for sustainable
development of the near-shore and coastal resources, and to develop policies and strate-
gies relevant for responding to long-term trends. The project also provides capacity
building and training to develop the capability within national and regional counterpart
PICs agencies to collect, manage and disseminate data and information about sea-level
changes. The project currently manages 12 Seaframe tide gauges in 12 PICs.
Development issues, concerns and priorities
One of the main concerns of development in the PICs is the general lack of expertise and
capabilities that are required to effectively implement activities and policies relating to
the implementation of the UNFCCC and other multilateral environmental agreements.
Thus, capacity building should enable implementation and coordination of national
priority needs and human resource requirements and should be ensured by a program-
matic approach rather than a project-by-project basis.
Capacity building
Under the UNFCCC, capacity building has been identified as critical for the implemen-
tation of the convention. As part of the Marrakech Accords, the following initial scope of
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needs and areas for capacity building in developing countries was identified, which are
pertinent to PICs: 
1. Institutional capacity building, including the strengthening or establishment, as
appropriate, of national climate change secretariats or national focal points;
2. Enhancement and/or creation of an enabling environment;
3. National communications;
4. National climate change programmes;
5. Greenhouse gas inventories. This could include development of PIC-specific emission
factors for all source/sink categories and strengthening of institutional, legal,
administrative and financial systems development of activity data; 
6. Vulnerability and adaptation assessment;
7. Capacity building for implementation of adaptation measures; 
8. Assessment for implementation of mitigation options;
9. Research and systematic observation, including meteorological, hydrological and
climatological services;
10. Development and transfer of technology;
11 Improved decision-making, including assistance for participation in international
negotiations;
12. Clean development mechanism;
13. Needs arising out of the implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the
Convention;
14. Education, training and public awareness;
15. Information and networking, including the establishment of databases.
The UNFCCC process also recognised the specific capacity building needs for the least-
developed countries, and that the small island developing states among them had the
least capacity to cope with and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The needs
and priority areas for capacity building in these countries include:
1. Strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing national climate change
secretariats or focal points to enable the effective implementation of the convention
and effective participation in the Kyoto Protocol process, including preparation of
national communications;
2. Developing an integrated implementation programme that takes into account the
role of research and training in capacity building;
3. Developing and enhancing technical capacities and skills to carry out and effec-
tively integrate vulnerability and adaptation assessments into sustainable
development programmes and developing national adaptation programmes of
action;
4. Strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing national research and
training institutions in order to ensure the sustainability of the capacity-building
programmes;
5. Strengthening the capacity of meteorological and hydrological services to collect,
analyse, interpret and disseminate weather and climate information to support
implementation of national adaptation programmes of action;
Climate Change and Development in Pacific Island Countries 175
6. Enhancing public awareness (level of understanding and human capacity develop-
ment).
Understanding the climate system and sea-level rise
Understanding the climate system is fundamental to sustainable development in the
PICs region. To inform local and regional responses to climate change, climate variability
and sea-level rise, it will be essential to strengthen the analytical capacity of relevant
national and regional institutions such as the national meteorological services to collect,
exchange and utilise data and information needed for preparing daily weather
forecasting, seasonal climate predictions and longer term climate change scenarios.
Improvements in the analytical capacity of meteorological services will enable an
increased focus on regional variability and changes, particularly extreme weather and
climate events as well as on a series of activities for better understanding of the impacts of
climate change on extreme events, in particular, the frequency and severity of tropical
cyclones, occurrences of ENSO events, and trends in heavy rain.
As sea-level rise and sea-level variability is of major concern to PICs, the mainte-
nance of existing observational networks and the strategic placement of future facilities,
improved techniques for detecting relative and absolute sea-level rise and improved
models will greatly assist with the formulation of response measures. Some of the specific
actions required include: a need for continuous monitoring of sea level and characterisa-
tion of the impacts of sea-level rise and storm surges; support for the maintenance of
meteorological equipment to ensure collection of reliable data at the national level; use of
satellite/remote sensing techniques in climate data applications with in-situ monitoring;
establishment of a regional sea-level database in the Pacific; and improvement of partner-
ships with global observing systems.
Education, training and public awareness
As part of their obligations and national programmes to implement the UNFCCC, the
PICs will seek to promote education, training and public awareness about climate change
and its impacts on biophysical and human systems. Some of the specific actions will
include efforts to cooperate in, promote, facilitate, develop and implement education
and training programmes focused on climate change, targeting youth in particular, and
including the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts for scientific,
technical and managerial personnel at the national and, as appropriate, sub-regional,
regional and international levels; and report in their national communications on their
accomplishments, lessons learned, experiences gained and remaining gaps and barriers
observed.
Impacts and vulnerability
PICs are continuing to experience the impacts of a changing and variable climate system
and related sea-level rise and variability. Collaboration between the PICs and regional
organisations needs to be strengthened and maintained.
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Some of the specific actions include the provision of appropriate training of
national experts in the science of climate change and sea-level rise, forecasting and
warning for droughts, floods and tropical cyclones, particularly related to the ENSO
phenomenon; better coordination of regional and international efforts to disseminate
information on impacts of climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise; and
the development of new frameworks for analysing impacts and vulnerability that
integrate science and local needs, in particular those that will assist with the character-
isation of vulnerability to climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise on
Pacific Island communities, and to integrate risk-management into sustainable devel-
opment planning and in development strategies of key sectors including agriculture,
tourism and fisheries.
Adaptation to climate change
The Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development at
the eighth session of the UNFCCC’s Conference of Parties states that it is ‘deeply
concerned that all countries, particularly developing countries, including the least devel-
oped countries and small island developing states, face an increased risk of the negative
impacts of climate change’. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change is a high
priority for all countries. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable. Adaptation
requires urgent attention and action on the part of all countries. 
Within current technical, institutional, technological and financial capacities, PICs
have been identifying a wide range of adaptation measures in different sectors. In order
to ensure the optimal use of the resources available to enhance the adaptive capacity of
the most vulnerable groups/sectors, it is pertinent to identify financial, technical, institu-
tional and technological gaps in the adaptive capacity of the PICs.
Priority actions on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation
Vulnerability and adaptation assessments in the PICs in the context of the preparation of
initial national communications focused on specific sectors, such as agriculture, water
resources, coastal systems, human health and fisheries. The assessments showed that
climate variability, development and social changes, and the rapid population growth
being experienced by most PICs, are already placing pressure on sensitive environmental
and human systems. The adverse impacts arising from these sources of stress would be
exacerbated by climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise. The following
actions and interventions would be necessary:
• Protection and rehabilitation of coral reef and mangrove ecosystems, and degraded
ecosystems;
• Protection of marginal lands and protection and management of potable ground
water resources,
• Breeding and introduction of salt-tolerant root crops, and drought-resistant culti-
vars and crops;
• Improved soil and water conservation practices in drought and flood-prone
areas;
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• Intercropping and increased diversity of crops, diversifying subsistence crops,
promoting agroforestry, encouraging sustainable practices and developing economic
opportunities;
• Increasing quarantine surveillance against introduced and invasive species;
• Coastal integrated catchment and management planning to increase the resilience
of coastal systems, foreshore protection measures including revegetation and estab-
lishment of setback zones;
• Preventing the discharge of pollutants in coastal and marine areas as a priority
measure to enhance the resilience of coastal and marine ecosystems;
• Measures to control aggregate removal for construction and other uses to help
reduce erosion;
• Development of contingency plans for resettlement of populations, emergency and
recovery plans;
• Public awareness programmes related to malaria, dengue fever and other diseases as
an essential, low-cost method for reducing the public health risk;
• Improving management and maintenance of existing water supply systems;
• Catchment protection and conservation;
• Developing drought and flood preparedness strategies;
• Increasing water storage capacity through the increased use of water tanks and/or
the construction of small dams;
• Measures to protect ground-water resources, including those that limit pollution
and the potential for salt-water intrusion;
• Measures to ‘cyclone-proof ’ houses and other buildings, such as through structural
design and choice of construction materials;
• Conservation of biodiversity;
• The introduction and enforcement of appropriate legislation and policies for the
conservation and sustainable use of living resources;
• Assessing and strengthening the adaptive capacity of institutional, political, finan-
cial, cultural and other human factors that influence the ability of systems to cope
with, or adjust to, climate change;
• Incorporating climate change and sea-level rise considerations into new develop-
ment proposals;
• Improving ability to communicate assessment findings to politicians, government
officials and leaders in industry and commerce;
• Improving the assessment methodologies and making them more applicable to the
needs and circumstances of PICs and initiatives that will improve the comprehen-
siveness, relevance and accessibility of data and other information required in the
assessment processes;
• Enhancing the methods for identifying, characterising, evaluating and prioritising
adaptation strategies to help ensure a more effective linkage between identified
vulnerabilities and proposed adaptation measures;
• Mainstreaming or integration of climate change adaptation into all levels of
decision-making processes and financial planning; 
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• Targeted training in a range of adaptation techniques, including impact assessment,
risk-management and the integration of these techniques within national develop-
ment planning and the wider community;
• Information support to communities, the private sector and government
through education and awareness programmes, the dissemination of case studies
and summaries for policy-makers. The use of print, radio, visual and web-based
media;
• Institutional strengthening of relevant government ministries, such as national
planning, finance and environment, cabinet and ministerial committees, as well as
local organisations and community groups involved in vulnerability assessment and
adaptation.
A number of policy responses, under specific sectors, which are of particular impor-
tance to the PICs include formulation of integrated coastal zone management plans;
development of renewable energy technologies for energy conservation, efficiency,
sustainable development and mitigation of climate change; identification of high risk
areas; improved management of water resources; sustainable management of marine
ecosystems and resources; strengthening of national disaster and emergency manage-
ment units; better understanding of the impacts of climate change on the health
sector; conservation of forests and catchments; management of waste disposal and
pollution prevention.
Priorities for implementation
During the period since the entry into force of the UNFCCC, the Climate Change
Country Team approach was used by PICs to undertake technical studies and policy
development in the context of climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise. In
addition, access to information required for technical studies and held in different
archives throughout government agencies has been well coordinated through these
country teams. The multi-sectoral nature of the teams and sub-committees has also
facilitated the identification of priorities and the development of climate policies in
relation to key sectors. Such initiatives will require strengthening and institutionalisa-
tion. There is also scope for further cooperation with small island developing states
experts in other regions, as well as with technical and financial support available
through the UN.
The PICs recognise that the effective implementation of the action programmes
will depend on the commitment of the national governments to provide financial,
technical and other resources. So far, substantial support has been provided to implement
some of the programmes, in partnership with regional organisations, multilateral or bilat-
eral partners.
Given the magnitude and the global nature of the issues involved and the activities
required to be undertaken, the resources of PICs alone are insufficient. Therefore, further
consultations will be undertaken bilaterally and through appropriate institutions to
establish financing partnerships.
The first priority in this regard will be to secure funds for the preparation of second
national communications, national adaptation programmes of action under the
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UNFCCC and the national self-assessment for implementing the UNCED Conventions
— the UNFCCC, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Convention to
Combat Desertification (UNCCD). Most of these activities will be funded through the
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Enabling Activity Programme, with some support
from bilateral partners. These funds will be used by the country teams for particularly
important tasks as identified by the individual countries, and in fulfilment of their
commitments. A second priority will be to develop strategies and mechanisms for the
integration of such activities into national planning processes. A further priority will be
to develop the international dimension of the work wherein information flows to the
international community and responses to needs arising could be facilitated through the
UN, in particular UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the UN
Development Programme, the UNEP, the World Meteorological Organisation, GEF and
CROP agencies.
The GEF Trust Fund has provided the bulk of funding through its climate change
focal area for the preparation of national communications from PICs and for funding of
the Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Project (PIREP). In addition, a set of new funds
has been created under the UNFCCC to assist with the preparation and implementation
of projects and activities relating to adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and
related capacity building. The funds established are:
• GEF Trust Fund —funding for 12 operational programmes ranging from mitiga-
tion of climate change to integrated ecosystem management. In addition, the GEF
has made available $US50 million for the period 2005–07 to pilot the strategic
approach to funding adaptation.
• Special Climate Change Fund — for funding adaptation, mitigation (projects that
are complementary to those funded under the GEF Trust Fund), technology
transfer and economic diversification.
• Least-Developed Countries Fund — for funding the preparation and implementation
of the national adaptation programmes of action for least-developed countries.
• Kyoto Protocol Fund or Adaptation Fund — for funding adaptation activities from
proceeds of the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, and volun-
tary contributions from developed-country parties. This fund will become
operational only after entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol.
Conclusion
There is a need to focus on the continued improvement of technical studies and policy
development as science-based understanding increases, and as their interrelationships and
complexities become clearer. Effort should not focus solely on studies, but rather on the
end point or implementation of the developed policies and plans, and on identifying the
ways and means to ensure that these efforts are harmonised and mainstreamed with each
PIC’s National Development Plans. Linking scientific analysis carefully to downstream
social and economic consequences will be vital.
Understanding climate change, climate variability and sea-level rise at the local and
national levels will be critical as will the development of appropriate methods and
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technology, the use and integration of traditional knowledge and the communication of
science in ways that can be understood and used by Pacific Island policy-makers and
their people.
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Part Three
A DEVELOPING
PACIFIC COMMUNITY
Pacific Island Regionalism: 
How firm the foundations 
for future cooperation?
Richard Herr
THE TEST FOR REGIONALISM has always been somewhat problematic in the case
of the Pacific Islands.1 A large collection of very small states and territories, widely
dispersed geographically with limited resources and limited capacities, scarcely fits the
theoretical models for effective, institutionalised cooperation. Typically, regionalism is
viewed in terms of efficiencies such as economies of scale for common markets, the
greater strength of alliances for security or heightened moral authority in promoting
decolonisation. Yet the long record, durability and varied extent of regional cooperation
among the Pacific Islands stands out as a rare example of apparent success among the
developing economies across the globe. Formal regional structures have existed since
1947 and span virtually all sectors in the public domain, from arts and culture to
economics and security. During this time, whatever questions have been put as to the
utility and purposes of regionalism have generally been answered in the affirmative, that
is, in favour of multilateralism among the Pacific Island polities. This is not to say that
Pacific Island regionalism has travelled a pothole-free road to success. Queries have been
raised and some of these remain as the states of the region assess the role that regionalism
is likely to play in the challenges of the 21st century. However, the more important
questions are probably those that have existed at the margins of consciousness or,
perhaps, have not been considered even darkly. One important and fundamental area of
concern has been the issue of regional capacity.
The concept of regional capacity has tended to be overlooked in analyses of South
Pacific regionalism, although issues relevant to this line of inquiry have been addressed in
cost-benefit assessments. Essentially, regional capacity refers to the efficiency and effec-
tiveness by which individual state inputs are converted into collective, regional outputs.
The mechanisms for this conversion can vary from harmonisation of policies, through
non-institutionalised regimes to formal intergovernmental organisations (IGOs).
Significantly, the creation of regional capacity in the Pacific Islands has been associated
primarily with IGOs from the outset. Whether this will remain the case in the future for
Pacific Island regionalism appears to depend partially on island perceptions that past
advantages will continue to be forthcoming. Equally, the non-island producers of
regional capacity in the South Pacific apparently will have to find sufficient benefit for
themselves if they are to maintain their support for the regional system. Thus, in order to
understand the prospects for Pacific Island regionalism, it is useful to consider its evolu-
tion and adaptation to the changing demand for regional capacity over the years.
Assessing the achievements of the Pacific Islands regional system in terms of its
objectives for the consumers and producers of regional capacity is no easy task. These
categories cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive. No country is only a producer of
regional capacity and none is only a consumer. Even the smallest member of the Pacific
Islands regional community contributes something to producing regional capacity. And
even the largest or most remote non-island participant consumes some of the output of
regional capacity. The difficulty with any assessment of the Pacific Islands regional system
is determining the cost-benefit ratio between net producers and net consumers of regional
capacity. Regrettably, too often this has been calculated primarily in dollar values for the
islands and in security values for the participating countries outside the region. This
simplistic method of calculating who produces regional capacity and who consumes it
misses the point of why anyone makes the effort at all or the complexity of motives that
have made this system one of the most durable and elaborate of any outside Europe. The
more sophisticated task involves something of a historical detective investigation to deter-
mine the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’ and ‘why’ of regional capacity in the South Pacific. 
This chapter reviews intergovernmental regionalism in the South Pacific in the past
six decades to assess the resilience of the Pacific Islands’ regional capacity. It is this robust-
ness — defined in terms of diversity, longevity and the range of issues covered — that
will assist the region to meet new international challenges. A key aspect of reforms such
as the ‘Pacific Plan’ is the role regional institutions will play in assisting the Pacific Island
countries (PICs) to cope with heightened global expectations in the exercise of sover-
eignty. If the limited state capacities of the smaller or weaker PICs make them essentially
consumers rather than producers of regional benefits, it is reasonable to reflect on who
are the producers and what benefits they derive from helping to create collective benefits
for other members of the regional association. The development of the current regional
system demonstrates some variations in the commitment to regional cooperation but its
survival and elaboration, even in the post-Cold War era, reveal support from all quarters.
Understanding the bases for the robustness of Pacific Island regionalism helps to give a
clearer guide to its flexibility and adaptability for meeting future needs. 
When and where? The origins and boundaries of regional
capacity 
The origins of the contemporary regional system date from the ANZAC Pact of 1944
when Australia and New Zealand made a démarche on postwar reconstruction and order in
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the Pacific Islands after being ignored in the general Allied Powers discussions. A South Seas
Regional Conference was convened in 1947 to progress the ANZAC agenda and six
colonial powers agreed to set up an arrangement to secure the more effective administration
of their Pacific Islands territories.2 The establishment of the South Pacific Commission
(SPC) (renamed the Pacific Community in 1998) as a formal IGO was the result. This
initial decision for international cooperation in the Pacific Islands was significant because it
defined the ‘where’ of the region. It has become conventional wisdom to view the SPC as a
child of the colonial era and so tainted by decisions for the region but not by the region.
The colonial context was unequivocally a principal factor in deciding on the boundaries of
the region, that is, the limits of what was inside the region and what was outside. The
consumers were inside the region, as it was defined, and the producers outside.
It is unusual but not unique for a regional organisation to be established entirely by
‘outsiders’. Although no Pacific Islanders had a direct part in identifying the geographic
limits of the region, the SPC’s work programme ambit has been one of the most
enduring and intractable features of Pacific Island regionalism. There has been virtually
no change in the scope of the region as identified in 1947 by the colonial powers.3 This
attachment to the ambit of the SPC is remarkable because it was the central issue for the
members of the South Pacific Forum (the Pacific Islands Forum since 1998) in the single
regional organisation dispute from 1976 to 1988. The forum members wanted and
expected, if successful, to have the independent states of the forum determine regional
policy across the entire breadth of the SPC region. There never appeared to be a question
that the forum members would redefine the reach of their regional capacity to the much
more limited scope of their own membership. Thus, whatever taint attached to the
colonial origins of the SPC as an organisation, it is clear that there was no dispute about
its identification of the authentic region. This agreement is one of the key contributions
the islands have made, and continue to make, to regional capacity. 
Whose regional capacity?
The 1947 Canberra Agreement, which established the SPC, made a clear demarcation
between the producers and consumers of regional capacity.4 The commission was
composed of representatives of the six colonial powers who had complete control of the
SPC’s work programme and decision-making processes. They drew together national
resources — technical expertise, finances and communication — and converted these
into regional work programme outputs. The Pacific Island territories were the consumers
of the output. Despite establishing a triennial meeting of Pacific Islanders, known as the
South Pacific Conference, to assist the commission, the conference had only an advisory
role and even this was limited. The course of decolonisation changed matters consider-
ably. Leaders of dependencies such as Fiji’s Ratu Kamisese Mara sought to reform the
SPC through the conference. Western Samoa, having achieved independence in 1962,
did not want to be restricted to the conference. Western Samoa (now Samoa) secured a
seat on the commission in 1965 despite fierce resistance from some metropolitan
members.5 These two developments began to reconfigure the distinction between
producers and consumers of regional capacity. 
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The pressure for reform of the SPC during the 1960s made the metropolitan
producers of regional capacity more aware of their own interests in controlling the
conversion process. The island consumers, on the other hand, became increasingly
willing to contribute more to the production of regional capacity in the hope that this
would entitle them to help to decide the substance of the output. The metropolitan states
that linked Cold War security to their presence in the Pacific Islands most overtly —
France and the United States — resisted the changes to the locally initiated changes to
the SPC just as they resisted decolonisation in their territories. The leading regional states
— Fiji, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands and Tonga — felt that the SPC should be
‘decolonised’ just as they had been. The consequence was a confrontation that altered the
regional perceptions of who ought to be involved in regional affairs.6
The existence of five independent and self-governing states — Western Samoa,
Cook Islands, Nauru, Tonga and Fiji — gave the islands the basis to pursue reform; if not
in the SPC, then outside it. The opportunity was seized at a meeting of the Pacific
Islands Producers’ Association (PIPA), a minor marketing arrangement, when these states
agreed to create a political organ for the decolonised South Pacific. However, recognising
their own limitations, these five Pacific Island countries adopted a somewhat imaginative
approach to generating additional regional capacity. They included Australia and New
Zealand in their plans. New Zealand hosted the first meeting of the South Pacific Forum
in Wellington at the request of the Pacific Island states in August 1971. The next meeting
(in Canberra, in February 1972) established an economic agency, the South Pacific
Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) to assist the development of the Forum
Island Countries (FICs).7
Initially, the forum seemed not to pose a direct challenge to the SPC. Indeed, all the
forum members retained their membership of the commission and the conference.
Nevertheless, there was a long-term aspiration for reform. The forum was not exclusively
an islands association. Australia and New Zealand were members of right, but the other
three SPC metropolitan powers, because of their resistance to reform of the SPC, were
excluded. The membership of the forum was in effect a means of reforming the SPC by
attrition. The island polities of the SPC would become eligible for forum membership as
they achieved their final political status (either independence or self-government). If the
winds of change swept away all colonial vestiges in the region, all the SPC islands plus
Australia and New Zealand would be members of the forum. Thus, ultimately, the basic
scope of the forum region would remain as that defined by the SPC but with an altered
external membership.
The establishment of the forum did not initially change regional outputs much.
Formally, all members shared a sovereign equality that made all simultaneously producers
and consumers. In practice, the objective of reforming the SPC left a legacy. The primary
immediate aims of the forum were largely developmental, as shown by the creation of the
SPEC. The costs of the SPEC were divided evenly, in a corporate sense, with Australia,
New Zealand and the FICs all paying one-third. This changed over time to skew the
production costs much more heavily toward non-FICs (non-member donors as well as
Australia and New Zealand) through project and extra-budgetary contributions. Thus, the
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decision-making burden of producing regional outcomes fell more formally on the FICs
through the forum and the SPEC, but financially little changed in terms of inputs.
However, there was a subtle change in regional outputs that eluded Australia and New
Zealand for many years. Because both were full members of the forum,8 the outputs of the
forum’s regional capacity applied as fully to the two non-FIC members as to the FICs,
unless specific provision was made. This had real significance when fisheries regulation
and security were addressed in later years. Thus, the forum’s creation redefined responsi-
bility for regional capacity but not so much the inputs or objectives, at least for a time. 
Regional capacity for what?
The SPEC was an OECD-type economic advisory body to the forum and the SPC’s
secretariat was a technical advisory body to the South Pacific Commission. Neither was
really an aid-delivery agency.9 Therefore, inter-agency rivalry did not appear inevitable.
The SPEC’s ambitions quickly came to the fore as it was designated the forum’s secre-
tariat (albeit with limitations) and absorbed PIPA. And, when forum members (through
the 1975 South Pacific Conference) supported a review into the continuing relevance of
the SPC in 1976 and authorised a review of their own into ‘more effective aid’, the game
was afoot.10 The ensuing dispute over control of the islands’ regional capacity was,
however, always misconceived. The key ostensible question, which derived from the
absorption of PIPA by the SPEC, was ‘could the South Pacific improve its regional
capacity institutionally?’. In reality, this question merely repeated Islander doubts relating
to the legitimacy of extra-regional stakeholders in regional processes. The quest for a
‘single regional organisation’ bedevilled the region for a dozen years. 
The problems attached to the single regional organisation issue were simple yet
convoluted. They were simple in that the forum would have been content merely to
acquire the regional capacity of the SPC — the resources it had for generating regional
outcomes — without the SPC’s three great power members or without its decision-
making processes. So too would have been many (but not all) of those island territories
likely to become members of the forum and the SPEC. However, there were American
and French territories that did not see themselves as early members of the forum.
Moreover, there were also smaller members of the forum that felt that having a second
string to the bow of regional capacity gave them more options than would be the case
with an SRO dominated by the larger regional states. There were also forum members
with doubts about excluding Britain, France and the US from regional affairs. 
The method of pursuing the single organisation objective, however, ensured that
any solution would be convoluted. The SPC was an organically integrated institution.
The forum and the SPEC were separate entities. Any union with the SPC could only be
with the SPEC, not the forum.11 Complicating the issue was the question of why the
forum members did not direct the SPC policy through their dominance on the confer-
ence.12 Some were concerned that members of the SPEC and the SPC would not
contribute ‘double’ funding to a single organisation. Indeed, it was asked, why would the
three excluded powers contribute at all? Would these states allow their territories to
participate in the new-look forum/SPEC without them? None of these questions could
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be resolved and so they festered as an open sore in the region until the abandonment of
the single organisation aim in 1988 with the creation of the South Pacific Organisation’s
Coordinating Committee (SPOCC). 
It is something of a historical irony that the single regional organisation issue
festered for as long as it did. The forum itself violated this objective in 1979 when it
established a new IGO under its auspices, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA). The FFA could have been managed through the SPEC had the forum members
been truly committed to the single organisation idea; the institutional means were not
impossible. However, the diversity of members’ interests in fisheries, the unfinished
status of the new International Law of the Sea and uncertainty as to the pressure that
might fall on the SPEC if it were asked to take on the unknown risks of a contested
fisheries role made the safety of an independent IGO under the forum appealing despite
the single organisation issue. The establishment of the FFA passed unremarked on either
its implicit rejection of the single regional organisation or its implications for further
compartmentalisation of specialist technical issues within separate agencies. In short, the
dream of the SRO as a single engine of regional capacity was lost, not just because of the
resistance of conservative powers in the SPC but because even the forum found a single
mechanism deficient for its needs. 
The single organisation issue had persisted even in the face of Cold War security
tensions. The Committee for the Coordination of Offshore Prospecting/South Pacific
(CCOP/SOPAC) began in 1972 as an Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP) project to search for hydrocarbons among the Pacific’s atolls.
Acceptance of an offer from the USSR to undertake a five-year program of marine
surveys brought protests from Australia and New Zealand. ESCAP, however, retorted
that it could not prevent its members from participating in ESCAP projects. A 1983
review favoured transferring political control to the islands despite the single regional
organisation constraint. In 1984, a memorandum of understanding authorised the IGO
option but without the full enthusiasm of the forum, notwithstanding that all the body’s
members (except Guam) were forum members.13 CCOP/SOPAC became the South
Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) in 1989 and was to serve the forum
members, to some extent, as the non-living marine resources counterpart to the FFA.14
The recognition of SOPAC as an IGO added to capacity in the region in another
area of technical expertise and demonstrated the increasing importance of marine
resources to the region’s development aspirations and responsibilities. And, like other
arrangements, the strengthening of capacity tended to reconfirm the importance of non-
island countries in the production of this capacity. The primary funders of SOPAC were
the three ANZUS states, even though their support was not an ANZUS activity. Indeed,
formally, SOPAC looked rather like the forum view of regional stakeholders. The
technical nature of SOPAC militated against too much angst on the exclusion of the US
since its involvement in SOPAC’s important science-based technical advisory committees
was not especially controversial. This stood in stark contrast with the FFA, where
concerns about United States involvement were real. Indeed, this factor had contributed
critically in 1978 to ensuring that the United States was excluded so that the FFA
emerged with a SPEC-like membership. 
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The need for technical cooperation across the entire gamut of fisheries interests
made some temporisation necessary. The modus vivendi favoured a cooperative arrange-
ment between the SPC and the FFA. The SPC had established the extent of much of the
region’s tuna resources prior to the establishment of the FFA. Moreover, it had set in
place data-collecting mechanisms for catch and effort trusted by the distant water fishing
nations (DWFNs), which were regarded as non-threatening in a regulatory sense. The
protocols for sharing (and to some extent sanitising) information between the SPC and
the FFA took some time to develop but the process itself undermined the single regional
organisation issue by demonstrating the possibilities for cooperative rather than competi-
tive arrangements. Significantly, this cooperation worked even given the enormous
financial and political stakes at risk. There can be little doubt that the existence of a dual-
track approach to developing the region’s fisheries resources eased the tensions alienating
the United States and the islands over the highly migratory tuna species. The United
States was a member by right of the SPC and so it could not be excluded fully from any
regulatory development as long as the SPC remained a part of the process. 
The emergence of the environment as a regional issue proved that inter-institu-
tional rivalries could not be laid to rest easily. Ownership of the UNEP’s ‘Regional Seas’
project for the South Pacific became a subject of the mid-1970s SPC-SPEC rivalry. A
hybrid inter-institutional administrative arrangement was devised to manage what
became known as the South Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP). The SPC
housed the program and provided the secretariat services while SPEC chaired the SPREP
executive. This arrangement became increasingly awkward in the next decade, especially
as more global resources for regional projects became available and regional acceptance of
the importance of environmental issues deepened. The forum regarded environmental
issues as ‘political’ and so entirely within its theatre of responsibility. However, the
outputs of SPREP’s regional capacity were shared by the SPC’s membership. For the
forum to incorporate SPREP within its family of agencies would have alienated the non-
FICs from its work. Such exclusion was unacceptable to the non-FICs. Moreover, the
international community would have had some doubts about a regional programme that
defined the Pacific Islands region more narrowly than SPREP’s original area of
coverage.15 Thus, the old problems of the single regional organisation continued to influ-
ence assessments of regional capacity even after the idea was abandoned as forum policy.
In 1991, a ministerial meeting of SPREP participants agreed to reconstitute SPREP as an
IGO with a headquarters in Samoa. Nevertheless, this decision was contingent on an
assurance, later realised, that sufficient funding from outside the islands would be avail-
able to fund these additional costs. 
The establishment of the South Pacific Organisations’ Coordinating Committee
(SPOCC) in 1988 was intended to end the inter-agency rivalry that had damaged
regional capacity so badly for more than a decade. Not only were the islands divided by
the single regional organisation debate, so were the external powers that provided so
much of the resources, particularly in the early years, needed to build, maintain and feed
this capacity. Thus, the creation of SPOCC was intended to achieve greater technical and
administrative efficiencies through easier collaboration between member agencies and,
Pacific Futures190
hopefully, to avoid the charge of duplication and waste. SPOCC was misnamed to some
extent, since it did not have the power to coordinate the affairs of its member agencies.16
Rather, it served as an advisory arrangement to the parent bodies through their secre-
tariats. SPOCC changed its name to the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific
(CROP) in 1999 in part as a consequence of a more general series of name changes to
delete ‘South Pacific’ from some agency names.17 The CROP arrangement appears to be
enjoying some success but not without some criticism. The governing bodies of some
regional agencies have questioned whether the CROP consultations have overreached
themselves. There is a suspicion that the agencies use their agreement to persuade their
governing bodies to endorse CROP decisions, thus reducing the control of these
governing bodies over their own secretariats. 
Why regionalism — the vindication of experience
The foregoing review of Pacific Island regionalism has passed only lightly over the range
of issues that have worked in various ways to provide the foundations for regional
capacity. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a few that have been critical for the success
and further development of this remarkably robust system. The identification of the
legitimate ‘region’ with the SPC boundaries is under-regarded and yet vital, as it enabled
this inclusive concept to survive the divisive pressures of the single regional organisation
confrontation. Indeed, the constancy of the islands’ commitment to the broader defini-
tion is a genuine hallmark of Pacific Island regionalism and has contributed enormously
to maintaining regional capacity. It avoided a too-polarised perspective on decolonisation
and so helped to protect the Pacific Island regional system from the extreme pressures
that appear to have poisoned Third World regionalism elsewhere. The willingness of
extra-regional powers to accept the need to address the diseconomies of scale that afflict
the archipelagic micro-states of the South Pacific has also been an important factor. The
current system could not exist in its present form without external support for regional
capacity. Equally, it is clear that the preference for IGOs has been strong by the islands
and their extra-regional sponsors. While some of this might have been driven by approval
of their experience, habit cannot explain the whole of their preference. Non-island
participants appear to prefer the legal status and more structured cooperation of this
arrangement, while the islands are able to enjoy an extension of their sovereignty in a
more politically level arena. 
Some of these foundations are so secure that it is difficult to imagine that they can
be undermined easily. The dependence on non-island funding remains a vulnerability
today, however, just as it was throughout the single regional organisation debate and
other developments such as the creation of SOPAC and the South Pacific Tourism
Organisation. Much depends on the perception of these non-island producers of regional
capacity that they too are beneficiaries of the outputs and so are consumers of these
outputs also. These perceptions were challenged during the decolonisation process and
by the Cold War. Nevertheless, island and metropolitan powers found sufficient
common purpose to work together through these tensions to maintain a commitment to
maintaining the area’s regional capacity. Even the post-Cold War pursuit of a peace
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dividend and increased emphasis on economic rationality have stressed the regional
system, but they have not broken it. Nevertheless, the straitened funding circumstances
within which SOPAC has found itself in recent years are an indication that the burden of
sustaining regional capacity through IGOs is substantial and cannot be assumed. Donors
are becoming more demanding that their expectations be met not only with regard to the
substantive outputs of regional capacity, but with the efficiencies of the conversion
process. Other factors are influential as well. The UK recently withdrew from the SPC
(for the second time in a decade) on the grounds of re-evaluating its national interests in
the region. Replacements from non-traditional extra-regional interests are not readily
forthcoming.18 On the other hand, the commitment of Australia and New Zealand
to contribute essential capacity to underpin regional cooperation seems to have
been strengthened by recent forum decisions, particularly in relation to the intended
‘Pacific Plan’.
In the final analysis, the foundations of the Pacific Islands’ regional capacity have
been firm enough and adaptable enough to survive for more than six decades. These
foundations, appropriately developed and extended, have come to support a remarkable
and valuable level of institutionalised cooperation. It is true that these foundations
required substantial input from outside the islands region. This support was initially
extended because it was in the interests of the outside powers. Subsequently, it has been
continued, in part, because the donor countries found new reasons for remaining
engaged. Importantly, these reasons include the fact that the islands have made effective
use of their regional capacity. Thus, the new challenges to be faced by the Pacific Islands
can be met, when appropriate, by a rich and mature multilateral capacity that has proved
its merit, together with significantly increasing input from Australia and New Zealand.
However, the foundations of Pacific Island regional capacity were laid to address old
problems. They will remain a firm basis for achieving contemporary regional aims only if
these foundations are built on and adapted to the new requirements of a new era.
Notes
1 This assessment is based on nearly 30 years of direct involvement in South Pacific
organisational issues, beginning with the 1976 review of the SPC. I am grateful to
Michael Powles for the opportunity to reflect on this experience. 
2 The six states included were Britain, France, the Netherlands, the United States, as
well as the two proposers — Australia and New Zealand. Perhaps significantly, some
possible inclusions were not at the Canberra conference. Portugal for East Timor and
Chile for Easter Island might have been invited but were not.
3 Some changes did occur including such minor ones as the yoyo-like inclusion and
exclusion of Norfolk Island over a 30-year period and the ambiguity surrounding the
status of Tonga within the SPC’s ambit. The key changes were the enlargement in
1951 for the US Micronesian territories and the contraction in 1962 with the exclu-
sion of West Papua. 
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4 This division was too neat even at the time, as demonstrated by ANZAC’s diplomatic
objectives in proposing the SPC. Moreover, the spirit of the age tended to view the
work of the SPC as altruistic, without significant benefit to the founding members,
even though occasionally they acknowledged some savings in pooling their research
efforts in the South Pacific. 
5 The term ‘metropolitan’ was long used to describe the founding extra-regional states
of the SPC and to distinguish them from island members of the commission after
1965. Today, the preferred term appears to be ‘donor member’. This usage reduces the
colonial heritage issue but tends to reintroduce the division between producers and
consumers of the SPC’s outputs. 
6 The start of nuclear testing in the Pacific by France in the mid-1960s was the catalyst
for this imbroglio, but the issue was not confined to France since the United States
shared a sensitivity on this matter for different reasons.
7 It is an interesting point of historical trivia that the SPEC was not established to be
the forum’s secretariat. This happened only two years later and with some pressure
from the SPEC’s inaugural Executive Secretary, Mahe Tupouniua. 
8 This point is reinforced in that there was no defined ambit of operation for the forum
in the way the scope of the SPC had been defined.
9 The SPC organs (Research Council and Secretariat) basically undertook research and
served as a clearing house for technical information to member governments and
territorial administrations. However, by the late 1960s, its pilot projects and service
activities did appear to many in the islands to be a source of direct aid even if this was
not formally their purpose. 
10 The two reviews had quite different results even though together they drew a line of
suspicious tension between the SPEC and the SPC. The SPEC review wanted a more
coordinated approach to regional aid, which went beyond what its own members
would support. The SPC review found the organisation had retained a raison d’être
even in the post-forum South Pacific. This determination was made essentially by the
SPC’s islands membership. 
11 Even when the SPEC was accepted as the forum’s secretariat, the forum did not
complete the process of becoming an IGO itself since it lacked a foundation treaty. It
would have been impossible for the forum as a heads-of-government ‘club’ to merge
with an IGO such as the SPC.
12 From 1973, the commission and the South Pacific Conference merged so that
decision-making within the SPC was controlled through the conference (although
some treaty obligations still required the formal continuance of the commission as an
organ of the SPC). From 1980, it was possible for the forum members, by voting as a
bloc, to control the conference.
13 The Memorandum served the purpose of doubts-removal legislation in municipal law
so that it confirmed the original intention of CCOP/SOPAC’s regional members to
constitute it as an IGO. Thus, CCOP/SOPAC was deemed technically not to be a
‘new’ regional organisation and so was not contrary to the single regional organisation
aspirations of the forum. The 1984 Memorandum of Understanding and
Pacific Island Regionalism 193
CCOP/SOPAC’s existing Terms of Reference served as the body’s foundation
documents until a full treaty was drafted in 1989. 
14 Although not founded under the aegis of the forum, CCOP/SOPAC sought a close
relationship with the forum and sends its annual report to the forum for considera-
tion just as the FFA does.
15 It includes all the 22 Pacific Island countries that are members of the SPC as well as
four of the five metropolitan states of the SPC — Australia, France, New Zealand and
the United States. Only one SPC member — the United Kingdom — remained
outside the SPREP. 
16 These now include: the Forum Secretariat (formerly the SPEC), the Pacific
Community (formerly the SPC), the Forum Fisheries Agency, the South Pacific
Regional Environment Program, the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission,
the Pacific Island Development Program, the South Pacific Tourism Organisation,
the University of the South Pacific, the Fiji School of Medicine and the South Pacific
Board for Educational Assessment. 
17 ‘South Pacific’ was seen by some as inappropriate because the region’s ambit included
islands above the equator and so was a slight to them. This issue had proved a
challenge to the SPC from the early 1960s but no consensus could be found as an
alternative until Dr Bob Dun, then Secretary-General of the SPC, forced ‘Pacific
Islands’ through in 1997.
18 Chile and Japan have expressed interest at various times in joining various agencies of
the regional system, but the most effective general mechanisms to date are the SPC’s
observer category and the forum’s Dialogue Partnership arrangement. These are not
fully satisfying for some as they do impact on the resources for sustaining the regional
organisations.
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Regionalism Above and Below the
Forum: The geographical/culture
regions, Asia-Pacific and others
Ron Crocombe
Introduction
Judged against logical criteria, the potential for effective regionalism in the Pacific Islands
is limited. Much has been achieved in wider forms of cooperation in governmental,
commercial, religious and other aspects of life, but it needs to be kept in perspective with
other forms of linkage within and beyond the Pacific Islands. This seems unlikely to
change despite renewed political interest among Pacific Islands Forum countries in devel-
oping closer political integration, which in fact is initiated, funded, promoted and
broadly sculpted by the governments of Australia, New Zealand and Europe in partic-
ular. As anywhere in the world, different regions apply for different functions (many
different regions already apply to a variety of organisations in and involving the Pacific
Islands), and finding the most appropriate and effective region for particular functions
will always be a matter of negotiation.
The major development in the Pacific Islands region is the paradigm shift from
‘West’ to ‘East’ with the major nations of East Asia soon to become the major external
influence on Pacific Island states. Asian nations will similarly become the major funders
of regionalism in the Pacific in the near future. Australia and New Zealand are likely to
seek to increase their involvement in the short term to counter the influence of Asia; but
that is likely only to delay the coming predominance of Asia.
In this time of rapid change on many fronts it is appropriate to rethink the existing
pattern of regionalism in terms of likely future needs. More will be gained if Pacific
Island countries decline current pressures for across-the-board closer integration among
the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum and instead identify what degree of regional
integration will provide the best solutions for their peoples for particular purposes and
what region is the most appropriate for each purpose.
Criteria for effective regionalism
There are several criteria for effective regionalism anywhere in the world. The more fully
they are met, the higher the potential for regional cooperation. The criteria might be
divided into the hardware and the software categories (or material and identity factors, or
body and soul).
Hardware or material items (the body) include:
• Geographical contiguity and proximity. The forum and Pacific Community regions
are the most scattered regions of the world, with no countries sharing land bound-
aries (whereas most of the world’s regions are contiguous).
• Intra-regional trade and investment. For trade, this is less than two per cent; for
investment, probably less, and both are decreasing.
• Air, shipping, telecommunications and media flows within the region are a tiny
proportion of the total, and reducing. More than 90 per cent of contact is with
individual nations on the Pacific Rim and beyond.
• Intra-regional freedom of movement and employment is minimal, although some
provision exists within the Melanesian Spearhead Group. There is scope to increase
it. Freer movement and work access could cause tensions and even conflict, but if
done in stages and with sensitivity, it could facilitate economic growth and regional
cohesion. Today, most island nations resist movement within the region but facili-
tate immigration from Asia, which is likely to cause more conflict than movement
of Pacific Islanders.
• Paying a significant share of the costs. For most Pacific Island regional organisa-
tions, 95 per cent or more of their budgets is paid from outside the region. The
Cook Islands pays 0.3 per cent of its national budget to regional organisations —
including UN agencies. That is about average. Given the increasing number of
nations outside this region with an interest in influencing it, the pressure for island
nations to pay might not be great. As no island nation derives much income or
other material benefit from within the region, the incentives to pay are low. It is
easy to have services accepted if provided free from outside, but that gives no
indication of the priorities of island nations, though it does show the priorities of
donor nations. 
Software or identity factors (the soul of the region) include:
• Ethnic/cultural ties. These are highest for Polynesia, next highest for Micronesia,
most diverse for Melanesia, and more preached than practised everywhere. As with
any identity ties, they are active only vis-a-vis others. Formerly relative to the West,
from now on, they will increasingly be vis-a-vis Asian countries and people.
• Religious/ideological compatibility. This is high as there is no major conflict of
political ideology (eg., capitalist/communist), and most Pacific political leaders (but
not business leaders) are Christian. The proportion of non-Christians is growing,
but is not generally the basis for conflict, except in Fiji. Compatibility might erode
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in the longer term as more people and religious/philosophical/value influences
come from Asia and elsewhere.
• Significant elements of common history and experience. These can provide some
basis for cooperation. The significant common elements in value systems, cultural
patterns, symbolic representation, etc., are likely to decline relative to total influ-
ences as the populations become more diverse (particularly with a growing Asian
proportion in most countries of the region) and as colonial history fades. 
The hardware basis for Pacific Island regionalism is relatively weak on all criteria,
accounts for a small proportion of total activities or linkages and is expected to decline.
The software basis is a little stronger — including feelings of common origins, historical
experiences and thought patterns — but it is still only moderate. In these circumstances,
although there is a strong case for regional interaction in particular fields, it would be
unwise to advocate comprehensive regional integration. The task is to identify what
degrees of regional interaction will provide the best solutions for the peoples concerned,
and which region is the most appropriate for each purpose. 
Which regions are the most appropriate for which functions?
The options include:
• The forum region, ie., English-speaking countries, comprising former British
(including Australian and New Zealand) and some US colonies — excluding the
largest, Hawai’i — but dominated by the former.
• The Pacific Community region, ie., former and present British (including
Australian and New Zealand), French, US and Dutch colonies. 
• Many other regional organisations have different geographical boundaries. For
example, the Pacific Islands Development Program includes all heads of
independent and non-independent Pacific Island governments, including the
Governor of Hawai’i. The Small Islands States Summit (Cook Islands, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue and Tuvalu) has not been very effective. The Central
Pacific Bloc (of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu) makes more sense for
some purposes but has not made much progress. A great diversity of NGOs,
community and sporting bodies all have their own boundaries within the islands.
Many include some countries beyond. 
• The colonial history regions. The British Commonwealth is the largest of these and
still the most influential. The French-associated entities (French Polynesia, New
Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna) likewise interact at many levels. The US-linked
entities (American Samoa, The FSM, Guam, Marshall Islands, Northern Marianas,
Palau and Hawai’i) constitute another area of relatively intense interaction —
though more with the United States than with each other because that is the main
source of funds, trade, population movement, etc.
• Culture-area regionalism. The three major culture areas make more sense for many
regional activities, and are the bases for many types of interaction. They would have
been the basis for much more, but the external donor nations have done all they
can to stifle culture-area regionalism and to promote all-islands regionalism, which
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they see as more congruent with their interests. Thus, activities undertaken on a
Pacific-wide basis will be encouraged and given large amounts of funds, but the
same activities on a culture-area basis will be discouraged and given none.
— The Melanesian region is many times larger in area and population than
Polynesia and Micronesia put together. Melanesia has relatively little to do
with them (except for Fiji, which also interacts significantly with western
Polynesia). The core of this region, with most in common, are the Pidgin-
speaking countries (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu). The
Melanesian Spearhead Group includes the heads of government of Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, and of the independence
movement of New Caledonia — but significantly not West Papua or the
Torres Strait Islands. 
— The Polynesian region is the most widely scattered, and its links, in hardware
and software, are much more with Australia and New Zealand, or the United
States or Chile (for Easter Island) than with Melanesia or Micronesia. 
— The Micronesian region. The nations (FSM, Marshall Islands and Palau) and
territories (Guam, Northern Marianas, Wake, etc.) have their ‘hardware’
connections with the northern hemisphere — with the United States and Asia
— and most of their software connections also. Almost the only activities for
which they look south are those paid for from abroad to fit external ideologies.
Kiribati’s and Nauru’s external orientations in the 1800s were also northwards.
They were turned south by colonial powers in the 1900s, but are already
returning north. Micronesia is the most cohesive culture area, with the best
basis for continuing cohesion. It is the smallest in area, population and spread,
and the only culture area in which all countries use the same international
language. These and other factors make interaction easier and the case for
cooperation stronger. 
• The Asia-Pacific region. This was largely irrelevant until the 1970s but is now the
fastest-growing region. Many in Asia see the Pacific Islands as a sub-region of the
Asia-Pacific. I know of 370 Asia-Pacific regional organisations, not including the
Asia-Pacific programmes of the UN agencies —more than 500 in total. That
includes many Asia-Pacific NGOs and voluntary organisations, but excludes the
many Asia-Pacific sporting and other organisations. The overall total of organisa-
tions linking Asia and the Pacific Islands is now likely to be more than 400. And
that does not include the powerful bilateral trade and investment links, or bilateral
government relations between Asia and Pacific governments. 
— At least 18 Asia-Pacific organisations are headquartered in Bangkok, six in
Manila, five in Kuala Lumpur, while Japan has more than 55. There are some
in other Asian nations. Each involves travel and communication for courses,
conferences and other activities and helps develop awareness and under-
standing of Asian nations and peoples. These organisations and activities are
still expanding.
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— The boundaries differ for different functions. Which countries belong to
particular Asia-Pacific NGOs varies immensely, in principle and even more in
practice. ASEAN overlaps with Papua New Guinea and East Timor, which are
now Associate Members of ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum. The
South-West Pacific Dialogue Group, initiated by former Indonesian president
Wahid in 2001, first met in 2002 and includes the foreign ministers of
Indonesia, the Philippines, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Australia and
New Zealand. 
— World Bank data shows that in the 31 years from 1965 to 1996, East Asian
economies averaged 5.5 per cent annual increase per capita, but Western
Europe, North America and Australia averaged only two per cent. The islands
showed no growth during that period. These differences, compounded during
the 31-year period and still compounding, give the East Asian economies an
enormous future advantage in the region.
• The Pacific Basin region. Japan initiated and promoted the Pacific Basin
Community concept to help overcome its isolation. This is a functional region for
many NGOs, eg., the Pacific Science Association and its associated Pacific Science
Congress (mainly inter-university), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC —
mainly multinational corporations), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
(PECC — governments and universities), etc. The overarching governmental body
is now APEC, which began as an Australian initiative. Pacific Basin regionalism will
grow, but is unlikely to reach the scale of Asia-Pacific regionalism. 
• Functional groupings (usually of multiple sub-regions) include the Association of
Small Island States, which includes islands of the Pacific, the Caribbean, the Indian
Ocean and others, and has its headquarters close to the UN in New York; the ACP
Group (of African, Caribbean and Pacific nations in relation to the EU); the
Commonwealth (which includes most Pacific Island nations along with many
island countries elsewhere in the world). 
When sources outside the islands decide it is in their interest to finance more activity on
a regional basis it will almost always be accepted, but it is hardly regional ‘cooperation’, as
it uses outside funds to hire people (mostly from the country where the programme is
based) to provide services to individual nations. 
Regionalism and language and cultural issues 
The forum recently established a goal of promoting language and culture as a regional
issue. More thought needs to be given to what forum leaders mean by culture. The most
basic elements of any cultural system are the economy, technology, political and value
systems. Pacific economies and technologies have joined those of the world, the political
structures were adapted from Western systems, but the value systems are an evolving
amalgam of indigenous, Christian and Western systems. Almost all discussion of cultural
issues is about a peripheral element of it, the expressive arts, which is safe and deflects
attention from more basic issues. 
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Support for Pacific languages is desirable and achievable, but within what overall
language policy? With more than 1,100 languages in the forum islands region, and some
cultural variation between all cultures, the forum’s goal of strengthening Pacific languages
and cultures can best be achieved by individual nations and national institutions.
Regional organisations will be keen to feed off such programmes, but are unlikely to
strengthen Pacific languages or cultures. If external resources are available for these
purposes, they should go directly to those who need them and will use them, otherwise
we will see more hijacking of the resources for the benefit of centrally located elites. Little
will dribble through to where it is needed. 
No nation can survive and thrive in tomorrow’s world with one small language,
even with a national lingua franca such as Pidgin, in multi-language countries. An inter-
national language is now also essential. In most cases, that will be English (and, for a
time, French in the present French territories, Indonesian in West Papua and Spanish in
Rapanui). English is the language of regional interaction for the medium term — beyond
that are several possibilities. Also, most Kiribati young men need Japanese or German to
work on the ships of one or the other country. Japanese is important for western
Micronesia with its dependence on Japanese tourism, investment and interaction.
Chinese (Mandarin and/or Cantonese) is likely to be needed more widely in the region.
The key need is for a language policy as a whole, not only a policy for indigenous
languages — important though they are. 
In the field of the expressive arts, the Festival of Pacific Arts occurs once every four
years. There are also a Melanesian Arts Festival and a Micronesian Arts Festival. All are
positive and popular, but are too expensive to run more than once in every four years or
so. And even then, they are funded largely from outside the region, or by foreign firms
within it. 
Vastly more international cultural activity occurs outside the Pacific Islands region.
New Zealand, Australia and Hawai’i host many festivals involving Pacific Islanders in
those countries and those who go from the islands to attend them. They are on a larger
scale than those in the islands. Taiwan’s annual Austronesian Festival, to which Pacific
Island teams are invited and paid to attend, is also becoming a major cultural event.
Pacific Islanders attend expressive arts performances much more outside the region
than within it. For example, the Cook Islands (with a national population of 12,000) has
in recent months had several performing arts teams in Germany, Spain and elsewhere in
Europe, a team in China and another at the Austronesian Festival in Taiwan, two teams
in Dubai, and various community ‘tere’ performing groups in New Zealand and
Australia. A team has performed in Japan for several months each year for about 35 years.
Apart from the Festival of Pacific Arts, I am not aware of any Cook Islands expressive arts
teams going to any other Pacific Islands country to perform. The regional exchanges or
festivals are worthwhile, but represent a small proportion of the total. The reality, unpop-
ular though it might be to many within the region, is that the regional proportion is
likely to expand only if countries outside, or foreign investors inside, decide it is in their
interest to fund it. 
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The paradigm shift from ‘West’ to ‘East’
For the past 250 years (or 500 years if we include the Spanish influence), the
overwhelming external influences on the Pacific Islands have come from Europe and its
derivatives (mainly Australia, New Zealand and the United States). The external forces
shaping islands regionalism have come from the same sources. Now we are in a transition
in which the external forces are increasingly from Asia, especially north-east Asia (China,
Taiwan, Japan, Korea). Moreover, all the indicators are that the main external influences
on Pacific Island regionalism will soon be from Asia. 
Pacific Island regionalism itself was originally vis-a-vis European colonial powers
with interests in the Pacific, then later with former colonial powers. Now the balance is
shifting more to Asia, especially north-east Asia (including ethnic north-east Asians in
South-East Asia). 
Neither island nations nor their regional organisations are preparing adequately for
this quantum change. There need to be changes in childhood and adult education,
language policies, and there need to be more students, journalists, diplomats and others
who study abroad going to Asian rather than Western nations. These changes will be a
major factor shaping how much the Pacific Islands benefit or lose from the economic and
political changes in process. Pacific Islanders with firsthand knowledge of at least one
Asian language, culture and systems of values, government and business will be more
successful in relations with these countries. 
Increased regional cooperation is a possible response to the challenges of the 21st
century, but more emphasis will need to be given to the areas of achievable growth,
particularly freer movement and employment and increased financial contribution by
island nations towards regional activity, and reinforcing the software factors by more
cultural and work exchanges, regional volunteering and intra-regional movement and
communication. All have room for expansion, but none for great expansion. 
The potential for regional organisations to improve the
quality of integrity systems
Small nations, or even larger nations with little money and limited highly qualified
manpower, are at a disadvantage in maintaining quality integrity systems — judges,
police, auditors, ombudsmen, etc. Government is becoming ever more complex with
more activities within the nation and involvement in an ever-increasing number of inter-
national organisations, conventions, treaties and agreements, all with internal
implications. Even large governments in wealthy countries find it difficult and expensive
to keep up with this growing complexity. In many cases, small countries are unable to
comply and required actions are simply not undertaken. Moreover, the smaller the
government, or the smaller the elite corps who staff it, the more difficult it is to achieve
objectivity, and the greater the network of pressures of reciprocal obligations to relatives,
friends and community, church and political party. In most Pacific Island nations,
integrity systems are under strain, severely weakening their capacity to deal adequately
with aspects of the new challenges.
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Two approaches can be pursued to strengthen integrity systems in Pacific Island
nations or at least lessen the disadvantages of the present situation. More can be done, by
pooling scarce legal and other resources on a regional basis, whether the region is a
culture region, the present Pacific Islands Forum or Pacific Community region, the Asia-
Pacific region or the world (which is the case with many agreements with the UN or its
international agencies). This is likely to achieve economies of cost and scale only if the
power and responsibility of execution are also given to the regional agency. Otherwise it
is likely to lead to duplication with another level of bureaucracy. And more can be done
on a bilateral basis with the bigger, richer neighbours on the Pacific Rim. 
There is scope for action on both fronts but which method is likely to give best
results in relation to each issue will need careful assessment. Because the term ‘region-
alism’ has become something of a mantra for solving problems beyond the national level,
and the Pacific Islands Forum was the model and the paramount decision-making body,
probably more reliance has been focused at that level than has been justified. 
It seems that more consideration should be given to bilateral linkages with countries
with established resources. For example, after a period of moving further from bilateral
linkages, the Cook Islands (and Niue even more so) is now going through a phase of
increased linkages with New Zealand for specialised medical, educational and other
services. Many of these can be more effectively and cheaply provided by bilateral links of
this nature than by regional organisations. 
The major donors have tried to centralise almost all regional activity on a Pacific
Islands-wide basis (but excluding large parts that do not fit their political agenda, such as
West Papua), and focus it on Fiji, which they use as a pivotal state. This has led to an
overwhelming proportion of the economic, employment, training and political benefits
from regionalism flowing to Fiji (which has only 10 per cent of the region’s population),
marginalising the other countries and peoples.
Changes as more regional funding comes from Asia
Will Asian funders of regionalism be more responsive to individual Pacific Island nations
and to other levels of regional interaction — eg., that relating to Melanesia, Micronesia
and Polynesia, and relating to the Asia-Pacific region? They might. For example, when
Samoa decided to set up a national university, the Western donors tried hard to wreck it
and force Samoa to confine itself to the University of the South Pacific, which the
withdrawing colonial powers had designed and funded. Japan came to the rescue and
supported the National University of Samoa. Samoa is much better off for tertiary educa-
tion than it would have been without it, and that university has given vastly more
stimulus to Samoan language and culture than any regional university could do. This is
not to suggest that Japan did this for altruistic reasons, any more than the other donors
established a regional institution for altruistic reasons. 
To take another example, Western donors have done everything in their power to
constrain regional activity by Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, but China recently
agreed to build a headquarters for the Melanesian Spearhead Group. This might not be
due to support for the principle, but because its Western competitors tried to strangle it;
Pacific Futures202
China can gain kudos by supporting it. (Incidentally, the Spearhead Group might be
better to follow the precedent of the Comision Permanente del Pacifico Sur — the South
Pacific Commission of the South American nations bordering the Pacific — which has
for the past 53 years rotated its headquarters every four years between the four member
countries, with the four top posts being held by people from each of the four countries.)
Whether Asian nations will continue to support the activities of smaller regions
within the Pacific remains to be seen. Like the present major donors, they will be guided
firstly by what they see as being in their own interests. This is not to suggest that they are
not concerned about the welfare of the Pacific Islands, but they too will tend to interpret
Pacific Islanders’ welfare in ways congruent with their own. 
Asian nations will probably try to reduce the Pacific Islands
to one vote in international forums
Having one vote each gives most advantage to the island governments, and to Australia
and New Zealand (in the short term at least) as they have had most success in coordi-
nating those votes in ways congruent with their interests. But it is contrary to Asian
interests, as well as contrary to the concept of democracy, for very small nations to have
the same vote as very large ones. China has nearly 200 times more people than all Pacific
Island nations put together, and more than 10,000 times more than the Cook Islands,
Nauru, Niue or Tuvalu. Why should Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Indonesian or other
Asian people be so disadvantaged in international voting power? I have heard this
complaint many times in Asia, and one day it will translate into action. The best chance
for the island nations might be to try to retain one vote each for Melanesia, Micronesia
and Polynesia. But they have probably been forced too much into the implicit ‘one-
region’ policy of the Western donors for that to be acceptable. 
Conclusion
The post-World War II ‘one-region policy’ set by the former colonial powers is being
increasingly marginalised or subordinated under larger units serving the Asia-Pacific or
the Pacific Basin regions, and by larger Asian nations shaping the agenda. Australia and
New Zealand will probably respond with larger contributions to sustain the present
regional framework and their influence in it for a time. However, as the world becomes
more complex, there is a need for more action at more diverse levels. It is to be hoped
that the external powers will respond more flexibly than they have in the past. 
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Whose Oceania? 
Contending Visions of Community
in Pacific Region-Building
Greg Fry
A LOSS OF FAITH in the post-colonial state — now often seen as non-viable, failed or
failing — has encouraged many influential governments and commentators to shift their
quest for answers to the question ‘What now for good governance in the Pacific?’ to the
regional level. Although the basic thrust of outside assistance and the commitment of
island governments remains focused on rebuilding or sustaining the centralised state,
increasingly, ‘good governance’ is viewed as being possible only within the context of a
revitalised and more deeply integrated regional political community. The regional level is
seen as having the potential to moderate the excesses of national governance through
establishing obligations to regional norms about good governance and economic
management. It is also seen as having the potential to assist in resolving conflict, to
increase the economic viability of the smaller states through the pooling of limited
resources, and to provide a cordon sanitaire against terrorism. 
The new faith in a regional answer to the national governance problem has been
reflected in a spate of high-profile proposals concerned with redefining the regional polit-
ical community of Oceania in significant ways. One proposal, emanating from an
Australian Senate Committee (Senate 2003: Chpt 1, 3; Cook 2004), but also put forward
in various forms by some Australian journalists and academics (Denoon 2004; Dobell
2003), is for a Pacific political and economic community. In the public commentary, this
proposal has conjured up ideas of a EU-style regional community for the Pacific and is
referred to by some journalists as a proposal for Pacific union.
A second kind of proposal for change has been promoted by the Howard
Government as part of its new hands-on policy approach to the Pacific since mid-2003.
This approach involves not only a commitment to what Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer refers to as ‘cooperative intervention’ in the Solomon Islands, and to the inser-
tion of in-line managers and police in Papua New Guinea and Nauru, but a commit-
ment to a more effective regional approach led by Australia. Its vision is of a revitalised
Pacific Islands Forum (managed by an Australian) with greater powers to intervene in
state sovereignty and to impose obligations on member states to conform to regional
norms and positions. This new commitment to a more effective regional effort is explic-
itly motivated by a security imperative — the war on terror — and has to be seen as part
of the Howard Government’s new doctrinal approach to the Pacific underpinned by its
view that Australia has a ‘special responsibility’ to look after ‘our patch’, defined in this
context as the Pacific Islands region. 
A third proposal was put forward by an Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) given the
task by the 2003 Pacific Islands Forum to review the forum (EPG 2004). This has
become the most important proposal because it has now been accepted — in the
Auckland Declaration in April 2004 — as the basis of future discussions by all Pacific
Islands Forum member countries, including Australia and New Zealand.1 Like the
Australian proposal, it does not seek a Pacific union, but it does propose much deeper
regional integration and a rethinking of the ‘Pacific Way’ to meet new challenges of
governance. Its motives are driven less by security concerns as by the challenges of good
governance, people’s welfare and concerns with wide participation in a regional commu-
nity. This position seems also to have been held by the New Zealand Government and
commentators who did not embrace either the more radical forms of an Australia-centric
community of the Senate Committee or the ‘war against terror’ arguments underpinning
Australia’s position. As chair of the forum, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clarke
made it clear that she wanted a more proactive Secretary-General in a crisis and radical
restructuring if the Pacific was not to become ‘a ghetto of conflict and poverty’ (SMH
2004: 12).
These three proposals have become confused in the public commentary. There has
been a tendency to represent the various Australian proposals, and even the New Zealand
Prime Minister’s position before the forum, as supporting a move towards a Pacific
Community modelled on the European Union.2 The Australian Government has denied
this. After the Auckland forum, the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, was
reported as saying that talk of a Pacific Union was premature: ‘It’s counterproductive and
it achieves nothing to be talking in those sort of grandiose terms … Let us crawl before
we walk’ (The Australian 2004). And the EPG report made it clear that although it was
not ruling out such a Pacific union as a long-term goal, the immediate concern was
making the Pacific Islands Forum more effective. There is clearly no intention at this
stage on the part of Australia, New Zealand or Pacific Island governments to move to a
political and economic community modelled on the EU. 
While the signing of the Auckland Declaration at one level suggests a settlement on
the question of what form the redefinition of the Pacific will take, it remains an impor-
tant exercise in my view to explore the implications of all three proposals mentioned
above. The Australian Government is obviously a key player in region-building, and in
its present mood, sees itself as having the ‘responsibility’ to manage things in ‘our patch’.
The flesh has yet to be put on the bones of the Pacific Plan recommended by the EPG, a
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process in which the Australian position will be influential. There are also some who see
the EPG report as already satisfying the key objectives of the Australian push for regional
reform (Metherell 2004) suggesting the need to examine the differences between the two.
The more radical proposal of the bipartisan Senate Committee reflects a broader
canvassing of Australian opinion and could become the basis of a Labor government’s
approach to region-building. Stripped of its controversial ‘one regional currency’ (the
Australian dollar) and ‘one regional labour market’ arguments, the Senate Committee’s
proposed Pacific community is not that much different from where the current regional
arrangements are heading in the forum, even without the EPG review. 
The legitimacy question
The particular concern of this chapter is the question of the moral and political legiti-
macy of contending visions of community contained in these region-building proposals.
The legitimacy of the post-colonial state is the key issue at the national level of gover-
nance in the Pacific;3 it should also be seen as central when regional forms of governance
are being defined or redefined. Lacking the coercive and socialising powers of the state,
the regional political community is even more dependent on legitimacy as the basis of its
political and moral authority. ‘Legitimacy’ takes us not only to questions of justice
(whether a particular form of region-building is seen as denying the rights of particular
groups, for example) but to questions of sustainability and order (whether a proposed
form of region-building is likely to gain political acceptance by those affected by it). By
legitimacy, then, I am not referring to the legal authority of the soft law associated with
declarations and treaties (or indeed of hard law if a more radical form of integrated
community were formed) or the legal authority of the founding processes engaged in by
sovereign states, but rather the acceptance and recognition of the moral and political
authority of the regional political community by the people who are subject to it.
I propose to argue that the legitimacy issue turns on the answer to the question of
who or what is excluded in a particular vision of regional community. That is, the
starting point to establishing the probable legitimacy of the various proposals for regional
community is to ask the question: who is Oceania for? We can think of this as a three-
part question. The first part is what does the community stand for as a set of values,
practices and ideas? At stake here is the key issue of how should Pacific Islanders live their
lives? For example, how should they be organised economically? What constitutes a
secure community? What should their relationship be with the land? What should the
moral obligation be to other Pacific Islanders living under colonialism or repression? The
second part is, who should be regarded as belonging to the community and on what
basis? And third, who can speak for it and determine its practices? 
Ultimately, the answers to the first and second parts of the question are derived
from the answer to the third: who controls the idea of Oceania and claims to speak for it?
I therefore propose to focus on this in exploring the legitimacy question in relation to the
current attempts to redefine regional community. In the post-colonial Pacific context this
question is pertinent. It has been at the centre of the struggle over the legitimacy of
various forms of Pacific community for more than 60 years. It has centred on a debate
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about the self-determination of Pacific societies and its flip side, a debate about
hegemonic regionalism (whether seen as colonial or neo-colonial) concerning the role of
colonial powers, ex-colonial powers and other outside forces, but particularly of
Australia, in defining what the Pacific should stand for as an idea. As importantly, it has
also involved a debate among Pacific Islanders about who represents the ‘self ’ in regional
self-determination. The rights of state elites to be the only group to speak for the regional
community have been challenged over several decades by non-governmental organisa-
tions, sovereignty movements, the leaders of dependent territories and women’s groups. 
We are now in a position to turn to a consideration of how current proposals to
redefine Oceanic regionalism, and the visions of community they contain, might enter
this longstanding contest over self-determination and what the region should stand for,
and the implications of this in turn for the legitimacy of this latest attempt at region-
building. 
The Australian Government proposal 
The Australian Government vision of Pacific community is for a state-centric commu-
nity of Pacific Island states managed by, but not including, Australia. The community
should embrace good governance, democracy and neo-liberal economic values and
harmonise laws around border control in a way that would suit Australia’s security
concerns. It calls for greater regional integration in the form of the pooling of resources
among Pacific Island states in such areas as police training and civil aviation. This
amounts to a return to the 1970s call for regional integration in the area of economic
development and to the 1980s call for regional security defined in ways that were seen as
promoting Australian security. It also seeks a community of states in which the obliga-
tions entered into by the island member states are more binding on national
governments than hitherto has been the case. This is consistent with Australia’s concern
to achieve more effective implementation of the Australian-led regional agenda of the
past few years on security and governance (which already has agreement on paper). 
This vision of community can then be seen as an extension of the vision implicit in
the existing forum. The community should stand for ‘good governance’ and ‘development’
as defined by the World Bank, but there should be a return to regional integration to
promote this. The processes of regional community should be changed to give effect to the
achievement of existing goals, particularly in relation to economic development and
securing the regional borders. Australia sees itself as a patron, not a participant, in such a
community. Australian territory and policies are not up for discussion or inclusion. Within
this vision, Australia nevertheless sees itself as having a ‘special responsibility’ to determine
this regional community for others. The responsibility is, however, to Western allies, and
particularly the United States, rather than to Pacific members of the community.
This new commitment to region-building is driven by a perceived security impera-
tive associated with the war on terror. It has to be seen in the context of Prime Minister
Howard’s attempt to minimise the commitment of Australian troops to Afghanistan and
Iraq since the fall of Baghdad while still appearing as a committed alliance partner with
the United States. It was also part of a conceptual shift in policy thinking exemplified in
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two key reports issued by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), which argued
that the region was now to be seen as a set of failed or failing states whose failure could
invite terrorist havens that would threaten Australian security interests (ASPI 2002; 2003). 
The change in Australia’s Pacific policy, again paralleling a paradigm shift suggested
by ASPI, has been dramatic. The most significant expression of this change in approach
concerned the decision to reverse a longstanding and considered policy of non-interven-
tion in the Solomon Islands. But also of importance was the Australian Government’s
decision to radically change the way it engaged with Papua New Guinea. The ‘enhanced
cooperation package’, or ECP, is a hands-on approach aimed at bolstering law and order
and ‘good governance’. It involves the direct insertion of 250 Australian police and a
number of government officials in in-line positions. A third expression of this new
doctrine can be seen in the change in Australia’s approach to Nauru in 2004. Australia
has insisted on placing its officers in key financial management and police positions in
the Nauru Government as the condition for Nauru receiving further assistance for its
bankrupt economy. 
The new commitment to redefining Pacific regionalism has to be seen in the light
of this hands-on engagement. In the context of developing the rationale for the Solomon
Islands intervention, Howard promoted the idea of the pooling of regional resources as a
means of small non-viable states finding the resources to govern and to avert the longer-
term economic problems producing state failure. He called specifically for regional
integration in civil aviation and police training. Consistent with the hands-on approach
at the centre of the new doctrine, Australia has also pushed to have an Australian in
charge of the reform process, overthrowing a 30-year convention of a Pacific Islander
being at the helm of the Pacific Islands Forum. While it is not new for Australia to use
regionalism as a vehicle for promoting good governance and ‘war against terror’ objec-
tives, what changed in 2003-04 was the degree of hands-on engagement, not least in the
personal involvement of the Australian Prime Minister. Nor was the push for an
Australian as Secretary-General a trivial matter, given the symbolism that this position
holds in representing the efforts of a past generation of Pacific Islanders to decolonise
South Pacific regionalism. 
The most important aspect of the new push for region-building from Australia is
the return of a very old Australian discourse in relation to the South Pacific, that of
‘special responsibility’. This idea — that Australia has a special responsibility to manage
things in the Pacific Islands region, a responsibility that it sees as being expected of it by
distant and powerful friends — is a recurring theme in the Prime Minister’s explanation
for the new hands-on approach to the Pacific since mid-2003. This self-image as leader
and manager recaptures the policy atmosphere of the 1980s and of 1994-96 when this
idea last surfaced. It, of course, raises issues of self-determination for Pacific states and
peoples particularly as the Howard Government has made no secret of the fact that it is
exercising this responsibility on behalf of the so-called Coalition of the Willing in this
part of the world in lieu of heavier deployments to the Middle East.
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The Pacific political and economic community proposal
At about the same time as Howard was announcing his government’s commitment to a
strengthened Pacific regionalism through a pooling of resources, a very different model of
Oceanic political community emerged as the main recommendation of A Pacific
Engaged, a report by the bipartisan Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
References Committee. This is a proposal for a Pacific political and economic commu-
nity (PPEC). The proposal is for a highly integrated economic community including a
free trade area, monetary union (preferably using the Australian dollar) and free labour
movement into Australia (although it recommends only a limited pilot scheme in the
first instance) and a high degree of obligation for island countries to engage in sound
economic management. Although ‘political community’ is also implied in the naming of
this proposal, it is clearly focused on the economy. There is no mention of a regional
parliament, regional confederation or other form of political integration such as joint
foreign policy (Senate 2003: Chpt 1, 3; Cook 2004.).
In contrast with the security-driven Australian Government proposal, the rationale
underlying the Senate Committee proposal is primarily a humanitarian one (Senate
2003: 7-10). The objectives are sustainable economic growth, democratic and ethical
governance, ‘shared and balanced’ defence and security, and better health, welfare and
education. The beliefs driving the proposal are that ‘economic and social problems are
worsening’ in the island states; that Australia has a responsibility to assist; and that the
best policy approach for Australia to achieve this is to promote or at least study the idea
of a fully integrated Pacific economic union. How is a Pacific community to achieve
these goals? An enormous weight is put on ‘sustainable regional economic growth’. If
such growth is achieved, it is argued, ‘issues of governance, international crime, law and
order, regional security and the health and wellbeing of the people will improve’ (Senate
2003: 7–8).
An equally large burden is put on the answer to the question: how might the Pacific
political and economic community achieve this ‘sustainable regional economic growth’?
The explicit answer given is pooling of resources and the imposing of disciplines in
economic management on national governments. Mike Moore, former Director-General
of the WTO, is cited with approval, for example, in observing that:
Studies show that countries preparing for entry to the EU and WTO do better than
those without such objectives. The economic discipline brings with it growth, social
progress and better governance. (Senate 2003: 79)
The Senate Committee’s proposal was clearly influenced by, but further developed the
ideas of, some key Australian academics and journalists. Donald Denoon, former
Professor of Pacific History at the ANU, for example, argues that: 
The only way that our region can become more prosperous and harmonious is to
revisit and revive the substance (though not the name) of Australasia, acknowledging
that the federal compact of 1900 was too narrow to serve the needs of the region.
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First, we should concede that there is a region and mutual responsibilities within it.
What should follow is the creation of a free trade area. Equally necessary is an
integrated defence structure. Ultimately the region and its members need something
like the European Community, so that currency fluctuations are avoided, capital and
technology flow freely, and the benefits of a larger market can be enjoyed. Anything
less is simply delaying the collapse of the smaller economies and polities, with
catastrophic consequences for Australia and New Zealand. (Denoon 2004: 13)
And Graeme Dobell, Radio Australia foreign affairs reporter, in an influential public
lecture delivered at Parliament House in February 2003, said, 
To match our security guarantee with an economic guarantee, it’s time for Canberra
to advocate the creation of a Pacific Economic Community grouping Australia, New
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Island states of the Forum and possibly the French
Pacific territories …
Our purpose is to prevent the disintegration of small societies and fragile states. We
need to put a regional floor beneath Pacific economies. Australia and New Zealand
need a broadly-based Pacific Community so that their demands for reform and
change are not merely dismissed as new forms of colonialism. Labour mobility would
give Canberra and Wellington fresh bargaining power to move the regional game in
new directions … Stronger regional structures are needed to give Island states some
life support and allow real nation-building. (Dobell 2003: 21-2)
All three proposals — that of Dobell, Denoon and the Senate Committee — envisage a
community in which there are rights and obligations or ‘mutual responsibilities’. The
Senate Committee makes this the ‘central plank’ of its PPEC. It argues that if Australia
has an obligation to the region (which the report assumes), and the region has a right to
expect Australia to play its role (again assumed), then the region has an obligation to
Australia to work towards economic reform and efficiency. The same logic appears to be
admired by Dobell in his reference to the success of the EU in getting the Pacific to do
what it wants:
Australia should be shamed that the European Union was able to force the Forum
Island countries to create an Islands-only free trade grouping. Rattling its aid money,
the European [Union] demanded the creation of a matching trans-national body so it
could more easily conduct its business through the Forum Secretariat in Suva. The
EU Aid Commissioner toured the region last October telling the Islands that small is
not beautiful, small is ridiculous in economic terms. If the EU can move the Pacific to
embrace an economic concept that delivers little real benefit to the Islands (and one
they’ve resisted for 30 years) then Australia and New Zealand should become bolder
about creating a regional community that could actually do some good.
Pacific Futures210
The problem is that this sounds more like imposing aid conditionality than forming the
basis of a sustainable social contract for building a community. Under this suggestion,
Australia determines who has responsibility to whom and what each does on the basis of
‘rattling its aid money’, to use Dobell’s phrase, or offering some labour access. All three
proposals are highly Australia-centric. They see an Australian hub with a series of spokes
rather than a regional community in which Australia happens to be the biggest member.
In this respect the community is to be built for Pacific Island societies but on Australian
terms.
Nevertheless, these three proposals appear more able to gain legitimacy than the
Howard Government’s vision because the primary motivation is at least to assist the
Pacific rather than to secure Australia. There is also at least some opening up of Australia
into the community. Furthermore, in the case of Dobell and the Senate Committee the
proposals are put forward in the context of making the case for more people-to-people
contacts between the Pacific and Australia, and for education of Australians on Pacific
matters. While their regional community concept is still one of a ‘community of states’, it
crosses a line into a broader notion of community with this link to society. 
The Pacific Eminent Persons’ Group proposal
The third prominent vision of future Pacific community grew out of an Australian and
New Zealand push for more effective regionalism at the Auckland Pacific Islands Forum
in August 2003. It is important to note that the Australian push reflected the Howard
Government’s position outlined above and not that of the Senate Committee. A Pacific
Engaged was released about the same time, and confused reporting of the Australian
position at the Auckland forum. As we have seen, the Australian Government was
concerned with tightening up regionalism as part of its responsibility to manage ‘our
patch’ in the war on terror. Prime Minister Howard went to the Auckland forum with
the intention of promoting further pooling of resources at the regional level, particularly
in the area of police training and civil aviation, as well as a tightening up of the processes
and management of the Pacific Islands Forum (including the insertion of an Australian
in the top regional post, running the Forum Secretariat). The position of New Zealand’s
Prime Minister, Helen Clarke, while obviously not embracing the ideas of Australia’s
‘special responsibility’, was also concerned to create a much more effective forum to
confront the issues that her government had been active in assisting in recent years:
development, law and order and conflict situations. 
In the event, the other Pacific leaders agreed to this agenda. As well as support in
principle for police training and civil aviation, they agreed to set up an Eminent Persons’
Group to conduct the first comprehensive review of the forum (Pacific Islands Forum
2003). The EPG was chaired by Sir Julius Chan, former Prime Minister of Papua New
Guinea and comprised several prominent members: Dr Langi Kavaliku of the Kingdom
of Tonga; Teburoro Tito, former President of Kiribati; Maiava Iulai Toma, the Samoan
Ombudsman; and Bob Cotton, a former Australian diplomat. It consulted widely in the
Pacific states at government and civil society levels. Reflecting the perceived urgency to
act, particularly as seen by forum chair, Helen Clarke, it reported to a special forum
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summit in Auckland in April 2004. What was before the leaders was a proposal for future
directions and an outline of the principles on which a future Pacific ‘community of states’
should be based. A vision statement outlined the general concept; its implementation
awaited the filling out of a Pacific Plan. The April forum agreed to the EPG report and
its vision statement in the Auckland Declaration.
While the EPG proposal grew out of Australian and New Zealand efforts to tighten
up the forum’s regional activities, it contains a significantly different vision of regional
community from that implicit in the Australian position in particular (although it might
be closer to that of the New Zealand Government4). I therefore wish to take a different
tack to those who see the EPG report as simply a reflection of Australian Government
interests. The Sydney Morning Herald’s Mark Metherell, for example, interpreted the
acceptance of the EPG report by the Pacific leaders as: 
Pacific leaders have agreed to more integration with Australia in return for more help
to counter the economic and political disintegration of their struggling countries.
(Metherell 2004)
The EPG’s conception of regional community has to be seen within the parameters of
their brief. Their task was to review the Pacific Islands Forum. Their starting point was
therefore very different from that of the Australian Senate Committee, which began with
a clean slate and came up with what they thought was an ideal regional community
rather than beginning with what was there already. Their finishing point was also, not
surprisingly, quite distinct. Nevertheless, while not advocating a highly integrated Pacific
economic community, the EPG did not rule out such a community in the future. It
observed that a Pacific economic union was in fact one of the earliest goals of the forum
and that it was ‘a vision that remains incomplete, though still a relevant objective’ (EPG
2004: 27). Pacific leaders signing onto the vision contained in the report also made it
clear that the time was not yet ripe for a Pacific union. 
The EPG nevertheless opts for a conception of community that goes beyond that
implicit in the current forum activities. First, it envisions a community of states engaged
in ‘deep integration’ (by implication, a higher level of integration than currently
attempted) and greater cooperation in such areas as transport, information technology,
quarantine, customs, security, judicial and public administration, and regional law
enforcement. Second, it promotes the idea of a more proactive secretary-general able to
act to mobilise the community to assist in times of regional crisis including within a
member state. This amounts to a gentle push across the line of state sovereignty. Third,
while seeing the community as a ‘community of states’, it nevertheless promotes the
participation of dependent territories, civil society groups such as women’s groups, youth
and churches in regional deliberations, and introduces the notion of ‘peoples of the
region’. Fourth, it seeks to settle the question of the legitimacy of Australian and New
Zealand membership of the community but also to place a check on any aspirations to
hegemonic relations between members: 
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It is time to put aside suspicions and differences by explicitly recognising that we are
all — whether from Small Island States or more prosperous Australia and New
Zealand — peoples of the region. We are political partners and are equal members of
the Forum. (Chan 2004: 1)
In terms of the relationship with the Australian conception of regional community, we
should particularly note that although the EPG vision shares the purposes of security and
development it is concerned to introduce Pacific heritage and cultural identity as a
guiding principle of regional community. The emphasis on a community of peoples as
well as of states also seems to suggest a departure from the Australian conception that, in
contrast, is state-centric and instrumentalist. The process by which this conception was
arrived at is also important. The EPG report is justly proud of the wide consultation that
was involved and describes the resultant recommendations accordingly as representing
‘authentic Pacific opinion’. 
Conclusion
Past experience would suggest that the EPG’s vision of a future Pacific community has
the most potential to gain the support of the Pacific states and other segments of Pacific
society. It reinforces the equal place at the table where decisions are made for all states
regardless of size, a principle that disciplines the larger states as well as seeking to assure
the smaller states. It also promotes a more inclusive community. While still state-centric
in its conception of community, it talks about an opening up to regional civil society on
the one hand and to the dependent territories on the other. It also introduces a more
balanced list of community concerns than the Australian proposals and introduces the
protection of cultural heritage as an equally important purpose of the regional commu-
nity. It is a vision that has been derived from extensive consultation with all sectors of
society in all member states. It therefore has the possibility of going some of the way to
meeting the concerns of those who felt excluded in the past. 
In practice, there is a danger that this more inclusive vision of the EPG will be
hijacked by an Australian government intent on promoting its ‘special responsibility’ to
manage the region in the war on terror. It is, of course, quite acceptable for Australia to
have concerns about its own security and the possible link between this security and the
governance of the post-colonial states in the Pacific. The difficulty begins, as in the past,
when Australia arrogates to itself the right to determine the agenda and values of the
Pacific community on behalf of the West, the United States or the international commu-
nity, or just in terms of its own domestic political requirements. This might eventually
lead to a lack of support among the island state members for the Australian-led agenda as
it did in the 1980s and in 1994-96. And, in the meantime, the adoption of an Australian
agenda might alienate the non-state actors whose participation is required if there is to be
room for a debate on the main assumptions of regional community visions about neo-
liberal development as the panacea for conflict resolution, good governance and security. 
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There is also the problem that the Australian vision does not include Australia as
part of the regional community and yet it wants to determine the values and purposes of
that community. While it continues to do this, the regional community will lack legiti-
macy and will be quietly challenged by those within it. In this regard, the Senate
Committee report and others concerned with a more integrated Pacific union offer a
more hopeful vision. They not only place Australia within an integrated region, they
recognise the need for people-to-people contact and for the education of Australians, if
a regional community is to be based on a feeling of identity.
Notes
1 The Auckland Declaration. Signed at Special Leaders’ Retreat, Pacific Islands Forum,
Auckland, 6 April 2004. (www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/Gen_docs/Auckland_
Declaration.pdf )
2 See, for example, Helen Tunnah, ‘Pacific Plan Hints at Economic Union’, The New
Zealand Herald, 7 April 2004; ‘The United States of the Pacific’, editorial, Sydney
Morning Herald, 17 March 2004, p. 12; ‘Be Open Minded on Pacific Union’, edito-
rial, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, 11 March 2004.
3 I examine this issue in ‘Political Legitimacy and the Post-colonial State: Reflections on
Some Common Threads in the Fiji and Solomon Islands Coups’, Pacifica Review, 12
(3), October 2000. pp. 295–304.
4 As in the establishment of the forum itself, New Zealand played an important role in
supporting the development of the EPG vision and the chair of the EPG singles out
the New Zealand Prime Minister, observing that ‘The Review was inspired by an
insightful presentation right at the start by the Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, the
New Zealand Prime Minister, Rt Hon Helen Clarke’. See Statement by Rt Hon Sir
Julius Chan GCMG KBE Chair of the Eminent Persons’ Group, Pacific Islands
Forum Review, March 2004, www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/pifre-
viewdocs/chair.html
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Rethinking Sovereignty 
in the Pacific
Transform Aqorau
Introduction
In April 2004, Pacific Islands Forum leaders met in Auckland, New Zealand, and agreed
on a blueprint for regional cooperation in the Pacific that would entail ‘deeper and closer’
cooperation. This has prompted some academics and commentators of Pacific Island
politics to speculate that this is the genesis of a move towards greater integration similar
to the European Union. While closer and deeper cooperation could potentially involve
greater integration, forum leaders have been careful about the way in which they have
characterised the need for improved cooperation so that it is not misconstrued as
usurping the sovereignty of Pacific Island states. This is understandable given the fact
that while there might not be any difficulties with integration at the procedural and
process level, such as harmonising fisheries laws, customs and quarantine regulations, the
same might not be true where such harmonisation would involve the surrender of sover-
eign powers. But for all their resolve and political machinations, there are indications that
the sovereign powers of Pacific Island states are already being ceded through cooperative
exchanges. While some politicians might perceive this as vitiating the idea of nation-state
sovereign powers, it is argued that the collective exercise of such powers would strengthen
the Pacific Island states. 
There are two schools of thought in the Pacific. The first seemingly finds support
among the old politicians who were involved in bringing the Pacific Islands states to
independence. These politicians still cling to the idea of absolute sovereign powers —
including the notion that the state is the embodiment of the sovereign nation. The views
expressed recently by veteran Solomon Islands politician Sir David Kausimae that
Solomon Islands should not change its currency from the Solomon Islands dollar to the
Australian dollar because it would be an affront to its sovereignty and integrity would
seem to be representative of the old school of thought. The second and more contempo-
rary school of thought is represented by the current generation of politicians who recog-
nise the strength of stronger and closer collective action. It is argued in this paper that
sovereignty in the Pacific Islands region is changing. However, the broad policy question
for Pacific Islanders is whether these changes will lead to an improvement in the quality
of their social and economic wellbeing. The conclusion that this paper makes is that
closer and deeper cooperation will require an erosion of the traditional notions of sover-
eignty, but whether it will lead to improved social and economic standards of living for
Pacific Islanders will depend on the extent to which Pacific Islanders and their leaders
understand the process of change taking place in the region and how they use the
strength gained when sovereign powers are exercised collectively to shape those changes
for their benefit.
Old and new sovereignty
The rise of sovereign states in the traditional sense can be traced to the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648 during which Europe consolidated its long transition from the
Middle Ages to a world of sovereign states. A definition of the term sovereignty is offered
in the Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. USA), Permanent Court of Arbitration 1928,
where the sole Arbitrator stated that 
… sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence
in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of
any other State, the functions of a State … Territorial sovereignty, as has already been
said, involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This right has as
corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other
States, in particular, their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war,
together with the rights which each may claim for its nationals in foreign territory.
Without manifesting its territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding to circum-
stances, the State cannot fulfil this duty …1
Under this definition, it is arguable that Pacific Island societies were sovereign
independent states even before they were colonised, because each society or tribe was
already exercising independence with respect to the territory in which it lived and where
it held dominion. These societies might have been clusters of families or tribes but each
one of them within the geographic sphere of their influence exercised power and
authority to the exclusion of other families and tribes. There are significant similarities in
the way that the idea of sovereign states evolved from components of fiefdoms in Europe
to states and the evolution of states in the Pacific. Europe was also a cluster of small
kingdoms in much the same way that traditional Pacific Island societies were organised
along tribal and linguistic lines. The major difference in the evolution of sovereign state-
hood in Europe and the Pacific is that in the Pacific, sovereign statehood, in the way in
which we have come to appreciate the term, was the direct result of colonial subjugation,
with which most of its inhabitants had no choice. The two exceptional cases in the
Pacific are Tonga, which was never colonised — although it is arguable that the consider-
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able influence of the church could be construed as a form of colonialism — and Fiji,
whose chiefs actually ceded the Fiji Islands to Queen Victoria.
It has been said that sovereignty can be best understood by reference to either of
two perceived historical trends — the first, a centuries-long evolution towards a
European continent, then a globe of sovereign states; the second, a circumscription of
absolute sovereign prerogatives in the second half of the 20th century (Philpott 2003).
The same perceptions are relevant to the evolution of statehood in the Pacific Island
states, with the exception that the idea of sovereign statehood as we have come to under-
stand the term today was generally forced on unwitting peoples through colonial
subjugation. As will be discussed later, the calls for a Pacific Plan and deeper and closer
collaboration could well be the embryonic stages of a move towards a circumscription of
absolute sovereign powers. It is argued that the very fact that states are interdependent on
each other for trade and economic development demonstrates that no one state can be
totally independent. Sovereignty has therefore never been absolute, although legally ‘each
sovereign state exercises unlimited territorial jurisdiction in respect of its own territory,
subject only to such limitations as may be established by international customary law,
treaties and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.2
Since the end of World War II, we have been witnessing the second strand of the
evolution of sovereign statehood: the circumscription of absolute sovereign powers. The
emergence of the UN and the increasing use of multilateral treaties have come to abridge
the rights of sovereign powers. The two most prominent ways in which the curtailment
of sovereign powers have developed have been through conventions, particularly human
rights conventions and regional integration such as in Europe. The following discussion
aptly describes the process of change: 
It was in 1948 that the majority of states signed the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, committing themselves to respect over 30 separate rights for individuals. As it
was not a legally binding declaration and contained no enforcement provisions, the
declaration left states’ sovereignty intact, but it was a first step towards tethering them
to international, universal obligations regarding their internal affairs. Over decades,
these human rights would come to enjoy ever stronger legal status. One of the more
robust human rights conventions, one that indeed curtails sovereignty, even if mildly,
through its arbitration mechanisms, is the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, formed in 1950. Roughly contempora-
neous, signed on December 9 1948, was the Genocide Convention, committing
signing states to refrain from and punish genocide. Then in the mid-1960s, two
covenants — the Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights — legally bound most of the world’s states to
respecting the human rights of their people. (Schwarzenberger 1967: 96–7)
Two of the biggest contributing factors eroding the idea of absolute sovereign preroga-
tives of states are globalisation and liberalisation. Globalisation and the rise in the power
and wealth of transnational companies have seen the relative decline, at least in economic
terms, of sovereign states. This raises its own complex set of problems, particularly with
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respect to governance and the control of entities that are not accountable to any partic-
ular state authority. Although this might not be a problem in most Pacific Island states,
already there are indications in some that transnational companies can have an influence
on policies in a way that undermines the legitimacy of the sovereign states.
Sovereignty in the Pacific
If we accept that sovereignty signifies independence and the ability to make decisions and
enforce those decisions, Pacific Island societies have been exercising sovereign powers
from time immemorial. They have been doing so through their own tribal and linguistic
groupings. If this were to be accepted as the form in which sovereignty has been exercised
in the Pacific, this might lead to a better understanding of the complex issues of gover-
nance and the problems that have beset the region in the past few years. For it is true to
say that generally Pacific Islanders do not identify themselves as being from their country
until they are outside it. Even then, they will take time to explain that even though they
are from this or that country, they are from this particular province or the eastern or
southern parts of the country.
Attitudes towards sovereign statehood in the Pacific have been influenced largely by
people’s identity and this is attributable to their tribal affiliation or linguistic grouping.
Thus, for instance, a Tuvaluan from the outer islands has a very different perception of
governance and allegiance than a Tuvaluan from Funafuti. The same could be said of all
the Pacific Islands. The idea of sovereign statehood or the state as being an instrument
through which they align themselves is anathema to their notions of sovereignty.
Sovereignty to them is limited to their own religious, tribal, landholding and language
groups.
The idea of sovereign statehood shared by peoples of different cultural and histor-
ical backgrounds is alien to most Pacific Islanders. Moreover, to a large extent, the shades
of sovereign power that are often exercised by government officials seem to belong to a
different world to the majority of Pacific Islanders, most of whom live lives that are
unaffected by what those government officials do or say. This poses considerable
challenges for nation-building and national identity.
The wider world only recognises sovereign states that are constitutionally estab-
lished. This discussion must therefore be informed by the constitutional trends that have
occurred in the modern Pacific. Samoa was the first country in the Pacific to become
independent, in 1962, and Palau the most recent, in 1994. There is quite a wide variety
in the constitutional structures and forms of the Pacific Island states. They range from an
Island kingdom (Tonga), to constitutional monarchies (Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and
Papua New Guinea) and from freely associated states (Cook Islands, Niue, FSM,
Marshall Islands and Palau) to republican states (Kiribati, Vanuatu, Nauru, Fiji and
Samoa). There are also territories and independence movements in the Pacific that are
vying for their own independent sovereign states. The West Papua movement and the
Republic of Mekamui on Bougainville are just some of the examples of the continuing
trends towards self-determination in the Pacific.
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In many ways, the process of decolonisation continues to be played out in the
Pacific. This is because the superimposition of sovereign government on peoples who have
not been used to living under the influence of an overarching national authority has not
worked as well as originally expected. As discussed, Pacific Islanders still see themselves as
being primarily from their tribal and language groupings. One of the areas in which the
original framers of many of the constitutions in the Pacific Island states have failed, has
been in not acknowledging the importance of customary landholding groups and
resource-owners. (The terms landholding groups and resource-owners are used inter-
changeably in the context of this discussion.) The failure specifically has been in not
taking into account the fact that 80 to 90 per cent of all resources and land come under
customary ownership. There is no traditional concept of state ownership over the majority
of resources in the Pacific Islands. This is the opposite of the situation in developed
countries, where most of the resources and land are state-owned and therefore the state as
an entity has a far greater impact on people’s daily lives than in the Pacific Island states.
In a real sense therefore, the idea that there is some supranational authority
exercising power and responsibilities in a spatial jurisdictional zone is not widely
accepted. Colonial subjugation and even post-colonial governments have failed to exert
any real control over the way in which people control their resources and land. The only
influence they have had is arguably the imposition of law and order, but even then it is
debatable whether governments do in fact exert any real influence over people’s daily lives
and whether any obedience to governments is attributable more to the influence of
churches and traditional chiefs. It is true to say that for most people in the Pacific Island
states their lives revolve around the church and traditional community activities. The
government’s influence and impact on their lives is minimal to almost non-existent. 
The process of decolonisation has reached a stage where Pacific Island states are
questioning the utility and efficacy of the constitutions they were given at independence.
The concentration of power away from the resource-owners has resulted in increased
agitation for the decentralisation of power, control and responsibilities. Various models of
decentralisation have been tried in the Pacific, albeit with little success. One of the
problems with the way in which decentralisation has been planned and implemented is
the assumption that by decentralising power and replicating at the provincial or local
level the system of government applied at the national level, it is possible to localise the
decision-making process. This is not always the case. Decentralisation must involve the
empowerment of resource and landowners in a legal sense — it must involve a process
that formally recognises the power and authority that traditional land and resources have
always held from time immemorial. This is the latest process of decolonisation that is
slowly taking place throughout the Pacific Island states.
Sovereignty and regional cooperation
The Pacific Islands are a grouping of diverse states; and Pacific Island peoples are even
more diverse. The biggest challenge facing the governments of the Pacific Islands is to
unite a very broad and diverse group of peoples. Regional cooperation in the modern
sense has assumed importance only in the past 30 or so years, but Pacific Islanders have
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been cooperating with each other for many centuries. For instance, in many of the larger
islands, the coastal-dwelling people coexisted with the bush people through bartering and
the exchange of food. The coastal people depended on the bush people for taro and other
root crops while the bush people looked to the coastal people to provide them with fish.
During the warring days, alliances were made between families and tribes for protection.
Regional cooperation had a purpose, and Pacific Islanders clearly understood the impor-
tance of strength in numbers. Pacific Islanders not only exchanged goods; they
understood the need to share whatever skills, knowledge and resources they had. Many of
the early missionaries who served in Melanesia came from Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands
and Fiji. They not only taught the Bible, they passed on weaving skills, singing and
dancing. These contacts have served to strengthen the relationships between Pacific
peoples, which are built not with bricks and mortar but in their hearts and souls.
Regional cooperation therefore has had a far longer history in the Pacific Islands
than most people realise. In calling for the establishment of the Pacific Islands Forum to
discuss matters of mutual interest and concern, the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was
merely playing out on a much wider and broader scale the meetings of the great councils
of elders that traditionally gathered to discuss problems affecting their communities. The
forum continues to play its part in fostering the lives of Pacific Islanders in a non-inter-
ventionist, consensus-based way. The problems faced by Pacific Islanders today are,
however, more complex. Not only have the traditional values of Pacific Islanders been
eroded through the introduction of Western lifestyles, food and indoctrination through
the mass media, their resources and bases of sustenance are threatened through exploita-
tion by unscrupulous investors often aided and abetted by corrupt government officials
and politicians. 
Generally, Pacific Island states have traditionally behaved towards each other in a
non-interventionist and non-provocative way, respecting each other’s sovereignty. This is
merely a reflection of their customary practices based on respect for one another, and
abhorrence of criticism of each other. This style of conducting business has probably not
resulted in any significant improvements in the quality of life enjoyed by Pacific
Islanders. While there have been important measurable outcomes as a result of regional
cooperation by Pacific Island states, the majority of Pacific Islanders are still insulated
from the benefits of regional cooperation. This is through no fault of their own, since
state cooperation operates only through state institutions, which are frequently alienated
from the general populace. This raises some serious questions about sovereignty and
governance. For instance, there are serious limits to what governments in the region can
do. They face a lack of financial resources and an adequately equipped and skilled human
resource pool. This suggests that Pacific Island states might not be as sovereign in the
strict sense of the word as they would like to believe. For what is sovereignty when one is
so dependent on others for development? Even though they are legally independent,
most, if not all, of the Pacific Island states are dependent on aid and trade as a means of
survival.
In recent years, there has been a noticeable shift in the behaviour of regional states,
from a non-interventionist, pacifist approach to a more proactive interventionist posture.
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The willingness of the Pacific Island states to intervene in the affairs of fellow Pacific
Forum states in accordance with the principles of the Biketawa Declaration represents a
fundamental shift in policy and perception. It is ironic in that traditionally Pacific
Islanders have invariably been prepared to assist one another, to provide a social support
outlet for each other, but as sovereign states they were shy to exercise the kinds of assis-
tance that they would traditionally give to their kin. The shift in policy represents not
only a fundamental transformation in the attitudes towards the sovereign omni-power of
the state, but a reversion to long-held practices of helping one another. It is no coinci-
dence therefore that the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands was code
named ‘Operation Helpim Friend’, the Pidgin terminology for helping a friend, because
that is essentially what Pacific Islanders and Pacific Island states have been doing for a
long time. It is somewhat of a paradox that for so long since becoming independent,
Pacific Island states have been hung up on principles of international law developed
elsewhere, including, for example, the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of
another country, even when that country is in dire straits. 
Towards a Pacific Community
It is interesting to note how some commentators were quick to point out that the
decision by the forum leaders to develop a Pacific Plan to facilitate ‘deeper and stronger’
cooperation would lead to the evolution of an EU-type Pacific region, with a common
parliament and possibly a common passport. No one is arguing that eventually these
things will not happen, but any assumption that they will automatically follow was
quickly quashed with cautious scepticism by some of the leaders themselves, who
probably see such moves as a threat to their careers! The Pacific is already a community
with shared values and a common heritage linked by the vast Pacific Ocean. The Pacific
separates but also joins the Pacific Island states.
With increasing uncertainty over security and environmental threats, it is more
important than ever that the Pacific Island states strengthen the Pacific community and
become more united. The best illustration of how Pacific Island states have benefited
from regional cooperation is in the management and conservation of the region’s lucra-
tive tuna resource. This resource, which is shared by all the Pacific Island states, is the
envy of vessels from powerful fishing states such as China, the United States and Japan.
Without regional cooperation, these powerful fishing states could very easily play the
Pacific Island states off against each other and thus take away the controls that they
currently exert over the tuna resource. Although there is strength in numbers, it must be
exercised carefully and used in a way that maximises mutual benefits for all the Pacific
Island states and not just some at the expense of others. 
There is also another good reason why the Pacific must move towards a closer
Pacific community and that is because the very viability of some of the Pacific Island
states is being questioned. Niue, for instance, has a population that is dwindling, threat-
ening its viability as a nation-state. Furthermore, Tuvalu and Kiribati face a real danger of
being washed under water as a result of climate change and sea-level rise. In the true
Pacific spirit of assisting each other, the Pacific Island states should help these states,
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which face serious threats to their existence. This would accord with the traditional spirit
of helping each other.
Conclusion
Generally, humans are territorial and loathe to give away what they have enjoyed for a
long time. In a way, the loss of sovereign powers enjoyed by traditional leaders and ceded
to a central government elected through universal suffrage is being played out also at the
regional level. There are increasing moves to bring the Pacific Island states closer together
in a way that circumscribes the absolute sovereign prerogative of states. In some ways, the
Pacific Island states are merely continuing historical trends. In the 17th century, the
different kingdoms in Europe evolved from the Middle Ages to become sovereign states;
by the 1940s, the move towards the circumscription of absolute sovereign powers was set
in train. It is still being played out with multilateral institutions now becoming an
important factor in influencing state policies.
The Pacific has not been immune from these trends with important developments
taking place in the past five years, which have significant implications for their sover-
eignty. The Pacific Islands Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), the Pacific Agreement
on Closer Economic Relations (PACER), the Treaty on Fisheries between the
Governments of certain Pacific Island states and the Government of the United States,
and the Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement (PIASA) are only some of the agreements
in which individual Pacific Island states have ceded some aspects of their sovereignty to
cooperative regional action. As argued in this paper, the notion that there is some limit to
sovereignty is not new to Pacific Islanders. The nationalist argument that this is ‘our
sovereignty’ and therefore no one else can have a say or do anything about it is totally out
of step with international practice.
The major impetus for rethinking sovereignty in the Pacific Islands region,
however, should be the common good and welfare of Pacific Islanders. If rethinking
sovereignty will lead to a better quality of life for them, so be it.
Notes
1 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. USA), Permanent Court of Arbitration 1928,
Sole Arbitrator Huber, 2 R.I.A.A. 829.
2 See George Schwarzenberger, 1967, A Manual of International Law, London: Steven
and Sons. pp. 96–7.
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Part Four
FINDING PACIFIC SOLUTIONS:
SOME PACIFIC VOICES FROM
ACROSS THE GENERATIONS
State, Nation and Community —
Strength Through Cooperation
Sir Mekere Morauta 
IN 1973, WHILE WORKING as an advisor to Papua New Guinea’s Constitutional
Planning Committee, Professor Ted Wolfers described Papua New Guinea as ‘a state in
search of a nation’. State and nation. Those two words still reverberate across the breadth
of the Pacific.
The context is often not a pleasant one: ‘failed state’, ‘troubled state’, ‘chaotic state’,
‘dependent state’, ‘Third World State’, and so on. All of us are aware of the political,
economic, social and environmental struggles that bedevil all corners of Oceania in one
form or another. All of us seek solutions, but it seems to me that our search is limited by
the highly formalised, structured way in which we see ourselves.
Our struggles are dealt with largely in the context of state and nation. Perhaps we
need to think about a new way to regard ourselves, and a new way for the world to regard
us. This publication, Pacific Futures, is therefore timely.
Pacific states are no longer isolated islands. Forces of globalisation are, on the one
hand, threatening the economic survival of islands, and, on the other hand, offering a
range of opportunities that Pacific states could take advantage of to their benefit. As
individual states and nations, we are not in a position to withstand the threats or benefits.
So what do we do?
It seems to me that we need to act as a Pacific community — work with each other,
help each other, especially in trade, in the exchange of information, the sharing of ideas
and in the sharing of institutions. We need to work together to find common solutions
to problems, and together take advantage of opportunities.
Is it not possible for Pacific countries to define clearly the areas where greater
cooperation could be achieved?
Example: apart perhaps from Papua New Guinea and Fiji, there are many fields of
specialised training that individual countries cannot afford to pursue on their own —
engineering, aviation, maritime, medical, dentistry, allied health disciplines such as
physiotherapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, sports medicine, and so on. 
We should therefore work together to establish regional institutions for such
training, or at least institutions to which all Pacific countries have access, and whose
training is given accreditation by all Pacific countries.
Such a concept could be supported by Australian and New Zealand aid programmes.
Australia and New Zealand should ensure that they do not fund institutions that dupli-
cate each other, but instead greater economies of scale could be achieved by focusing on
one or two regional institutions in a particular discipline.
Similarly, I see a role for the Pacific Islands Forum in conceiving, coordinating and
promoting areas for cooperation.
It is only by working together that Pacific Island states will collectively strengthen as
a region and successfully face the threats of globalisation and environmental degradation,
as well as benefit from the opportunities of greater access to the wider world.
State, nation, community: the search continues.
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Responding to Contemporary
Forces Transforming the Pacific
Judge Tuiloma Neroni Slade 
DEFENDING OUR HOME is the defining challenge for the Pacific. We inhabit vast
areas of the world’s largest ocean. We have rights, but also responsibilities. Once
bountiful, the Pacific Ocean, like many others, is under severe environmental stress. We
need to work for its protection and for the conservation of its resources. It is salutary, and
timely, that we have agreed on a Pacific Islands Regional Oceans Policy for integrated
policies and to set clear targets. 
In the past 30 years or so, Pacific states have been second to none in their efforts to
develop and settle international rules for the order and governance of the world’s oceans
and seas. The Pacific contribution1 is widespread and internationally acknowledged.
Today, some of our finest diplomatic and legal talents are at the forefront of the impor-
tant work of the International Seabed Authority and the development of management
rules for tuna stocks in the western and central Pacific.2
The ocean must remain a special challenge, in part because of the extraordinary
opportunities that will come with scientific advancements and the potential for commer-
cial use of ocean-floor minerals and possible new energy sources. It would be an advantage
if countries of the region and their institutions of learning, and entrepreneurs, were as
advanced in their engagement and preparations in anticipation of such developments.
Pacific states must be as resourceful and innovative on ocean-resource issues as they
have been on serving the sea-transportation needs of the region. Almost against the odds,
the experience of the Pacific Forum Line has been a resounding success. That would not
have been possible without political vision and leadership. One clear lesson from that
experience was that beyond a certain point in the involvement of public servants, such a
specialised commercial venture needed to be in the hands of the professionals. It is a
lesson well worth remembering for the future.
On matters of security, Pacific states have been solidly united by their declarations3
and persistent in their efforts, before the International Court of Justice4 and elsewhere, to
keep the region nuclear-free. They have continued to develop substantive positions in the
context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the notion of a nuclear-free southern
hemisphere. Pacific states acting in common, by their choice of issues and the quality of
their advocacy, command considerable attention and impact at the international level. It
is capital of the highest value in the exercise of our multilateral strategies.
Other major challenges mount within our Pacific home environment. Climate
change is a particular concern because of its already evident consequences and multifac-
eted impact on sustainable development efforts, and more particularly for the difficulty
in finding international agreement on the required responses. In the international debate,
the smaller island states have helped to focus attention on issues of vulnerability and
cultural and ethical dimensions. It is important that they be supported. It is important
also to own up to the fact that all countries, large and small, developed and developing,
contribute to the global causes of climate change. All countries should now take steps, no
matter how small, towards long-term solutions. 
Today, Pacific communities and their economies and social values are also being
challenged by ever more serious and particularly insidious criminal activity in the form
trafficking in humans and drugs, the trade in small arms and global terrorism. The
oceanic vastness of the region makes the task of policing and securing the borders almost
impossible.
Finding solutions — never easy for so diverse a region — is a challenge in itself
given the array of competing and complicated issues. There is no shortage of ideas; no
lack in fine words and declarations. What is needed, as Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-
General, has so often said, is better understanding of how to translate principle into
practice, how to make institutions (all of us) and instruments (like the Pacific Plan) work
or to work more effectively.
The improvement of capacities and of health standards will stand always as a first
priority, for it is impossible to develop a nation without a healthy and well-trained
population. We know of the ‘poverty of opportunity’5 that exists in our region, especially
among youth and women. The Pacific Plan approved by the Pacific Islands Forum in
Apia in August 2004 draws attention to this. We want to be sure that solutions are geared
to needs and priorities, and that practical and prompt action is taken. We must avoid the
alarming discrepancy that so often lies between commitment and action. 
Solutions will not always be within the capacity of individual states, especially given
the complex and transnational character of major problems. But allowing for the all too
tempting prospect of solutions from elsewhere is a danger in itself. More often than not,
the true power of correction lies within states.
There cannot be any illusion about the enormity of the challenges confronting the
Pacific. This publication highlights major concerns. Many of those addressed in early
chapters are long-standing and among the basic issues raised in the independence consti-
tutions. They would be best left to the traditional and constitutional arrangements of
each community. That they remain current concerns speaks to their fundamental impor-
tance to communities and the difficulties of finding solutions. Other issues addressed are
as complex, if not more so, for the problems are conditioned by contemporary forces,
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which are today transforming our modern world, and the Pacific, as never before.
Together they present a most formidable set of challenges for individual states and for the
region as a whole. 
But the Pacific is not a stranger to challenges. It is at its best when its communities
act together. The forum exists to rally the regional instinct, what has become known as
the ‘Pacific Way’. Much has been tackled and much achieved, but a great deal more for
the improvement of the human condition and human rights needs to be done. The insti-
tutions for regional interaction and cooperation are in place. Each, including the forum
itself, requires continuing reform and strengthening. It is submitted that by any standard
Pacific states can claim credentials of the highest order for their endeavours in regional
cooperation and for supporting each other. 
Having a strong and effective state, accountable under the rule of law, is the first
requirement of democracy and development. It is the political ambition of people all over
the world. This was the pledge of the Millennium Declaration endorsed by all Pacific
states. It is a requirement that lies at the heart of the ‘way forward’ under the Pacific Plan.
It is essential to have the law on our side. The rule of law in the affairs and conduct of
states is of paramount importance to the countries of the Pacific. Fundamentally, it is the
force that motivates our endeavours regionally and internationally. The weak and the
small have a larger stake in the rule of law than do the strong and powerful. Ultimately,
for Pacific states, the law is the most effective protection. 
Notes
1 To, among others, the negotiations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982; in the establishment of the Forum Fisheries Agency in 1984; the UN
Agreement relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Species, 1995; the development of FAO standards on compli-
ance in high-seas fisheries and other related practices; and the UN Informal
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea.
2 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 2000.
3 The Pacific was declared a nuclear-free zone under the South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty, signed in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, in 1985.
4 See, for example, Roger S. Clark and Madeleine Sann (eds). 1996. The Case Against
the Bomb. Camden.
5 Pacific Human Development Report 1999.
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Towards a Pacific Community
Rt Rev. Jabez Bryce
THE PACIFIC CHURCHES came together for the first time in Samoa in 1961. The
Pacific Conference of Churches was constituted in 1966 to coordinate the churches’
witness as a community in the Pacific region. Now many of these churches have become
autonomous bodies, independent of their former mission boards and parent churches.
Leadership in the churches in the region is in the hands of indigenous people of the
Pacific Islands. Lay people who hold leadership roles in the churches were and are the
same folk who are decision-makers in their respective governments and societies. As a
body, the church still has an influence in Pacific societies and its capacity to have a
bearing on the lives of people in urban and rural areas is still considerable.
My personal thoughts about, hopes and fears for the region’s future stem from my
experience and involvement in ecumenical engagements in the Pacific Conference of
Churches.
First, I believe the churches need to be relevant in order to make their influence in
society meaningful. It is no longer adequate to cling to traditional church structures and
ways of worship if they are not relevant to the worshipping community and the everyday
challenges facing society. To prepare Pacific Islanders for the future, the church needs to
train and equip its clergy, and laity, to be well informed about issues — social, economic,
political, judicial, etc. — that affect them. The coups in Fiji, the civil unrest in the
Solomons, the upheavals in Bougainville, the rumblings in Tonga, New Caledonia and
Tahiti, the economic problems in Nauru, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the region —
these are concerns that the churches need to address together with the various island
governments. Churches need to be well equipped to give quality and intelligent biblical
and theological advice and direction and not simply preach on moral and ethical
grounds.
This calls for a revisiting of training in theological institutions so that they are
relevant for today’s developments. Globalisation, technology, youth culture, human
sexuality and terrorism, to name only a few, are realities of life today. The churches need
to be up and running with society in finding solutions to living within the tension of
some of the challenges brought about by these realities.
Secondly, churches in the Pacific have great influence not only in the decision-
making processes in urban areas but further afield. The church is the one institution that
touches the grassroots people in rural communities on a day-to-day basis. It is therefore
vital for the future of a Pacific community to encourage the church to examine its role.
While the church’s role of providing spiritual direction remains its most vital task, there
needs to be more encouragement to engage in everyday human encounters. The stress
and pressures of everyday life in the 21st century demand new approaches and coping
mechanisms that can guide and assist people. Many Pacific Islanders still look to the
church to provide direction that is relevant and meaningful to what is going on around
them. Churches have to understand present trends and evaluate the sociopolitical
changes that are happening in the region. They need to develop a critical sense of what is
right and what is wrong for their people. They need to be relevant and have a vision of
their goals and objectives in this life and not just faith for the life to come. They can start
now by making issues of justice, peace and integrity of creation just as important as the
energy and time devoted to worship, teaching from the Bible and moral and ethical
issues.
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The Future for the North Pacific
Robert A. Underwood
THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS north of the equator is shaped by the area’s contin-
uing strategic utility. Being close to potential conflicts in Asia that could pit millions of
people against each other and knowing that the results of that conflict will reshape the
entire Pacific, forces Pacific Islanders in the North Pacific to take a sobering and realistic
view of security and the prospects for a peaceful Pacific.
We could see this in two ways. Acting as a kind of buffer zone, North Pacific
Islanders are doing their part to keep international conflict out of the South Pacific. This
has historically been the case. Even in World War II, the action north of the equator was
of greater consequence to the prosecution of the overall effort against Japan than the
battles in the South Pacific.
From a peace activist point of view, the words ‘Pacific’ and ‘pacifist’ could not be
more distant from each other than they are in Micronesia. Continuing missile testing in
Kwajalein, a $10 billion military infrastructure in Guam, Ulithi as the site of pre-
positioned ships and the participation of the freely associated states in the US’ Coalition
of the Willing in the war in Iraq all point to vigorous participation in security matters for
Micronesians.
The lesson of strategic value for the North Pacific is that great powers will continue
to behave as great powers have in the past. When their interests are at stake, they act and
small islands can do very little in response other than to take advantage of their strategic
value for internal, domestic purposes. US economic assistance in exchange for political
support by the independent countries (FSM, Palau and the Marshall Islands) and
economic activity sparked by military presence for the territories (Guam and the CNMI)
comprise the current political-economic field of play for North Pacific Islanders.
The poor man’s counterpart to this is the attempt by some South Pacific Island
nations to lay claim to an anti-terrorism agenda in order to secure some forms of assis-
tance from larger nations. This is an agenda driven by the United States and, in a similar
way to Micronesians, although far less lucratively, the South Pacific Islands are trying to
take advantage of the concerns of larger nations to benefit local priorities.
For those who do not wish to become part of agendas driven by powerful nations in
the world, the only strategy is to behave like a Pacific lobster. These lobsters have no
natural defences and no bite in the form of claws. They hope that if they lie still, they will
blend in with their surroundings and their predators will just move on and pick some
other lobster. This approach has historically kept some of the South Pacific states out of
the clutches of the world powers, but all of the North Pacific has been scooped up at one
time or another.
In this environment, the emergence of regional organisations such as the Pacific
Islands Forum can fall prey to larger agendas. As a kind of union of Pacific lobsters, there
might be little collective bite since none of the delectable creatures have any claws. But
most continue to hope that regional awareness, identity and dialogue can lead to
something more substantial and unique. 
The chances of setting a unique agenda that is entirely divorced from the concerns
of larger powers are minimal. But there is nothing to keep the entire Pacific region from
developing a common agenda that will highlight more regional and domestic concerns.
This will take special effort and understanding from fellow Islanders south of the
equator. The American-affiliated portion of Micronesia is comprised of two domestic
territories and three freely associated states. They are part of their own networks in
Micronesia and through various programmes managed by the US bureaucracy.
Additionally, there is nothing to indicate that the United States is favourably disposed to
regionalism independent of its influence.
Cultivating a regional identity, let alone developing a common agenda, is beset with
difficulties. But with special understanding and continuing dialogue through the Pacific
Islands Forum and the Pacific community, the contacts will increase. The Pacific Islands
Forum should establish observer status for territories and facilitate the participation of
those territories. Regional activities should always include North Pacific participation
even if it is sometimes minimal.
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Embracing a Culture of 
Human Rights in the Pacific
Gina Houng Lee 
IN THE MIDST of post-conflict reconstruction, in the midst of increasing poverty,
against the backdrop of environmental problems and in the arena of increasing urbanisa-
tion, what can we in the Pacific hope for?
In my 10 years’ experience working in the area of women’s human rights, I became
convinced that our focus has to be with the people — and the people I’ve worked with
have given me inspiration and the strength to continue working in this area and to stay in
the Pacific, while many other Pacific Islanders migrate to New Zealand and Australia.
I also remember the advice of a close friend of mine who challenged my thinking and my
work when she said, ‘Being in a position of privilege gives us even greater responsibility
to work for those who are not.’ 
My first hope is to build a culture of human rights that is integrated into everything
we do. The second is that Pacific people will invest sufficiently in their home countries
and communities. 
Let me start with human rights and culture. Most of our human rights are
protected under our Bills of Rights in Pacific Island constitutions. Fiji is the only Pacific
Island country to have a national Human Rights Commission. But how do we make
human rights a reality? How do we translate the ideals and rights from our constitutions
into our everyday lives? 
We start with small changes; we start with everyday challenges. Our first weapon is
education: education that allows us to think for ourselves but also to think with our culture
as the foundation. My experience of our education system was one based on respect for
teachers, that the teacher was always right. Enforced respect for authority can be a good
thing, but it can also hamper creative thinking because it does not encourage us to
challenge established ideas. More inquiring and creative thinking needs to be encouraged.
Part of my core work has involved working with legal rights training officers and
community paralegals to advocate for change — whether helping a woman obtain
maintenance for her children, helping a community group obtain access to clean
drinking water, or challenging the government to be more accountable and transparent
— all this within a rights-based framework. The work of such people is unrecognised and
its long-term impact is hard to measure. But in my meetings with men and women from
the Pacific, I feel personally empowered by community action and the work being done
in pursuit of a common good, searching for justice and for change that matters.
Community human rights workers are constantly challenged. Inevitably, they make
leaders and our Pacific community uncomfortable. And, in making people uncomfort-
able, they can be subjected to social ostracisation. But no human rights work is
comfortable. Many non-governmental organisations face the challenge and are seen as
troublemakers, as a nuisance by government. One of the key challenges is delivering the
human rights principles of equality, non-discrimination and freedom against a backdrop
of conservative Pacific Island cultures. 
For example, when calling for changes to allow women to participate in village
meetings, a common response is that men should make all the decisions, that that is our
culture. But human rights educators have to challenge the myth that culture is static.
They have to argue that culture and custom are influenced by social, political and
economic changes. Indeed, in the Pacific, even in some of the remotest areas, there is
access to the Internet. Access to print and regional and global news constantly influences
our thinking. A way of working around this is to work with the main community leaders
such as church leaders. This can be an advantage, because our communities are so small,
and everyone is related or connected somehow. I am always impressed with the way
social networks, links and connections are used successfully by human rights workers
seeking solutions to community issues. 
There is often fear that change will bring about disharmony and disunity. But
a human rights approach asks us to look at our culture and customs to see if things are
unfair and unjust and how we can make changes that will ensure everyone benefits —
and that people within our communities are not being denied their rights.
The dream is to forge a human rights culture that embraces our own cultures but
also allows us to question cultural practices that might deny rights; that comes from the
heart but is practised in the law; that focuses on the essence of the ideals of the Pacific but
can translate into people enjoying fundamental rights.
My second hope is with Pacific people and the challenges to their everyday lives.
It rests with people who have travelled and been educated locally or abroad but who return
to their roots with a commitment to work with communities in their home countries. 
A close friend of mine, a former finance manager, worked in an executive position
in a corporate firm. She inspires me. After many years of working her way up the corpo-
rate ladder, she made a change to go back to her husband’s village and her own village in
their home island to start a coconut-oil exporting industry. Her concern was the lack of
opportunities in their respective villages. Her drive was the need to help her own people
through working the land. She firmly believes that those who have an advantage must go
back to the villages or the communities they come from and help work with the people.
This is the future of the Pacific. 
The Pacific voice must be heard — we have to let it be heard if we want change.
Human rights can liberate and empower, ensuring that people make decisions because
they are informed and not because they have to listen and obey. 
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There is Hope for the Future
Transform Aqorau
AS I DROVE TO WORK on Thursday 11 November 2004, hundreds of schoolchildren
were lined up outside the Lawson Tama Stadium, ready to march to the beat of the Royal
Solomon Islands Police Force Band. To celebrate International Children’s Day, the
children were marching to Town Ground, where they would be met by a government
minister who would give the usual speech about how government gives priority to
children. I could not help wondering about the future of these children. Only the day
before, the local newspaper, the Solomon Star, had published a two-page story about a
$SI70 million grant from the Government of Taiwan, which listed the grant’s benefici-
aries, into whose accounts the money had been paid. In addition to a few government
ministries, most of the beneficiaries were politicians. What hope is there then for today’s
schoolchildren, who marched to honour International Children’s Day, if political leaders
are interested only in helping themselves? In an interesting twist, the Prime Minister of
Solomon Islands issued a stinging attack against the editor of the Solomon Star in the 11
November 2004 edition of the Star, accusing the editor of mounting a campaign to oust
him from office. It is even more worrying when political leaders talk about transparency
and accountability but pay only lip service to it in practice.
The behaviour of our political leaders often reduces people to despair, but I would
argue that we can all build a better future for ourselves. Where better to start than with
the schoolchildren who marched on that November morning? It is said that we are only
borrowing today from our children, so why can’t we involve those whose future we have
borrowed to help build that future today? The youth of today should by now realise that
if current political leaders are not going to establish a secure future for them, they should
take the initiative to map out their future. Politicians do not have a monopoly on creative
ideas and vision. 
In May 2004, I was asked by a group of Solomon Islands students at the University
of the South Pacific to address them at their Tokstori Friday Discussion Group. The
turnout was rather small considering the large Solomon Islands student population at the
university. Nonetheless, I was keen to share a message of hope. A few days earlier, a
Solomon Islands student journalist had asked me what I thought about the number of
university graduates who could not find paid employment in Solomon Islands. My
message was that graduates had to get away from the mindset that the only place where
they could fully make use of their skills and qualifications was in the formal sector. The
biggest challenge facing the Pacific Islands is harnessing the informal sector, where the
majority of Pacific Islanders earn their living. There is no reason therefore for graduates
not to work with rural people, sharing ideas with them, explaining how government
works so that they cannot be easily fooled by politicians. In other words, if we want a
happy and bright future for ourselves and our children, we must strive to take action
without waiting for politicians to do things. Too often, one hears the comment that the
government should fix this, or do that, or build this, etcetera. We have to move away
from a dependency mentality. We cannot do so, however, unless we realise that no one
else will give us the kind of future that we crave and strive for.
The future I would like to see is one in which there is a 100 per cent literacy level. I
want to see universal primary and secondary education for everyone — boys and girls,
men and women — and even adult education offered so that there is a continuous flow
of information, imparting knowledge and skills. Education is the key to ensuring that we
have a high level of skills and expertise to attract the kind of investment that is not
exploitative, such as logging, but which is dependent on high skill levels, such as the
manufacturing of computers and putting together cars. A highly skilled and knowledge-
able population will be able to attract high-technology investment. 
I want to see a future in which resource and landowners are empowered so that they
can utilise the rights that they have to their resources in ways that can improve the
quality of their social and economic wellbeing. Most of the natural resources in the
Pacific Islands are subject to customary ownership but somehow translating those rights
to generating wealth that can improve living standards has been elusive. This is because
Pacific Island states have pursued economic development models that alienate rather
than enjoin the resource and landowners in development. The lessons that have been
learnt in Bougainville and Solomon Islands are very important for the Pacific Islands.
These conflicts have informed us that we would isolate resource and landowners from
development at our peril.
I want to see a future in which a certain proportion of members of parliament are
women and youth. They are such an integral part of society that it is almost ridiculous
that they have been marginalised in the decision-making processes in most of the Pacific
Island states. I want to see a future in which political leaders are held accountable for
their actions and are truly representative of the electorate. This means that what they do
reflects what their constituency desires. This will have implications for the way the
business of parliament is conducted. It must be done in a more transparent and open
way.
It is not at all difficult for the Pacific Island states to establish a bright future for
themselves. First of all, we must have a vision, a goal, that in 20 to 50 years, we want to
be able to live to a certain standard of living; that by that time we will have a well-
educated population, with 100 per cent literacy levels, with access to clean, safe drinking
water, where food security is ensured through sustainable farming and fishing practices,
Pacific Futures238
and where the population is healthy. Without this vision, there is nothing to work
towards, there is no hope. I am hopeful, because there is no hopeless situation, just
people who have become hopeless. There is a saying that problems are just opportunities;
opportunities to resolve them. As we stand at the beginning of the 21st century, we have
an opportunity to do things differently, to learn from the mistakes of the past, and to
chart a course for a bright and hopeful future.
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